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PREFACE
How many really suffer as a result of labor market problems? This is one of the most critical 
yet contentious social policy questions. In many ways, our social statistics exaggerate the 
degree ofJKardship. Unemployment does not have the same dire consequences today as it did 
in the 1930s when most of the unemployed were primary breadwinners, when income and 
earnings were usually much closer to the margin of subsistence, and when there was no safety 
net for those failing in the labor market. Increasing affluence, the rise of multiple earner 
families, the growing predominance of secondary earners among the unemployed, and im 
proved social welfare protections, have unquestionably mitigated the welfare consequences of 
joblessness. Earnings and income data also overstate the dimensions of hardship. Among the 
millions with hourly earnings at or below the minimum wage level, the overwhelming majori 
ty are from multiple-earner, relatively affluent families. Most of those counted by the poverty 
statistics are elderly, handicapped or have family responsibilities which keep them out of the 
labor force, so the poverty statistics are by no means an accurate indicator of labor market 
pathologies.
Yet there are also many ways our social statistics underestimate the degree of labor market- 
related hardship. The unemployment counts exclude the millions of fully employed workers 
whose wages are so low that their families remain in poverty. Low wages and repeated or pro 
longed unemployment frequently interact to undermine the capacity for self-support. Since 
the number experiencing joblessness at some point during the year is several times the 
number unemployed in any month, those who suffer as a result of forced idleness can equal 
or exceed average annual unemployment, even though only a minority of the jobless in any 
month really suffer. For every person counted in the monthly unemployment tallies, there is 
another working part-time because of the inability to find full-time work, or else outside the 
labor force but wanting a job. Finally, income transfers in our country have always focused 
on the elderly, disabled and dependent, neglecting the needs of the working poor, so that the 
dramatic expansion of cash and in-kind transfers does not necessarily mean that those failing 
in the labor market are adequately protected.
Mountains of facts, figures and learned treatises have been marshalled to prove that the 
truly needy are few and far between. An equally imposing volume of contradicting evidence 
documents uncounted and unmet basic needs. The result is confusion. It is uncertain and bit 
terly disputed whether those suffering seriously as a result of labor market problems number 
in the hundreds of thousands or the tens of millions, and, hence, whether high levels of 
joblessness can be easily tolerated or must be countered by job creation and economic 
stimulus, whether the safety net needs dismantling or strengthening, and whether the long- 
term hardship trends justify a "laissez faire" response or demand fundamental restructuring 
of labor markets and the income distribution system. There is only one area of agreement in 
this debate—that the existing poverty, employment and earnings statistics are inadequate for 
one of their primary applications, measuring the welfare consequences of labor market prob 
lems.
This book presents a set of new measures developed to determine who really suffers as a 
result of joblessness, low earnings and involuntary part-time employment. Available employ 
ment, earnings and poverty data are structured into an array of core indicators which incor 
porate alternative need and workforce attachment standards, which assess the severity of 
problems, as well as the numbers affected, which consider earnings from both an individual
and family perspective, as well as considering earnings supplements including in-kind aid. 
The aggregate measures, in turn, are disaggregated to identify the relative hardship burdens 
for different population segments and geographic areas.
These measures are, then, used to reassess long-term and cyclical labor market 
developmentsTTKe changing status of minorifres, tHe^ interrelationships between"family pat 
terns^ and employjmLent_problems, the effectiveness of income transfers^or the working poor, 
alternative macroeconomic_£olicies and ahost of other issues. The dual aim ofThese apptTca- 
tions is to demonstrate the utility~and reliability of the new measures, while providing needed 
perspective on employment problems and policies.
The aim was not just to develop and gain acceptance for a new statistical indicator, but to 
design a comprehensive system for measuring and analyzing the y elf are consequences of 
labor market problems. The hardship measures were intended as a "third leg" in our social 
statistics system, supplementing poverty and unemployment data and providing alternative 
perspectives on the major issues which have been analyzed using poverty and unemployment 
as proxies for labor market-related hardship. This ambitious undertaking was based on the 
assumption that in order to fully address earlier critiques of hardship measures, to cope with 
the inherently complex issues, to validate the internal consistency of the data and to 
demonstrate their varied uses, it was necessary to provide detailed information and com 
prehensive analysis. Tradeoffs were anticipated, though underestimated. The chances for er 
ror and its discovery, the difficulties of definitional refinement, tabulation and analysis, as 
well as the problems of comprehensible presentation, multiplied with each disaggregation 
and application. In retrospect, the ambitiousness of the effort was naive, somewhat Faustian 
and probably misplaced. I can only hope that in struggling through the mind-numbing 
statistics and terminology, or in weighing the inevitable shortcomings and mistakes, the 
reader will give some credit for my having "dared to fail greatly," as well as for my intellectual 
persistence, if not perspicacity.
This work is a reflectior^ofjilteer^ with Sar Levitan. Dr. Levitan was 
one of the first to recognize the need to integrate income and employment statistics. He was 
among the initial developers and advocates of hardship measures. As Chairman of the Na 
tional Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, he worked long and hard 
to gain consensus for the adoption of hardship indicators. Sar supervised and supported the 
work on this volume, encouraging greater simplicity and succinctness. He should not be 
blamed because I ignored this sage advice.
The Bureau of the Census tabulated the hardship measures under contract from Dr. 
Levitan's Center for Social Policy Studies at The George Washington University and MDC 
Incorporated. The Census Bureau is not responsible for any definitional errors, and it does 
not necessarily endorse nor approve the measurement concepts. However, without the hard 
work, expertise and good will of its technicians, this book would not have been possible. In 
particular, I would like to recognize the contributions of Gregory Russell who helped refine 
and validate the measures, as well as supervising their tabulation.
This study was made possible by grants from the Charles Stewart Mott, Edna McConnell 
Clark and Ford Foundations. It was only completed because Nancy Kiefer and Cathy 
Glasgow kept working to the last minute before entering the counts of the unemployed and 
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CHAPTER 1. MEASURING WHAT MATTERS
The Consequences of Labor Market Problems
The well-being of most individuals and families is determined pri 
marily by their success in the labor market. Since earnings account for 
three-fourths of total personal income, the unavailability or intermittency 
of employment, restricted hours of weekly work, or low wages are a major 
cause of economic hardship. I/
A substantial share of work force participants encounters such 
problems. During 1980, for instance, 21.4 million workers aged 16 and over 
experienced at least a week of joblessness. Another 7.6 million worked 
part-time involuntarily at least a week. There were an additional 7.3 
million full-time and 9.1 million voluntary part-time workers who earned 
less than the minimum wage equivalent for the cumulative hours they were 
willing and able to work. Together, these groups with employment and 
earnings problems accounted for nearly two-fifths of the 118.3 million who 
participated in the 1980 work force.
Not all of these individuals suffered seriously as a result of their 
own employment and earnings problems. Some were secondary earners in 
affluent families or had other sources of income. Others had reduced, but 
still adequate, earnings. But for all too many, the failures in the labor 
market resulted in severe distress. Fifteen million work force partici 
pants resided in families with earnings below the poverty level and 8.4 
million in poor families.
Our present system of labor force concepts and statistics was de 
veloped during the 1930s because of, and in order to measure, the suffering 
which resulted from the massive unemployment of the Great Depression. In 
the absence of extensive income transfer programs, with the work force 
composed primarily of breadwinners, and with a large share of the 1930s 
working population concentrated near the margin of subsistence, unemploy 
ment and hardship were synonymous. But the expansion of social welfare 
protections, the increasing affluence of the population, and the rise of 
multiple earner families, subsequently reduced the correspondence between 
joblessness and deprivation.
While extensive information has been gathered for many years on the 
hourly and weekly wages of American workers, these earnings data have 
received far less attention than the unemployment counts. It is usually 
assumed that family heads and primary breadwinners can achieve subsistence 
earnings if they can find jobs, hence employment has traditionally been 
considered the key factor affecting well-being. Most of the low-wage 
workers are new entrants to the labor force and secondary family earners.
Poverty concepts and statistics were developed in the 1960s to measure 
the dimensions of deprivation. The poverty definition and counts include 
both persons with labor market-related problems and those unable to work 
because of age, disability, family responsibilities or other barriers. 
Poverty is, thus, determined as much, or more, by the adequacy of transfers 
and private pensions and the demography of the population as by labor 
market conditions.
Over the years, the unemployment, earnings and poverty statistics have 
been disaggregated in ever finer detail in order to identify those among 
the unemployed who really suffer as a result of joblessness, those whose 
low earnings result in low income, and those whose poverty is caused 
primarily by labor market problems or could be cured by labor market 
interventions. But it is extremely difficult to piece together these 
separate items of detailed information in order to determine how many and 
who really suffer as a result of labor market problems. In the absence of 
simple and accepted statistical indicators which link employment and 
earnings data with measures of well-being, the unemployment and poverty 
rates tend to predominate in public policy formulation, planning, resource 
allocation and analysis, as proxies for the hardship resulting from the 
fallings of or failures in the labor market. Unfortunately, these measures 
do not serve these purposes well.
Unemployment does not always result in deprivation, nor does employ 
ment guarantee well-being. Poverty is in many cases unrelated to labor 
market problems. Low wages are not usually associated with low family in 
come.
t Less than a fifth of the individuals who experienced unemployment 
during 1980 lived in poor families. On the other hand, over a million 
persons were employed full-year, full-time the usual standard of success 
in the labor market--yet they and their families still lived in poverty.
t Nearly half of the individuals with hourly earnings at or below 
the minimum wage lived in families with incomes above $15,000 annually, and 
nearly two-thirds were in families with incomes above $10,000 annually.
t Three-fifths of all poor persons 14 and over did not work at all 
during 1980 because of illness or disability, school, housekeeping, retire 
ment, or other reasons unrelated to job availability.
Unemployment rates, wage data or aggregate poverty counts alone yield 
a distorted picture of fluctuations and long-term trends in labor market- 
related economic hardship.
t The number and proportion of labor force participants with inade 
quate annual earnings fluctuate less from year to year than the number and 
proportion who experience unemployment. Hardship is a chronic structural 
problem, exacerbated by recessions and depressions, alleviated by re 
coveries, but far less cyclical than joblessness.
  There has been very little improvement in the relative status of 
blacks as judged by unemployment and poverty rates. In contrast, there has 
been absolute and relative progress in alleviating labor market-related 
hardship, largely because of improvements in earnings rates.
  At the beginning of the 1960s, two-thirds of poor family heads 
worked, and a third worked full-time, full-year. Two decades later, less 
than half worked at all, and only 16 percent full-time, full-year. In 
other words, a declining portion of economic hardship (as measured by the 
poverty counts) is labor market-related.
Policies designed to alleviate labor market-related hardship may be 
misdirected to the extent they are based on poverty, unemployment, or wage data alone.—————————
t Where unemployment rates are used to distribute employment and 
training resources, large metropolitan areas and particularly their suburbs 
receive a far larger share than if hardship measures were used. The 
volatility of unemployment rates also leads to significant year-to-year 
fluctuations in local funding, with adverse programmatic consequences, even 
though the underlying structural problems to which interventions are 
addressed remain relatively stable. On the other hand, the use of poverty 
rates for allocation tends to divert resources to areas whose problems may 
not be labor market-related or amenable to such interventions.
t Local or national employment and training policies which target 
resources to population subgroups based on their relative unemployment 
rather than hardship rates divert scare resources to solving temporary 
problems with less serious consequences; conversely, targeting on the basis 
of poverty diverts resources to individuals and areas whose problems cannot 
necessary be solved by employment-oriented interventions.
  Across-the-board increases in the minimum wage have a modest 
impact on alleviating poverty, and a substantial portion of the benefits 
are realized by workers in affluent families. Wage data alone suggest only 
the gains which are realized by minimum wage increases, while hardship 
measures capture the disemployment effects which may, in part, offset the 
positive earnings impacts of minimum wage increases.
As these examples suggest, the currently available poverty, employment 
and earnings statistics are inadequate for one of their primary applica 
tions measuring the welfare consequences of labor market problems. 
Without a conceptual and measurement framework which links income, em 
ployment and earnings information, and without accepted indicators de 
veloped specifically to measure labor market-related hardship, it is 
difficult to determine who needs help most, why, or how it can best be 
provided. As a result, our understanding is frequently clouded and our 
policies misdirected.
Because of these shortcomings, there is increasing recognition of the 
need for a measure or set of measures which considers employment and earn 
ings problems in light of the economic hardship which results. A variety 
of hardship indicators have, in fact, been developed from available labor 
market and income statistics, demonstrating the conceptual promise of such 
measures in providing a better understanding of secular and cyclical 
trends, income transfer and minimum wage issues, and the relative severity 
of need for subareas and subgroups in the economy.
However, this analytical work has also suggested the significant 
definitional, measurement and interpretative problems implicit in hardship 
measures. There are normative issues inherent in defining any labor market 
status or income-based needs statistics, such as agreeing on the severity 
standards and deciding who will and will not be counted relative to these 
standards. Because hardship measures link poverty, earnings and employment 
concepts, the issues inherent in each of these separate measurement systems 
must be addressed. There are conceptual issues which are inherent in 
seeking to link individual earnings with family or household well-being, 
since family composition and income other than earnings are affected, but 
not determined, by labor market factors. There are measurement issues and 
uncertainties which result from shortcomings in existing data bases. Then, 
there are interpretative issues related to all of these definitional, 
conceptual and measurement questions.
Because of these problems, no set of hardship measures or applications 
has gained wide acceptance. Yet taken together, previous work has provided 
the foundation for an acceptable and extremely useful hardship measurement 
system. It is now possible to derive a set of composite measures that 
strikes an appropriate normative balance, which overcomes many conceptual 
problems and provides the information for better understanding the un- 
resolvable issues. The composite measures cannot escape the underlying 
shortcomings in income and labor force statistics, but the needed improve 
ments and their implications can be clearly identified. Based on previous 
work, it is also possible to dramatically expand the information yield and 
improve the policy relevance of hardship measures so that they can be 
institutionalized as a "third leg" in our system of social welfare indi 
cators, supplementing employment and earnings statistics and the poverty 
measures.
This volume reviews the evolution of hardship measures as well as the 
underlying normative, conceptual, measurement and interpretative issues. 
It proposes a modified set of measures and suggests how these will overcome 
many of the problems in previous hardship indicators. The measures are 
calculated from existing labor market and income statistics covering 1974 
through 1980. The hardship data are presented and analyzed in detail. The 
policy implications of the measures, the possible improvements, and the 
remaining issues are, then, discussed.
The Evolution of Hardship Measures
A Summary of Earlier Efforts
The hardship concept was first included in a 1967 Report on Employment 
and Unemployment in Urban Slums and Ghettos prepared by then Secretary of 
Labor W. Willard Wirtz. 2/ The measure, which was applied to data from a 
special survey of ten ghetto areas in eight major cities, included the 
following:
1. All persons unemployed in the survey week;
2. Individuals employed on a part-time basis but seeking full-time 
work;
3. Family heads with full-time jobs earning less than $60 weekly 
(the weekly wage needed to lift a family of four above the poverty thresh 
old) and unrelated individuals under age 65 earning less than $56 weekly in 
full-time jobs (the minimum wage times 40 hours of weekly work);
4. Half of all males age 20 through 64 who were not in the labor 
force--an estimate of the number who would be active jobseekers if more and 
better paying jobs were available; and
5. Half the difference between the measured female and male adult 
populations an adjustment for the undercount of males.
Another approach was developed in the 1968 Manpower Report of the 
President using Current Population Survey annual work experience data 
gathered each March covering the previous calendar year. 3/ This measure 
included all persons working full-time, full-year but earning less than 
$3,000 annually, and all persons unemployed 15 or more weeks during the 
year.
In 1970, William Spring, Bennett Harrison and Thomas Vietorisz de 
veloped an index for the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and 
Poverty based on data collected by the Bureau of the Census for 60 poverty 
areas in 51 large cities. £/ The index included the following:
1. Persons unemployed in the survey week;
2. Persons working part-time involuntarily for economic reasons 
during the survey week;
3. Persons not in the labor force who wanted but were not seeking 
work because they did not think they could find employment (discouraged 
workers); and
4. Full-time workers paid less than $80 a week the amount necessary 
on an annualized basis to support an urban family of four at the poverty 
level.
In 1973, Herman P. Miller developed a two-part index also utilizing 
the same Census Employment Survey data for the 60 poverty areas. $/ The 
"subemployment" measure included:
1. Persons unemployed in the survey week;
2. Persons working part-time involuntarily during the week;
3. Persons outside the labor force, wanting jobs but discouraged by 
the prospects; and
4. Family heads or unrelated individuals employed and earning less 
than the prevailing minimum wage of $1.60 per hour or working full-time but 
with annualized weekly earnings below the poverty level for their house 
holds.
The Miller subemployment count excluded persons 16 to 21 years of age 
who were primarily students, as well as persons 65 years and over, on the 
assumption that their labor force attachment was minimal. The hardship 
measure was, then, derived by screening from the subemployed all indi 
viduals residing in families or households with above average incomes.
The Employment and Earnings Inadequacy Index was developed in 1974 by 
Sar Levitan and Robert Taggart and was calculated from the Current Popu 
lation Survey data gathered each March covering current labor market status 
as well as the previous year's work experience. 6/ It was, like the Miller 
index, a two-part formulation, with a subemployment measure counting 
persons with labor market problems and an "Employment and Earnings In 
adequacy" (EEI) measure excluding those subemployed residing in families or 
households with adequate incomes. The subemployment index included:
1. Persons unemployed during the survey week;
2. Persons outside the labor force in the survey week, wanting jobs 
but discouraged by the prospects;
3. Persons working part-time involuntarily for economic reasons 
during the survey week; and
4. Family heads and unrelated individuals currently employed full- 
time whose earnings in the previous 12 months were less than the poverty 
threshold for their families or households.
Persons age 16 to 21 whose major activity during the survey week was 
school attendance, as well as persons 65 years of age and over, were 
excluded from the subemployment count on the assumption that their labor 
force attachment was limited. The EEI measure, then, screened out all 
those individuals among the subemployed who resided in families and 
households with adequate incomes as judged relative to the medians for 
metropolitan or nonmetropolitan areas for families and unrelated in 
dividuals.
In 1975, Thomas Vietorisz, Robert Mier and John Giblin proposed a 
two-index approach with an "exclusion index" counting persons with in 
dividual labor market problems and an "inadequacy index" assessing earnings 
in light of family needs. TJ The "exclusion index" counted:
1. Persons unemployed in the survey week;
2. Persons not in the labor force but desiring work;
3. Persons in the labor force full-time but working less than 35 
hours in the survey week;
4. Persons currently employed but working less than 50 weeks in the 
last year for economic reasons; and
5. Full-time, full-year workers earning less than an adequate income 
defined by a range of annualized wages.
The "inadequacy index" was restricted to individuals counted by the 
exclusion index who were family heads or unrelated individuals whose 
incomes were below adequacy standards specified as a range of multiples of 
the poverty level for each family or household. All heads or unrelated 
individuals above these income levels were excluded.
Irwin Garfinkel and Robert Haveman in 1977 introduced the concept of 
"earnings capacity poverty," which was closely related to the hardship 
notion. 8/ "Earnings capacity" was defined as the annual income that would 
be produced if the household head and spouse were employed during all weeks 
of potential work (excluding weeks of illness, disability or unemployment) 
at the earnings level of other workers matched according to age, schooling, 
race, sex, region, work pattern and marital status. The earnings capacity 
poor were defined as the percentage (arbitrarily set at the poverty rate) 
lowest in the earnings capacity distribution. "Capacity utilization" com 
pared actual earnings over the year to earnings capacity. Earnings ca 
pacity utilization, thus, sought to measure the work effort of families and 
households while earnings capacity poverty identified the household heads 
and spouses who would be the worst off even if their work effort and 
earnings were up to potential.
In 1979, Robert Stein of the Bureau of Labor Statistics proposed a 
simple hardship measure that included all primary earners in the labor 
force more than half year whose individual earnings were below the poverty 
line for their families or households, and whose total family or household 
incomes were less than double the poverty line. 9/
In its 1979 report, Counting the Labor Force, the National Commission 
on Employment and Unemployment Statistics(NCEUS) developed (although it 
did not recommend) a hardship index based on work experience and earnings 
over the previous year. 10/ The measure included full-year, full-time 
workers whose individual earnings alone were inadequate to lift their 
households or families out of poverty, excluding those in families or 
households with a total income more than double the poverty threshold. The 
full-time, full-year labor force was defined as persons who were in the 
labor force 40 weeks or more, plus those who did not work at all, sought 
work at least 15 weeks, but left the labor force because of discouragement 
over job prospects. Excluded were persons who usually worked part-time 
voluntarily.
Bruce Klein in 1980 sought to link the Garfinkel/Haveman earnings 
capacity notion with the hardship concept, assessing the portion of in 
dividuals in hardship who would have inadequate income if working and 
earning up to "capacity." ll/ The "subemployed" were defined as:
1. Persons who did not work during the year but spent at least 13 
weeks or more looking for work and did not look in other weeks because they 
felt they could not find work;
2. Unemployed workers who were looking for work or on layoff 14 
weeks or more, worked at some time during the year, and were in the labor 
force 40 weeks or more;
3. Persons who worked 13 weeks or more part-time during the year but 
wanted full-time jobs; and
4. Individuals employed full-time for 40 weeks or more whose 
earnings were below the poverty level for their families.
"Earnings capacity economic hardship" was determined by assigning 
"potential" earnings to the subemployed and then comparing their augmented 
income (not including transfers) to an adequacy standard of 150 percent of 
the poverty threshold for the family or household. Potential earnings were 
defined as 40 weeks of 40 hours weekly at the minimum wage for discouraged 
workers; the number of weeks in the labor force times usual weekly earnings 
for those unemployed during the year; actual earnings times the ratio of 40 
hours per week to usual weekly hours for the involuntarily part-time 
workers; and actual earnings for full-time workers in poverty. In other 
words, the Klein measure sought to identify those with labor market-related 
hardship who could not earn an adequate income if fully employed.
The Underlying Issues
There are subtle yet quite significant differences between the assump 
tions and approaches adopted in these various subemployment, hardship, 
earnings capacity and earnings adequacy measures. Each had shortcomings, 
but it is possible to pick and choose the best features in order to develop 
more useful and acceptable measures:
1. Individual vs. family perspectives. Individuals with similar 
work force experience may have different family status, income needs and 
supplements to their own earnings, so that their well-being will differ 
despite equal earnings. Should income adequacy and hardship be judged in 
terms of individual needs or in terms of family needs? Three different 
approaches were advanced to deal with this issue. The Wirtz, 1968 Manpower 
Report, and Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz measures were focused on the in 
dividual assuming that the labor market should provide a basic standard 
which would lift a family of four out of poverty, whether or not an in 
dividual worker had these breadwinning responsibilities.
The Miller, Levitan/Taggart, the NCEUS, Stein and Klein measures used 
a two-step procedure to determine hardship. The first step defined the 
subemployed according to individual labor market problems; the second 
screened out persons whose family or household incomes were adequate. 
However, none of these measures clearly distinguished individual vs. family 
problems because the low earners, who constituted a significant portion of 
the subemployed, were defined in terms of family or household income needs. 
The Garfinkel/Haveman earnings capacity poor were also defined from a 
family or household earnings perspective.
The Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin approach derived two indices designed 
specifically to separate individual earnings problems from aggregate family 
earnings inadequacy, judging the first relative to wage standards applied 
to all workers and the second relative to income adequacy standards re 
flecting each individual's family size and needs. This is conceptually the 
preferred approach.
2. Timeframes. A person employed and with adequate earnings in any 
given survey week may experience a reduction in hours, hourly earnings or 
unemployment which generates inadequate earnings over a year. On the other 
hand, joblessness or reduced hours of employment for a week or two may not 
create undue hardship if earnings the remaining weeks are adequate. The 
number who experience labor market problems over a year are several times 
the number who experience them in any week, while only a small proportion 
of those with problems in any week will have them recur for a significant 
duration. The time period for assessing the adequacy of employment, 
earnings and income is, therefore, critical.
The Wirtz and Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz measures were based on labor 
force and earnings status in a single survey week. The Miller, Levitan/ 
Taggart and Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin measures based some components on survey 
week status and other components on experience over the previous year. The 
1968 Manpower Report, the NCEUS, Stein, Garfinkel/Haveman and Klein meas 
ures all used the work, earnings and income experience over the previous 
year. This latter approach is conceptually most appropriate for several 
reasons: First, hardship measures seek to identify individuals with con 
tinuing structural problems, rather than those whose labor market diffi 
culties are only short-term and do not have serious consequences for 
well-being. Second, it is possible to define some weekly status variables 
in terms of their duration where the necessary information is gathered for 
example, including in a definition of hardship only the currently unem 
ployed with 15 or more weeks of unemployment but this is not possible for 
most other earnings and employment status variables which are measured only 
for the survey week and annually. Family or household income data are 
collected only on an annual basis. Third, the poverty counts, which assess 
the hardship resulting from both labor market and non-labor market prob 
lems, have an annual focus. It makes sense, then, to use this same time- 
frame in assessing the labor market-related hardship components.
3. Income and earnings standards. Assuming an annual timeframe and 
separate consideration of individual problems and family needs, there are 
several different standards which could be and have been used to define 
hardship. The higher the earnings or income standards, the greater the 
number of individuals and proportion of the population which will be 
counted in hardship.
The individual earnings standards adopted by the Wirtz, 1968 Manpower 
Report, Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz and Miller measures were the weekly, 
hourly or annual earnings needed to lift a family of four out of poverty. 
Miller and Wirtz also used the minimum wage as the earnings standard for 
some components. Klein, NCEUS and Levitan/Taggart used the poverty level 
or its multiple as a minimum earnings standard, thus weighing individual 
earnings in light of family size. Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin used a parametric 
approach, defining individual earnings adequacy under a range of hourly 
earnings standards.
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Several different family income standards were utilized. Miller and 
Levitan/Taggart used the mean and median incomes of families and unrelated 
individuals as the upper income screens, i.e., parameters which did not 
consider family size in assessing whether income was more than adequate. 
NCEUS and Stein used 200 percent of the poverty threshold for each par 
ticular family, while Klein used 150 percent. Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin em 
ployed a parametric approach with a range of income standards adjusted for 
family size. The other hardship measures used earnings and income stand 
ards synonymously, i.e., low earners were defined in terms of the poverty 
threshold or the minimum wage, and there was no screening out based on 
other sources and total levels of family income.
Probably the most defensible standards are the minimum wage for 
individual earnings and the poverty level for family income. The para 
metric approach, which calculates hardship under a range of different 
income and earnings standards, is complex if too many alternatives are 
utilized, but a few multiples of the basic standards can be extremely 
helpful in suggesting the sensitivity of hardship counts to alternative 
standards of need. It is inconsistent to use the minimum wage or family 
poverty level as an adequacy standard for individual earnings but to use a 
mid-level income (such as the median, mean, or 200 percent of poverty) as 
the cutoff point for family income hardship. Consistent income and 
earnings standards should be used rather than a low-level for screening in 
individual earnings problems but a mid-level for screening out families 
judged to have adequate incomes.
4. Nonearned income. Given the overlap between work and welfare, 
earnings alone may provide a less than adequate income but economic hard 
ship may be alleviated by income transfers or other nonearned income such 
as private pensions or alimony. The Wirtz, 1968 Manpower Report, Spring/ 
Harrison/Vietorisz, Miller, and Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin indices were con 
cerned only with earnings. The Levitan/Taggart, Stein and the NCEUS 
indices counted all income in assessing adequacy for the families and 
households of the subemployed. The Garfinkel/Haveman and Klein measures 
excluded transfer payments but counted other nonearned income.
Three separate but related issues are involved: Whether the labor 
market is providing minimal earnings for an individual; whether the earn 
ings of family members are adequate to meet minimal family needs; and, when 
this is not the case, whether nonearned income offsets earnings deficits. 
Put another way, the focus is, respectively, what an individual needs or 
should receive as a minimum from work; what he or she needs to earn in 
light of family status in order to be self-supporting; and what is needed 
in order to achieve minimal well-being in light of transfer payments or 
other income. No single measure can address all of these questions.
5. Treatment of secondary earners. One of the reasons for intro 
ducing a hardship index is that the increase in multiple earner families 
has reduced the hardship consequences of unemployment for any single family 
member. Yet it is clearly more significant if the family member experi 
encing labor market problems is the primary breadwinner rather than another 
member who contributes minimally to the family exchequer. Many of the 
hardship measures, therefore, focused in some way on those assumed to be 
primary breadwinners. The Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin "exclusion index" meas-
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uring individual earnings problems included all workers regardless of 
family status; however, the "inadequacy" measure assessing well-being in 
cluded only family heads and unrelated individuals. The Stein measure was 
restricted to primary earners. The Miller, Levitan/Taggart and Wirtz 
indices included only family heads or unrelated individuals in the low 
earners category of the subemployed and hardship measures, although making 
no distinction on the basis of breadwinner status in the other component 
categories. The Garfinkel/Haveman measure of earnings capacity poverty 
considered both family heads and their spouses.
In contrast, the 1968 Manpower Report, Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz, the 
NCEUS and Klein measures considered all potential earners and did not 
exclude on the basis of breadwinner status. This is the most consistent 
and probably the most reasonable approach. If the family or household is 
considered the appropriate unit for judging income needs and adequacy, then 
it is inconsistent to count a dollar of actual or potential earnings from 
one family member differently from that of another. To exclude from the 
hardship counts those individuals in families with adequate earnings or 
incomes including the wages and salaries of secondary earners, but to fail 
to count secondary earners with problems who live in families with below 
adequate earnings, is also inconsistent. If an inclusive definition is 
used which counts secondary earners with problems but disaggregates by 
family status, then hardship due to low earnings of the primary breadwinner 
can be identified through disaggregation where this is appropriate.
6. Attachment to the labor force. Earnings alone will rarely pro 
vide an adequate individual or family income when the weeks and weekly 
hours of work availability are limited. On the other hand, earnings from 
even a few additional weeks of work, or from part-time employment by an 
extra worker, can improve a family's well-being and perhaps lift the family 
out of poverty. Most of the hardship measures had at least some low 
earnings components restricted to persons working in full-time, rather than 
part-time, jobs. Those measures based on annual earnings, income and work 
experience usually restricted attention to persons with significant labor 
force attachment, variously defined. The 1968 Manpower Report measure 
included only low earners employed 50 weeks or more and all other labor 
force participants who experienced 15 or more weeks of unemployment. The 
Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin low earnings category also required 50 weeks of 
attachment. The NCEUS and Klein measures used a 40 week attachment re 
quirement, while Stein required more than half-year participation. The 
Levitan/Taggart measures restricted the low earners categories to currently 
employed household heads who were assumed to be attached to the labor force 
by dint of their current work and breadwinning responsibilities. The 
remaining indices, which were based only on employment status in the survey 
week, implicitly required far less continuity of attachment to the labor 
force.
The degree of labor force attachment is also an issue in defining 
discouragement. Job search demonstrates availability and desire for work, 
and one might reasonably doubt the commitment of an individual claiming to 
want work but saying none is available without having looked. The dis 
couraged in the Vietorisz/Mier/Gibl in index included all those outside the 
labor force claiming to want employment. Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz in 
cluded persons wanting work who listed inability to find work as either a
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primary or secondary reason for not looking. The Levitan/Taggart measures 
restricted the discouraged to those wanting work but not looking primarily 
because they thought they could not find a job or perceived personal 
employment barriers (lack of skills or age), while the Miller index was 
even more restrictive, excluding those who perceived personal employment 
barriers. The NCEUS and Klein measures included those whose main reason 
for not working in the last year was the belief that no jobs were avail 
able, but added a further requirement of at least 15 weeks of job search in 
the first case, and 13 in the second. Stein implicitly required 26 weeks 
of work or unemployment, with no subspecification for those individuals who 
were discouraged some or all of their weeks outside the labor force.
Attachment was also the basis for exclusion of groups assumed to have 
alternative income and activities. The Levitan/Taggart and Miller indices 
excluded persons over age 64 as well as 16- to 21-year-old students. 
Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz restricted attention to persons age 16 to 65 
years. These exclusions, justifiable on average, were unreasonable in many 
individual cases where younger or older workers had primary breadwinning 
responsibilities.
There was no agreement, then, on the appropriate length of work force 
attachment, since the measures based on survey week status required only 
one week of participation while those with an annual focus had requirements 
ranging from 13 to 50 weeks. Each approach measured something funda 
mentally different and reasonable arguments were made for both restrictive 
and inclusive standards. Clearly, then, it is necessary to incorporate 
alternative attachment standards within hardship measures. An inclusive 
approach, i.e., with minimal attachment requirements, can be disaggregated 
to focus on those with longer attachment, and is preferable to an ex 
clusionary approach defined by a strict attachment standard which, there 
fore, limits information available on persons with real problems but 
falling marginally short of the strict standard. As an example, the 
inclusive approach is used in defining unemployment; the definition 
encompasses persons seeking just one hour of work a week as well as those 
seeking 40-hour jobs, or those unemployed one week as well as those jobless 
a year or more. Attachment is handled by disaggregating part-time and 
full-time jobseekers and short-term or long-term unemployed.
There are some other reasonable principles which might be applied in 
order to further simplify the attachment issue:
First, groups of individuals should not be excluded because, on 
average, they have marginal attachment; inclusion or exclusion should be 
based, insofar as possible, on individual behavior, experience and needs, 
treating all individuals by the same rules. In particular, there is no 
justification for excluding all persons aged 65 years and over, or 
students, except by the same criteria used for others.
Second, attachment standards should apply consistently. Mixing time- 
frames so that some persons are included by survey week status but others 
by annual experience violates this principle. So, too, does inclusion of 
part-time workers who are unemployed but not part-time workers who receive 
a subminimum hourly wage, or a low earner who works 35 hours weekly but not 
one who works 34 hours more weeks which yield more annual hours of work 
availability.
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Third, while the truly discouraged should be included in any hardship 
count, the definition should include a minimum job search requirement to 
provide a tangible demonstration of job desire and availability and some 
proof that the inability to find work is, in fact and not just imagination, 
a primary reason for nonparticipation.
7. Disaggregations and supplementary statistics. Counts of persons 
with inadequate income or earnings are one dimensional indicators of need, 
including persons with no earnings whatsoever as well as those fully em 
ployed but with earnings a dollar short of meeting adequacy standards. The 
Miller, Levitan/Taggart and Klein measures all estimated the average 
incomes of persons excluded and included in the subemployed and hardship 
counts, as well as the percentages living in poverty. Combined with the 
disaggregations by typology of labor market problems, these data provided 
some indication of the relative severity of different types of problems for 
individuals included in the counts. Klein introduced the deficit notion, 
already used in the poverty data system, measuring the dollar shortfall of 
income or earnings relative to the needs standards.
Hardship may result from low earnings despite full employment, as well 
as from part-time, intermittent, or no employment, and each of these work 
experience patterns and problems might be addressed by different policy 
measures. It is, therefore, necessary to isolate the typology of labor 
market problems causing hardship. The subemployment measures were usually 
derived by cumulating separate components defined according to the typology 
of labor force problem and these separate component totals were usually 
presented. For instance, the Levitan/Taggart Employment and Earnings 
Inadequacy count was composited of, and disaggregated for, the unemployed, 
discouraged workers, fully-employed low earners, the intermittently 
employed and persons employed part-time involuntarily.
Some of the previous hardship measures were also disaggregated by 
family status, race, age, sex and other key demographic variables. Geo 
graphic breakdowns were also available in a few cases. The Miller, Wirtz 
and Spring/Harrison/Vietorisz measures were calculated strictly for central 
city poverty areas, while the NCEUS, Klein and Levitan/Taggart measures 
included breakdowns for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.
While primary emphasis in previous hardship measurement efforts went 
to developing acceptable indicators and explaining their meaning rather 
than utilizing the measurement system for analytical purposes, Levitan/ 
Taggart, NCEUS, and Klein examined cyclical hardship patterns, as well as
racial differentials over time. To better identify the causes and cures of 
hardship, there was some experimentation with simulations in the Garfinkel/ 
Haveman and Klein measures, which estimated hardship after augmentation of 
individual earnings up to estimated "capacity." These measures also 
assessed variants with and without income transfers.
Some of the measures also dissaggregated according to different need 
standards. The Vietorisz/Mier/Giblin measures used a parametric approach 
in defining need and thus produced several score of alternative indices. 
The NCEUS and Levitan/Taggart measures were calculated (but not published) 
with a range of assumptions about attachment and adequacy standards. The 
hardship measures also, in some cases, calculated exclusion rates i.e.,
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the proportion in any labor market problem category excluded because of 
earnings or income above adequacy standards.
The appropriate degree and focus of disaggregation and of derivative 
measures is suggested not only by the previous work on hardship, which was 
basically exploratory in nature and focused on developing indicators rather 
than data systems, but also by the approaches used in presenting and
analyzing labor force and poverty statistics. Both annual work experience 
and poverty data are published with breakdowns by age, marital and family 
status, number of family earners, income levels and sources, education, 
occupation, race and region. The poverty data calculate total and average 
income deficits to measure the severity of poverty. The "near-poor" 
population is counted using 125 percent of the poverty thresholds. There 
are supplementary data which identify income sources, measure poverty with 
and without cash transfers included, and, recently, calculate the incidence 
of poverty before and after the receipt of in-kind aid. The work ex 
perience measures assess severity in terms of frequency and duration of 
joblessness and the weeks of labor force participation. In other words, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1 annual report on work experience, and its 
monthly report on employment and earnings, as well as the annual Bureau of 
the Census reports on poverty and income, provide examples of the types of 
disaggregation which are possible and have proven useful.
The National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics 
argued for a comparable array of information organizing these data elements 
from the hardship perspective: 12/
A single indicator cannot give individual attention to 
the . . . components of labor market related hardship . . ., deal 
with multiple classifications of labor force status during a 
year, or give separate attention to the individual's status and 
to his or her family's economic status.
The commission therefore recommends that the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics prepare an annual report containing measures of the 
different types of labor market related economic hardship re 
sulting from low wages, unemployment and insufficient partici 
pation in the labor force. These data, which refer to in 
dividuals, would be presented in conjunction with the family 
relationship and the household income status of the in 
dividual ....
The purpose of the annual report would be to present em 
ployment problems in relation to the most basic economic problem: 
inadequate income. The Bureau of the Census publishes statistics 
on the poverty population, with peripheral attention to labor 
force attachment. The perspective would be reversed in the 
recommended report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which 
would start with labor force status and labor market conditions 
and relate them to poverty.
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Consensus and Convergence
There is, then, consensus on some hardship measurement issues and 
convergence on others:
First, the concepts and related indicators linking labor force and 
income status should differentiate between individual earnings problems 
disregarding family status, and family earnings shortfalls which consider 
differing family size and composition.
Second, hardship measures should also differentiate between family 
earnings shortfalls and family income deficits, while it would be desirable 
to further differentiate the income deficits before and after cash transfer 
payments as well as weighing the effects of in-kind aid.
Third, the measures should utilize an annual timeframe, drawing on 
work experience rather than current work status data, and annual rather 
than weekly earnings.
Fourth, the minimum wage is the only socially agreed-upon standard for 
judging the adequacy of individual earnings, while the poverty thresholds 
are the most frequently used and publicly accepted standards for judging 
the adequacy of family income. Supplemental calculations assessing hard 
ship relative to multiples of the minimum wage and the poverty level can 
indicate the sensitivity of the measures to alternate needs standards, can 
enrich analytical potential and can reduce debate about appropriate needs 
standards.
Fifth, since a dollar of earnings by any family member has an equal 
impact on family well-being, the earnings deficits resulting from the labor 
market problem affecting all family members should be treated consistently. 
The distinction between "primary" and "secondary" earners should be handled 
by disaggregation not by exclusion. The severity of an individual's 
problems should be measured in terms of the dollar decrement which it 
produces in the income or earnings of the individual and family.
Sixth, various typologies of labor market experience which generate 
earnings problems should be identified since they result from substantially 
different causes and require substantially different cures. Along with the 
numbers affected by each type of problem, the resulting income and earnings 
shortfalls should also be estimated, since some types of problems usually 
have more severe consequences than others.
Seventh, the adequacy of earnings and labor force experience should be 
judged relative to an individual's hours and weeks of availability for 
work. All work force participants should be included if individual 
earnings fall short of a minimum adequacy level for their hours of availa 
bility and if this shortfall contributes to family earnings and income 
deficits. Labor force attachment issues should be addressed by disaggre 
gating these more inclusive measures according to the degree of partici 
pation in the work force and the size of the individual earnings deficits.
Eighth, the hardship concepts and indicators must have the potential 
for disaggregation to consider family size and composition, age, race, sex,
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region, occupation, and education, i.e., paralleling the disaggregations of 
poverty and work experience data. There should be an annual presentation 
and analysis of these disaggregated data supporting the composite hardship 
indicators.
The first step, then, is to define a set of hardship measurement 
concepts and related indicators that meet these various requirements.
A Measurement and Assessment System
The Primary Indicators
The proposed hardship measurement and assessment system consists of 
three sets of core indicators which measure the adequacy of individual 
earnings, the adequacy of family earnings, and the adequacy of family 
incomes in terms of both the numbers who fall below minimum standards and 
the dollar shortfalls relative to these standards:
1. The Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE) measure counts indi 
viduals who, because of low wages or limited employment, have earnings less 
than what would have been provided by employment at the minimum wage (or 
its multiple) during the annual hours of actual or discouraged labor force 
participation. The Inadequate Individual Earnings Deficit (HE Deficit) is 
the difference between the earnings that would have been generated by 
minimum wage employment for all hours of availability and actual annual 
earnings of persons in the HE.
2. The Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE) measure counts work force 
participants whose earnings, when added to those of other family members, 
do not provide a minimally adequate family income as judged by the poverty 
standard (or its multiple) for the family. An unrelated individual is 
considered a family of one. The Inadequate Family Earnings Deficit (IFE 
Deficit) is the difference between the earnings of all workers in the IFE 
and the poverty levels (or multiples) for their families.
3. The Inadequate Family Income (IFI) measure counts work force par 
ticipants whose earnings and nonearned incomes, combined with those of 
other family members, do not provide a minimally adequate family income as 
judged by the poverty standard (or its multiple). The Inadequate Family 
Income Deficit (IFI Deficit) is the difference betweenthe incomesof 
families Tn the IFI and the poverty levels (or multiples) for these 
families.
These indices are calculated using three sets of adequacy standards 
arbitrarily defined as "severe," "intennediate" and "moderate" hardship. 
The severe hardship standards are the minimum wage for judging the adequacy 
of individual earnings (HE) and the poverty thresholds for judging the 
adequacy of family earnings and family incomes (the IFE and IFI). The 
intermediate hardship standards compare earnings and incomes to 125 percent 
of the minimum wage equivalent for the individual and 125 percent of the
17
poverty threshold for the family. The moderate hardship standards use 150 
percent of the minimum wage equivalent and 150 percent of the poverty level 
to define individual and family hardship.
For all those who worked or sought work during the previous year, the 
adequacy of individual earnings is assessed relative to their total time in 
the work force. Actual annual earnings are compared to an "individual 
earnings standard" derived by multiplying the hourly standard (the minimum 
wage, 125 percent of the minimum or 150 percent of the minimum, depending 
on whether severe, intermediate or moderate hardship counts are being 
derived) times each person's weeks in the work force multiplied by the 
hours they were seeking work or working weekly. Since the legislated 
minimum wage is changed irregularly, the dollar level equal to the real 
average minimum wage for the 1967-1980 period is used as the hourly 
earnings standard for severe hardship.
The adequacy of family earnings and family income are assessed rela 
tive to 100, 125, and 150 percent of the poverty standards for each family 
with at least one member in the work force. The poverty thresholds, of 
course, vary with family size and farm or nonfarm residence.
Hardship is assessed for all persons participating in the work force 
over the course of a year, as well as for the subsets of participants in 
the work force 27 weeks or more, i.e., "half-year," and those in the work 
force "full-year," defined as 50 weeks or more.
In summary, the system calculates nine basic variants of the HE, IFE, 
IFI and their associated HE, IFE and IFI Deficits: each measure is 
estimated using severe, intermediate, and moderate hardship standards 
considering full-year, half-year, and total work force participants.
Supplementary Measures
The hardship measurement system includes several supplementary meas 
ures, as well as subclassifications and disaggregations of the primary 
indicators:
First, all work force participants (whether in the labor force full- 
year, half-year or less-than-half-year) are classified into mutually 
exclusive categories based on their work experience patterns over their 
weeks of participation in the previous year:
1. Employed full-time (35 hours or more weekly) during all weeks of 
work force participation.
2. Employed part-time some or all weeks for persons employed 
throughout their period of participation. Subcategories include persons 
involuntarily employed part-time at least one week and the remainder 
employed part-time voluntarily.
3. Intermittently employed, combining weeks of employment and weeks 
of unemployment. Subcategories include those "mostly unemployed" (two-
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thirds or more of their weeks in the work force), "mostly employed" 
(working two-thirds or more of their weeks of participation), and the 
remainder with a "mixed" pattern.
4. Nonemployed during weeks of availability for work. Subcategories 
include persons "unemployed" throughout all weeks in the work force and 
those searching for work at least four weeks but "discouraged" the re 
mainder of the year.
Second, incidence rates are derived for the HE, IFE, and IFI, by 
dividing the number with inadequate individual earnings, family earnings, 
and family incomes, respectively, by the number in the work force. The HE 
index measures the probability that a work force participant will have 
earnings less than the minimum wage (or a multiple of the minimum) for the 
hours and weeks of work that individual is an active or discouraged work 
force participant. The IFE index measures the proportion of the work force 
whose earnings, combined with those of other family members, would result 
in some degree of hardship in the absence of other income sources. The IFI 
index measures the incidence of hardship among work force participants 
after nonearned income is added to family earnings.
Third, aggregate and average HE, IFE and IFI Deficits are calculated 
for individuals in different work force experience categories. The HE 
Deficits of persons in any given work experience category are straight 
forwardly added and averaged. Family earnings and income deficits are 
allocated among family work force participants in proportion to their 
shares of the combined individual earnings deficits of family members. 
Where the combined HE Deficits of family members are less than the 
family's earnings or income deficit, the difference is distributed ac 
cording to family members' shares of family earnings if each received at 
least minimally adequate individual earnings. This procedure for allo 
cating family deficits among members suggests the relative impact of each 
member's employment and earnings problem on family hardship. The distri 
bution of the total deficits among persons in each work experience category 
are also calculated, suggesting the relative severity of different labor 
force pathologies.
Fourth, all these measures the HE, IFE, and IFI counts, their in 
cidence rates and distributions, plus the HE, IFE, and IFI Deficits, 
average deficits and deficit distributions as calculated for individuals 
based on their category of work force experience are further disaggregated 
according to age, race, sex, family size and number of earners, individual 
family status, educational attainment, individual earnings, individual 
earnings deficit, family income, region and area of residence, and occupa 
tion. These calculations parallel the standard disaggregations of the 
poverty and work experience data.
Interpretative Indices
Individual earnings may be inadequate because of low wages, periods of 
nonemployment or less than desired hours of weekly employment. A person 
with Inadequate Individual Earnings may be in a family with adequate family
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earnings, as exemplified by the teenager in a family with a fully employed 
and well-paid head. Likewise, a person with adequate individual earnings 
may reside in a family which, because of large size or few work force 
participants, may have Inadequate Family Earnings even though no members 
have Inadequate Individual Earnings. Family income inadequacy, which is 
assessed only for persons in the adjusted work force, results when family 
earnings are low and are not adequately supplemented by transfers and other 
sources of nonearned income.
To help sort out the causes, consequences and cures for hardship, 
there are a range of interpretative indices in addition to the primary 
indicators and supplementary measures. To better assess the underlying 
labor market pathologies and the effectiveness of various labor market 
interventions, the earnings and incomes of individuals in hardship are 
augmented in several different ways to simulate certain "what if" con 
ditions. For instance, the IFE and IFE Deficit are calculated after 
augmenting the earnings of all unemployed and involuntarily part-time 
workers by providing minimum wage (or multiple) earnings for all hours of 
idleness. Under a closely related augmentation scheme, these same in 
dividuals are ascribed "capacity employment" defined as their usual hourly 
earnings rate for all hours of forced idleness. The impact of increased 
hourly wages or earnings supplements is simulated by the "enhanced earnings 
augmentation" which raises the actual earnings of all workers in the IFE by 
10 percent. The attainment of minimally "adequate employment" for all work 
force participants is simulated by augmenting each worker's annual earnings 
up to the level of the minimum wage multiplied by the annual hours of 
availability for work. The impacts of more comprehensive solutions for 
labor market problems are simulated by an "enhanced capacity" augmentation 
which first provides workers in the IFE their usual wage for any hours of 
forced idleness, then increases everyone's annual earnings by 10 percent.
To better assess the interaction between family size and composition 
and the family's earnings patterns and problems, a variant of the IFE is 
calculated which considers only persons who also have Inadequate Individual 
Earnings. The difference between this smaller total and the regular IFE 
suggests the number whose family hardship results from large families and 
limited work effort rather than the failure of family members to earn 
minimum wages during their hours of availability.
To determine the marginal effect of solving the problems of sig 
nificant segments of the population in hardship, the IFE and IFE Deficit 
are calculated by augmenting the earnings of particular family member 
subgroups (such as heads, wives or other family members) and age subgroups, 
and then determining how many families would remain with earnings below the 
poverty level (or its multiple), as well as the size of their deficit. The 
augmentations include providing minimum wage and usual earnings for all 
hours of forced idleness, and increasing earnings up to the individual 
earnings standard for all hours of availability.
To better understand the effectiveness of cash and in-kind aid in 
alleviating the consequences of labor market problems, the IFI and IFI 
Deficit are calculated with cash transfers excluded from family income. 
Differencing the Net-of-Transfers IFI and the regular IFI suggests the 
number of work force participants lifted out of poverty by cash transfer
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payments. An Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total is also calculated 
indicating the proportion of persons with Inadequate Family Earnings who 
are lifted out of hardship by other income sources, and an Earnings 
Supplementation Rate-Nontransfers indicates the proportion of the IFE 
escaping poverty (or its multiple) by the receipt of nontransfer earnings 
supplements alone. Finally, the IFI and IFI Deficit are calculated after 
adding the estimated value of food stamps to cash income; they are also 
calculated after adding the estimated values of food stamps, housing 
subsidies and school lunches.
Thus, the hardship measurement system consists of an array of thirty 
measures which are calculated separately for individuals in the labor force 
full-year, half-year, and at any point during the year, using, in each 
case, the severe, intermediate, and moderate hardship standards (Table 
1.1). For each of these nine variants of the data matrix, there are 
disaggregations of the measures according to work experience patterns, and 
then these complete data sets are further disaggregated by age, race, sex, 
family status, occupation, family income, individual earnings and area of 
residence of the work force participants.
Assumptions and Approaches
All measures involve normative judgments and assumptions translated 
into a set of decision rules and definitions which are used in considering 
the information gathered about the status and experience of each in 
dividual. The detailed definitions used in the calculation of the hardship 
measures from the March Current Population Survey responses are presented 
in Appendix A, but the general assumptions and approaches which are 
implicit must first be understood.
Inclusiveness
The proposed set of hardship measures is inclusive rather than ex 
clusive, encompassing diverse labor market problems, work force attachment 
levels, as well as family earnings and income patterns. The adequacy of 
individual earnings is judged by the standard that each work force par 
ticipant should earn at least the minimum wage for the hours and weeks he 
or she is willing and able to work, and that each family with work force 
participants should be able to at least earn enough to escape poverty. All 
earnings and earnings shortfalls are considered from an individual as well 
as family perspective, considering each individual's work experience and 
his or her family needs. The disaggregation of individuals in the hardship 
counts according to work experience patterns and duration of work force 
participation, and the disaggregations by family status and individual 
characteristics, are used to identify the portion of hardship accounted for 
by persons with continuous work force attachment, primary breadwinning 
responsibilities or particular patterns of work experience which may be of 
concern.
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Table 1.1 HARDSHIP MEASURES
Primary Indicators
1. IIE--Number of work force participants failing to earn the 
minimum wage (or its multiple) for their annual hours in the work force.
2. HE Deficit Shortfall of individual annual earnings relative to 
the minimum wage equivalent.
3. IFE--Number of work force participants in families with earnings 
below the poverty level (or its multiple).
4. IFE Deficit Shortfall of family earnings relative to the poverty 
level (or its multiple) for families with at least one work force par 
ticipant.
5. IFI Number of work force participants in families with incomes 
below the poverty level (or its multiple).
6. IFI Deficit Poverty deficit for families with at least one work 
force participant.
Supplementary Measures
7. HE Incidence Percent of work force with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings.
8. IFE Incidence Percent of work force with Inadequate Family 
Earnings.
9. IFI Incidence Percent of work force with Inadequate Family 
Income.
10. HE Average Deficit HE Deficit divided by HE count.
11. IFE Average Deficit IFE Deficit divided by IFE count.
12. IFI Average Deficit IFI Deficit divided by IFI count.
Interpretative Indices
13. Full Employment IFE IFE if every individual were employed at 
minimum wage (or its multiple) for all hours of involuntary idleness.
14. Full Employment IFE Deficit--IFE Deficit if every individual were 




15. Capacity Employment IFE--IFE if every individual were employed at 
his or her usual hourly wage for all hours of involuntary idleness.
16. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit--IFE Deficit if every individual 
were employed at his or her usual hourly wage for all hours of involuntary 
idleness.
17. Enhanced Earnings IFE IFE if annual earnings of all workers were 
raised by 10 percent.
18. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit--IFE Deficit if annual earnings 
were raised by 10 percent.
19. Adequate Employment IFE IFE if all persons earned at least the 
minimum wage equivalent (or its multiple) for all hours in the work force.
20. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit IFE if all persons earned at 
least the minimum wage equivalent (or its multiple) for all hours in the 
work force.
21. Enhanced Capacity IFE--IFE if all persons were provided employ 
ment at the usual wage for all hours of forced idleness, and earnings of 
all persons were increased by 10 percent.
22. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit--IFE Deficit if all persons were 
provided employment at the usual wage for all hours of forced idleness, and 
earnings of all persons were then increased by 10 percent.
23. Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total--Proportion of persons in IFE 
who escape poverty as a result of nonearned income.
24. Earnings Supplementation Rate-Nontransfers--Proportion of persons 
in IFE who escape poverty as a result of nontransfer earnings supplements.
25. IFI Net-of-Transfers Work force participants in families with 
cash incomes, excluding transfers, which are below the poverty level (or 
its multiple).
26. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit--IFI Deficit when cash transfers are 
subtracted from family income.
27. IFI Including Food Stamps--IFI when estimated value of food 
stamps is added to cash income.
28. IFI Deficit Including Food Stamps--IFI Deficit when estimated 
value of food stamps is added to cash income.
29. IFI Including In-Kind Aid--IFI when estimated value of food 
stamps, school lunches and housing subsidies are added to cash income.
30. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit--IFI Deficit when estimated 
value of food stamps, school lunches and housing subsidies are added to 
cash income.
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As noted previously, this inclusive approach was adopted because the 
exclusion rules used in previous measures to focus on breadwinners and in 
dividuals with a serious commitment to work, treated certain situations and 
individuals inconsistently. For instance, the restriction of hardship 
counts to "full-year" labor force participants using a 40-week attachment 
standard excluded an individual unemployed 39 weeks but too ill to work the 
remainder of the year despite the fact that this individual's labor market 
experience would have been just as much a source of economic hardship as 
that of a low earner unemployed for 8 weeks during the year. Likewise, the 
restriction of previous hardship measures to primary earners and their 
problems implicitly and incorrectly assumed that an extra dollar of 
earnings to the primary earner would alleviate hardship while an extra 
dollar to a secondary earner would not, or that problems of primary earners 
could be cured more easily (which may or may not be true) or should have 
higher priority than those of others in the family.
By measuring hardship relative to individually derived standards based 
on annual hours of work availability, by treating all earners equally in 
considering family earnings and income adequacy, and by providing dis- 
aggregations to get at the issues usually handled by exclusion, these 
anomalies were reduced. Inclusive measures can be disaggregated to the 
exclusive measures but the inverse is not true. For instance, if 40 weeks 
of participation were the standard for counting hardship, data would not be 
available to assess the problems of those with, say, 35 to 39 weeks of 
participation. Clearly, then, the information yield is enriched by the 
inclusive approach adopted in the proposed hardship measures.
How Much Not Just How Many
The use of the earnings and income deficit approach to supplement the 
hardship counts provides an indicator of the severity of individual and 
family problems. Previous hardship measures were usually one-dimensional-- 
once included, each individual counted the same as another regardless of 
the degree of hardship, making it necessary to exclude by definition all 
those considered to have less serious problems, such as voluntary part-time 
workers. They are included in the proposed measures if earning less than 
the minimum wage or living in families with inadequate earnings or income. 
They might contribute only a small amount to the budget of their families, 
and the increment from raising their wages to the minimum might be small, 
but this is revealed by the average earnings and income deficits for such 
workers. With such information and the weighting which is implicit, there 
is no reason for arbitrary exclusion.
There is some inherent arbitrariness in allocating family earnings and 
income shortfalls among family members. While the decision rule is com 
plex, the principle is not. To the extent that family members earn less 
than the minimum wage equivalent for their hours in the work force, and 
that these individual shortfalls cause the family earnings or income 
deficits, these family deficits can reasonably be distributed according to 
the relative severity of members 1 individual problems. If all members had 
at least minimally adequate earnings, any remaining family deficit would 
require greater earnings from all family members in proportion to their 
relative contribution to total family earnings.
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The hardship counts can be straightforwardly disaggregated to focus on 
the subsets of all work force participants who are available for work 
full-year or half-year. However, assumptions are required in order to 
allocate family income and earnings shortfalls among family members where 
some may be participating full-year or half-year but others less-than- 
full-year or less-than-half-year. Where the hardship measures are re 
stricted to full-year or half-year participants, the adopted approach 
allocates the family deficit by the same two-step procedure outlined above, 
except that only the individual earnings deficits of the full-year or 
half-year participants are considered in the first step. In other words, 
to the extent the individual earnings problems of the full-year or half- 
year participants lead to a family's earnings or income shortfall, the 
full-year or half-year participants are assigned this share of the family 
shortfall. The relative contributions of all family earners are considered 
in allocating any remaining family earnings or income deficit. This means 
that the share of the family IFE and IFI Deficits allocated to full-year 
and half-year participants under the full-year and half-year disaggrega- 
tions of the hardship measures are not the same as the shares allocated to 
them under the hardship calculations for the total work force.
Hardship Standards
The choice of the minimum wage to assess the adequacy of individual 
earnings and the poverty level to measure the adequacy of family earnings 
and income are based on the fact that the minimum wage and the poverty 
levels are unquestionably the most accepted and understood needs indi 
cators. Yet there are some implications which must be recognized and some 
adaptations which must be made.
Because the legislated minimum is adjusted sporadically, sometimes 
lagging behind the cost of living and then suddenly catching up in a single 
step, its use would produce irregular fluctuations in the individual 
earnings adequacy measures reflecting the irregular changes in the law 
rather than changes in well-being. In years when the legislated minimum 
was eroded by inflation, the individual hardship count would go down even 
though real purchasing power of low wage earners would probably be de 
clining. Conversely, there would appear to be an increase in individual 
hardship in years when the legislated minimum was raised because wage 
adjustments would not be instantaneous. To avoid this anomaly, the pro 
posed hardship measurement system does not use the legislated minimum wage 
as the basis for the individual earnings standard, but rather an average of 
the real value of the legislated minimum, with adjustments to maintain 
purchasing power from year to year.
Since an indexed minimum rather than the legislated minimum wage is 
used as the individual earnings standard, its acceptability depends on the 
base level and the cost index which are used. The Minimum Wage Study Com 
mission suggested indexing the legislated minimum relative to nonfarm 
earnings because of problems with the Consumer Price Index, particularly 
the weight given to fluctuating housing mortgage interest costs. However, 
the poverty level used to assess the adequacy of family earnings and 
incomes is an absolute rather than relative standard, i.e., it is adjusted
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each year for the CPI. Thus, the CPI index minus housing interest costs is 
used to calculate the minimum wage standard for each year, thereby over 
coming many of the problems with the regular CPI, while achieving con 
sistency in the use of absolute adequacy standards for both family and 
individual earnings.
There is no reason to assume that the real value of the legislated 
minimum wage in any specific year is a better base than another, which is 
why the adopted approach was to average the real value (adjusted for the 
CPI minus housing interest costs) of the legislated minimum wage from 1967 
through 1980 (using the minimum legislated for pre-1966 covered workers). 
This relatively long period included minimum wage increases legislated in 
1966, 1974, and 1977, as well as the erosion periods of 1969 through 1973 
when the minimum was stable despite inflation, and 1980, when it rose but 
not enough in light of unexpectedly high rates of inflation. The 1966 Fair 
Labor Standards Act amendments completed most of the extensions in 
coverage. 13/ In other words, the average for the 1967-1980 period 
reasonably represents the real standard selected by society over the years 
when coverage was relatively comprehensive and stable, over periods of 
minimum wage activism and neglect, as well as during economic growth and 
recession and changing political cycles.
Another base period would yield different individual earnings stand 
ards for each year. For instance, if the average for the 1974-1980 period 
had been used as the baseline rather than the average for the 1967-1980 
period, the standard for each year would have been 1.2 percent lower. 
Likewise, the use of the total CPI, rather than the CPI minus housing 
mortgage costs, would have yielded different standards, particularly in 
1980 when interest rates rose so much faster than other CPI components.
Minimum wage standards Minimum wage standards
using 1967-1980 as base and using 1974-1980 as base and Minimum wage standard
adjusting for CPI minus adjusting for CPI minus using 1967-1980 as base Legislated
mortgage Interest costs mortgage Interest costs and adjusting for CPI minimum wage
1974 $1.99 $1.96 $1.98 $2.00
1975 2.16 2.14 2.16 2.10
1976 2.29 2.26 2.29 2.30
1977 2.44 2.41 2.44 2.30
1978 2.61 2.58 2.62 2.65
1979 2.87 2.84 2.92 2.90
1980 3.21 3.17 3.31 3.10
There is no adjustment for the student learners differential since it 
is impossible to determine which of the students in the labor force are 
covered by certificates. Likewise, there is no way to identify workers in 
jobs not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The disaggregations in 
the hardship tallies permit adjustments where these are considered appro 
priate. For instance, teenage students or agricultural workers can be 
subtracted from the totals.
The use of severe, intermediate and moderate hardship standards not 
only accommodates varying judgments about what constitutes hardship, but it 
also increases analytical potential. For instance, one policy might reduce 
the number in severe hardship more than another, but alter the intermediate
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hardship count by less. Likewise, some subgroups in the work force may be 
more concentrated above the severe hardship line but below the intermediate 
hardship cutoff, while others are concentrated among those with severe 
hardship. The different data sets can be used like scissors to cut through 
many critical issues concerning the relative severity of problems, thus 
supplementing the dimension added by the deficit measures.
The severe, intermediate and moderate income and earnings standards 
are arbitrary. Rather than 100, 125 and 150 percent of the minimum wage 
and poverty thresholds, any other multiples could have been used. The 
choice was dictated largely by the conventions in previous hardship studies 
and by value judgments based upon examination of the income and earnings 
distributions in the population. In 1979 the poverty threshold for a 
nonfarm family of four was $7,412 and for an unrelated individual, $3,800. 
The minimum wage standard of $2.87 would have produced annual earnings of 
$5,800 assuming 2,020 annual hours of employment. The median income for 
households with four members was $22,576. For all unrelated individuals, 
the median was $7,542, but, perhaps more appropriately, it was $13,321 for 
unrelated individuals in the labor force full-year. The severe, inter 
mediate and moderate income and earnings standards, thus, represented the 
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Obviously, minimum wage level earnings and multiples provide better 
for the needs of unrelated individuals than for families, and for small 
families than for large ones. In 1980, for instance, the Minimum Wage
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Commission estimated the hourly earnings needed for an individual full-time 
worker to provide poverty level annual earnings for households of different 
sizes:
Hourly wage equivalent for an individual worker employed 














Conversely, the poverty threshold is based on family size so that a 
sole worker in a large family must earn more than a sole worker with fewer 
breadwinning responsibilities. The divergence between what society con 
siders adequate earnings for an individual and the self-support needs of 
families is the reason why there are separate measures and standards for 
individual earnings adequacy and family earnings adequacy.
The minimum wage standards do not vary with residence while the 
poverty thresholds are lower in farm areas. The income needs of farm 
residents were estimated to be 25 percent less than those of nonfarm 
residents when poverty was first defined; the accepted differential was 
reduced to 15 percent in the poverty counts covering the 1974-1980 period 
for which the hardship measures are calculated. The minimum wage is 
uniform for the entire nation and, therefore, does not account at all for 
cost-of-living differentials. Thus, for rural compared to urban areas, the 
HE measures will be relatively larger than the IFE and IFI measures 
because of the cost adjustment in the poverty standard but not in the 
minimum wage standard.
It might make sense to utilize cost-of-living adjustments for all 
earnings and income standards. For instance, the BLS lower living stand 
ards which vary for metropolitan areas based on cost survey data, might be 
utilized rather than the poverty levels. This option would be important if 
the hardship measures were to be utilized in resource allocation (although 
the poverty measures which do not utilize such adjustments are used 
currently without much debate).
Typologies of Work Experience
The categorization of the work force according to their work experi 
ence pattern during their weeks of participation is critical in order to 
understand the nature of the underlying labor market problems and hence the 
appropriate solutions. This classification is relatively straightforward. 
The work experience categories include full-time employment during the 
full-period of work force participation at one extreme, no employment 
whatsoever at the other extreme, with intermittent employment and unemploy 
ment, as well as part-time employment falling between these extremes. The
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intermittently employed are subcategorized by the proportion of their weeks 
in the labor force they are employed and unemployed, just as work ex 
perience measures subclassify participants according to weeks of jobless- 
ness. The intermittently employed include workers whose usual employment 
is part-time voluntary, part-time involuntary, full-time, or a mixture. 
The nonemployed and intermittently employed may include individuals seeking 
part-time work for some or all weeks not working. Workers employed full- 
period but with some weeks of part-time employment are subcategorized into 
those who worked part-time voluntarily and those who worked part-time 
because full-time work was not available. The involuntarily part-time 
employed include some who worked full-time most of the period, while the 
voluntarily part-time employed include individuals wanting full-time work 
some weeks but restricted by reasons other than the lack of full-time work. 
The important point is that any individual can be classified in one and 
only one work experience pattern category.
Because the Current Population Survey questions used in calculating 
the hardship measures are limited, assumptions must be made about the hours 
of work for individuals who mix full-time and voluntary part-time employ 
ment in order to calculate the individual earnings standard. Where an in 
dividual works predominantly part-time, 40 hours of availability are 
assumed during weeks this individual indicates he or she wants more than 35 
hours of employment. Where work is predominantly full-time, hours worked 
when employed part-time are assumed to be 20 hours per week.
Finally, the nonemployed are subcategorized into those who are dis 
couraged vs. those unemployed. The discouraged workers include persons who 
did not work in the last year, who claimed that the inability to find work 
was the primary reason, and who looked for a job at least a month. This 
job search requirement is used in order to weed out individuals who claimed 
they wanted to work and could not find jobs, but might not have been really 
eager for employment, or might not have known about available opportunities 
because of the absence of job search. A more rigorous job search require 
ment would alter some but not all of the hardship measures. For instance, 
an individual with five weeks of unemployment, counted as discouraged 
according to the above definitions, would appear among the totally un 
employed in the hardship measures for the total work force even if two 
months of job search were required to classify an individual as dis 
couraged; on the other hand, this individual with five weeks of unem 
ployment would be excluded from the full-year tallies if a two-month search 
period were used in the discouraged worker classification. The deficits 
and interpretative measures which augment earnings are also affected by the 
stringency of the job search requirement, since those counted as dis 
couraged are ascribed 50 weeks of work force participation in calculating 
individual earnings standards and deficits, whereas they would only be 
ascribed their weeks searching for work if included among the totally 
unemployed. The intermittently employed who were outside the labor force 
for some weeks might also have been discouraged, but this cannot be 
determined from the CPS questionnaire since inability to find work is not 
included as one of the possible reasons for nonparticipation unless it 
occurs throughout the year. Because earnings adequacy is judged relative 
to weeks in the labor force for the intermittently employed, the inability 
to estimate their weeks of discouragement leads to a slight understatement 
of the number with Inadequate Individual Earnings.
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"What If" Measures
The Full Employment, Capacity Employment, Enhanced Earnings, Adequate 
Employment and Enhanced Capacity IFE and IFE Deficit measures augment the 
earnings of work force participants in different ways, and then determine 
how many would remain with family earnings below the poverty level (or its 
multiple). The aim of these interpretative indices is to help in assessing 
the impacts and implications of policy alternatives. For instance, the 
Full Employment IFE yields a general sense of the costs and consequences of 
a large-scale job creation approach, while the Enhanced Earnings IFE yields 
some notion of what would occur if minimum wages were raised. This does 
not mean that guaranteeing minimum wage jobs or increasing the legislated 
minimum would have these exact effects on hardship. For instance, if 
minimum wage jobs were guaranteed, there is no doubt that most workers 
fully employed at less than the minimum would leave their existing jobs for 
the new positions. Many persons would be attracted from outside the labor 
force. Likewise, minimum increases would have disemployment effects as 
well as attracting more workers into the labor force. The augmented 
measures, thus, provide indicators of relative magnitudes and directions of 
change associated with alternative policies, but are hardly the last word 
on their relative impacts.
The augmented measures are disaggregated by the same work force 
attachment, work experience pattern and demographic categories as are used 
for the other hardship indicators. In the disaggregations for full-year 
and half-year workers, only the earnings of the full-year or half-year par 
ticipants are augmented in the prescribed ways. The "what if" question 
addressed by these measures is "how many full-year or half-year partici 
pants would remain in families with earnings below the poverty level (or 
multiple) if the earnings of the full-year or half-year participants in the 
family were augmented in the prescribed ways?"
The work experience and demographic disaggregations for any of the 
nine hardship severity/work force attachment combinations for the augmented 
measures include persons in the disaggregated group who are in families 
with inadequate earnings after al 1 work force participants with the re 
quired attachment have their earnings augmented. For instance, in the Full 
Employment IFE for the total work force, the earnings of the voluntary 
part-time workers are not augmented because they have no hours of forced 
idleness; nevertheless, the number of voluntary part-time workers in the 
Full Employment IFE will be lower than in the regular IFE because some have 
other family members whose earnings are augmented, raising their families 
out of poverty.
To shed light on secondary earner issues, the Full Employment, 
Adequate Employment and Capacity Employment IFE measures are also cal 
culated by augmenting only the earnings of specified subgroups while 
leaving constant the earnings of all other individuals in the work force. 
The combined earnings of family members are, then, compared to the poverty 
standard or multiple, and al1 family members in the work force are included 
in the marginally augmented tallies if they fall below the standards or 
multiples. Because marginal augmentation involves extensive computer time 
and cost, it is only undertaken for the age/student status and family 
relationship disaggregations. The disaggregations of the marginally aug-
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mented measures for age/student and family status subgroups count all work 
force participants in families which remain with inadequate earnings after 
augmentation of the earnings of the specified age/student or family status 
subgroups. In contrast, the age/student and family relationship disaggre- 
gations for the regularly augmented IFE measures include just the subgroup 
members who remain in families with inadequate earnings after every family 
member has their earnings augmented in the specified manner.
Valuing In-Kind Aid
The IFI Including Food Stamps and the IFI Including In-Kind Aid esti 
mate how many work force participants remain with a below-poverty living 
standard after receipt of in-kind aid. These measures are derived from 
responses to the supplemental questions on noncash benefits which were 
added to the March 1980 Current Population Survey questionnaire and con 
tinued in March 1981. The valuation of food stamps is relatively straight 
forward, since food stamps are very similar to cash income and since 
individuals are queried concerning the dollar amount of food stamps 
received. The IFI Including Food Stamps as income simply adds cash and 
food stamps received for each family with at least one work force par 
ticipant and compares this with the poverty level (or its multiple).
The IFI Including In-Kind Aid adds the estimated value of school 
lunches and housing subsidies to food stamps and cash income. These 
estimates are much more problematic because the CPS questions concerning 
lunches and housing are not as specific, and a range of plausible assump 
tions yields quite different valuations. 14/ The CPS asks how many 
children in the household received free or reduced price lunches. Ac 
cording to federal program statistics, about 9.9 million children from poor 
and near-poor families received free meals in 1979, at an average federal 
subsidy of 93<t per meal, while 1.7 million received reduced-price lunches, 
at an average subsidy of 73<£. Another 13 million received lunches at 
prices modestly below cost because of the provision of federal commodities. 
It is assumed that families in the latter category will not perceive that 
they are getting a free or reduced-price meal. This squares with the 
aggregate counts from the March 1980 in-kind questionnaire, where 11.3 
million youth age 5 to 18 lived in households reporting that their children 
usually received free or reduced price lunches in 1979. The poverty 
threshold in 1979 for an urban family of four was based on a $1.71 daily 
feeding cost for each family member. Since six out of seven of the persons 
receiving free or reduced price lunches got free lunches, and since the 
subsidy for the reduced price lunch exceeded the amount budgeted for each 
poverty meal, it is reasonable to assume that all families who reported 
receipt of a free or reduced price meal, in fact, had their food needs 
reduced by one-third per person each day a lunch was received. Assuming 
that meals were available for 182 school days, with a twenty percent 
absentee rate, that the lunches reduced food costs of each recipient by 
one-third (i.e., covering one of three meals), and that food costs repre 
sented a third of the poverty level (which is the basis of the poverty 
definition), then each recipient in a family would have augmented family 
cash income by .044 of its poverty threshold per household member (one-half 
year times 80 percent attendance times one-third reduction in daily food
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costs times the one-third of a poverty income which presumably is allocated 
for food). The estimated value of free lunches for a family of four with 
two children receiving lunches was $164 in 1979, whereas the supply price 
to the government was estimated to be $271. Though the subsidized lunch 
might have supplied more calories and nutrients than the poverty budgeted 
diet, and certainly cost more to deliver, it hardly eliminated the need for 
breakfast and dinner for the student.
Valuation of housing benefits is even more conjectural. If benefits 
were valued at government subsidy cost and added to cash incomes, many of 
the residents of subsidized housing would be considered nonpoor simply 
because the units are more costly and presumably more adequate than the 
alternatives which would have been secured in the absence of housing 
subsidies. Yet the income remaining after rent might still be less than 
what is necessary to purchase other needed goods and services. For 
instance, a family of three with a cash income of $4800 living in a new 
public housing unit might pay only $100 monthly in rent even though an 
equivalent unsubsidized unit would rent for $500 monthly. The annual 
subsidy would cost the government $4800 and the sum of cash and housing 
valued at this subsidy would be above the poverty threshold for this 
family. But can a family of three survive on $3600 net of housing costs? 
Not if housing costs equal just a fourth of the poverty threshold, with 
three-fourths required for other needs, as the poverty index assumes. 
Therefore, the crude valuation procedure adopted in the hardship cal 
culations caps the housing subsidy at the estimated housing expenditure 
share for unsubsidized low income families. In 1979, according to the 
annual housing survey, occupants of subsidized units paid a median of 24 
percent of cash income for gross rent (the public housing formula, for 
instance, allowed for a rent of 30 percent of adjusted income). Among all 
households (subsidized and unsubsidized) with less than $3000 cash income, 
the median percent of cash income going for gross rent was in excess of 60 
percent. For renter households with $3000 to $7000 cash incomes, the 
median was 44 percent; for those with $7000 to $10,000, the median was 31 
percent; and for the $10,000 to $15,000 income group, it was 24 percent. 
Adjusting for the estimated proportions below the median who were in 
subsidized units, the medians for each income class are estimated to be 
roughly 65, 50, 35 and 30 percent, respectively, for residents of un 
subsidized units with each level of family cash income. Subtracting the 24 
percent of cash income that is usually paid as rent in subsidized units 
means that housing expenditures were reduced by approximately 40, 25, 10, 
and 5 percent, respectively, of the cash incomes for households in the 
different cash income classes. This is, admittedly, a very crude esti 
mation procedure. For instance, large and small families with the same 
cash incomes are estimated to spend the same proportions of income on 
housing, which is unlikely. Regression analysis from the annual housing 
survey data could derive a predicted housing cost percentage for each 
household, and rent subsidy formulae could be used to predict subsidized 
housing rents. However, such detailed calculations were not justified for 
the present purposes. Further, since two-thirds of the 2.3 million house 
holds in public and leased housing had no reported earners, only a small 
proportion of all persons in hardship were affected by in-kind housing aid, 
and in most of the cases where the low-income families with work force 
participants resided in subsidized units, the estimation procedures should 
have yielded a reasonable "best guess" of the impacts of housing subsidies 
on well-being. It is important to stress, however, that the in-kind valua-
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tions for housing, like the valuations for school lunches, are below the 
subsidy costs. The principle which is applied in both cases is to de 
termine whether the cash income, which remains after the specific need is 
met by in-kind aid, will provide for a poverty level "market basket" after 
subtracting the price which this "market basket" assumes for each element 
provided in-kind.
A Comprehensive System
The thrust of this effort is not just to develop an acceptable hard 
ship indicator, but to design a comprehensive system of measurement and 
analysis to supplement the poverty and labor force statistics systems, as 
well as the massive body of analytical work covering labor market problems 
and appropriate public policies which has been based on the poverty and 
unemployment measures. In particular, the disaggregations and the inter 
pretative measures were designed to provide data usable with minimum 
adaptation or manipulation to address a range of important theoretical and 
policy issues. For instance, previous hardship indicators have suggested 
that the number of persons in hardship fluctuates less than the number 
unemployed over the business cycle because those who already have struc 
tural problems are the ones who suffer most in recessions, i.e., their 
hardship simply becomes more severe. The proposed measures permit a much 
better assessment of the shifting severity of need over the business cycle. 
Because the labor force categories are mutually exclusive and descriptive 
of all possible work experience patterns, recession or recovery-induced 
shifts from one category to another can be identified; for instance, shifts 
from the mostly employed category to the mostly unemployed category as 
economic conditions worsen. The comparison between the severe, inter 
mediate, and moderate adequacy counts enriches the analysis of the severity 
issues. The family responses to changing economic conditions such as 
increased labor force participation and earnings of added family members 
can be assessed by analysis of the disaggregations. The augmented earnings 
IFE measures provide varied perspectives on the changes in the composition 
and causes of hardship over the business cycle. The effectiveness of 
income transfer programs in protecting against cyclical fluctuations can be 
determined from relative movements in the IFI and the IFI Net-of-Transfers. 
In other words, the tabulated data can be added, subtracted and multiplied 
to address most analytical issues concerning the hardship consequences of 
macroeconomic changes. The tabulated data are equally useful in assessing 
secular trends, the problems of minorities, the impacts of changing family 
size, composition and work patterns, allocation and targeting issues, 
transfer program impacts, as well as the potentials of policy tools, such 
as minimum wage increases and full-employment job creation. Such appli 
cations are demonstrated in the following analyses using the annual 
hardship data calculated for the 1974-1980 period.
There are tradeoffs, however, in seeking to develop a hardship 
measurement system rather than a single indicator, and in trying to 
accommodate the criticisms of previous hardship measures. The departures 
from previous approaches overcome most of the criticisms but increase the 
complexity. There are three primary sets of hardship measures rather than 
one or two in other hardship systems, and these sets include deficit meas-
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ures of hardship severity as well as body counts of those who fall below 
specified standards. Because the measurement system is inclusive, dis- 
aggregation is necessary for acceptability in certain contexts, since the 
aggregated measures include some individuals who may have only minimal 
attachment to the work force and thus only a small potential contribution 
to the well-being of their families. The use of severe, intermediate, and 
moderate income and earnings standards further complicates the picture. 
Finally, the incorporation of interpretative indices as an integral part of 
the measurement system increases potential understanding of causes and 
interactions, but generates even more numbers for consideration.
The critical issue is whether the added complexity of the hardship 
approach adds to understanding of the interface between work and well- 
being, whether it leads to increased attention to the structural employment 
problems which have the most severe consequences, and whether it provides 
an improved framework for assessing policy alternatives. The subsequent 
analysis seeks to document the meaningfulness and reasonability of the 
measures and their utility in analysis of the causes and cures for the 
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CHAPTER 2. HARDSHIP IN 1979
The Derivation and Dimensions of Hardship
The Basic Indicators
While the complete array of hardship statistics tabulated for a single 
year is imposing, including over a half million numbers, and though the 
unfamiliar terminology can be unwieldy, the underlying notions are quite 
simple. The core indicators which serve as the building blocks of the 
hardship measurement system are derived straightforwardly from available 
work experience, income and earnings statistics. They are designed to 
address six basic questions:
Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE) - How many of the persons 
who participate in the work force during the year are unable to 
earn at least the minimum wage multiplied by their total hours of 
work availability?
HE Deficit - What additional earnings are needed to raise the 
wages and salaries of these individuals with inadequate earnings 
to the minimum wage level?
Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE) - How many work force partici 
pants are in families whose total wages and salaries are below 
the poverty level?
IFE Deficit - Among work force participants with Inadequate 
Family Earnings, what is the shortfall between family earnings 
and poverty threshholds?
Inadequate Family Income (IFI) - How many work force participants 
have earnings and other family income below the poverty level?
IFI Deficit - How many dollars of added earnings or other income 
are needed to raise the families of work force participants in 
the IFI out of poverty?
Based on the work experience, income, earnings and other information 
collected in the Current Population Survey each March covering the preced 
ing calendar year, these questions can be answered for each year from 1974 
through 1980. However, the derivation and dimensions of hardship are best 
illustrated using 1979 as a baseline. This last year of the 1970s was also 
the last in which there was a reasonably healthy economy. The national 
unemployment rate averaged 5.8 percent--0.4 percentage points below the 
1970s average and 1.6 percentage points below the unemployment rate for
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1980 and 1981. The annual employment growth in 1979 was a robust 2.5 per 
cent, equalling the employment growth rate averaged over the 1970s and in 
contrast to a slight decline in total employment during 1980 and 1981. The 
real value of the legislated minimum wage which prevailed in 1979 very 
nearly equalled the real value of the legislated minimum averaged over the 
1967 to 1980 period. The poverty rate was 11.6 percent, just a shade below 
the average for the 1970s but significantly below the 13.0 percent rate in 
1980. While the cost-of-living (and the poverty thresholds) rose by 13.3 
percent in 1979, noticeably above the 7.4 percent annual increase of the 
1970s, inflation was more in line with the 11.0 percent annual increase 
averaged in 1980 and 1981. In other words, 1979 was not the best of years 
for our nation's economy, but it was generally characteristic of the 1970s 
and a reasonable baseline for assessing the rather dramatic changes which 
have occurred in the 1980s.
For this baseline year, the six primary severe hardship measures are 
estimated as follows:
1. Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE). During 1979, seven of 
every ten persons age 16 or over worked or looked for work in the 
civilian labor market (Chart 2.1). Among these 117.0 million 
participants, one of every four, or 28.3 million, had annual 
earnings less than the amount each would have earned if paid the 
minimum wage for all hours they were willing and able to work 
during the year. I/
2- HE Deficit. To raise the earnings of these individuals up to 
the minimum wage equivalent for their hours of availability would 
have required $52.0 billion in additional earnings, which repre 
sented 4.0 percent of the nation's total wages and salaries. The 
average worker in the HE needed $1,839 more to achieve minimally 
adequate individual earnings.
3. Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE). Not all these individuals 
suffered seriously as a result of their earnings shortfalls; 
while others, who earned at least the minimum wage equivalent, 
nevertheless lacked the annual family earnings required to escape 
poverty either because of their own limited hours of work 
availability, their large families, or the lack of supplementary 
family earners. Two-thirds of the 28.3 million persons with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings lived in families with combined 
earnings above the poverty level, leaving only 9.1 million in 
families unable to achieve minimal self-support by the work of 
family members. On the other hand, there were 4.2 million work 
force participants with adequate individual earnings relative to 
their hours of availability who were in families with below- 
poverty earnings. These 13.3 million work force participants 
with Inadequate Family Earnings represented 11.4 percent of the 
total work force.
4- IFE Deficit. Work force participants in the IFE needed an 
additional $31.7 billion in wages and salaries to raise their 
families' earnings to the poverty level. This IFE Deficit repre 
sented 2.4 percent of the nation's total wages and salaries and
Chart 2.1. PERSONS IN SEVERE HARDSHIP, 1979
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averaged $2,384 for each work force member with Inadequate Family 
Earnings.
5. Inadequate Family Income (IFI). Of the 13.3 million in the IFE, 
2.8 million were in families lifted out of poverty by the receipt 
of private pensions, alimony, interest and other nontransfer 
income. Cash transfers such as welfare and social security, 
raised an additional 3.4 million above the poverty threshold. 
Thus, only half of the individuals with Inadequate Family 
Earnings were in households with Inadequate Family Incomes. This 
7.1 million in the IFI represented 6.0 percent of the work force 
and two-fifths of the poor age 16 and over.
6. IFI Deficit. Transfers and other sources of income reduced the 
$31.7 billion IFE Deficit by almost three-fifths. The remaining 
$12.8 billion IFI Deficit for families with members in the work 
force represented 56 percent of the nation's total poverty 
deficit. To alleviate poverty among the working poor would have 
required $1,818 in earnings supplements for each work force 
participant.
Hardship and Work Force Attachment
These measures of severe hardship count all individuals participating 
in the work force during 1979, including some working or looking for part- 
time work totalling just a few hours of availability over the year, but 
others in the labor force full-time, full-year. The incidence, nature and 
consequences of employment and earnings problems vary with the annual hours 
of availability.
In order to understand these interrelationships, the basic hardship 
indicators are calculated for only those participants in the work force at 
least half-year, i.e., 27 weeks or more, as well as for those participating 
full-year, i.e., 50 weeks or more. The half-year hardship counts are a 
subset of the total hardship counts, while the full-year counts are a 
subset of the half-year counts. Hardship incidence rates are calculated 
for these subsets; in other words, the HE incidence among full-year 
workers equals persons in the work force for 50 weeks or more who have 
earnings below the minimum wage level, divided by the total number of 
full-year participants. The hardship deficits for full-year and half-year 
participants focus on the individual earnings shortfalls of these in 
dividuals and the share of the family earnings and income shortfalls that 
can be attributed to their labor market problems.
Increased work force attachment reduces the probability of suffering 
hardship (Chart 2.2). Among those participating less than half-year during 
1979, the proportions with Inadequate Family Earnings and Inadequate Family 
Income were more than four times those among full-year work force partici 
pants. Obviously, families with full-year participants had more hours of 
potential employment and were, therefore, more likely to have family earn 
ings above the poverty level. Yet the HE incidence among less than half- 
year participants was also greater than among full year participants, even
Chart 2.2. INCIDENCE OF HARDSHIP BY WORK FORCE ATTACHMENT, 1979
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though each individual's annual earnings were judged relative to his or her 
weeks and weekly hours in the work force.
Although seven of every ten work force participants in 1979 worked or 
looked for work at least 50 weeks, only half of the persons with Inadequate 
Individual Earnings were full-year participants (Chart 2.3). Among all 
work force participants with Inadequate Family Earnings and Inadequate 
Family Income, only three-fifths participated for half a year or more and 
just two-fifths were full-year participants.
If two individuals averaged the same earnings deficits each week in 
the work force, the one with more weeks of attachment would have a larger 
individual earnings deficit and would account for a larger share of the 
total HE Deficit. Thus, the work force participants with less than 
half-year in the labor force accounted for only a ninth of the total HE 
Deficit, even though they represented a third of persons in the HE. Con 
versely, the half of persons in the total HE who were in the work force 
full-year accounted for three-fourths of the aggregate HE Deficit. If the 
family earnings and income deficits are allocated among all family work 
force participants according to each participant's share of the combined 
individual earnings deficits for all family members where this total 
exceeds the family's IFE and IFI Deficits, and the remainder of the 
family's IFE and IFI Deficits, if any, according to each participant's 
share of family earnings assuming all family workers achieved at least 
minimally adequate individual earnings, the deficit attributed to each 
individual represents the relative importance of his or her earnings 
problem in contributing to the family earnings or income shortfall. Using 
this procedure for allocating family deficits among family work force 
participants, the full-year and half-year workers accounted for roughly the 
same shares of the 1979 IFE and IFI Deficits as they did of the IFE and IFI 
counts, 2J This is because the family deficits were less for families with 
full-year workers, so that even though the average HE Deficit of full-year 
workers was substantially larger than that of less-than-full-year workers, 
the difference in their average IFE and IFI Deficits was less:













































The attainment of minimum wage earnings for individuals and poverty- 
level earnings for families is hardly a cause for rejoicing. For an urban 
family of four, the lowest-level food menu of the Department of Agricul 
ture, dinner out at an inexpensive restaurant once every two months, 
minimally adequate rental housing, no out-of-town trips, auto ownership by
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Total HE = 28,269 = 24.2% Total work force
Half-year HE = 19,299 = 19.5% Half-year work force
16.5% Total work force
Full-year HE = 14,248 = 17.0% Full-year work force
12.2% Total work force
INADEQUATE FAMILY EARNINGS
Total IFE = 13,280 = 11.4% Total work force
Half-year = 8,014 = 8.1% Half-year work force
6.9% Total work force
Full-year IFE = 5,675 = 6.8% Full-year work force
4.9% Total work force
INADEQUATE FAMILY INCOME
Total IFI = 7,052 = 6.0% Total work force
Half-year IFI 
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4,278 = 4.3% Half-year work force 
3.7% Total work force
3,09& = 3.7% Full-year work force 
2.6% Total work force
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just half of families, a movie for the children once a month, no ciga 
rettes, and a six pack of beer three times a month for the family, would 
have cost an estimated $12,585 in Autumn 1979. 3/ If one family member 
worked full-time at the minimum wage in 1979, his or her $5,900 in earnings 
would have provided for less than half of this Bureau of Labor Statistics- 
defined lower living standard. If a second family member also worked 
half-time all year, the combined family earnings would be less than three- 
fourths of the standard, and even full-time, full-year minimum wage earn 
ings by two family members would fall slightly short. Put another way, a 
family of four with one fully employed full-time worker, and one fully- 
employed part-time worker, both earning 150 percent of the minimum wage, 
would just exceed the BLS lower living standard, and a few weeks of 
unemployment would drop the family below this modest level of sufficiency. 
A family with income or earnings 150 percent above the poverty level would 
also fall short. After cutting the three six packs of beer a month and the 
once-a-month movie, there is little that could be labelled frivolous in the 
market basket which could be afforded by a family with workers earning 150 
percent of the minimum wage or with earnings or income 150 percent above 
the poverty level. Such workers and families may not be living in absolute 
deprivation, but they certainly cannot be considered more than marginally 
self-sufficient.
The use of less severe earnings and income standards increases the 
hardship counts and related deficits (Chart 2.4). Calculating the HE by 
comparing earnings to 125 percent, rather than 100 percent, of the minimum 
wage for all hours of availability, raises the HE tally for all work force 
participants by 45 percent; while comparing family earnings and incomes to 
125 percent rather than 100 percent of the poverty level raises the IFE by 
30 percent and the IFI by nearly half. Under these "intermediate" hardship 
standards, the HE, IFE, and IFI Deficits are two-thirds, one-half, and 
four-fifths above the severe hardship deficits (Table 2.1). There were 
51.4 million work force participants in 1979 who earned less than $4.50 per 
hour of availability, the moderate hardship standard; while 21.6 million 
had family earnings less than 150 percent of the poverty level and 14.4 
million had family incomes below this level. To provide all work force 
participants with 150 percent of the minimum wage for their hours of avail 
ability would have required $136.4 billion in- additional earnings, repre 
senting 10.5 percent of the nation's total wages and salaries. To provide 
earnings and income 150 percent of the poverty level for all families with 




The unemployment rate is our nation's most carefully scrutinized and 
widely quoted social indicator, to a large extent because of the presumed 
association between joblessness and suffering. Each week of forced idle 
ness reduces annual earnings and increases the chances that, over the
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Chart 2.4. HARDSHIP AMONG 1979 WORK FORCE PARTICIPANTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
ADEQUACY STANDARDS
(Numbers 1n Thousands)
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] MODERATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 14,354 = 12.3% Work force
INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 10,524 = 9.0% Work force
SEVERE HARDSHIP STANDARDS = 7,055 = 6.0% Work force
Severe Hardship Standard: HE earnings standard 100 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family 
income standard 100 percent of poverty
Intermediate Hardship Standard: HE earnings standard 125 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family 
income standard 125 percent of poverty
Moderate Hardship Standard: HE earnings standard 150 percent of minimum
wage and IFE family earnings and IFI family 
income standard 150 percent of poverty
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course of the year, earnings will be inadequate (Chart 2.5). Almost all of 
the 1979 work force participants who were unemployed or discouraged for 
two-thirds or more of their weeks of participation had annual earnings 
below the minimum wage level for their yearly hours of availability. Yet 
among those unemployed less than a third of their weeks in the labor force, 
only a third had Inadequate Individual Earnings. Since this group with 
shorter duration unemployment represented three of every five work force 
participants who experienced unemployment in 1979, only half of all the 
unemployed were in the HE. Moreover, among the unemployed with Inadequate 
Individual Earnings, only two in five resided in families with combined 
earnings below the poverty level, and only one in four resided in poor 
families after the receipt of transfers and other nonearned income:
Experienced unemployment (000) 18,468
Unemployed with adequate individual earnings -8.591
Unemployed in HE 9,877
Unemployed with Inadequate Individual Earnings but
adequate family earnings -6,169
+ Unemployed with adequate individual earnings but
Inadequate Family Earnings +502
Unemployed in IFE 4,210
Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by nontransfer
income -548
Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by transfer
income -1,044
Unemployed in IFI 2,618
Thus, only half of the unemployed were in the I IE, less than a fourth 
in the IFE and only one in seven in the IFI. Conversely, over half of the 
unemployed resided in families with incomes above $15,000 annually, com 
pared with just 6 percent of labor force participants included in the IFE 
count, and virtually none of those included in the IFI count (Chart 2.6). 
Without question, the HE, the IFE, and particularly the IFI rates, are 
much better indicators of economic hardship than the unemployment rate.
Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment, rather than 
unemployment, were the most frequent causes of hardship. Two-thirds of the 
28.3 million work force participants with Inadequate Individual Earnings, 
and a similar proportion of the 13.3 million with Inadequate Family 
Earnings, suffered no weeks of unemployment during the year. There were 
6.4 million low-paTcf workers who were employed full-time during their 
participation in the labor force but did not earn the minimum wage equiva-
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Chart 2.5. SEVERE HARDSHIP INCIDENCE RATES AMONG INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DIFFERING PATTERNS OF WORK EXPERIENCE DURING 1979*
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lent for their hours of availability. Likewise, over a fifth of persons 
with Inadequate Family Earnings, and a fourth of those with Inadequate 
Family Incomes, had full-time jobs during all their weeks in the labor 
force. Thirty-five percent of part-time workers employed all weeks in the 
labor force did not earn the equivalent of the minimum wage for their hours 
of availability, and they accounted for over two-fifths of the HE. Part- 
time workers also accounted for 46 percent of the IFE and 38 percent of the 
IFI.
Employed full-time, all weeks
Employed part-time voluntarily 
some or all weeks
Employed part-time involuntarily 
some or all weeks
Unemployed one-third or fewer of 
weeks in work force
Unemployed one-third to two-thirds 
of weeks in work force
Unemployed over two-thirds of weeks 




Work experience pattern distribution
of persons in severe 
hardship counts for total work force
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Another perspective is provided by the hardship deficit measures. The 
average hardship deficits for part-time workers were much lower than those 










HE IFE IFI HE IFE IFI
$1,974 $4,176 $2,591 $5,960 $5,069 $3,253
2,157 2,314 1,747 2,720 2,411 1,956
1,830 2,506 1,954 2,825 2,409 2,120
1,060 2,159 1,553 1,648 1,940 1,670
2,480 2.196 1,840 3,309 2,334 2,176
Total $1,839 $2,384 $1,118 $2,698 $2,345 $2,036
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In the aggregate, persons in the severe hardship HE were $52.0 
billion short of the minimum wage equivalent for their annual hours in the 
work force. Those who were employed full-time during their weeks in the 
work force accounted for 31 percent of this deficit, while those who were 
employed part-time some or all weeks and experienced no unemployment 
accounted for 29 percent. Thus, individuals unemployed some or all weeks 
accounted for only two-fifths of the HE Deficit. The individuals in the 
IFE with full-time employment all weeks in the work force accounted for a 
fifth of the $31.7 billion IFE Deficit and workers employed some weeks 
part-time and experiencing no unemployment accounted for over two-fifths. 
In other words, the low earnings of part-time workers in hardship were a 
major factor in the economic hardship faced by their families.
Share of severe hardship deficits
for total work force 
by work experience pattern
HE Deficit IFE Deficit IFI Deficit
Employed full-time all weeks 30.6%
Employed part-time voluntarily 17.9
Employed part-time involuntarily 11.2
Unemployed one-third or fewer 
of weeks in work force 10.5
Unemployed one-third to two- 
thirds of weeks in work force 11.4
Unemployed more than two-thirds 















The relative importance of unemployment, involuntary part-time work, 
and low wages received for full-time or voluntary part-time work, varied 
with the hardship and work force attachment standards. Part-time workers 
with no unemployment accounted for 31 percent of all work force partici 
pants with Inadequate Individual Earnings in 1979, but only 26 percent of 
the full-year HE (Table 2.2). Conversely, full-time workers with no 
unemployment accounted for 23 percent of the total HE but 29 percent of 
the full-year HE. The explanation for this difference is that a lesser 
proportion of full-year participants were part-time workers (29 percent vs. 
21 percent), while the HE incidence among full-year part-time workers was 
less than among all part-time workers (29 percent vs. 35 percent).
Fully-employed, full-time workers with no unemployment represented a 
larger share of the hardship counts and deficits when the income and 
earnings standards were less stringent. They accounted for 23 percent of 
the 1979 severe hardship HE for the total work force but 34 percent of the 
moderate hardship HE; their shares of the severe and moderate hardship IFE 
counts were 22 and 28 percent, respectively. Conversely, the unemployed 
accounted for 35 percent of the severe hardship HE for the total work 
force but only 26 percent of the moderate hardship HE, while representing
Table 2.2. SHARE OF HARDSHIP BY WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN*
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32 percent of severe hardship IFE but only 29 percent of the moderate 
hardship IFE.
Alleviating Hardship By Solving Labor Market Problems
The relative importance of different labor force pathologies is 
suggested by the changes in the hardship counts and deficits which occur 
when earnings are augmented in various ways. Suppose, for instance, that 
all labor force participants experiencing unemployment or involuntary 
part-time employment were ascribed minimum wages for all hours of forced 
idleness. The combination of these augmented earnings with the wages and 
salaries of other family members would, in many cases, lift family earnings 
above the hardship threshhold. The Full Employment IFE--calculated just 
like the "regular IFE but after augmenting the earnings of the unemployed 
and involuntary part-time workers—was a fourth below the regular IFE in 
*1979, as was the Full Employment IFE Deficit (Table 2.3).
If the unemployed and involuntary part-time workers in the IFE were 
ascribed the same wage as they averaged during their hours of employment— 
or up to the earnings capacity they demonstrated in the labor market—the 
Capacity Employment IFE would have been just a sixth below the regular IFE 
and the Capacity Employment IFE Deficit a fifth below the regular IFE Defi 
cit. Because the impact of augmentation was less when unemployed and 
involuntary part-time workers were ascribed their usual wage, rather than 
the minimum wage, for their hours of idleness, it is clear that many in the 
IFE experiencing forced idleness also received low wages when they worked.
Eliminating Inadequate Individual Earnings would not eliminate 
Inadequate Family Earnings. If all persons in both the HE and IFE counts 
were ascribed the minimum wage equivalent for all hours of availability, 
and their then adequate individual earnings were added to those of other 
family members, this Adequate Employment IFE would have been 36 percent 
below the regular IFE in 1979, but would still have included 8.5 million 
persons. While the regular IFE Deficit would have been reduced by two- 
fifths, an Adequate Employment IFE Deficit of $18.8 billion would have 
remained.
If the annual earnings of the persons in the IFE were enhanced by 10 
percent, whether through increased hours of employment or raised hourly 
wages, the Enhanced Earnings IFE would have been only a tenth below the 
regular IFE. Even if the unemployed and involuntary part-time workers were 
first provided employment for all hours of idleness, with wages at their 
usual hourly rate, and then the earnings of all persons in the IFE were 
enhanced by 10 percent, this Enhanced Capacity IFE would still have been 55 
percent of the regular IFE, and 7.4 million work force participants would 
have remained in families with earnings below the poverty level.
The family earnings shortfalls of half-year and full-year, as opposed 
to total, work force participants were much more clearly the result of 
labor market problems rather than limited work force availability, as 
suggested by the greater impacts of earnings augmentation for half-year and 
full-year workers. For instance, if full-year participants with Inade-
Table 2.3. REDUCTIONS IN INADEQUATE FAMILY EARNINGS RESULTING FROM AUGMENTED INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS
Severe Hardship Standards Intermediate Hardship Standards Moderate Hardship Standards
Hardship
IFE







Full Employment IFE Deficit -
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit,
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit^
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit5
Percent Reduction In Regular IFE
Full Employment IFE -
Adequate Employment IFE.
Capacity Employment IFE .
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
Enhanced Capacity IFE5
Percent Reduction in Regular
IFE Deficit
Full Employment IFE Deficit 1 «
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit,
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit

























































































































































































































^In calculating the Full Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are augmented by providing all unemployed and involuntarily part-time employed persons 
in the IFE the minimum wage (or 125 and 150 percent of the minimum wage for Intermediate and moderate hardship standards) for all hours of forced 
Idleness.
^In calculating the Adequate Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are augmented for all persons In the IFE with Inadequate Individu.il Earnings. Their 
earnings are raised to the Individual adequacy standard, i.e., the minimum wage or Its multiple times their hours of availability
In calculating the Capacity Employment IFE and Deficit, the unemployed jnd involuntary part-time workers in the IFE are provided their usual 
wage (when working) for all hours of forced idleness.
4 In calculating the Enhanced Earnings IFE and Deficit, th'e earnings of each person In the IFE are augmented by 10 percent.
In calculating the Enhanced Capacity IFE and Deficit, unemployed and involuntary p.n t-1linu worker-, In the IFE are fir'it or.j/i<Jtil U,-;ir usual wd<ie 
(when working) for all hour-, of forced Idl'-rieis, then their capacity level earning-,, as well as thu earning', of all other pui .<,n. in the IFE, are 




quate Family Earnings in 1979 were provided the minimum wage equivalent for 
all hours of availability, or their actual earnings if higher than this 
level, the regular full-year IFE would have been reduced by three-fifths. 
The Enhanced Capacity IFE for full-year participants was only a third of 
the regular IFE for full-year participants.
Full Employment augmentation had a greater effect on reducing moderate 
and intermediate hardship than severe hardship; while Capacity Employment 
augmentation had a lesser effect. Multiples of the minimum wage exceeded 
the usual earnings of the unemployed, so that when their earnings were 
augmented by providing 125 or 150 percent of the minimum for each hour of 
unemployment or involuntary part-time work, this represented a substan 
tially greater increment than when usual earnings were ascribed for all 
idle hours. Adequate Employment augmentation had a greater effect in 
reducing moderate than severe hardship because persons with Inadequate 
Individual Earnings represented a larger share of the moderate hardship IFE 
than the severe hardship IFE (69 percent of persons in the severe hardship 
IFE for the total work force had Inadequate Individual Earnings compared to 
83 percent of the persons in the moderate hardship IFE).
Breadwinners and Breadwinning Responsibilities
By definition, Inadequate Individual Earnings may result only from low 
hourly earnings, unemployment, involuntary part-time employment, or some 
combination. Inadequate Family Earnings often results from these in 
dividual labor market problems, but can be compounded by limited work force 
participation of family members as well as by large families. Among the 
13.3 million total work force participants with Inadequate Family Earnings, 
and the 5.7 million in the full-year IFE, 4.2 million and 1.2 million, 
respectively, had adequate individual earnings. On the other hand, 
individual earnings problems were not always, or not even usually, as 
sociated with family earnings problems. Among the 28.7 million total work 
force participants and 14.2 million full-year work force participants with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings in 1979, only 9.1 and 4.5 million, respec 
tively, were in families with below-poverty earnings.
Overall, the IFE incidence was higher among unrelated individuals and 
workers who were members of two-person families than among those living in 
families with three to five members. The IFE incidence was also sig 
nificant among families with six or more members:
IFE rate for total 





Six or more members 13.9
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However, controlling for the number of work force participants, hard 
ship increased with family size. Reflecting the higher HE rates among 
part-time and secondary earners, the work force participants from larger 
families with more than one earner were most likely to have Inadequate 
Individual Earnings (Table 2.4). Workers with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings were more likely to have Inadequate Family Earnings if their 
families were larger. The more family members to support, the greater were 
the chances that a person with adequate individual earnings would never 
theless have below-poverty family earnings.
Conversely, the likelihood of Inadequate Family Earnings was much 
lower when there were more breadwinners in the family and when these bread 
winners had greater labor force attachment. Families with four to five 
members had the following probabilities of having annual earnings below the 
poverty level:
Probability of below-poverty 
family earnings
Three or more full-year work force participants 1.6%
Three or more half-year work force participants 2.0
Three or more in work force during year 3.0
Two full-year work force participants 5.5
Two half-year work force participants 6.2
Two in work force during year 8.6
One full-year work force participant 12.3
One half-year work force participant 14.6
One in work force during year 20.5
Supplements to Family Earnings
The economic hardship which would have resulted from Inadequate Family 
Earnings was significantly mitigated by transfer payments and other non- 
earned income. Nearly half of all 1979 work force participants with family 
earnings below the poverty level had at least minimally adequate family 
incomes. Nontransfer earnings supplements accounted for 45 percent of 
those rising out of poverty, while the addition of transfers accounted for 
the remainder. The IFE Deficit of $31.7 billion for 1979 was reduced to 
$24.0 billion by nontransfer income, and reduced further to $12.8 billion 
(or the IFI Deficit) by cash transfers. This $11.2 billion deficit 
reduction caused by transfers was not the amount of transfers received by 
the families of workers in the IFE, since the benefits they received may 
have exceeded the IFE Deficit in many cases. Nevertheless, the deficit 
reduction provides an important indicator of the degree to which labor 
market-related hardship was alleviated by transfers and other income.
The "Earnings Supplementation Rate"--i.e., the probability that a 
worker with Inadequate Family Earnings will have adequate family income 
because of transfers and other nonearned income—was, understandably, much
Table 2.4. INCIDENCE OF HARDSHIP BY FAMILY SIZE AND NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN TOTAL WORK FORCE*
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lower when he or she had a more severe labor market problem or more mouths 
to feed, and, therefore, a greater deficit to make up by earnings supple 
ments. The Earnings Supplementation Rate for the total work force was 46.9 
percent, with a 21.3 percent reduction in the IFE due to nontransfer income 
[Chart 2.7). Among voluntary part-time workers—who had lower average IFE 
Deficits—the Earnings Supplementation Rate was 60.4 percent, compared to 
only 32.8 percent for persons in the IFE who had no employment during their 
weeks in. the work force. Those in the IFE with adequate individual 
earnings or an individual earnings deficit of less than $250 had a 57.8 
percent chance of rising out of poverty as a result of earnings supple 
ments, compared to a 31.7 percent Earnings Supplementation Rate among IFE 
workers with individual earnings deficits of $4,000 or more. Families with 
more members were less likely to be lifted out of the IFE, reflecting their 
larger family earnings deficits. As the number of family earners in 
creased, so did the likelihood of earnings supplementation, again because 
the extra earnings brought the families closer to the poverty threshold.
Because most cash transfers are income targeted and are reduced as 
earnings increase, the proportions of 1979 work force participants who were 
moved out of intermediate and moderate hardship, by the receipt of transfers 
were lower than the proportion moved out of severe hardship, even though 
the numbers affected were nearly the same. The percentage reduction in the 
severe hardship IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit which resulted from cash 
benefits exceeded the percentage reductions in either the intermediate and 
moderate IFI Net-of-Transfer Deficits, even though the dollar reductions 
were much smaller simply because there were more persons and hence more 
recipients in moderate and intermediate, compared to severe, hardship. 
Again, the deficit represented only the difference between income net of 
transfer and the poverty level; the transfers received by persons lifted 
out of hardship by their receipt may have exceeded this deficit reduction 
to the degree the cash benefits raised incomes above the poverty level. 
Since most of the persons in severe hardship who received transfers 
remained below the moderate hardship standards, most of the transfers 
received by the poor in the work force were included in the deficit 
reductions measured using moderate hardship standards:
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Chart 2.7. PERCENT OF PERSONS IN SEVERE HARDSHIP IFE BUT NOT IN IFI BECAUSE 
OF EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTS*
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The IFI considers only cash transfers, but in-kind aid such as subsi 
dized housing and free school lunches may reduce cash needs, while food 
stamps may actually be used as currency in some communities. Adding the 
value of food stamps received by a family to its cash income in 1979 re 
duces the number of work force participants with Inadequate Family Income 
by half a million and the IFI Deficit from $12.8 to $10.9 billion. Valuing 
school lunches at the poverty budget expenditure for each meal, and sub 
sidized housing at the estimated percentage reduction in housing expendi 
ture which resulted from subsidies, and adding these amounts to cash and 
food stamp income for recipient families, reduces the IFI and its Deficit 
even more. Where there were 7.1 million persons in the severe hardship IFI 
considering only cash income, and 6.5 million counting the value of food 
stamps as income, the number drops to 6.2 million when subsidized housing 
and school lunches are counted as income, reducing the IFI Deficit to $10.4 
billion. As in the case of cash transfers, the percentage reductions in 
hardship counts and deficits resulting from in-kind aid are greater for the 
severe hardship measures than the intermediate or moderate hardship 
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The Burdens of Hardship
Hardship is concentrated among women, minorities, younger and older 
work force participants, persons with limited education, workers in blue 
collar and service jobs, residents of nonmetropolitan, particularly rural, 
areas as well as large central cities. As a general rule, the concen 
tration of hardship among these subgroups and areas is even greater than 
the concentration of joblessness, so that the relative severity of the 
problems of the less advantaged is greater from the hardship perspective.
Sex and Family Status
Only 16.0 percent of females in the work force during 1979 experienced 
unemployment, very near the 15.4 percent incidence among males. Yet 
because of lower wages, one of every three female participants had earnings 
below the minimum wage equivalent for their hours of availability, compared 
to just one of every six males. One reason was that the males were more 
likely to be full-year participants (81 percent vs. 61 percent for fe 
males), and the HE among full-year workers tends to be lower than among 
part-year workers. Yet 23 percent of the women in the work force full-year 
had earnings below the minimum wage equivalent compared to just 13 percent 
of male full-year participants:
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Females with Inadequate Individual Earnings were less likely than 
males to live in families with Inadequate Family Earnings, while among 
individuals with Inadequate Family Earnings, females were more likely than 
males to escape poverty through the receipt of nonearned income:
60
Proportion of persons with 
Inadequate Individual 
Earnings who were in 
families with Inadequate 
Family Earnings
Proportion of work force 
participants in families 
with Inadequate Family 
Earnings whose families 
exited from poverty as a 











As a result, the sex differentials in IFE and IFI incidence were less
than the differential in IIE incidence. Females accounted for three-fifths




Persons with Inadequate Individual Earnings
Persons with Inadequate Family Earnings















The labor market problems of women are often downplayed because 
females are more likely than males to live in families with other earners. 
Nearly a fourth of all male participants in 1979 were family heads whose 
wives were either not present or not in the work force compared to only 12 
percent of females in the work force who were family heads (Table 2.5). 
Yet comparing hardship among males and females with similar breadwinning 
status, women were clearly worse off, increasingly so if they were parents 
or primary earners:
Table 2.5. DISTRIBUTION OF HALES AND FEMALES IN THE WORK FORCE AND IN SEVERE HARDSHIP BY FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIP
Male
Male Family Householder, 
No Wife in Work Force
Male Family Householder, 





















































































































Family heads, no 
husbands or wives 
in work force
Male family heads with 
wives in work force 
vs. working wives
Other family members 
Unrelated individuals
Female Female 






























The hardship deficits suggest that the labor market problems of women 
have serious consequences for themselves and their families. Females 
account for half of the severe hardship deficits for the total work force 















The Problems of Minorities
Minorities bear a disproportionate share of hardship burdens. Blacks, 
who represented 10 percent of the total work force in 1979, and 16 percent 
of those experiencing unemployment, accounted for 15 percent of the severe 
hardship HE, 22 percent of the IFE, and 28 percent of the IFI (Table 2.6). 
The black shares of the severe hardship deficits were 15, 26, and 30 
percent, respectively. While the black shares of moderate hardship were 
somewhat lower, the majority of black work force participants had in 
dividual earnings below the moderate hardship standard, or 150 percent of 
the minimum wage for their hours of availability.
The chances of experiencing unemployment during the year were 165 
percent higher for blacks than whites; and the chances of having individual 
earnings below the minimum wage equivalent were 151 percent higher (Table 
2.7). But only a third of the whites with Inadequate Individual Earnings 
were in families with Inadequate Family Earnings, compared to almost 
two-thirds of the blacks in the HE. Thus, the IFE incidence among black





















































































































































































Individuals unemployed over one-third of their weeks in the work force.
Table 2.7. INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF LABOR MARKET PROBLEMS AND HARDSHIP AMONG WHITES, BLACKS AND 
HISPANICS




































































































































































































































UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP INDICATORS
FOR BLACKS AND HISPANICS 






































































Individuals unemployed over one-third of their wo»ks In the work force.
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work force participants was 246 percent the incidence among whites. 
Furthermore, half of the whites with Inadequate Family Earnings were lifted 
out of poverty by other family income, compared to less than a third of 
blacks. As a result, black workers were nearly three and a half times as 
likely as whites to have Inadequate Family Income.
Hispanics (self-identified according to origin and including both 




divided by divided by
white black
incidence incidence
Unemployment incidence 150% 91%
Likelihood predominantly unemployed 180 68
HE incidence 124 82
IFE incidence 163 66
IFI incidence 240 70
While Hispanics with Inadequate Individual Earnings were less likely 
than blacks to have Inadequate Family Earnings (51 percent of Hispanics in 
the severe hardship HE were also in the IFE compared to 64 percent of 
blacks), those with Inadequate Family Earnings were more likely to have 
Inadequate Family Income (the Hispanic IFI was 72 percent of the IFE com 
pared to 68 percent for blacks) largely because they were less protected by 
transfers. Nonearned income raised 10 percent of the Hispanic IFE out of 
poverty, and cash transfers 19 percent, compared to Earnings Supplementa 
tion Rates of 8 percent and 24 percent, respectively, for blacks in the 
IFE.
Age and Hardship
The 1979 I IE incidence among work force participants age 65 and over 
was twice that among workers age 25 to 44 (Chart 2.8). Many older workers 
remained in the work force because of economic necessity, but those with 
low family earnings were likely to have other sources of income, par 
ticularly transfers, so that while their IFE rate was over five times that 
among 25- to 44-year-olds, their IFI rate was actually lower.
The HE incidence among teenagers was three and a half times that 
among prime age workers. But the younger work force participants with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings were more likely than prime age workers in 
the HE to reside in families with other earners and other income sources 
which lifted them out of hardship (Table 2.8). This was particularly true 
of students, who represented three-fifths of all teenage work force par 
ticipants and a fifth of participants age 20 through 24. 4/ Where 35
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percent of all prime age (25-44) work force participants with Inadequate 
Individual Earnings also had Inadequate Family Earnings, only 15 percent of 
teenage students in the I IE, and 27 percent of 20-24 year-old students, 
resided in families with below-poverty earnings.
These hardship patterns reflect underlying age-related work partici 
pation and family patterns. Four-fifths of prime age work force par 
ticipants in 1979 were in the labor force year-round and 55 percent were 
employed full-time, full-year (Table 2.9). In contrast, only 55 percent of 
workers age 65 and older were full-year participants, and less than one in 
seven worked full-year. Only a third of teenage work force participants in 
1979 participated full-year and just 6 percent were employed full-time, 
full-year. Teenagers represented a quarter of the total work force but 
only a ninth of the full-time, full-year work force.
Younger and older persons in hardship were more likely than prime age 
individuals to have been in the work force less than full-year and to have 
experienced unemployment or part-time employment. For instance, although 
half of those with Inadequate Individual Earnings were under age 25 or over 
age 64, younger and older full-year participants, accounted for only a fifth 
of the total HE, while those working full-time, full-year accounted for 
only 4 percent.
Because younger and older work force participants had fewer hours of 
availability, their average hardship deficits were lower than those of 
prime age workers (Table 2.10). Moreover, the younger and older workers 
with Inadequate Family Earnings were more likely than prime age partici 
pants in the IFE to have had their hardship mitigated by nonearned and 
particularly transfer income, as suggested by their Earnings Supplementa 
tion Rates:
Percent in IFE Percent in IFE
lifted out of lifted out of
poverty by all poverty by






As a result, younger and older workers represented a smaller share of 
hardship deficits than of hardship counts. Prime age participants ac 
counted for 31 percent of the I IE but 35 percent of the I IE Deficit, 33 
percent of the IFE but 37 percent of the IFE Deficit, and 42 percent of the 
IFI but 48 percent of the IFI Deficit.
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Table 2.9. AGE, WORK FORCE ATTACHMENT, WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERNS AND 
HARDSHIP, 1979*




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Payoffs of Education
Limited education increases the likelihood of inadequate earnings and 
income. Over a third of high school dropouts in the 1979 work force had 
Inadequate Individual Earnings, and one in eight had Inadequate Family 
Income—incidence rates that were, respectively, 3.7 and 5.5 times those of 
college graduates (Chart 2.9). In comparison, the incidence of unemploy 
ment among dropouts was only 2.6 times the incidence among college 
graduates. Thus, dropouts accounted for 21 percent of the work force and 
29 percent of the unemployed, but 46 percent of the HE count, and 43 
percent of both the IFE and IFI counts (Table 2.11).
The less educated were far less likely to achieve stable, full-time 
employment during their weeks in the work force, and this, in part, ex 
plained the large differentials in hardship incidence rates. During 1979, 
only two of five dropouts were in the work force full-year and employed 
full-time, all weeks, compared to half of high school graduates with no 
further education and nearly two-thirds of college graduates (Table 2.12). 
Not only did 22 percent of dropouts experience some weeks of joblessness, 
but 9 percent experienced some weeks of involuntary part-time employment 
(or three times the incidence of involuntary part-time work among par 
ticipants with some post-secondary education).
Yet whatever their pattern of work force experience, persons with less 
education were more likely to suffer individual and family hardship (Table 
2.13). For instance, among the less than full-year participants with some 
weeks of unemployment, the HE rate for dropouts was half again that of 
college graduates, the IFE rate was double, and the IFI rate was triple. 
The college educated with Inadequate Individual Earnings were less likely 
to reside in families with inadequate earnings, while those in families 
with inadequate earnings were more likely to have other sources of income 
lifting them out of poverty:
Percent Percent 
HE in IFE IFE not in IFI
High school dropouts 44.6% 43.4%
High school graduates 28.7 46.9
1-3 years post-secondary education 30.4 50.2
College degree 32.4 56.2
Good Jobs. Bad Jobs
Not surprisingly, hardship was concentrated among workers in those 
occupations with low average wages and higher unemployment. The IFE rate 
among individuals employed primarily as laborers was three times the rate 
among those employed primarily in technical, professional or managerial 
jobs (Chart 2.10). Service workers were over four times more likely to 
have Inadequate Family Income than professional, technical, and managerial 
workers.
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Table 2.13. SEVERE HARDSHIP INCIDENCE BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS AND WORK FORCE EXPERIENCE PATTERN*











Total 65.6 40.8 34.6 21.3 16.2 9.4 15.3 13.4 21.5 8.9 7.6 4.9 8.8 
Employed full-time,
51.5 15.3 14.8 7.4 5.3 3.1 15.4 3.4 6.5 2.2 1.6 1.0 2.7
Employed full-time,
less than full-year 60.1 30.2 30.6 21.9 10.2 9.8 16.2 11.6 22.6 15.1 15.3 8.0 9.4
Employed part-time, 
some weeks; in work 
force full-year 61.6 40.2 37.1 25.8 20.6 16.1 9.7 12.7 22.6 9.8 8.0 7.7 6.3
Employed part-time, 
some weeks; in work 
force less than 
full-year 59.9 42.0 46.6 38.7 33.4 24.1 14.9 19.7 40.4 21.3 20.4 17.7 8.1
Unemployed some weeks; 
In work force full- 
year 84.4 60.3 53.1 41.9 35.4 30.1 18.8 22.4 26.1 14.9 13.8 12.6 10.9
Unemployed some weeks; 
in work force less 









4.4 1.4 1.0 0.6
5.4 14.9 8.5 6.5 4.5
3.8 2.9
8.1 18.2 8.8 9.0 5.7
8.7 17.1 8.3 7.6 6.3
2.5 33.4 17.5 14.5 10.2
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As a result of these disparate hardship rates, white collar workers 
accounted for half of the work force but only a fourth of the severe 
hardship IFI and IFI Deficit, and a third of the IFE and IFE Deficit. 
Conversely, service workers represented a seventh of the work force but a 
fourth of the IFE, IFI and associated deficits (Table 2.14).
Major differences in the work experience patterns by occupation were 
reflected in the hardship patterns (Table 2.15). Less than three-fifths of 
laborers and service workers were full-year work force participants during 
1979 compared to over four-fifths of professional, technical and managerial 
workers. Likewise, less than half of laborers and service workers with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings were full-year work force participants 
compared to three-fifths of professional, technical, and managerial workers 
in the IIE. Blue collar workers in the IFE and IIE were more likely than 
other workers to have experienced some unemployment during the previous 
year. Over half of service workers in the IIE and IFE were part-timers 
employed all weeks in the work force.
The Geography of Hardship
Hardship was concentrated in central cities and nonmetropolitan areas. 
Central city workers, who represented 28 percent of the work force, ac 
counted for a similar proportion of the IIE and IIE Deficit, but 32 percent 
of the IFE and 35 percent of the IFE Deficit, as well as 35 percent of the 
IFI and 37 percent of the IFI Deficit (Table 2.16). The suburban areas 
surrounding these central cities accounted for 41 percent of the labor 
force but only 35 percent of the unemployed, 34 percent of the IIE, 31 
percent of the IFE and 27 percent of the IFI. Suburban work force par 
ticipants with Inadequate Individual Earnings were much less likely than 
their central city counterparts to have Inadequate Family Earnings (26 
percent vs. 39 percent). In addition, 52 percent of the suburbanites in 
the IFE were lifted out of poverty by nonearned income compared to only 42 
percent of central city residents with Inadequate Family Earnings (Table 
2.17).
Nonmetropol itan areas accounted for 31 percent of the labor force but 
39 percent of the IIE, 38 percent of the IFE, and 37 percent of the IFI. 
While the incidence of unemployment was roughly the same as in metropolitan 
areas, the rates of family earnings and income inadequacy were two-fifths 
higher. Hardship was particularly acute in farm areas. Over two-fifths 
of workers residing in farm areas had Inadequate Individual Earnings, while 
the IFE incidence was half again that of metropolitan areas.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.16. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, WORK FORCE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP BY REGION AND 
METROPOLITAN AREA
Inside SMSA
SMSA 1 Million or More 
Central City 
Balance







East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 







































































































































































































Table 2.17. INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP IN 1979 BY REGION AND METROPOLITAN AREA*
Inside SHSA 












Cast North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Atlantic 


















































































































































































































































Hardship was concentrated in the South. The South Atlantic region 
(Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North and 
South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia) accounted for a sixth of the 
labor force, the unemployed and the predominantly unemployed, but nearly a 
fifth of the IFE and the IFI. The East South Central area (Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee) accounted for 6 percent of the labor 
force and the unemployed, but 7 percent of the HE, 8 percent of the IFE 
and 9 percent of the IFI. Finally, the West South Central area (Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas), with 10 percent of the work force, con 
tained 11 percent of the HE, 13 percent of the IFE and 14 percent of the 
IFI. In contrast, the New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont), Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York 
and Pennsylvania), and East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Ohio and Wisconsin) areas together contained 40 percent of the labor force 
and 42 percent of persons experiencing unemployment, but only 37 percent of 
the HE, 34 percent of the IFE and 31 percent of the IFI. The West North 
Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebrasks, North and South 
Dakota) and Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) areas had hardship shares roughly proportional to 
their labor force shares; while the hardship shares of the Pacific states 
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington) were slightly lower 
than their labor force and unemployment shares.
The explanations are varied. The New England, Middle Atlantic, and 
East North Central areas all had below average HE rates in 1979. For 
these three areas, the proportions of individuals with inadequate earnings 
who were in families with inadequate earnings were below the 32.2 percent 
average for the nation, while the Earnings Supplementation Rates for 
individuals in the IFE were above the 46.9 percent national average and 
transfers lifted larger proportions of workers in the IFE above the poverty 
threshold than the 25.5 percent averaged nationwide.
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Notes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the 1979 data used in this chapter are the
1979 estimates adjusted for 1980 Census weights. The choice of 1970 
or 1980 Census weights makes very little or no difference when in 
cidence rates are involved but is usually more of a factor in the 
levels and distributions of hardship. The 1979 data adjusted for the
1980 Census were not available until most of this chapter and its 
charts and tables had been completed, so that adjustments were made 
only in charts and tables where the 1980-weighted figures differed 
noticeably from the 1970-weighted figures. The use of 1970 weights is 
noted by an asterisk.
2. In allocating the family IFE and IFI Deficits among family work force 
participants when the total work force is considered, the HE Deficits 
of all family members are first summed, and if this exceeds the IFE 
and IFI Deficits for the family, the IFE and IFI Deficits are allo 
cated according to shares of the combined HE Deficits. If the 
combined HE Deficits of all family members are less than the IFE 
and/or IFI Deficits, the difference is allocated according to shares 
of family earnings which would be contributed by each member if those 
with HE had minimally adequate earnings. In the case of the full- 
year and half-year hardship deficits, the HE Deficits of only the 
full-year or half-year participating members are first summed, and the 
allocations then proceed as indicated above. The IFE or IFI Deficits 
for the total work force, minus the IFE or IFI Deficits for the 
full-year or half-year work force, do not equal the IFE or IFI 
Deficits allocated to the less than full-year or less than half-year 
workers in the total work force deficit allocations.
3. "Family Budgets," Monthly Labor Review, August 1980, pp. 29-30.
4. In determining the adequacy of family income and earnings, college 
students were counted as members of their regular families unless they 
had a permanent, independent residence.

CHAPTER 3. HARDSHIP TRENDS OVER THE 1974-1980 PERIOD
An Overview
Seven Lean Years
Is hardship increasing or decreasing? Are the differentials in 
hardship incidence narrowing or widening? Have changes in the composition 
of the work force exacerbated hardship? Has the safety net for the working 
poor been substantially improved? These and other important questions 
about labor market developments and related hardship trends can be tenta 
tively addressed using the hardship data tabulated for the 1974-1980 
period.
These seven years may be remembered fondly, but only in contrast to 
the depression conditions of the 1980s. Unemployment reached and remained 
at levels which had previously been considered untenable. The annual 
unemployment rate averaged 6.8 percent from 1974 through 1980, compared to 
the 4.7 percent average for 1947 through 1973. The 1974-1980 period 
witnessed slowed productivity growth and minimal improvements in real 
wages. Output per hour increased only 7 percent between 1974 and 1980, 
half the increase over the preceding six years. The purchasing power of 
average hourly earnings in private nonfarm employment, which had risen by 
16 percent between 1964 and 1973, fell by 5 percent between 1974 and 1980. 
Likewise, progress slowed in the War on Poverty. The poverty rate dropped 
from 14.2 percent of the population in 1967 to 11.2 percent in 1973, but 
then rose to 13.0 percent in 1980, largely as a result of the slack labor 
market conditions.
High unemployment, slowed productivity growth, and increased poverty 
were, in part, the result of changes in the composition of the working 
population. Teenagers (16-19) accounted for 7.2 percent of the work force 
in 1947, but 8.8 percent in 1980; and the 16- to 24-year-old share rose 
from 19.7 to 23.5 percent. However, by the late 1970s, these trends were 
reversing, as the teenage share dropped from 9.7 percent between 1974 and 
1980, while the 16- to 24-year-old share dropped from 24.1 to 23.5 percent. 
Other compositional shifts during the 1974-1980 period were more consistent 
with secular trends. From 1947 to 1973, the female share of the labor 
force had increased from 28.1 to 38.9 percent. By 1980, it had reached 
42.7 percent. Married males with a spouse present declined from 52.3 
percent of the work force in 1947 to 44.8 percent in 1973, then further 
declined to 37.9 percent in 1980. White collar workers had increased from 
43.4 percent of the experienced labor force in 1960 to 47.8 percent in 
1973, and their share continued to increase to 52.2 percent in 1980. The 
percent of the labor force who were high school graduates rose from 53.8 
percent in 1962 to 67.7 percent in 1973, and continued rising to 76.2
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percent in 1980; the proportion with a college degree increased from 11.0 
to 14.1 percent, and then 18.2 percent. The long-term population shifts to 
suburban areas, and to the Southern and Western states, accelerated between 
1974 and 1980. I/
Slowing Progress
With high unemployment, slowed real wage gains, and shifts in the 
composition of the work force, there was very limited progress in reducing 
labor market-related hardship. The hardship measure defined by the 
National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, (which 
included persons in the work force 40 weeks or more, plus those discouraged 
but seeking work at least 15 weeks, whose individual earnings were less 
than double the poverty level for their families) declined from 11.2 
percent in 1967 to 7.9 percent in 1973, but then rose to 8.3 percent in 
1979. The Levitan/Taggart Employment and Earnings Inadequacy Index (which 
included those currently unemployed, discouraged, or working part-time as 
well as those working full-time but earning less than a poverty income over 
the previous year, minus all those in families with above average incomes) 
remained constant between 1968 and 1974, but then rose from 10.5 percent in 
1974 to 11.8 percent in 1979. 2/
The hardship measures proposed in this volume reveal a similar 
picture. Over the 1974-1980 period, for which these measures were tabu 
lated, there was a significant decline in the incidence of Inadequate 
Individual Earnings, a lesser decline in the incidence of Inadequate Family 
Earnings, but no improvement in the incidence of Inadequate Family Income. 
This is suggested by comparisons between the low unemployment years, 1974 
and 1979, and the high unemployment years, 1975 and 1980. 3J The severe 
hardship HE rate dropped by 1.6 percentage points between 1974 and 1979, 
and 1.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980. The IFE rate fell by 0.2 
percentage points in the first period and 0.4 percentage points in the 
second. The IFI rate rose by 0.5 percentage points between 1975 and 1980:
Changes in severe hardship incidence 
for total work force
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
HE 25.8% 24.2% -1.6% 29.1% 27.7% -1.4%
IFE 11.6 11.4 -0.2 13.2 12.8 -0.4
IFI 6.1 6.0 -0.1 6.9 7.2 +0.3
Put another way, the number of persons with Inadequate Family Income 
increased both relative to the number with Inadequate Family Earnings and 
the number with Inadequate Individual Earnings, while the IFE rose in 
relation to the HE:
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Relative changes in HE, IFE and IFI 
severe hardship counts
Ratios
IFI * IFE 























Similarly, the average I IE and IFE Deficits, measured in 1980 dollars, 
declined between 1974 with 1979, as well as between 1975 and 1980, but the 
average IFI Deficit rose. The IFI Deficit, thus, increased relative to the 





































































The improvements in the HE and IFE between 1974 and 1979, as well as 
between 1975 and 1980, reflected the reductions in unemployment over these 
same periods (Table 3.1). Yet the numbers in hardship increased relative 
both to the numbers experiencing unemployment and the numbers predominantly 
unemployed (i.e., more than one-third of their weeks in the work force). 
There was an increase in the IFE and IFI rates among persons experiencing 
unemployment, but declines in all three hardship incidence rates among 
those who were employed full-time or part-time all weeks in the work force. 
The proportion of persons with Inadequate Individual Earnings who were in 
families with Inadequate Family Earnings increased slightly. More 
critically, however, the proportion of those with Inadequate Family 
Earnings lifted out of poverty by earnings supplements declined, totally as
Table 3.1. LONG-TERM SHIFTS IN KEY SEVERE HARDSHIP AND UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
HE 25.8% 24. 2% -1.6% 29.1* 27.7% -1.4%
IFE 11.6 11.4 -0.2 13.2 12.8 -0.4
IFI 6.1 fi.O -0.1 6.9 7.2 +0.3
Experienced 
Unemployment 17.9 15.8 -2.1 20.2 18.1 -2.1
Predominantly 
Unemployed 7.5 6.4 -1.1 10.4 8.7 -1.7
HE * Experienced
Unemployment 1.44 1.53 +0.09 1.44 1.53 +0.09
IFE •» Experienced
Unemployment 0.65 0.72 +0.07 0.65 0.77 +0.12
IF! •» Experienced
Unemployment 0.34 0.38 +0.04 0.34 0.40 +0.06
IIE * Predominantly
Unemployed 3.46 3.77 +0.31 2.77 3.16 +0.39
IFE •» Predominantly
Unemployed 1.55 1.77 +0.22 1.26 1.46 +0.20
IFI •» Predominantly
Unemployed 0.82 0.94 +0.12 0.66 0.82 +0.12
Percent Unemployed
in HE 54.2 53.5 -0.7 59.9 59.6 -0.3
Percent Unemployed 
in IFE 21.9 22.8 +0.9 25.6 26.6 +1.0
Percent Unemployed
in IFI 13.7 14.2 +0.5 14.4 17.4 +3.0
Unemployed As 
Percent HE 37.6 34.9 -2.7 41.6 39.0 -2.6
Unemployed As
Percent I c £ 33.8 31.7 -2.1 39.3 37.6 -1.7
Unemployed As 
Percent IF! 39.9 37.1 -2.8 41.8 43.9 +2.1
Percent of Persons 
Employed All Weeks 
But in HE 19.6 18.7 -0.9 21.2 20.6 -0.6
Percent of Persons 
Employed All Weeks 
But in IFI 9.3 9.2 -0.1 10.0 9.7 -0.3
Percent of Persons 
Employed All Weeks 
But in IFE 4.5 4.5 0 5.1 4.9 -0.2
Percent HE in IFE 0.31 0.32 +0.01 0.34 0.35 +0.01
Earnings Supplemen 
tation Rate-Total 47.1 46.9 -0.2 47.3 44.0 -3.3
Earnings Supplemen 
tation Rate- 
Nontransfers 18.3 21.3 +3.0 16.2 19.5 +3.3
Earnings Supplemen 
tation Rate-Transfers 28.8 25.6 -3.2 31.1 24.5 -6.6
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a result of the declining impacts of transfers in alleviating severe 
hardship. If transfers had the same proportional impacts in 1979 as in 
1974, and in 1980 as in 1975, the IFI would have declined by more than the 
IFE, since the impacts of earnings supplements other than transfers 
increased significantly.
The patterns of change in intermediate and moderate hardship were 
somewhat more complex. The 1974-1979 and 1975-1980 declines in the severe 
hardship HE were not matched by improvements in the intermediate and 



















































































Consequently, the moderate hardship HE increased from 1.72 times the 
Thesevere hardship HE in 1974 to 1.82 times the HE in 1979 (Table 3.2). 
ratio of the moderate and severe hardship IFEs stayed the same from 1974 to 
1979, but the ratio of the moderate and the severe hardship IFIs declined 
from 2.08 to 2.04.
Changes in Work Force Attachment and Work Experience Patterns
Over the 1974-1980 period, the average work force attachment of all 
participants increased. In 1974, 70.2 percent of the total work force 
participated fifty weeks or more compared to 71.8 percent in 1979. The 
proportion of the total work force with at least half a year of partici 
pation rose from 83.0 to 84.4. Since increased weeks in the work force 
reduce the likelihood of experiencing hardship, this trend toward increased 
attachment had a positive impact on hardship rates. Weighting hardship 
incidence among full-year and less than full-year participants in 1979 by 
their 1974 shares of the total work force, and the 1980 rates by their 1975 
shares, and comparing these weighted rates to actual hardship incidence for 
the total work force in 1979 and 1980, respectvely, suggests that increased 
attachment was associated with a 0.3 to 0.4 percentage point reduction in 
the HE rate and with lesser effects on the IFE and IFI rates:
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Table 3.2. CHANGE IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEVERE, INTERMEDIATE AND MODERATE 



































































































































































































1979 actual severe hardship rate for total
work force 24.2% 11.4% 6.0%
1979 if had 1974 proportion full-year
participants 24.6 11.6 6.2
1974-1979 improvement from increased
attachment 0.4 0.2 0.2
1980 actual severe hardship rates for total
work force 27.7 12.8 7.2
1980 if had 1975 proportion full-year
participants 28.0 13.0 7.3
1975-1980 improvement from increased
attachment 0.3 0.2 0.1
1980 if had 1974 proportion full-year
participants 28.7 13.4 7.5
1974-1980 improvement from increased
attachment 1.0 0.6 0.3
The incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings fell among both 
full-year and less than full-year participants, but more so among the 
latter than the former (Table 3.3). In contrast, the IFE rate improved 
more for full-year participants. There was also a decline in the ratio of 
the average hardship deficits of full-year participants compared to those 
for the total work force. As a result, the full-year IFE and IFI Deficits 
declined relative to the total IFE and IFI Deficits despite the relative 
growth of the full-year work force.
There were two significant and offsetting changes in work experience 
patterns over the two comparison periods. First, the incidence and 
severity of unemployment declined. The proportion of the population 
experiencing unemployment was 2.1 percentage points lower in 1979 than in 
1974, and 2.2 percentage points lower in 1980 than 1975 (Table 3.4). Since 
hardship is more prevalent among the unemployed than the employed, the un 
employment incidence declines should have lowered hardship rates. Weight 
ing the 1979 hardship rates among work force participants experiencing 
unemployment and those not experiencing unemployment by their 1974 shares 
of the total work force suggests that the reduction in unemployment should 
have contributed a 0.7 to 0.8 percentage point improvement in the severe 
hardship HE for the total work force, a 0.2 to 0.3 percentage point 
improvement in the IFE rate, and a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage point improvement 
in the IFI rate:
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Table 3.3. RELATIVE CHANGES IN SEVERE HARDSHIP FOR FULL-YEAR HALF-YEAR 
AND TOTAL WORK FORCE
work Force Ratio







Full-Year * Total 
Half-Year * Total
HE Deficit Ratio
Full-Year * Total 
Half-Year * Total
HE Average Deficit Ratio







Full-Year •» Total 
Half-Year + Total
IFE Deficit Ratio
Full-Year -t Total 
Half-Year < Total
IFE Average Deficit Ratio







Full-Year •* Total 
Half-Year < Total
IFI Deficit Ratio
Full-Year * Total 
Half-Year * Total
IFI Average Deficit Ratio

























































































































































































Table 3.4. CHANGES IN WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERNS AND WORK FORCE ATTACHMENT, 
1974-1980



































































































































































































The proportion of the unemployed who did not work at all or were out 
of work over one-third of their weeks in the work force declined from 41.8 
percent in 1974 to 40.6 percent in 1979, or from 51.8 percent in 1975 to 
48.3 percent in 1980. Since the short-duration unemployed had lower 
hardship rates, this shift within the unemployed should have been a further 
positive factor.
The percent of the labor force employed part-time some or all weeks in 
the work force and experiencing no weeks of unemployment, rose from 22.5 
percent in 1974 to 29.2 percent in 1979, or from 25.2 to 27.5 percent 
between 1975 and 1980. The 1979 severe hardship HE incidence among 
part-time workers was 35.1 percent compared to 19.7 percent among all other 
work force participants; the IFE rates were 13.7 and 8.6 percent, respec 
tively; while the IFI rates were 7.9 and 5.2 percent, respectively. Thus, 


















































But the incidence of hardship also changed within the various attach 
ment and work experience pattern subgroups (Table 3.5). The severe 
hardship HE incidence increased among both full-year and total work force 
participants who experienced unemployment, including those not employed at 
all, mostly unemployed, those mixing employment and unemployment, and even 
those mostly employed. Because the share of the unemployed who were mostly 
employed increased, the HE rate among the unemployed as a whole fell 
despite the rising incidence in each subgroup. In 1979, 53.5 percent of 
persons experiencing unemployment 'had Inadequate Individual Earnings com 
pared to 54.2 percent in 1974. From 1975 to 1980, the severe hardship HE 
rate fell from 59.9 to 59.6 percent.









































































































































































































































































































In contrast, the severe hardship HE incidence fell among participants 
employed part-time some or all weeks in the work force, as well as among 
those employed full-time all weeks of participation. Because part-time 
workers increased relative to full-time workers, the improvement in HE 
incidence for those employed all weeks of participation was slight, 
declining 0.9 percentage points between 1974 and 1979.
The changes in the severe hardship IFE and IFI rates among the various 
work experience and work force attachment subgroups were similar, but in 
these cases, the increased hardship incidence among the unemployed sub 
groups was not offset by the reduced predominance of unemployment among the 
intermittently employed. The IFE rate among work force participants 
experiencing unemployment rose from 21.9 in 1974 to 22.8 percent in 1979, 
and from 25.6 to 26.6 percent between 1975 and 1980. The IFI rate among 
the unemployed rose from 13.7 to 14.2 percent in the first period and from 
14.4 to 17.4 percent in the second. Even though the I IE incidence among 
the unemployed had declined over both periods, the proportion of the un 
employed with Inadequate Individual Earnings who also had Inadequate Family 
Earnings increased. In addition, the IFI incidence among the unemployed 























































The balance of these changes in work force attachment, work experience 
patterns, and hardship incidence among work attachment/experience subgroups 
can be assessed by weighting the 1979 incidence rates for each subgroup 
(i.e., disaggregating the total work force into full-year participants not 
employed, mostly unemployed, mixing employment and unemployment, mostly 
employed, employed part-time involuntarily, employed part-time voluntarily 
and those employed full-time, plus less than full-year participants in 
these same work experience categories) by their 1974 shares of the total 
work force. Comparison of the weighted with the actual 1979 hardship 
rates, then, suggests the effect of changing attachment/experience 
patterns, while comparison with the actual 1974 hardship rates suggests the 
effect of incidence rate changes for the subgroups. The same comparisons 
can be made between 1975 and 1980. Declining HE incidence within the 
various work experience/attachment subcategories was responsible for all of 
the 1974-1979 drop in the severe hardship HE rate and a third of the 
1975-1980 drop. The IFE incidence declines within the various work experi 
ence/attachment subcategories were responsible for the slight improvement 
in the overall severe hardship IFE, but slight increases in incidence from 
1975 to 1980 offset the effects of favorable work experience/attachment 
shifts over this period. The increases in IFI incidence within the various
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work experience/attachment subcategories were responsible for the rise of 
the severe hardship IFI, which otherwise would have declined because of the 
favorable work experience/attachment changes:
HE
Actual 1979 HE rate 24.17 




Actual 1974 HE rate 25.83 
Effect of changing
incidence 1974-1979 -1.97
Actual 1980 HE rate 27.67 




Actual 1975 HE rate 29.05 
Effect of changing 
incidence 1975-1980 -0.40
IFE
Actual 1979 IFE rate 11.35 




Actual 1974 IFE rate 11.59 
Effect of changing
incidence 1974-1979 -0.35
Actual 1980 IFE rate 12.77 




Actual 1975 IFE rate 13.18 
Effect of changing 
incidence 1975-1980 +0.17
IFI
Actual 1979 IFI rate 6.03 




Actual 1974 IFI rate 6.13 
Effect of changing
incidence 1974-1979 -0.01
Actual 1980 IFI rate 7.15 




Actual 1980 IFI rate 6.94 
Effect of changing 
incidence 1975-1980 -0.65
Long-Term Shifts in the Composition 
and Distribution of Hardship
Changes in the demographic, geographic and occupational distributions 
of the work force were generally favorable over the 1974-1980 period and 
should have reduced hardship incidence. The favorable factors included the 
aging of the post-war babies into the prime working years and the exit of 
older workers, the increased educational attainment of the work force, and
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increased employment in occupations characterized by lower hardship rates. 
The shift of population to areas characterized by lower wages and lower 
transfers was a marginally negative factor, but was balanced by a relative 
improvement in hardship incidence in the previously worst off areas as well 
as the suburbanization of metropolitan area populations.
Aging Postwar Babies and Exiting Oldsters
The proportion of the work force who were individuals in their "prime" 
working and earning years increased noticeably over the late 1970s:
Share of total work force
1979- 1980- 1980- 

























































Weighting the 1979 severe hardship rate for each age group (and 
counting younger students and nonstudents separately) by its 1974 work 
force share, suggests that the HE and IFE rates were reduced noticeably by 
these changes in age composition. Since older workers have low IFI 
incidence despite high IFE incidence, their declining share offsets the IFI 
improvement expected from increased numbers of prime age workers:
HE IFE IFI 
incidence incidence incidence
Incidence in 1979 if had 1974 age 
distribution 24.73% 11.59% 6.01%
Actual 1979 incidence 24.17 11.35 6.07
Changes in hardship incidence rates 
associated with age shifts -0.56 -0.24 +0.02
99
Yet the incidence of hardship among the different age groups also 
changed with the changes in work force shares, combining to alter the age 
composition of persons in hardship.
First, the participation rates of 16- to 19-year-olds, and of persons 
45 and over, declined, while rising significantly among prime age workers 
(Table 3.6). This reduced the proportion of the younger and older segments 
of the work force who were marginal participants likely to be in hardship, 
thus reducing the relative hardship rates for these age groups.
Second, full-year work force participation rose more among 16- to 
24-year-olds than among 25- to 44-year-olds, while full-year participation 
declined among older workers. This reduced the relative hardship incidence 
among younger participants, but increased the relative incidence among 
older participants.
Third, the incidence of unemployment declined more among younger and 
older workers than among those of prime age, which should have reduced the 
disparity in hardship incidence.
Fourth, the incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings declined among 
unemployed teenagers, while rising more for prime age workers than other 
age groups.
Fifth, the probability of Inadequate Family Earnings among persons 
with Inadequate Individual Earnings rose noticeably among prime age 
workers, with lesser increases or actual declines for younger and older 
participants in the HE.
Sixth, the Earnings Supplementation Rate declined substantially among 
prime age workers in the IFE, while increasing among younger and older 
workers, with most of this the reflection of more rapidly expanding non- 
transfer supplements received by the families of younger and older partici 
pants in the IFE, as well as a less severe decline in transfer supplements 
for older participants.
The end result of these various factors was a substantial change in 
the relative incidence of Inadequate Family Earnings and Income among the 
different age groups. The IFE rates declined for 16- to 19-year-olds and 
for work force participants age 45 and over, while increasing for prime age 
work force participants. The IFI rate rose by 0.9 percentage points for 
prime age workers between 1975 and 1980, while declining 2.3 percentage 
points for teenage work force participants and 1.0 percentage points for 
participants age 65 and over.
The teenager and older-worker shares of hardship declined substan 
tially as a result of their reduced work force shares and their falling 
hardship rates:
Table 3.6. CHANGES IN WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP BY AGE



















































































































Share of Work Force Participants 
Experiencing Unemployment Proportion in Work Force Full-Year
1974
HE Incidence Among Those Experiencing
Unemployment
'1979- 1980- 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shares of severe hardship for total work force
1979- 1980-
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 197516-19 —— —— ——— —— —— ———
HE 26.1% 24.5% -1.6% 25.3% 22.5% -2.8%
HE Deficit 17.0 16.1 -0.9 16.8 14.8 -2.0
IFE 14.9 13.4 -1.5 14.8 12.9 -1.9
IFE Deficit 14.3 12.8 -1.5 13.9 11.8 -2.1
IFI 17.5 15.7 -1.8 18.6 14.1 -4.5
IFI Deficit 14.8 13.5 -1.3 15.5 11.8 -3.7
45 and over
HE 27.4 24.8 -2.6 26.6 23.5 -3.1
HE Deficit 35.7 33.2 -2.5 33.9 27.9 -6.0
IFE 40.5 36.2 -4.3 37.8 33.8 -4.0
IFE Deficit 38.2 34.1 -4.1 35.7 31.3 -4.4
IFI 26.7 21.5 -5.2 24.9 20.3 -4.6
IFI Deficit 23.8 20.3 -3.5 19.3 17.9 -1.4
The corollary is that employment problems of teenage and older workers 
have become less costly to solve, but their alleviation would also have 
less effect on aggregate hardship. If all 45- to 64-year-olds with In 
adequate Individual Earnings in 1974 had, instead, received the minimum 
wage equivalent for their hours and weeks in the work force, the total IFE 
would have been 13.1 percent lower (Table 3.7). Similar augmentation of 
this age subgroup's earnings in 1979 would have reduced the total IFE by 
only 10.8 percent. Likewise, the provision of minimum wage earnings for 
all hours of joblessness or involuntary part-time idleness among 45- to 
64-year-olds would have reduced the IFE by 0.7 percentage points more in 
1974 than in 1979.
Increasing Human Resource Endowments
The educational attainment of the work force improved dramatically 
over the 1974-1980 period. In 1974, 33.6 percent of total participants did 
not have a high school degree, outnumbering the 32.4 percent with some 
post-secondary education. By 1980, the situation was reversed. Dropouts 
and high school students represented only 24.1 percent of the work force 
and were far outnumbered by those with some post-secondary education, who 
represented 37.0 percent:
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Table 3.7. PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN THE TOTAL IFE RESULTING FROM AUGMENTATION 
OF THE EARNINGS OF SEPARATE AGE SUBGROUPS ONLY
Reduction in IFE resulting fronu 
Full Employment augmentation
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
16-19 3.91% 3.22% -0.69% 4.58% 3.79% -0.79%
20-24 4.70 4.77 +0.07 6.58 6.28 -0.30
25-44 7.59 8.53 +0.94 9.81 11.10 +1.29
45-64 6.97 6.04 -0.93 8.73 7.09 -1.64
65+ 2.71 2.29 -0.42 2.68 2.08 -0.60
Reduction in IFE resulting fronu 
Adequate Employment augmentation
16-19 4.89 4.04 -0.85 5.64 4.50 -1.14
20-24 6.30 6.45 +0.15 7.77 8.52 +0.75
25-44 12.79 12.81 +1.02 13.54 17.24 +3.70
45-64 13.14 10.84 -4.40 13.75 11.88 -1.87
65+ 4.64 3.48 -1.16 4.26 3.31 -0.95
Reduction in IFE resulting from3 
Capacity Employment augmentation
16-19 2.31 2.05 -0.26 3.29 2.63 -0.66
20-24 4.05 3.13 -0.92 5.08 5.34 +0.26
25-44 6.57 7.06 +0.49 9.20 10.30 +1.10
45-64 4.78 3.84 -0.94 6.09 5.12 -0.97
65+ 0.97 0.96 -0.01 0.96 0.60 -0.36
Full Employment augmentation—All unemployed and involuntarily part-time 
employed in the IFE who are in the specific age cohort are ascribed the 
minimum wage for all hours of forced idleness, and the effect on the total 
IFE is calculated.
2 Adequate Employment augmentation—All persons in the specific age cohort
who are in the IFE who have Inadequate Individual Earnings are augmented 
to a minimally adequate level and the effect on the total IFE is calculated.
3 Capacity Employment augmentation—All unemployed and involuntarily part-time
workers in the IFE are ascribed their usual wage for their hours of forced 
idleness, and the effect of this augmentation on the total IFE is calculated,
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Share of total work force
1979- 1980- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975 1974
High school student 4.9% 4.3% -0.6% 4.5% 4.1% -0.4% -0.85
Post-secondary student 4.3 4.0 -0.3 4.1 4.0 -0.1 -0.3
High school dropout 28.7 20.9 -7.8 24.8 20.0 -4.8 -8.7
High school graduate
only 37.3 38.1 +0.8 37.5 38.8 +1.3 +1.5
Post-secondary 1-3
years 14.0 15.8 +1.8 14.0 16.0 +2.0 +2.0
College graduate 14.1 16.9 +2.8 15.0 17.0 +2.0 +2.9
Since hardship incidence declines with increased education, the edu 
cational upgrading of the work force was a favorable development. Weight 
ing the 1979 hardship levels for each of the six educational categories by 
its 1974 share of the total work force, and comparing the weighted hardship 
rates with the 1979 actuals, suggests that a 2.6 percentage point decline 
in the HE rate, 1.5 percentage points in the IFE rate and 0.9 percentage 
points in the IFI rate, might have been expected as a result of improved 
education, if all else remained the same. All else clearly did not stay 
the same, since these decrements exceeded the 1.7, 0.2 and 0.1 percentage 
point drops in the three hardship rates, but the educational shifts were 
clearly a highly favorable factor:
HE rate if 1979 incidence rates among 
education groups but 1974 shares
Actual 1979 HE incidence
Reduction in HE associated with 
educational improvement -2.59
IFE rate if 1979 incidence rates among 
educational groups but 1974 shares
Actual 1979 IFE incidence
Reduction in IFE incidence associated 
with educational improvement -1.47
IFI rate if 1979 incidence rates among 
educational groups but 1979 shares 6.91
Actual 1979 IFI incidence 6.03
Reduction in IFI incidence associated 
with educational improvement -0.88
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Hardship incidence declined more, or rose less, for persons who had 
completed some post-secondary education than for high school dropouts or 
high school graduates with no further education (Table 3.8). For instance, 
the gap between the severe hardship HE rates for dropouts and college 
graduates increased 3.8 percentage points between 1974 and 1980; the IFE 
gap increased by 2.8 percentage points, and the IFI gap by 2.9 percentage 
points. Interestingly, the differential between the IFE and IFI rates of 
dropouts and high school graduates with no further education did not in 
crease between 1974 and 1979 or between 1975 and 1980, even though the 
differentials in unemployment and I IE rates widened over both periods.
The relative decline in hardship incidence among completers of post- 
secondary education offset, to some degree, their increasing work force 
share. Yet the persons in hardship in 1979 and 1980 had significantly more 
education than the persons in hardship in 1974 and 1975. Persons witn some 
post-secondary education accounted for a 3.8 percentage point larger share 
of the severe hardship HE in 1980 than in 1974, while their IFE and IFI 
shares rose 3.5 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively (Table 3.9).
The Impacts of Occupational Upgrading
Hardship is most prevalent among farm workers, laborers and service 
workers; it is least prevalent among white collar workers. The share of 
the total work force in the high incidence occupations declined by 1.4 
percentage points between 1974 and 1979, while the white collar share 
increased by 3.1 percentage points (Table 3.10). Weighting the 1979 hard 
ship and unemployment incidence rates in each of the nine occupational 
subclassifications (professional and managerial, sales, clerical, craft and 
kindred workers, operatives, laborers, farm and service workers, plus those 
not employed during the year) by their 1974 work force shares suggests that 
the occupational shifts were a positive factor in reducing both unemploy 
ment and hardship:
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Table 3.8. HARDSHIP AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND DIFFERENTIALS BY EDUCATION 
LEVEL
HE Incidence
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout
High School Graduate, 
No Further Education
1-3 Years Post-Secondary 
Education
College Four Years or 
More
riign School Oropout- 
High Scnool Graduate
High School Dropout- 
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
High School Dropout- 
College
High School Graduate- 
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
High School Graduate- 
College
1-3 Years Post-Secondary- 
College
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout
High School Graduate, 
No Further Education
1-3 Years Post-Secondary 
Education
College Four Years or 
More
High School Dropout- 
High School Graduate
High School Dropout- 
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
High School Dropout- 
College
High School Graduate- 
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
High School Graduate- 
College
1-3 Years Post-Secondary- 
Co liege
Percent Experiencing Unemployment
	1979- 1980- 1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975 1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
28.4X 21.91 -6.5X 28.4X 27.IX -1.3X 68.7X 65.5X -3.IX 76.IX 74.OX -2.IX
23.9 18.7 -5.2 25.3 20.5 -4.8 41.6 42.7 +1.1 51.2 49.1 -2.1
22.0 22.0 0 25.9 25.2 -0.4 34.2 34.9 +0.6 38.7 39.5 +0.8
17.5 15.9 -1.6 20.1 18.7 -1.4 21.9 21.4 -0.5 25.3 25.7 +0.4
13.7 13.0 -0.7 16.7 13.9 -2.8 16.7 16.3 -0.4 19.8 18.6 -1.2
9.7 8.5 -1.2 10.5 9.0 -1.5 9.2 9.4 +0.2 11.0 10.6 -0.4
4.5 6.1 +1.6 5.8 6.8 +1.0 12.4 13.5 +1.1 13.4 13.8 +0.4
8.3 9.0 +0.7 9.2 11.6 +2.4 17.6 18.6 +1.0 18.9 20.9 +2.0
12.3 13.5 +1.2 15.4 16.5 +1.1 25.1 25.5 +0.4 27.7 28.9 +1.2
3.8 2.9 -0.9 3.4 4.8 +1.4 5.2 5.1 -0.1 5.5 7.1 +1.6
7.8 7.4 -0.4 9.6 9.7 +0.1 12.7 12.0 -0.7 14.3 15.1 +0.8






































































































13.8 14.0 +0.2 15.2 16.0 +0.8 8.2 8.5 +0.3 8.9 10.5 +1.6
16.6 16.6 0 18.8 19.4 +0.6 9.9 10.1 +0.2 10.7 12.8 +2.1
0.8 1.4 +0.6 1.1 2.3 +1.2 0.7 1.0 +0.3 0 1,6 +1.6
3.6 4.0 +0.4 4.7 5.7 +1.0 2.4 2.6 +0.2 1.8 3.5 +1.7
2.8 2.6 -0.2 3.6 3.4 -0.2 0.7 1.6 +0.9 1.8 1.9 +0.1
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Table 3.9. INCREASED EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AMONG TOTAL WORK FORCE 
PARTICIPANTS IN SEVERE HARDSHIP
HE Share
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout
High School Graduate, 
No Further Education
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
College Graduate
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout
High School Graduate, 
No Further Education
1-3 Years Post- 
Secondary Education
College Graduate
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout
High School Graduate, 
No Further Education

































































































































































Table 3.10. OCCUPATIONAL SHIFTS AND CHANGING WORK FORCE ATTACHMENT OVER 1974-1979 PERIOD
Percent Total 














































































































































No Employment 2.1 1.8 -0.3 17.8 17.8 0.5 0.5
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1979 total unemployment incidence if 1974 occupational
distribution but 1979 unemployment rates in each
occupation 16.54%
1979 unemployment incidence 15.79
Reduction in unemployment incidence between 1974 and 1979 
related to occupational shift -0.75
1979 HE if 1974 occupational distribution but 1979 HE
rates for each occupation 25.08
1979 HE incidence 24.17
Reduction in HE incidence between 1974 and 1979 related to 
occupational shift -0.91
1979 IFE if 1974 occupational distribution but 1979 IFE
rates for each occupation 
1979 IFE incidence
Reduction in IFE incidence between 1974 and 1979 related to 
occupational shift -0.52
1979 IFI if 1974 occupational distribution but 1979 IFI
rates for each occupation 6.36
1979 IFI incidence 6.03
Reduction in IFI incidence between 1974 and 1979 related to 
occupational shift -0.33
For the high incidence occupations, increases in work force attachment 
reduced the severe hardship rates. For instance, the proportion of farm 
workers who participated full-year rose by 2.0 percentage points between 
1974 and 1979, and the proportion of service workers participating full- 
year rose by 2.1 percentage points, compared to an increase of only 0.5 
percentage points among white collar workers. Reflecting this change, the 
IFE rate among farm workers declined 9.5 percentage points, and that among 
service workers fell 2.9 percentage points, while the IFE incidence re 
mained almost stable for white collar workers (Table 3.11). While the 
variance in unemployment incidence rates within the nine broad occupational 
categories declined slightly, the variance in hardship rates declined 
substantially:
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Variance between nine occupational subclassifications in 
hardship and unemployment incidence
Unemployment I IE IFE IFI 
incidence incidence incidence incidence
1979- 1979- 1979- 1979- 
1974 1979 1974 1974 1979 1974 1974 1979 1974 1974 1979 1974
Total wprk force
Standard deviation 7.7% 6.7* -1.0% 18. 4% 15. 7% -2.7% 9. 1% 7.0% -2. IX 5.9% 4.6% -1.3%
Coefficient of variation 
(st.nd.rd deviation *
g 53 . 1 . 13 . 5 80 . 3 63.7 -16.6
Full -year work force
Standard deviation 9.0 8.4 -0.6 18.5 16.5 -2.0 8.9 8.3 -0.6 5.4 5.2 -0.4
Coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation » 
n!ean) 57.5 55.8 -1.7 75.2 70.0 -5.2 88.6 72.1 -6.5 98.4 82.1 -16.3
The Changing Geography of Hardship
There were significant shifts in the geographic distribution of the 
work force over the 1974-1980 period. The share residing in the New 
England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central and East South Central states 
declined, while the share in the South Atlantic, West South Central, 
Mountain and Pacific states increased:
Total work force share
New England 
Middle Atlantic 
East North Central 
West North Central 
South Atlantic 
East South Central 

































On balance, the regions where hardship was more prevalent grew faster. 
Weighting the 1979 severe hardship rates for each region by its 1974 work 
force share suggests that the work force redistribution was a modestly 
negative factor:
Ill
Total HE rate If 1979 incidence in each region
but 1974 share 24.08%
Actual 1979 HE incidence 24.17
1974-1979 increment in total HE rate associated 
with shift to high incidence regions +0.09
Total IFE rate if 1979 incidence in each region
but 1974 share 
Actual 1979 HE incidence
1974-1979 increment in total IFE rate associated 
with shift to high incidence regions +0.07
Total IFI rate if 1979 incidence in each region
but 1974 share 
Actual 1979 IFI incidence
1974-1979 increment in total IFI rate associated 
with shift to high incidence regions +0.05
But the fast growth regions also experienced relative declines in 
hardship incidence. In the South Atlantic, West South Central, Mountain 
and Pacific states, the I IE, IFE and IFI rates all declined over both the 
1974-1979 and 1975-1980 periods (Table 3.12). These improvements reduced 
the regional disparity in hardship rates. Even though the standard devia 
tion in unemployment incidence for the nine regions, expressed as a per 
centage of the mean, actually rose between 1974 and 1980, the variance in 
regional hardship rates declined. It should be noted, however, that the 
impacts of the 1980 recession were concentrated in a few regions and 
increased the variation in hardship over 1975 levels:
Coefficients of variation for unemployment 
and hardship rates of nine regions
1979- 1980- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975 1974
Incidence unem 
ployment 10.4% 8.8% -1.6% 10.3% 11.1% +0.8% +0.7% 
Incidence pre 
dominantly un 
employed 17.4 16.3 -1.1 21.4 20.7 -0.7 +3.3 
HE incidence 16.6 11.0 -4.4 10.4 12.9 +2.5 -3.7 
IFE incidence 25.5 18.3 -7.2 18.0 18.6 +0.6 -6.9 
IFI incidence 37.8 25.9 -11.9 28.1 28.8 +0.7 -9.0
The distribution of the population between metropolitan and nonmetro- 
politan areas remained fairly stable, but central cities lost ground, 
particularly those in large SMSAs, as the suburbs grew:







































































































































































































































New England: Connecticut, Maine. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
North Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
East North Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri. Nebraska, North and South Dakota
South Atlantic. Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North and South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
Pacific: Alaska, California. Hawaii, Oregon, Washington
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This suburbanization should have alleviated hardship somewhat, as 
suggested by weighting the 1979 hardship incidence in central cities in 
larger and smaller metropolitan areas, suburbs in larger and smaller 
metropolitan areas, and nonmetropolitan areas, by the 1974 shares of the 
total work force residing in each type of area:
Total HE rate if 1979 incidence for each
type of area but 1974 distribution 24.21% 
Actual 1979 HE incidence 24.17
HE incidence reduction associated with
suburban shift -0.04
Total IFE rate if 1979 incidence for each
type of area but 1974 distribution 11.41 
Actual 1979 IFE incidence 11.35
IFE incidence reduction associated with
suburban shift -0.06
Total IFI rate if 1979 incidence for each
type of area but 1974 distribution 6.11 
Actual 1979 IFI incidence 6.03
IFI incidence reduction associated with
suburban shift -0.08
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The hardship picture improved more in nonmetropolitan than metro 
politan areas. Between 1974 and 1979, the IFE and IFI rates in metro 
politan areas both rose by 0.3 percentage points, compared to drops of 1.3 
and 0.9 percentage points, respectively, in nonmetropolitan areas (Table 
3.13). Larger metropolitan areas improved relative to those with under one 
million population. This occurred despite a relative deterioration of 
conditions in the large SMSA central cities, where the IFI rate increased 
by 1.4 percentage points between 1974 and 1979, compared to an increase of 
only 0.2 percentage points in the surrounding suburbs.
There was a narrowing of the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan and central 
city/suburban differentials in hardship incidence. Considering five 
discrete types of areas (central cities and suburban areas in SMSAs with 
over 1 million population, central cities and suburban areas in smaller 
SMSAs, and nonmetropolitan areas), the standard deviation in hardship 
incidence, expressed as the proportion of the mean for the five areas, 









Coefficients of variation in hardship and
unemployment rates of large and small 
SMSA central cities, large and small SMSA suburbs 








































The Changing Status of Minorities—A Detailed Assessment
Slow Gains For Blacks
The well-being of black workers and their families improved substan 
tially over the 1960s and early 1970s, both in absolute and relative terms. 
According to the hardship measure developed by the National Commission on 
Employment and Unemployment Statistics, the incidence of hardship among 
nonwhites fell from 3.9 times than that among whites in 1967, to 3.0 times 
the white rate in 1979, despite the fact that there was no relative im 
provement in nonwhite unemployment rates (Table 3.14). The incidence of
115
Table 3.13. LONGER-TERM SHIFTS IN SEVERE HARDSHIP INCIDENCE FOR TOTAL 
WORK FORCE IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS
HE Incidence
Inside SMSA 
SMSA Over 1 Million 
Central City 
Balance





SMSA Over 1 Million 
Central City 
Balance





SMSA Over 1 Million 
Central City 
Balance


























































































































































































Table 3.14. CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP AMONG WHITES AND NONWHITES 





































Unemployment Nonwhite White Ratio
Rate Hardship Hardship Hardship Differential Between
Differential Incidence Incidence Rates Whites and Nonwhites
4.0% 34.0% 8.7% 3.9 25.3%
4.5 26.2 8.2 3.2 18.0
6.2 20.7 6.8 3.0 13.9
3.5 27.2 8.4 3.2 18.8
5.0 25.2 10.0 2.5 15.2
6.7 26.0 10.1 2.6 15.9
Persons in work force 40 weeks or more, no more than half weeks voluntary part-time; if discouraged, then looked for a job at least 
15 weeks; earned less than poverty level for family; family income less than twice poverty level.
pCurrently unemployed, discouraged, employed full-time but earned less than poverty income in previous years or employed involuntarily 
part-time; family earned less than median income in previous year.
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inadequate employment and earnings among nonwhites, as measured by the 
Levitan/Taggart hardship index, fell from 3.2 times the incidence among 
whites in 1968 to 2.6 times the incidence in 1972, even though the nonwhite 
unemployment rate increased from 2.1 to 2.3 times that of whites. Yet, 
most of this improvement was realized in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
According to the Levitan/Taggart indicator, nonwhites actually lost ground 
between 1971 and 1979.
The hardship measures as defined in this volume confirm that there was 
very modest relative improvement in the well-being of black workers and 
their families over the last half of the 1970s (Table 3.15). The incidence 
of Inadequate Individual Earnings among black workers declined slightly 
from 1.55 to 1.53 times the incidence among whites, while the black IFE 
incidence fell from 2.60 to 2.49 times the rate among whites, and the black 
IFI incidence from 3.60 to 3.46 times the white IFI rate. Though limited, 
these gains occurred in spite of a deterioration in relative unemployment, 
as the annual unemployment rate of blacks increased from 2.08 to 2.39 times 
the rate for whites.
When judged in terms of intermediate and moderate, rather than severe, 
hardship, the absolute and relative gains of blacks were more substantial. 
For instance, the gap between the intermediate hardship IFE rates for 
blacks and whites narrowed by 2.1 percentage points between 1974 and 1979, 
even though the gap in their severe hardship IFE rates narrowed by only 0.8 
percentage points:
Black - white Black t white 
incidence incidence
1979- 1979- 
1974 1979 1974 1974 1979 1974
HE incidence
Severe 13.5% 12.1% -1.4% 1.55 1.53 -0.02
Intermediate 14.9 13.9 -1.0 1.44 1.41 -0.03
Moderate 15.5 14.3 -1.2 1.36 1.34 -0.02
IFE incidence
Severe 15.8 14.6 -0.8 2.60 2.49 -0.11
Intermediate 19.5 17.4 -2.1 2.51 2.35 -0.16
Moderate 22.5 20.0 -2.5 2.40 2.23 -0.17
IFI incidence
Severe 12.5 11.8 -0.7 3.60 3.46 -0.14
Intermediate 17.5 15.8 -1.7 3.36 3.16 -0.20
Moderate 21.7 19.2 -2.8 3.07 2.88 -0.19
As a result, the intermediate hardship IFE declined for blacks rela 
tive to their severe hardship IFE; while for whites, intermediate hardship 
increased relative to severe hardship. Likewise, the ratio of the inter-
Table 3.15. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP INCIDENCE FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS 
AND WHITES
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mediate and severe hardship IFI rates declined more for blacks than whites. 
Thus, the modest relative improvements in severe hardship between 1974 and 
1979 were not accomplished by simply moving a few additional black workers 
above minimum wage earnings levels or family incomes and earnings modestly 
above poverty levels. A more realistic interpretation is that the gains of 
those slightly above the severe hardship level created a vacuum which may 
have pulled up those below:
HE incidence 
Whites
Intermediate * severe 
Moderate * severe
Blacks




Intermediate t severe 
Moderate * severe
Blacks




Intermediate * severe 
Moderate t severe
Blacks











































Several factors contributed to the modest gains of blacks, offsetting 
the deterioration in their relative unemployment status. The participation 
rates among blacks age 16 and over declined by 1.3 percentage points 
between 1974 and 1979, while increasing 1.5 percentage points for whites.
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To the extent that the marginal entrants and leavers were those most likely 
to be in hardship, the at-risk group increased among whites while declining 
among blacks. Increased attachment of black workers was a positive factor 
to the extent the chances of inadequate earnings are lower among those par 
ticipating more weeks. The proportion of blacks in the work force fifty 
weeks or more rose by 3.3 percentage points compared to a 1.4 percentage 
point increase among whites (Table 3.16). Likewise, part-time workers more 
often suffer hardship than full-time workers; and the percent of the total 
black work force employed full-time during all weeks of participation 
declined by only 3.4 percentage points, while dropping 4.8 percentage 
points for whites between 1974 and 1979. The full-time, full-year share of 
the total black work force declined by 0.5 percentage points compared to a 
3.0 percentage point drop among whites.
The earnings of black workers improved, as suggested by the fact that 
the HE incidence among persons with no weeks of joblessness declined more 
for blacks than whites (Table 3.17). In contrast, the HE incidence among 
workers with some unemployment rose among blacks while falling among 
whites. The share of the work force experiencing unemployment dropped 2.3 
percentage points for blacks, or slightly more than the 2.1 percent decline 
among whites, but the share of the unemployed who were jobless for two- 






Employed full-time 16.1% 13.8% -2.3% 
Employed part-time 53.1 41.8 -7.3 
Experienced unemployment 68.8 70.3 +1.5
Whites
Employed full-time 11.2 9.6 -1.6 
Employed part-time 39.4 34.5 -4.9 
Experienced unemployment 51.5 50.2 -1.3
The balance of all these changes is suggested by weighting the 1979 
IIE rates for full-year and less than full-year participants with each of 
the seven different work experience patterns by the share of the 1974 total 
work force in each category, as well as by weighting the 1974 rates by the 
1979 patterns. All else remaining the same, the HE incidence changes 
between 1974 and 1979 would have reduced the gap between black and white 
HE rates by 0.5 percentage points, while the work experience/attachment 
shifts would have also reduced the differential roughly the same amount. 
In other words, these two factors contributed about equally to the relative 
improvement for blacks:
Table 3.16. CHANGES IN LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT AND WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERNS FOR WHITES, BLACKS 
AND HISPANICS 1974-1979













































































































































































66.9 70.2 +3.3 70.6 72.0 +1.4 68.8 70.8 +2.0
Table 3.17. CHANGES IN THE INCIDENCE OF INADEQUATE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS BY RACE, LABOR FORCE 
ATTACHMENT AND WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN, 1974-1979






































































































































































1979 HE rate if each work experience/
attachment category had 1979 HE
incidence but 1974 share 23.25% 35.80% 12.55% 
Actual 1979 HE incidence 22.95 35.05 12.10
Reduction in HE rate associated with
changing work force patterns -0.30 -0.75 -0.45
1979 HE rate if each work experience/
attachment category had 1974 IIE
incidence but 1979 share 24.77 37.39 12.62 
Actual 1979 HE inc-idence 22.95 35.05 12.10
Reduction in HE rate associated with 
declining incidence in each work 
experience/attachment category -1.82 -2.34 -0.52
Not only did the I IE incidence decline more for blacks than for whites 
between 1974 and 1979, the percent of workers with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings who were in families with Inadequate Family Earnings increased 
more for whites than for blacks:









The increased incidence of family earnings inadequacy among persons 
with Inadequate Individual Earnings occurred despite a declining number of 
dependents per worker in the families of workers in the HE. The changes 









Other family members per worker 










The proportion of the blacks with adequate individual earnings who had 
Inadequate Family Earnings declined slightly between 1974 and 1979, and 
significantly between 1974 and 1980. In both cases, these declines were 



















The ratio of the IFE to the I IE changed very little, with roughly 
equal shifts among black and white workers:






















The IFE rates for black workers who experienced unemployment, as well 
as those employed full-time or part-time all weeks in the work force, all 
improved relative to those of whites. Only among the short-term unemployed 




Employed full-time 11.0% 9.3% 
Employed part-time 42.8 36.0 
Experience unemployment 44.2 42.4
Whites
Employed full-time 4.5 4.0 -0.5 
Employed part-time 18.1 16.2 -1.9 
Experienced unemployment 18.3 19.0 +0.7
On balance, the work experience pattern shifts were more favorable for 
whites than blacks between 1974 and 1979, adding 0.5 percentage points to 
the black-white IFE differential. In contrast, the IFE incidence rate 
declines for each work experience category were more favorable for blacks 
than whites, reducing the differential by 1.5 percentage points:
Whites Blacks Blacks-whites
IFE if 1974 IFE rates among work
experience groups but 1979 share 10.75 26.95 16.20 
Actual 1974 IFE incidence 9.94 25.67 15.73
Increase in IFE rate between 1974 
and 1979 associated with changes 
in work experience patterns +0.81 +1.28 +0.47
IFE if 1979 IFE rates among work
experence groups but 1974 share 9.41 23.61 14.20 
Actual if 1974 IFE incidence 9.94 25.67 15.73
Decline in IFE rate between 1974 and 
1979 associated with changes in 
IFE incidence within each work 
experience category -0.53 -2.06 -1.53
The Earnings Supplementation Rate, i.e., the percent of the IFE lifted 
out of poverty by the receipt of cash transfers and other nqnearned income, 
declined for both blacks and whites over the 1974-1980 period, but more so 
for blacks than whites. The impact of nontransfer income supplements 
increased less for blacks than for whites, but the impact of cash transfers 
declined less for the black working poor than for whites (Table 3.19).
Table 3.18. CHANGES IN THE INCIDENCE OF INADEQUATE FAMILY EARNINGS BY RACE, LABOR FORCE 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Among persons employed full-time and voluntarily part-time, the declines in 
overall Earnings Supplementation Rates between 1974 and 1980, but par 
ticularly in transfer supplementation, were relatively greater for whites 
than blacks. On the other hand, earnings supplements for unemployed 
blacks, and particularly transfer supplements, declined more than for the 
white unemployed.
Significant Improvements for Hispanics
Hardship declined substantially for Hispanic workers, much more than 
for white workers, even though unemployment rate differentials did not 
narrow. In 1974, the Hispanic average annual unemployment rate was 1.62 
times that of whites and remained 1.63 times as high in 1979. Neverthe 
less, the Hispanic HE incidence declined from 1.32 to 1.28 times that of 
whites, while family earnings and income inadequacy declined even more. 
The Hispanic/white IFE incidence ratio dropped from 1.82 to 1.66, while the 
IFI incidence ratio fell from 2.73 to 2.42. The absolute differences also 
declined:
Changes in Hispanic-white severe hardship 
incidence differentials
1979-1974 1980-1975 1980-1974
HE incidence -1.5% +0.6% -0.4%
IFE incidence -1.6 -1.7 -0.6
IFI incidence -1.5 -1.9 -0.5
The reductions in severe hardship among Hispanics were apparently 
achieved by the movement of many individuals and families only slightly 
above the severe hardship adequacy standards. In contrast to the patterns 
for blacks, severe hardship gains of Hispanics were not matched or exceeded 
by declines in moderate and intermediate hardship. The intermediate 
hardship HE incidence among Hispanic workers actually rose by 1.0 per 
centage points between 1974 and 1979 despite a decline of 3.0 percentage 
points in the severe hardship rate. While the differential in severe 
hardship HE rates for Hispanics and whites declined by 1.5 percentage 
points, the differential in intermediate hardship rates rose by 1.2 per 
centage points. Likewise, the Hispanic-white severe hardship IFI dif 
ferential fell by 1.5 percentage points, but the intermediate hardship 


























































































































The declining hardship experienced by Hispanic workers was not the 
result of relative improvements in their work experience patterns. Between 
1974 and 1980, the Hispanic labor force participation rate increased 2.3 
percentage points compared to the 1.5 percentage point increase for whites; 
thus, more high risk, marginal work force participants were added to the 
Hispanic work force. While the proportion of all Hispanic workers who 
participated full-year rose by 1.9 percentage points compared to 1.4 
percentage points for whites, the proportion employed full-time, full-year 
declined by 3.4 percentage points compared to the 3.0 percentage point 
decline for whites. Part-time work increased significantly. In 1974, 12.5 
percent of the total Hispanic work force was employed part-time voluntarily 
all weeks of participation. By 1979, this share had risen to 18.3 percent, 
a 6.8 percentage point increase among Hispanics, compared to the 4.4 per 
centage point increase among whites. Weighting the 1974 HE rates for each 
work experience pattern category by its 1979 share suggests that these 
shifting work patterns were associated with a 0.2 percentage point decline 
in the Hispanic/white HE differential. On the other hand, the declining 
incidence rates within various work experience categories were associated 
with a 0.9 percentage point reduction in the differential:
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Hispanics- 
Hi spam'cs Whites whites
HE rate if had 1974 HE incidence
for each work experience category
but 1979 share 32.85% 25.19% 7.66% 
Actual 1974 HE incidence 32.32 24.44 7.88
Increment in IIE incidence associated 
with 1974-1979 changes in work 
experience patterns +0.53 +0.75 -0.22
HE incidence if had 1979 HE rates
for each category but 1974 share 20.19 27.44 
Actual 1979 HE incidence 22.95 29.26
Decrement in HE associated with 
incidence changes with work 
experience categories -2.76 -1.82 -0.94
The absolute and relative declines in family earnings inadequacy among 
Hispanic workers were even greater than the individual earnings improve 
ments, largely because of favorable changes in family work force parti 
cipation. For Hispanic families with at least one individual in the HE, 
the number of other family members per work force participant declined from 
1.59 to 1.28 between 1974 and 1980 compared to the decline from 1.04 to 
0.88 for whites:
Other family members per worker in families 









Thus, the percent of persons with Inadequate Individual Earnings who 
also had Inadequate Family Earnings declined more (or increased less) for 





















The narrowing of the Hispanic-white IFI differential resulted not only 
from the relative improvements in the IFE, but also from relative increases 
in Earnings Supplementation Rates of Hispanics. Between 1974 to 1979, the 
proportion of the IFE raised out of poverty by nontransfer earnings supple 
ments increased by 3.6 percentage points for Hispanics compared to 3.2 
percentage points for whites; while the proportion lifted out of poverty by 
the addition of transfers declined 3.4 percentage points for whites but 




























































The Interrelationship of Changing Family 
Patterns and Labor Market Trends
The Hardship Consequences of Shifting Family Patterns
With declining family size, the aging of the post-war babies, and 
increased work force participation of wives and other family members, the 
number of dependents per breadwinner declined significantly. There were 
2.01 persons in the civilian population for each work force participant in 
1974 but only 1.90 in 1979. The number of dependents per work force par 
ticipant in families with at least one worker declined from 0.79 to 0.66:
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Breadwinners and breadwinning responsibilities
1979- 1980- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 ig75 1974
Participation rate of persons
age 16 and over 68.9% 70.1% +1.2% 68.8% 69.8% +1.6% +0.9%
Percent 16 and over in work
force full-year 48.4% 50.3% +1.9% 49.5% 51.6% +2.1% +3.0%
Civilian population per person
in work force 2.01 1.90 -0.11 2.01 1.90 -0.11 -0.11
Number oersons in families 
with a work force participant 
per work force participant 1.79 1.66 -0.13 1.78 1.66 -0.12 -0.13
Civilian population per full- 
year work force participant 2.87 2.65 -0.22 2.77 2.57 -0.02 -0.30
Number persons in families 
with a member in work force 
full-year per full-year 
work force participant 2.55 2.32 -0.23 2.45 2.25 -0.20 -0.30
Persons in families with a 
member in HE * total with 
HE 2.09 1.98 -0.11 2.05 1.93 -0.12 -0.08
There was a rather dramatic decline in average family size. In 1974, 
12.0 percent of the civilian population age 16 and over lived in families 
with six or more members, while 12.5 percent were in single person fam 
ilies. By 1979, the proportion in large families had declined to 9.3 
percent, while the proportion in one-person units had risen to 15.6 per 
cent:
Distribution of civilian 
population age 16 and over






The participation rates for persons age 16 and over living in two- 
person families, as well as for those living in families with six or more 
members actually declined, but increased for unrelated individuals and 


















Participation rate for persons 






















The proportion of the work force who were responsible only for their 
own support rose from 11.2 percent in 1974 to 14.6 percent in 1979. On the 
other hand, the proportion who were the sole breadwinners in families with 
two or more members declined from 18.5 to 15.8 percent. Put another way, 
79.2 percent of the workers living in families with two or more members in 





Four or five members
Six or more members
Total
Share of total work force by number of 













































Reduced family size and increased earners helped to alleviate family 
earnings and income inadequacy. Weighting the 1979 hardship rates in each 
of the 15 family size/number of earners categories in the text table above 
by the 1974 work force share in each of these categories suggests the 
magnitude of these effects:
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HE incidence if had 1979 HE rates for each earners/
family size category but 1974 share 24.31%
Actual 1979 HE incidence 24.17
Improvement associated with changes in family size
and earners -0.14
IFE incidence if had 1979 IFE rates for each earners/
family size category but 1974 share 
Actual 1979 IFE incidence
Improvement associated with changes in family size
and earners -0.39
IFI incidence if had 1979 HE rates for each earners/
family size category but 1974 share 
Actual 1979 IFI incidence
Improvement associated with changes in family size
and earners -0.30
Changes in the sex and family relationship patterns of the work force 
increased hardship probabilities. Unrelated individuals, who have high IFE 
and IFI rates, increased from 11.3 to 14.9 percent of the work force 
between 1974 and 1980 (Table 3.20). Male family heads with no wives in the 
labor market or no wives present declined from 17.0 to 13.0 percent over 
this period, while the female share of the work force rose by 2.0 per 
centage points and the female family head share by 0.7 percentage points. 
Since males, and particularly male family heads, are less likely to face 
labor market-related hardship, their declining work force shares offset the 
positive effects of smaller families and increased breadwinners. Weighting 
the 1979 severe hardship rate for each of the nine sex/family relationship 
subgroups (male family heads with and without wives in the work force and 
without wives present, female family heads, wives, male and female others, 
plus male and female unrelated individuals) by its 1974 work force share 
yields weighted hardship rates below the actual 1979 levels:
Table 3.20. CHANGES IN THE SEX AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE WORK FORCE

























































































Wife in Work Force 
Wife Not in Work Force 
Wife Not Present






Other Female _ __ __ __ __




HE rate if had 1979 HE incidence for each sex/family
relationship category but 1974 share 23.87% 
Actual 1979 I IE incidence 24.17
HE rate increment associated with changing sex/
family relationship patterns +0.30
IFE rate if had 1979 IFE incidence for each sex/family
relationship category but 1974 share 11.04
Actual 1979 IFE incidence 11.35
IFE rate increment associated with changing sex/
family relationship patterns +0.31
IFI rate if had 1979 IFI incidence for each sex/family
relationship category but 1974 share
Actual 1979 IFI incidence
IFI rate increment associated with changing sex/
family relationship patterns +0.29
Shifting the Burdens
The incidence of hardship declined among families with three or more 
workers, as well as among single-person families with a worker (Table 
3.21). Hardship incidence increased in families with three or more members 
but only one person in the work force.
Fortuitously, an increased percentage of the large families had 
multiple earners and the multiple earners increased their work force 
attachment. For instance, the percent of workers living in families with 
four or more members and having at least two full-year participants rose 
from 52.5 percent of workers in such families in 1974 to 56.6 percent in 
1980 (Table 3.22). In other words, more of the "secondary" earners had 
come to share "primary" breadwinning responsibilities with the family head.
The incidence of hardship declined modestly among all male family 
heads in the work force, and actually increased for those whose wives did 
not participate, but the hardship rates dropped significantly among female 
family heads, as well as among male and female unrelated individuals (Table 
3.23). The HE incidence among female workers dropped significantly, 
compared to very modest improvements for males. However, this produced no 
relative improvement in women's chances of attaining adequate family 
earnings or income because an increasing proportion of females in the work 
force were family heads or unrelated individuals, both characterized by 
high IFE and IFI rates.
The changing hardship rates for the various sex/relationship subgroups 
reflected quite disparate labor market developments. Work force attachment 
increased significantly among females. It rose among wives and "secondary" 
family earners. All else being equal, this should have reduced the rela 
tive incidence of hardship among these groups:





Four or Five Members




Four or Five Members




Four or Five Members




















































































































































Table 3.22. INCREASING WORK FORCE ATTACHMENT AND ADDED BREADWINNERS
Share of total work force participants by family size, 





Four or Five Members
Six or More Members
At Least One Of Family 
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Table 3.23. HARDSHIP RATES IN 1974 AND 1979 FOR SEX/FAMILY RELATIONSHIP SUBGROUPS
HE Incidence IFE Incidence Ifl Incidence
Male Family Heads
Wife in Work Force 
(Male Householder)



























































































































































































































































































































The incidence of unemployment declined significantly for wives and 
other family members, and since hardship is more prevalent among the unem 
ployed than among those working all weeks of participation, this was also a 
positive development for these subgroups:
Percent experienced unemployment
Male family heads 
Male heads with 






























































These changing unemployment probabilities, combined with the changes 
in the sex/family relationship of the work force, altered the composition 
of the unemployed, increasing the proportion of the jobless who had primary 
breadwinning responsibility. Male family heads with no wife in the work 
force, female family heads, wives with no husband in the work force, and
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unrelated individuals accounted for 32.8 percent of workers experiencing 
unemployment in 1974 but 36.7 percent of those experiencing unemployment in 
1979:
Share of persons experiencing unemployment
1974 1979 1979-1974
Male family head 27.9 24.3 -3.6
With wife in work force (17.3) (16.1) (-1.2)
Without wife in work force (10.6) (8.2) (-2.4)
Female family head 5.4 6.6 +1.2
Wives 21.8 20.8 -1.0
Other family members 32.6 31.1 -1.7
Unrelated individuals 12.3 17.2 +4.9
As a result, the family earnings and income inadequacy associated with 
unemployment increased despite a decline in the HE incidence among the 
unemployed:
Hardship incidence among persons who 
experienced unemployment
1974 1979 1979-1974
HE incidence 54.2% 53.5% -0.7%
IFE incidence 21.9 22.8 +0.9
IFI incidence 13.7 14.2 +0.5
The Changing Composition of the Hardship Population
These shifts in work force composition and changes in hardship 
incidence altered the sex/family relationship and family size/earner dis 
tribution of the hardship population. Work force participants in families 
with six or more members accounted for 16.4 percent of the IFE in 1974 but 
only 11.8 percent in 1979 (Table 3.24). Workers supporting only themselves 
increased from 23.2 percent of the IFE in 1974 to 26.4 percent in 1979, 
while participants from families with three or more breadwinners declined 
from 12.1 percent to 9.0 percent. Female family heads accounted for an in 
creasing share of the hardship population (Table 3.25). Conversely, male 
family heads, wives and other family earners constituted a declining share. 
While the female HE share declined, the female IFE and IFI shares in 
creased.
As a result, the employment and earnings problems of male family heads 
decreased in relative importance. This is true even when attention is 
restricted to families with two or more members (i.e., excluding the 
growing number of unrelated individuals). Male family heads in multiple 
member families accounted for 36.1 percent of the 1974 IFE Deficits of such
Table 3.24. CHANGES IN THE FAMILY SIZE/EARNERS COMPOSITION OF SEVERE HARDSHIP
HE SHARE IFE SHARE IF! SHARE




Four or Five Members
Six or More Members
Two 1n Work Force
Two Members 
Three Members 
Four or Five Members 
Six or More Members
Three or More in 
Work Force_____
Three Members
Four or Fwe Members
Six or More Members




Four or Five Members
Six or More Members
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Four or Five Members

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.25. CHANGES IN THE SEX/FAMILY RELATIONSHIP COMPOSITION OF SEVERE HARDSHIP
HE SHARE IFE SHARE
IF I SHARE
Male Family Head 1"*
Wives in Wot k Fort? 
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families but only 33.6 percent of their 1979 IFE Deficits. There was a 
decline of 4.4 percentage points in their IFE Deficit share between 1975 
and 1980:
Share of severe hardship deficits for 
families with two or more members
1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
HE Deficit share
Male family heads 27.7% 25.4% -2.3% 28.0% 27.2% -0.8 
Female family heads 6.5 6.6 +0.1 6.2 8.0 +1.8 
Wives 32.1 33.0 +0.9 31.1 19.7 -0.4 
Other 33.7 34.9 +1.2 34.6 35.1 +0.5
IFE Deficit share
Male family heads 36.1 33.6 -2.5 39.4 35.0 -4.4 
Female family heads 26.4 27.0 +0.6 22.9 26.6 +3.7 
Wives 12.9 13.1 +0.2 12.3 12.6 +0.3 
Other 24.6 26.3 +1.7 25.4 25.9 +0.5
IFI Deficit share
Male family heads 43.7 39.9 -3.8 44.6 40.4 -4.2 
Female family heads 30.8 33.8 +3.0 27.2 32.7 +5.5 
Wives 8.3 9.1 +0.8 9.5 8.6 -0.9 
Other 17.2 17.2 0 18.7 18.3 -0.4
If all unrelated individuals with Inadequate Individual Earnings and 
with Inadequate Family Earnings had their earnings augmented to the 
adequacy level (i.e., the minimum wage standard multiplied by their annual 
hours of availability for work), two-fifths of unrelated individuals in the 
IFE would have had augmented earnings above the poverty level, and the 
aggregate IFE would have been reduced by 9.3 percent in 1974. Augmenation 
of their earnings to the adequacy level in 1979 would have reduced the IFE 
by 10.1 percent. In contrast, augmentation of the earnings of male family 
heads to the adequacy level would have reduced the IFE count by 14.7 
percent in 1974, but only 12.4 percent in 1979:
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Percent reduction in IFE if earnings
of subgroup members in IFE 
were increased to minimally adequate level
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
Male family heads 14.71 12.40 -2.31 15.77 14.45 -1.32 
Female family heads 3.56 3.51 -0.05 3.73 4.67 +0.94 
Wives 7.39 6.02 -1.37 8.15 6.95 -1.20 
Other males 5.35 3.99 -1.36 6.15 6.34 +0.19 
Other females 3.46 2.98 -0.48 3.30 3.89 +0.59 
Male unrelated
indivjduals 4.66 5.45 +0.79 5.20 5.74 +0.54 
Female unrelated
individuals 3.96 4.68 +0.72 4.87 5.43 +0.56
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Notes
1. Employment and Training Report of the President, 1981 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 105-307; and Money Income 
and Poverty Status of Families and Persons In the United States: 
1980,CurrentPopulationReportP-60,RcT27(Washington:U737 
Government Printing Office, 1982).
2. Unpublished tabulations from the National Commission on Employment and 
Unemployment Statistics.
3. To determine the multi-year trends over the 1974-1980 period, it is 
necessary to sort out the influence of cyclical patterns. Macro- 
economic conditions in 1980, when a recession was just taking hold, 
differed from those in 1974, the last year of a slow recovery from the 
1970-71 recession, so that 1974-1980 comparisons reflect both cyclical
and secular effects. The 1979 calendar year, when unemployment 
averaged 5.8 percent, is more comparable with 1974, when the rate was 
5.6 percent. Likewise, 1980 and 1975 were both recession years, 
although the earlier decline was more severe, with an 8.5 percent 
unemployment rate compared to the 7.1 percent rate in 1979. By 
comparing 1974 with 1979 hardship levels and patterns, and 1975 with 
1980, it is possible, in at least a general way, to separate changes 
which reflected multi-year trends, from those which reflected business 
cycles. The 1979 data used in this chapter are normally derived based 
on 1980 Census weights. An asterisk notes where 1970 Census weights 
are used.
CHAPTER 4. HARDSHIP OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Hardship Persists in Good Times and Bad
The Cyclicality of Hardship
Hardship rises and falls with the business cycle. When the unemploy 
ment rate goes up, more individuals experience weeks without earnings, the 
duration of unemployment increases and more of the unemployed encounter 
recurrent bouts of joblessness. This obviously increases the incidence of 
Inadequate Individual Earnings. Because of the reduced contributions of 
primary as well as secondary family work force participants, more families 
experience earnings below the poverty level. Countercyclical income 
transfers, particularly unemployment insurance, rescue some but not all of 
these recession victims from severe hardship, so that the number with 
Inadequate Family Income rises along with the IFE.
In general, however, the cyclicality of hardship is less extreme than 
the cyclicality of unemployment. During recessions, the number with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings rises more than the number of unemployed but 
the IFE count increases by substantially less, while the IFI increment is 
smaller still. The percentage fluctuations in hardship are less than the 
percentage fluctuations in joblessness.
There were two periods of rising unemployment within the 1974-1980 
period for which the hardship measures were calculated. The national 
unemployment rate rose from 5.6 percent in 1974 to 8.5 percent in 1975, 
declining subsequently through 1979. It then rose from 5.8 percent in 1979 
to 7.1 percent in 1980. The number of annual average unemployed rose by 54 
percent in the 1974-1975 recession, and by 25 percent in the 1979-1980 
recession (Table 4.1).
The severe hardship HE count rose by 3.6 million during the first 
recession and 4.5 million during the second, compared to increases of 2.8 
and 1.5 million, respectively, in average annual unemployment, and 2.6 and 
2.9 million, respectively, in the number of work force participants ex 
periencing unemployment during the year. But the IFE counts rose only 1.8 
million in each of the two recessions, while the IFI counts increased by 
only 0.9 and 1.4 million, respectively. I/
The plots of hardship and unemployment incidence rates and levels for 
1974 through 1980 illustrate the similarity in unemployment and I IE 
changes, but the lesser cyclical ity of the IFE, and the even more dampened 
cyclicality of the IFI (Chart 4.1). Likewise, the constant dollar HE 
Deficit was much more cyclically sensitive than the IFE Deficit, while the 
IFI Deficit was relatively stable (Chart 4.2).
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(15 Weeks or More)
Persons Experiencing Unemployment 
During Year
Persons Unemployed More Than One- 





IIE Deficit (1980 $}
IFE Deficit (1980 $)
IFI Deficit (1980 $)
HE Average Deficit (1980 $)
IFE Average Deficit (1980 $)
IFI Average Deficit (1980 $)
149











































I I I I







1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
151
Hardship and unemployment were highly correlated (Table 4.2). The 
coefficient of correlation between the average annual unemployment and HE 
rates was a high 0.92, and the correlation with the IFE rate was 0.94. The 
relationship between the IFI and unemployment rates was less exact, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.78 In fact, the constant dollar average IFI 
Deficit was negatively related to unemployment, declining during re 
cessions.
The standard deviation in the number of average annual unemployed over 
the 1974-1980 period was slightly higher than the standard deviation in the 
IFE total and half again the IFI standard deviation (Table 4.3). Propor 
tionately, however, the fluctuations in unemployment were much greater than 
the fluctuations in hardship. The standard deviation in average annual 
unemployment represented 15 percent of its mean, while the standard 
deviations in the severe hardship I IE, IFE and IFI counts represented 7, 7 
and 9 percent of their respective means. Put another way, if resources or 
concern were allocated in proportion to the levels of need, the cyclical 
fluctuations in resources and concern would have been much less if the 
nation focused on the yearly IFE and IFI tallies rather than the annual 
unemployment counts.
Severe hardship fluctuated relatively more than moderate or inter 
mediate hardship (Table 4.4). The intermediate and moderate HE increased 
when unemployment rose, but the increments in the severe hardship com 
ponents accounted for all of these increases. The differential between the 
intermediate and severe hardship HE totals, and the moderate minus inter 
mediate HE counts, were negatively correlated with the annual average 
unemployed. In other words, the intermediate and moderate HE counts 
declined modestly relative to the severe hardship counts during recessions 
(Table 4.5). The intermediate and moderate hardship IFI counts, on the 
other hand, were somewhat more cyclical than the severe hardship IFI 
counts. Apparently the victims of recession were lifted out of poverty by 
countercyclical transfers and other income, but were not lifted above the 
intermediate or moderate hardship adequacy standards.
How Rising Unemployment Causes Hardship
The business cycle impacts are reflected in the changing work ex 
perience patterns of persons in the HE, IFE and IFI. When unemployment 
rises in a recession, many of the victims are those who were in hardship 
even in good times. As an example, the HE cohort employed full-time 
during all weeks in the work force dropped by half a million between 1974 
and 1975, as the fully-employed suffered bouts of joblessness (Table 4.6). 
By the same token, the incidence of hardship increased among those who 
experienced unemployment. Three-fifths of the 1975 and 1980 unemployed had 
Inadequate Individual Earnings compared to 54 and 53 percent, respectively, 
of the individuals who experienced unemployment during 1974 and 1979:
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Table 4.3. STATISTICAL MEASURES OF THE VARIABILITY AND INTERRELATEDNESS 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP OVER THE 1974-1980 PERIOD*
	 1 Standard . Coefficient . 
	Mean deviation of variation
Average annual unemployment rate 6.8 1.0 15.8
Average annual unemployed (000) 6,644 982 14.8
Percent experiencing unemployment 17.8 1.6 9.2
Persons experiencing unemployment 19,532 1,498 7.7
Percent predominantly unemployed 8.3 1.5 15.8
Persons predominantly
unemployed (000) 9,063 1,487 16.4
HE incidence 26.8 1.7 6.5
HE (000) 29,471 2,001 6.8
IFE incidence 12.2 0.7 5.8
IFE (000) 13,388 948 7.1
IFI incidence 6.5 0.4 6.6
IFI (000) 7,137 649 9.1
HE Deficit (Millions 1980 $) 64,346 6,256 9.7
IFE Deficit (Millions 1980 $) 36,508 2,594 7.1
IFI Deficit (Millions 1980 $) 14,429 1,431 9.9
HE Average Deficit (1980 $) 2,181 103 4.7
IFE Average Deficit (1980 $) 2,727 28 1.0
IFI Average Deficit (1980 $) 2,021 36 1.8
The "standard deviation" is a measure of the absolute variability of a 
statistic (i.e., two-thirds of the numbers are predicted to be within _+ one 
standard deviation of the mean); the "coefficient of variation," which is 
the standard deviation divided by the mean, is a measure of the proportionate 
variability of a statistic (i.e., the variability of numbers with different 
scales can be compared since the coefficients of variation are all in the 
same percentage terms); and the "correlation coefficient" is a measure of the 
proportionate changes in one statistic which occurs with equal proportionate 
changes in another statistic (i.e., it is close to +1.0 when the statistics 
change the same proportionate amounts and it is close to 0 if the changes 
are not related).
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Table 4.4. FLUCTUATIONS IN SEVERE, INTERMEDIATE AND MODERATE HARDSHIP IN 




















































































































Table 4.5. RELATIVE LEVELS OF SEVERE, INTERMEDIATE AND MODERATE HARDSHIP, 1974-1980*
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The result is that the proportions of the hardship counts who had 
experienced unemployment during the previous year and who were jobless for 
more than one-third of their weeks in the work force both rose during 
recessions (Chart 4.3).
There were significant cyclical changes in work force attachment which 
were reflected in the full-year and less-than-full-year hardship counts. 
Over the 1974-1980 period, full-year participants averaged 72 percent of 
the work force, rising from 70 percent in 1974 to 74 percent in 1980. 
Among those experiencing unemployment, and among the I IE, IFE and IFI 
counts, 61, 52, 45, and 46 percent, respectively, were full-year partici 
pants on average over the entire period. But the fluctuations around those 
means varied significantly (Chart 4.4). From 1974 to 1975, the number of 
full-year work force participants rose by 3.1 million while the less than 
full-year participants declined by 2.3 million. From 1979 to 1980 (using 
1980 Census weights in both cases), the full-year work force grew by 3.5 
million while the less than half-year work force declined by 2.1 million. 
Apparently, more participants stayed in the work force full-year to bolster 
family earnings in the face of adversity, while many of those with limited 
attachment were discouraged and did not participate in the work force. 
Reflecting these patterns, the full-year participant components of the HE, 
the IFE, and the IFI rose dramatically in recession years while the less 
than full-year participants in hardship rose much more modestly.
Transfers helped to mitigate the impacts of recession, but the effects 
were much greater in the 1974-1975 recession than in the 1979-1980 re 
cession. From 1974 to 1975, 47 percent of those added to the IFI Net-of- 
Transfers were raised out of poverty by cash benefits compared to just 18 
percent of those added to the IFI Net-of-Transfers between 1979 and 1980. 
The total reduction of the Net-of-Transfers IFI was 37 percent in 1975 but 
only 30 percent in 1980:
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Chart 4.4. YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES IN FULL-YEAR AND LESS THAN FULL-YEAR PARTICIPATION IN WORK FORCE AND 
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The Victims of Recession
The victims of recession include prime age workers, males and more 
skilled workers who rarely suffer hardship in good times. The political 
responsiveness to recessionary cycles of unemployment in contrast to the 
the benign neglect of persistent structural problems is explained by these 
compositional shifts, as the politically leveraged segments only begin to 
suffer during severe recessions.
The Impacts on Prime Age Workers
In both the 1974-1975 and 1979-1980 recessions, the proportionate 
increases in unemployment and individual earnings inadequacy were greater 
among 25-to-44-year-old workers than among older or younger participants 
(Table 4.7). Inadequate Family Earnings also rose most substantially among 
25-to-44-year-olds, although 20-to-24-year-olds were also adversely 
affected. In the 1974-1975 recession, the IFE rise among prime age workers 
was mitigated by increased transfer payments; 27.5 percent of the 25-to- 
44-year-olds with Inadequate Family Earnings were lifted out of poverty by 
the receipt of transfers in 1975, up from 21.1 percent in 1974. This was 
not true in the 1979-1980 recession, where the percent of 25-to-44-year- 
olds in the IFE who were lifted out of poverty by the receipt of transfers 
actually fell from 19.7 to 18.2 percent between 1979 and 1980. As a 
result, the prime age workers' share of the IFI rose much more in the 
second period (Table 4.8).
Some of the recession's impacts on younger and older workers were 
"disguised" by their withdrawal from the work force (and hence from the 
hardship tallies) in the face of adversity. The percentage point increases 
in hardship rates during recessions were greater among teenagers than prime 
age workers, and if the net reduction in the number of work force partici 
pants were added to the measured increases in hardship counts, then the 
estimated impacts on older and younger workers were substantial.
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Table 4.7. ABSOLUTE AND PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION, 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND HARDSHIP DURING THE 1974-1975 AND 1979-1980 
RECESSIONS, BY AGE OF WORKERS
Change 1974-1975 Change 1979-1980
	(000) (%) (000) (%)
Work Force
16-19 -339 -3.0 -693 -5.9
16-19 Student -400 -6.2 -96 -1.5
20-24 +145 +1.6 +264 +1.5
20-24 Student -66 -2.7 -64 -2.4
25-44 +1,376 +3.3 +1,740 +3.3
45-64 -274 -0.9 -109 -0.3
65+ -66 -1.6 -54 -1.3
Experienced Unemployment
16-19 -9 -0.2 +150 +4.9
16-19 Student -121 -7.0 +168 +12.5
20-24 +452 +9.7 +664 +14.7
20-24 Student +43 +7.2 +77 +16.7
25-44 +1,376 +20.7 +1,627 +20.9
45-64 +685 +20.8 +500 +17.7
65+ +66 +19.0 -9 -3.8
HE
16-19 +680 +9.7 +637 +6.3
16-19 Student +249 +6.0 +376 +9.5
20-24 +959 +19.3 +1,221 +22.2
20-24 Student +177 +17.7 +171 +16.0
25-44 +1,236 +16.6 +2,132 +24.1
45-64 +604 +10.5 +610 +11.1
65+ +109 +6.8 +77 +5.0
IFE
16-19 +244 +13.6 +162 +9.1
16-19 Student +30 +3.2 +112 +13.3
20-24 +418 +22.5 +408 +18.0
20-24 Student +59 +14.6 +29 +6.2
25-44 +747 +21.3 +963 +21.4
45-64 +306 +10.5 +292 +9.2
65+ +46 +2.4 +6 +0.3
IFI
16-19 +234 +21.0 +89 +8.0
16-19 Student +62 +11.3 +68 +14.8
20-24 +266 +22.1 +371 +25.9
20-24 Student +48 +24.2 +52 +25.1
25-44 +299 +12.8 +751 +25.1
45-64 +107 +7.6 +164 +12.7
65+ 0 0 +34 +15.0
Table 4.8. CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION AND INCIDENCE OF WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND 




























































































































































































































Cyclical Patterns for Sex and Family Relationship Subgroups
Males were disproportionately affected by recessions. They repre 
sented 56 percent of those experiencing unemployment during 1974, but 65 
percent of the 1974-1975 increment in unemployment. By 1979, the male 
share among the unemployed had fallen to 54 percent, but males were even 
more adversely affected by the recessions, accounting for 69 percent of the 
1979-1980 rise in unemployment. The male shares of the unemployed and of 
those unemployed over one-third of their weeks in the work force rose by 
1.0 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively, from 1974 to 1975, and by 2.0 
and 4.0 percentage points, respectively, from 1979 to 1980, while the 
female shares declined by the same amounts (Table 4.9).
Males were relatively more likely to suffer hardship during re 
cessions, and the male shares of the HE, IFE and IFI all rose from 1974 to 
1975 and from 1979 to 1980. However, the shifts were less pronounced in 
the hardship shares than in the unemployment shares. For instance, where 
the male share of persons experiencing unemployment rose by 2.0 percentage 
points between 1979 and 1980, the male share of the HE rose by 1.3 per 
centage points, their share of the IFE by only 0.5 percentage points, and 
their IFI share by only 0.3 percentage points.
The explanation is apparent when the male and female totals are 
disaggregated by family relationship. The percentage of the work force who 
were wives did not change in response to recessions, and the wives' shares 
of the unemployed and the HE counts actually declined. Yet their shares 
of the IFE and the IFI rose. In other words, hardship among families with 
wives in the work force reflected the problems of both the wives and their 
working husbands. Wives more frequently had husbands who worked and the 
husbands, on average, accounted for a larger share of earnings than vice 
versa. Thus, the individual problems of male heads were reflected more in 
the tallies for females than the problems of female earners were reflected 
in the male tallies.
Other males and females, who usually represented secondary or tertiary 
family earners, withdrew from the work force in the face of economic 
adversity. Their shares of the unemployed, thus, declined. However, their 
shares of the severe hardship IFI count rose slightly because the pro 
portion of the IFE who were lifted out of poverty by nonearned income 
declined during recessions, particularly so in the 1979-1980 recession when 
their share of the IFE declined by 0.6 percentage points, while their share 
of the IFI rose by 1.3 percentage points.
Unrelated individuals, both male and female, were particularly 
affected by the 1974-1975 recession, but less so in the 1979-1980 decline. 
Their share of the severe hardship IFI count rose by 0.7 percentage points 
between 1974 and 1975, but dropped by 1.6 percentage points between 1979 
and 1980. The changes in the IFE shares were +0.4 and -0.2 percentage 
points, respectively.
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Table 4.9. SEX AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF WORK FORCE, UNEMPLOYED 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Education is Less of a Protection in Recessions
In good times and bad, education provides protection from hardship. 
However, the increments in the hardship counts which result from recessions 
include a larger share of the better educated. In 1974, for instance, high 
school dropouts represented 32.0 percent of persons experiencing unemploy 
ment, 34.6 percent of the HE, 47.5 percent of the IFE, and 49.7 percent of 
the IFI. In contrast, dropouts accounted for only 30.0, 20.7, 28.6 and 
27.3 percent, respectively, of the 1974-1975 increases in these unemploy 
ment and hardship measures (Table 4.10). Thus, the dropout share of the 
severe hardship HE, IFE and IFI counts fell, respectively, by 1.6, 2.4 and 
2.8 percentage points between 1974 and 1975. The pattern was similar in 
the 1979-1980 recession, with the HE, IFE and IFI shares of dropouts 
falling by 1.6, 1.5 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively.
One reason was that the less educated withdrew from the work force in 
the face of economic adversity. During the 1974-1975 recession, the number 
of dropouts in the work force declined by 1.1 million, or more than double 
the average annual decline over the 1974-1979 period. Between 1979 and 
1980, 0.8 million withdrew from the work force. The number of work force 
participants with some college education increased by 1.9 million in the 
first period, only slightly below the 1974-1979 trend increase of 2.0 
million per year.
The better educated were far less affected, both in absolute and 
relative terms, by the 1979-1980 recession than by the 1974-1975 recession. 
The percent increases in the HE, IFE and IFI counts for college graduates 
were 3.5, 2.5 and 5.1 times the percent increases for dropouts in the 
1974-1975 recession, but 1.5, 0.4 and 0.9 times the increases for dropouts 
in the 1979-1980 recession. The hardship share of persons with just a high 
school education rose by more in the second recession than the first, and 
for dropouts the share declined by less. Students were much more likely to 
withdraw from the work force in the earlier recession, so that the declines 
in their hardship shares were noticeably greater between 1974 and 1975 than 
between 1979 and 1980.
Race and Recessions
Minorities accounted for a larger share of persons with continuing 
structural employment problems than of persons with only cyclical employ 
ment problems. The number of white workers experiencing unemployment rose 
by 14.0 percent between 1974 and 1975, and the number who were unemployed 
for more than one-third of their weeks in the work force rose 44.5 percent, 
compared to increases of 11.8 and 28.9 percent, respectively, among black 
workers (Table 4.11). The severe hardship IFE count increased 17.7 percent 
for whites, compared to only 5.2 percent for blacks. These patterns 
prevailed despite the fact that white work force participation declined 
more in response to the recessions than did black participation. The white 
work force grew 2.2 million annually between 1974 and 1979, but only 
547,000 between 1974 and 1975, and 847,000 between 1979 and 1980. In 
contrast, the black work force growth of 190,000 and 278,000, respectively 
in the two recession periods, was much closer to the trend line of 279,000 
annual growth.
Table 4.10. CHANGES IN WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND SEVERE HARDSHIP IN THE 1974-1975 
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Table 4.11. IMPACTS OF 1974-1975 AND 1979-1980 RECESSIONS ON WHITES, 
BLACKS AND HISPANICS























































































































































































































































































































































































Blacks represented 15.0 percent of the unemployed in 1974 but only 
12.8 percent of the 1974-1975 increment in unemployment. More strikingly, 
blacks represented 22.0 percent of the 1974 severe hardship IFE count but 
only 7.4 percent of the 1974-1975 increase:
Relative shares of structural and






















































































Blacks and Hispanics suffered more, both relatively and absolutely, 
during the 1979-1980 downturn than during the more severe 1974-1975 re 
cession. Comparing the recession-induced increments in unemployment and 
hardship, the 1979-1980 rises for blacks and Hispanics far exceeded those 
in the 1974-1975 recession. In this earlier recession, the increases in 
hardship incidence rates for Hispanics were substantially lower than those 
of whites, while in the second recession they equalled or exceeded those of 
whites. In part, this occurred because the Hispanic population withdrew 
from the work force in very substantial numbers in the earlier recession (a 
measured decline of 123,000, compared to the trend line growth of 269,000 
for the 1974-1979 period) but this apparently did not occur in the second 
recession.
The Geographic Impacts of Recessions
Both the 1974-1975 and 1979-1980 declines had disproportionately large 
impacts on the East North Central states but limited effects on the Pacific
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states (Table 4.12). In many other cases, however, the regions that fared 
comparatively well in the earlier recession were victims of the latter 
decline and vice versa. For instance, the New England states had in 
creasing shares of hardship in the first recession but declining shares in 
the second, while the hardship shares of the East Southern Central states 
declined from 1974 to 1975 but rose from 1979 to 1980.
Surprisingly, the largest central cities within metropolitan areas had 
declining shares of hardship in both recessions (Table 4.13). The impacts 
of the 1979-1980 recession were comparatively much more concentrated in 
nonmetropolitan areas than were the impacts of the 1974-1975 recession.



























































































































































Table 4.13. CHANGE IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN SHARES OF WORK FORCE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
HARDSHIP RESULTING FROM RECESSIONS
YEAR-TO-YEAR PERCENTAGE POINT CHANGE IN SHARES
Inside SMSA
SMSA More Than 1 Million
Central City 
Balance
























































































































Outside SMSA +0.1 +0.4 +1.0 +2.1 +0.3 +1.5 -0.9 +0.6 -0.2 +2.7 +2.6
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Notes
1. The 1979-1980 comparisons in this chapter utilize the 1980 Census 
weights for the 1979 survey responses. The time series presentations 
for the 1974-1980 period present the 1979 data utilizing both the 1970 
and 1980 Census weights. Cases where the 1970 Census weights are 
utilized in calculations are noted by an asterisk.
2. There have been several changes in the survey questions which identify 
Hispanics, as well as in the Census survey techniques which affect the 
weights for CPS survey responses. The 1979-1980 data for Hispanics 
are much more dependable than the 1974-1975 data.

CHAPTER 5. APPLYING THE HARDSHIP MEASURES
Policy Options
A primary aim of economic and social policy is to alleviate the 
economic hardship which results from labor market problems. The basic 
tools are macroeconomic policies to stimulate employment and reduce unem 
ployment, minimum wage changes to alter the payoff from employment, trans 
fer programs to offset insufficient earnings, and targeted job creation and 
training programs to help those in need who are at the end of the labor 
queue.
The hardship measures provide a useful perspective for assessing these 
policy options. They demonstrate quite clearly that macroeconomic policies 
are not likely to significantly alleviate labor market-related hardship, 
that an array of employment and training interventions are needed to 
supplement macroeconomic policies, that hardship is not so much an in 
dividual problem as a family problem, so that solutions to individual 
earnings difficulties will not necessarily eliminate family earnings 
shortfalls, and that welfare and workfare must overlap if hardship is to be 
eliminated for those in the work force and their dependents.
The Limitations of Macroeconomic Policies
Hardship declines when unemployment falls, and rises during re 
cessions; but it requires an enormous drop in the unemployment rate to 
achieve a modest percentage decline in hardship. Hardship will continue at 
significant levels under any foreseeable degree of recovery from the 
current recession.
As noted previously, only half of those experiencing unemployment 
during 1979 had Inadequate Individual Earnings, less than a fourth were in 
families with Inadequate Family Earnings, and only one in seven remained 
with Inadequate Family Incomes after the receipt of cash transfers and 
other earnings supplements. In addition, only a minority of persons in 
hardship experienced any weeks of unemployment: the unemployed constituted 
35 percent of the severe hardship HE count in 1979, 42 percent of the IFE 
and 37 percent of the IFI. Finally, many who suffered from unemployment 
and hardship had such limited participation or large breadwinning responsi 
bilities that they would not have escaped poverty even if they found jobs 
which paid minimally adequate wages. Nearly three-fifths of workers with 
Inadequate Family Earnings who, themselves, experienced at least a week of 
joblessness would have remained in the IFE even if all workers were pro 
vided minimum wage employment for periods of forced idleness. Thus, any
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reduction in the aggregate number of unemployed yields a proportionately 
smaller direct reduction in the severe hardship counts. Indirect impacts 
are difficult to estimate. As unemployment falls, average wages tend to 
rise faster, second jobs become readily available, involuntary part-time 
employment declines, and more second or third family members enter the work 
force. Yet the percentage decline in hardship is less than the percentage 
decline in unemployment which occurs during recovery, and vice versa during 
recessions. The standard deviation in the unemployment rate over the 
1974-1980 period was 16 percent of the mean, while the coefficients of 
variation in the severe hardship HE, IFE and IFI rates were 7, 7 and 9 
percent respectively.
While hardship is the result of limited hourly wages, as well as 
limited hours of employment, increases in the minimum wage--!ike reductions 
in unemployment—have a muted effect on hardship. Only a minority of 
workers who earn at or below the minimum hourly wage come from low-income 
families. The Minimum Wage Study Commission found that over two-fifths of 
all low-wage workers in 1978 were from families with incomes above $15,000 
and three-fifths had family incomes over $10,000. \J Only 11 percent of 
minimum wage workers lived in poor families, 17 percent in near poor 
families, and less than a fourth in families with incomes less than 150 
percent of the poverty threshold. Thus, the persons in hardship would 
benefit from only a small portion of the wage bill generated by any in 
crease in the minimum wage. The Minimum Wage Study Commission concluded 
that minimum wage increases were associated with higher unemployment among 
minorities and teenagers and perhaps slightly higher unemployment among 
disadvantaged adults. Disemployment, thus, would offset some of the 
benefits resulting from increased hourly wage levels, particularly af 
fecting those in the hardship counts. Moreover, many in hardship would 
remain there even if their hourly wages were increased. A ten percent 
increase in wages for persons with Inadequate Family Earnings in 1979 would 
have lowered the severe hardship IFE by just a tenth in 1979.
On balance, however, hardship does decline when the legislated minimum 
wage is raised, and increases when the real value of the minimum wage is 
eroded by inflation. This is almost a tautology in the case of the HE 
count, since the severe hardship adequacy standard is the average real 
value of the legislated minimum for the 1967-1980 period, adjusted for the 
CPI less home ownership costs, so that workers earning the legislated 
minimum wage will be counted in the I IE when the legislated minimum falls 
below this adjusted average real value. But the IFE and IFI counts are 
also affected, since when the real purchasing power of minimum wages falls, 
low-wage workers are less likely to be able to raise their families above 
the cost of living adjusted poverty levels.
The plot of year-to-year changes in hardship and unemployment demon 
strates these relationships (Chart 5.1). While hardship generally rose and 
fell in the same pattern as unemployment during the 1974-1980 period, there 
was a noticeable increase in the severe hardship HE between 1976 and 1977 
despite declining unemployment. The IFE also rose, and the IFI held 
constant, even though falling unemployment should have resulted in de 
clines. In 1976 the legislated minimum and the adjusted average real 
minimum wage were equivalent, but because the legislated minimum was not 
raised in 1977, it fell below the adjusted real minimum standard. Put
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another way, workers earning just the legislated minimum in 1976 for their 
annual hours of availability would have had adequate individual earnings 
according to the definitions used in the hardship measures, but those 
earning just the legislated minimum in 1977 would have fallen below the HE 
adequacy standard:
Adjusted
real value of Legislated 
Legislated minimum wage minimum •» 
minimum wage 1967-1980 real minimum
1974 $2.00 $1.99 $1.01
1975 2.10 2.16 .97
1976 2.30 2.29 1.00
1977 2.30 2.44 .94
1978 2.65 2.61 1.02
1979 2.90 2.87 1.01
1980 3.10 3.21 .97
Since the hardship measures could only be calculated for the 1974-1980 
period, it is impossible to derive very precise statistical estimates of 
the relationship between changes in aggregate unemployment, the legislated 
minimum wage and hardship levels. However, there were fairly significant 
fluctuations in the unemployment rate during these seven years, when it 
ranged from 5.6 to 8.5 percent, and the legislated minimum wage ranged from 
94 to 102 percent of the average real minimum wage for the 1967-1980 
period. Regression analysis suggests that the severe hardship, unemploy 
ment and legislated minimum wage levels were interrelated:
Equation 1: HE incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate) + c (100 X average real minimum wage\
legislated minimum wage '
r2 = 0.90 
a = 1.756 
b = 1.25 
c = 0.163
Interpretation: An increase in the unemployment rate of 1.0 per 
centage points was associated with an increase in the severe hardship HE 
rate of 1.25 percentage points. An increase in the ratio of the adjusted 
average real minimum wage to the legislated minimum wage from 100 percent 
to 110 percent would have increased the HE incidence by 1.63 percentage 
points.
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Equation 2: HE incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate) + c (100 X average real minimum wagex
legislated minimum wage ' 






Interpretation: An increase in the unemployment rate of 1.0 per 
centage points was associated with an increase of 1.17 percentage points in 
the severe hardship HE rate. An increase in the adjusted average real 
minimum wage from 100 percent to 110 percent of the legislated minimum wage 
would have increased the HE incidence by 1.85 percentage points. There 
was a downward trend in the incidence of individual earnings inadequacy 
which lowered the HE rate for the total work force by an estimated 0.86 
percentage points over the 1974-1980 period.
Equation 3: IFE incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate) + c (100 X average real minimum wagex 





Interpretation: An increase in the unemployment rate of 1.0 per 
centage points was associated with an increase in the severe hardship IFE 
rate of 0.54 percentage points; thus, IFE incidence was less sensitive to 
unemployment changes than was HE incidence. An increase in the ratio of 
the adjusted average real minimum wage from 100 to 110 percent of the 
legislated minimum wage would have increased the IFE by 0.56 percentage 
points; thus, the severe hardship IFE rate was less responsive to the 
minimum wage level than was the HE rate.
Equation 4: IFE incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate) + c (100 X average real minimum wage. 
legislated minimum wage ' 
+ d (year = 1 in 1974 to 7 in 1980)
r2 = 0.92 
a = 2.900 
b = 0.540 
c = 0.055 
d = 0.007
Interpretation: While the HE rate trended down over the 1974-1980 
period, there was no significant shift in the IFE rate.
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Equation 5: IFI incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate + c (100 X average real minimum wage% 





Interpretation: An increase in the unemployment rate of 1.0 per 
centage points was associated with an increase in the IFI incidence of 0.26 
percentage points; thus, the severe hardship IFI rate was less sensitive to 
unemployment changes than was the IFE rate. An increase in the ratio of 
the adjusted average real minimum wage from 100 to 110 percent of the 
legislated minimum wage would have increased the severe hardship IFI rate 
by 0.40 percentage points; thus, IFI incidence was less responsive to the 
minimum wage level changes than was the IFE rate.
Equation 6: IFI incidence = a + b (annual average unemployment 
rate) + c (100 X average real minimum wage^
legislated minimum wage ' 






Interpretation: There was apparently an upward trend in the severe 
hardship IFI rate, adding 0.4 percentage points over the 1974-1980 peciod. 
The addition of the trend variable increases the explanative power (r ) of 
the equation.
The hardship rates among full-year workers were slightly less re 
sponsive to unemployment changes and slightly more responsive to minimum 
wage changes (Table 5.1). The intermediate and moderate hardship IFE and 
IFI rates for the total work force were slightly more responsive to 
aggregate unemployment changes than the severe hardship IFE and IFI rates.
These equations can be used to predict hardship levels for 1981 based 
on the actual unemployment rate and the ratio of adjusted average real 
minimum wage to the legislated minimum wage. Estimates for 1982 can be 
derived by using alternative inflation and unemployment assumptions:
Table 5.1. HARDSHIP INCIDENCE CORRELATIONS OVER TIME WITH UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE MINIMUM WAGE LEVEL
d
b c (year = 1
2 (annual average (100 X average real minimum wage\ in 1974 to 
r a unemployment) legislated minimum wage ' 7 in 1980)
Full-year hardship r 
full-year work force
HE 0.94 -9.55 +1.09 +.212 -.039
IFE 0.95 -3.21 +0.63 +.066 -.021
IFI 0.77 -1.36 +0.30 +.033 -.050
Full-year hardship T 
total work force H-
00
HE 0.93 -8.04 +0.94 +.151 +.044
IFE 0.92 -3.05 +0.48 +.052 +.012
IFI 0.70 -1.56 +0.24 +.027 +.052
Intermediate hardship
HE 0.94 +17.07 +1.05 +.120 +.053
IFE 0.92 +5.56 +0.68 +.053 +.020
IFI 0.78 +0.62 +0.37 +.062 +.037
Moderate hardship
HE 0.75 +33.29 +0.95 +.050 +.159
IFE 0.92 +7.54 +0.86 +.058 +.048
IFI 0.82 +3.03 +0.57 +.063 -.002
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Severe hardship for 
total work force
IIE IFE IFI 
incidence incidence incidence
1980 actual 27.7% 12.8% 7.2%
1981 predicted on basis of unemployment
and inflation rates 28.3 13.1 7.4
1982 predicted on assumption of--
9% unemployment; 5.0% inflation 30.7 14.2 8.0 
9% unemployment; 7.5% inflation 31.3 14.3 8.1 
9.5% unemployment; 5.0% inflation 31.3 14.4 8.2 
9.5% unemployment; 7.5% inflation 31.9 14.6 8.3 
10% unemployment; 5.0% inflation 32.0 14.7 8.3 
10% unemployment; 7.5% inflation 32.4 14.9 8.4
Recognizing the imprecision of forecasts based on only seven years of 
data, it is clear that hardship is currently a major problem which will not 
ease significantly under any foreseeable economic scenario. Even if un 
employment miraculously fell to 7.0 percent in 1982, with inflation a low 
5.0 percent, the severe hardship IFE rate would be 13.2 percent and the IFI 
rate 7.4 percent. The dramatic changes which have taken place in transfer 
programs are likely to raise the IFI above even these high levels. Thus, 
even assuming heathy recovery, both the IFE and IFI rates would be as bad 
or worse than the highest rate in the 1974-1980 period.
What if Employment Problems Were Solved
The limited relationship between macroeconomic changes and hardship is 
not just because the benefits of higher wages and increased employment must 
trickle down to those most in need; it is also a reflection of the inherent 
limitations of labor market remedies. Inadequate Family Earnings and 
Inadequate Family Incomes are not just the result of involuntary idleness 
or low wages, but also result from restricted work force participation 
relative to breadwinning responsibilities:
t If the annual earnings of all workers in the 1979 severe hardship 
IFE were increased by ten percent, nine of ten would still have Inadequate 
Family Earnings.
§ If all persons in the severe hardship IFE who were involuntarily 
idle in 1979 were provided employment at their usual wage for all hours of 
idleness, more than four of five would still have had Inadequate Family 
Earnings, and three-fourths would have remained in the IFE if they were 
provided minimum wage employment for all hours of forced idleness.
t If every person in the severe hardship IFE were provided mini 
mally adequate individual earnings, 64 percent would still have had Inade 
quate Family Earnings.
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t Even if every worker in the IFE were provided employment at their 
usual wage for all hours of idleness, and earnings were, then, increased by 
10 percent, 56 percent would have remained with Inadequate Family Earnings.
The corollary is that transfers are essential if labor market-related 
hardship is to be eliminated. The IFE Deficit in 1979 was $31.7 billion. 
Nontransfer earnings supplements reduced this by $7.7 billion, cash trans 
fers by $11.2, and in-kind aid by another $2.2 billion. If the earnings of 
everyone in the IFE were raised at least to the minimal individual adequacy 
level, the IFE Deficit would have still been $18.8 billion. Even Enhanced 
Capacity augmentation, providing the usual wage for all hours of forced 
idleness, and then increasing the earnings of all individuals by ten per 
cent, would have left a deficit of $16.7 billion. In other words, if 
nontransfer earnings supplements remained at the same level, transfers 
could be reduced if earnings were augmented, but they would still be needed 
to fill the substantial gaps remaining for the working poor.
Moreover, the need for transfers has modestly increased rather than 
decreased over the 1974-1980 period, as suggested by the decline in the 
importance of labor market problems as a cause of labor market-related 
hardship, and in the effectiveness of labor market cures in mitigating 
hardship. For instance, the Enhanced Capacity IFE was 53.9 percent of the 
severe hardship IFE in 1974 but 55.6 percent in 1979:
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1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 . 1975 1980 1975
Full Employment IFE as
percent IFE 1 75.2% 75.9% +0.7% 69.3% 69.9% +0.6%
Full Employment IFE 
Deficit as percent 
IFE Deficit 1 70.2 69.9 -0.3 61.4 62.9 +1.5
Adequate Employment IFE
as percent IFE2 61.2 64.1 +2.9 57.2 57.9 +0.7
Adequate Employment IFE 
Deficit as percent 
IFE Deficit2 57.9 59.3 +0.4 51.8 53.0 +1.2
Capacity Employment IFE
as percent IFE 3 82.1 83.5 +1.4 76.6 77.1 +0.5
Capacity Employment IFE 
Deficit as percent 
IFE Deficit3 79.5 80.4 +0.9 71.6 73.4 +1.8
Enhanced Earnings IFE
as percent IFE4 90.8 90.3 -0.5 90.3 90.3 0
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In calculating the Full Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are augmented 
by providing all unemployed and involuntarily part-time employed persons in 
the IFE the minimum wage for all hours of forced idleness.
2 In calculating the Adequate Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are augmented
for all persons in the IFE with Inadequate Individual Earnings. Their earnings 
are raised to the individual adequacy standard, i.e., the minimum wage or its 
rultiple ti-es their hours of availability.
In calculating the Capacity Employment IFE and Deficit, the unemployed and 
involuntary part-time workers in the IFE are provided their usual wage (when 
working) for all hours of forced idleness.
In calculating the Enhanced Earnings IFE and Deficit, the earnings of each 
person in tne IFE are augmented by 10 percent.
In calculating the Enhanced Capacity IFE and Deficit, unemployed and in 
voluntary part-time workers in the IFE are first provided their usual wage 
(when working) for all hours of forced idleness, then their capacity level 
earnings, as well as the earnings of all other persons in the IFE, are raised 
b> 10 percent.
Different Strokes
The five augmentation alternatives address different labor market 
problems and provide varying degrees of mitigation. For instance, the
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Enhanced Earnings IFE augmentation simulates a 10 percent wage rate in 
crease, assuming no changes in hours of work. The Capacity IFE augmen 
tation eliminates measured forced idleness while the Full Employment IFE 
goes further in assuring that at least the minimum wage will be paid for 
hours of forced idleness even if the individuals usually receive less than 
the minimum. Adequate Employment augmentation affects low-wage, fully- 
employed workers, as well as those with involuntary idleness, while the 
Enhanced Capacity IFE augmentation simulates the elimination of forced 
idleness combined with a 10 percent increase in hourly earnings. In real 
life, any augmentation of wages or hours of work would likely affect work 
force participation, attachment and job choice, so that the augmentations 
provide only very crude indicators of the effects of changes in the em 
ployment and earnings variables; nevertheless, they do help in indicating 
who will benefit from alternative interventions and to what degree.
A worker may escape the IFE as a result of augmentation even if his or 
her individual earnings are increased little or none, since another family 
member's earnings may be significantly augmented. For instance, a teenager 
with no employment in a family with a head working full-time, full-year, 
but earning 10 percent below the poverty level, will exit the IFE with 
Enhanced Earnings augmentation even though the teenager's earnings would 
remain zero. In general, however, the impacts of augmentation on the IFE 
levels for most segments of the work force suggest the nature of their 
employment problems and the potential solutions.
Enhanced Earnings augmentation, for instance, had almost no impact on 
the IFE count among persons without any employment during 1979 and very 
little on persons unemployed two-thirds or more of their weeks in the work 
force (Table 5.2). The most significant impacts from this augmentation 
were experienced by the full-year IFE who were mostly employed. In con 
trast, Full Employment augmentation reduced the IFE by two-fifths among 
those who experienced some unemployment but only a sixth among those 
employed all weeks in the work force.
Reflecting differences in work force problems and their severity, as 
well as in family status, the augmentation alternatives had quite different 
impacts on significant segments among workers with Inadequate Family 
Earnings:
• Females benefited less under all forms of augmentation, and this 
was particularly true for female family heads (Chart 5.2). Enhanced 
Capacity augmentation reduced the IFE of female family heads by three- 
tenths, while reducing the number of male family heads in the IFE by nearly 
half. In contrast, augmentation significantly reduced the number of wives 
in the IFE, since frequently both their own and their husbands' earnings 
were affected by the augmentation.
• The impacts of augmentation were less for work force participants 
residing in larger families with fewer earners (Table 5.3). The IFE reduc 
tion which resulted from Capacity Earnings augmentation was only a little 
greater when there were more workers in a family; for instance, among 
participants from three-member families, 14 percent of those from families 
with one participant were lifted out of the IFE by Capacity Earnings aug 
mentation, 28 percent of those from families with two participants, but 24
Table 5 2 IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EARNINGS AUGMENTATION APPROACHES FOR WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN/WORK 
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In calculating the Full Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are augmented by providing all unemployed and involuntarily part-time employed 
persons in the IFE the minimum wage for all hours of forced Idleness. In calculating the Adequate Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are 
augmented for all persons in the IFE with Inadequate Individual Earnings. Their earnings are raised to the individual adequacy standard, i.e., 
the minimum wage or its multiple tunes their hours of availability. In calculating the Capacity Employment IFE and Deficit, the unemployed and 
involuntary part-tune workers in the IFE are provided their usual wage (when working) for all hours of forced idleness. In calculating the 
Enhanced Earnings IFE and Deficit, the earnings of each person in the IFE are augmented by 10 percent. In calculating the Enhanced Capacity IFE 
and Deficit, unemployed and involuntary part-time workers in the IFE are first provided their usual wage (when working) for all hours of forced 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3. IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EARNINGS AUGMENTATION APPROACHES IN 1979 DEPENDING ON FAMILY SIZE 
AND NUMBER OF EARNERS 1
IFE REDUCTION
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In calculating the Full Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are aunmentpd by providing all unemployed and involuntarily part-time employed 
persons In the IFE the minimum wage for all hours of forced idleness. In calculating the Adequate Employment IFE and Deficit, earnings are 
augmented for all persons in the IFE with Inadequate Individual Earnings. Their earnings are raised to the individual adequacy standard, i.e., 
the minimum wage or its multiple times their hours of availability. In calculating the Capocity Employment IFE and Deficit, the unemployed and 
Involuntary part-time workers in the IFE are provided their usual wane (when working) for all hours of forced idleness. In calculating the 
Enhanced Earnings IFE and Deficit, the earnings of each person in the IFE are augmented by 10 percent. In calculating the Enh.ino.-d Capacity IFE 
and Deficit, unemployed dnd involuntary part-time workers in the IFE are first provided their usual wage (when working) for all hours of forced 
idleness, then their capacity level earnings, as well as the earnings of all other person-, in the IFE, are raised by 10 percf-nt.
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percent of those from families with three participants. The IFE reductions 
resulting from Full Employment augmentation increased much more signifi 
cantly with each additional family worker; there was a 14 percent reduction 
for workers from three-member families with one work force participant, but 
58 percent among families with three participants. Obviously, the second 
and third family earners were usually low paid when they worked compared to 
unemployed first workers in families.
• Prime age workers in the IFE were relatively more affected by 
Capacity Earnings and Enhanced Earnings augmentation than Full Employment 
and Adequate Employment augmentation, suggesting that their earnings rates 
and totals were relatively higher so that minimum wage employment was not 
the answer for their needs (Chart 5.3). The 45-to-64-year-olds in the IFE 
benefited most by Adequate Employment augmentation and Enhanced Capacity 
augmentation. Not unexpectedly, few teenagers were lifted out of poverty 
by Capacity Earnings augmentation, while older workers experienced below 
average reductions under all the different forms of augmentation.
• All of the employment and earnings augmentations helped high 
school graduates with no further education more than those with greater and 
lesser education (Chart 5.4). Dropouts benefited relatively more from the 
Capacity Earnings and Full Employment augmentations which simulated in 
creased hours of employment for periods of forced idleness. In contrast, 
college graduates did relatively best under the Adequate Employment and 
Enhanced Capacity augmentations, suggesting that their problems were more 
frequently limited hours of availability or large family support responsi 
bilities. High school and post-secondary students—those with the fewest 
hours of availability—benefited least from all of the augmentations.
t Blacks gained relatively more from the Capacity Earnings and Full 
Employment augmentations simulating reductions in forced idleness (Chart 
5.5). In contrast, whites experienced above average IFE reductions from 
the Enhanced Earnings, Adequate Employment and Enhanced Capacity augmen 
tations which increased earnings for workers with low pay or limited hours 
of availability relative to support responsibilities. Hispanics benefited 
more than whites or blacks from Enhanced Earnings augmentation, suggesting 
that low wages relative to breadwinning responsibilities were a particu 
larly serious problem for them.
t Blue-collar workers benefited relatively more from the Full 
Employment and Capacity Earnings augmentations compensating for forced 
idleness (Chart 5.6). White-collar workers, particularly professional, 
managerial, technical and administrative workers, benefited relatively more 
from Enhanced Earnings augmentation. The problems of service workers were 
least likely to be mitigated by any of the labor market-oriented initi 
atives. Farm workers benefited most from the Adequate Employment and 
Enhanced Capacity augmentations since they were more likely to be under 
employed and with quite low wages.
t Reflecting higher wage levels, the Enhanced Earnings and Capacity 
Employment augmentations had greater impacts in metropolitan than non- 
metropolitan areas. Likewise, reflecting more frequent part-time employ 
ment, metropolitan areas benefited relatively more from the Adequate 
Employment and Enhanced Capacity augmentations (Chart 5.7). Central cities
196
Chart 5.3. IMPACTS OF EARNINGS AUGMENTATION ON AGE GROUPS
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Chart 5.4. IMPACTS OF EARNINGS AUGMENTATION ON EDUCATIONAL GROUPS
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Chart 5.5. IMPACTS OF EARNINGS AUGMENTATION ON WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS
PERCENTAGE IFE REDUCTION PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN IFE DEFICIT
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benefited more than the suburbs from the Full Employment and Capacity 
Earnings augmentations compensating for forced idleness, while the suburbs 
benefited more from the Enhanced Earnings, Adequate Employment and Enhanced 
Capacity augmentations which compensated for low earnings relative to 
breadwinning responsibilities and which affected part-time workers 
significantly.
The Safety Net for the Working Poor
Since the alleviation of employment and earnings problems will not, 
alone, assure adequate family incomes because of limited family work force 
participation relative to support responsibilities, work and welfare must 
inevitably overlap if hardship is to be eliminated among the working poor. 
This overlap has increased over the years. In 1974, 28 percent of all 
families reported no income other than earnings, while 11 percent reported 
no earnings, leaving 61 percent who combined earnings with other income. 2/ 
By 1979, the proportion with earnings supplements had increased to 74 
percent. Among unrelated individuals, the proportion with earnings supple 
ments rose from 35 to 47 percent. The overlap increased among the poor, as 
well as the nonpoor:
Poor
Unrelated Poor unrelated 
Families individuals families individuals






























How well do these earnings supplements protect those whose individual 
and family earnings are inadequate? Are transfer benefits equitably 
distributed and, in particular, do they reward individuals and families 
exhibiting greater work effort? Do in-kind benefits fill the gaps in the 
cash transfer system? Did the growth of social welfare expenditures over 
the 1970s improve the safety net and perhaps even justify some retrenchment 
at the outset of the 1980s? The hardship measures provide some perspective 
on these vital questions, and the answers in many cases contradict conven 
tional wisdoms.
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Poverty Has Not Been Eliminated
Cash transfers and other nonearned income significantly mitigate labor 
market-related hardship. In 1979 and 1980, the IFE was reduced by a fifth 
by nontransfer earnings supplements, such as pension benefits, alimony, 
interest and dividends (Table 5.4). Cash transfers subtracted a third from 
the number with family earnings and other nontransfer income below the 
poverty level, reducing the IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit by 47 percent in 
1979 and 45 percent in 1980. Nevertheless, 7.0 million work force par 
ticipants slipped through the safety net in 1979, and 8.5 million in 1980. 
An additional $14.6 billion in transfers or other income would have been 
required to eliminate cash income poverty among work force participants in 
1979 and $17.5 billion in 1980.
It has been argued, however, that in-kind aid makes up much, if not 
all, of this shortfall. In fiscal 1980, $8.7 billion worth of food stamps 
were provided to the needy, along with $1.8 billion in free or reduced 
price school lunches for children from poor or near-poor families. Housing 
assistance subsidies totaled $5.4 billion. Federal contributions for 
health care programs provided an estimated $16.2 billion in aid to the 
poor. 3/ With a poverty deficit of just $17.5 billion for poor households 
with work force participants, and a total poverty deficit of $29.7 billion 
for all poor households, these in-kind aid programs were of obvious im 
portance. Yet the evidence suggests that these benefits did not eliminate 
hardship.
While the exact impact of in-kind aid depends on the value assigned to 
such benefits, it is clear that only a minority of the working poor escape 
poverty even when in-kind benefits other than health care are "cashed out" 
and added to other income. Health care is a special case, since it is so 
difficult to value and allocate benefits. For instance, the person on 
kidney dialysis has no lesser food, shelter, or even other medical care 
needs because he or she is receiving $50,000 or $100,000 in treatment 
annually. It is much clearer, however, that the family receiving food 
stamps does not have to spend its own income on food, and there is anec 
dotal evidence that food stamps circulate much like cash in some poverty 
areas. The value of food stamps, at least when used directly for food 
purchases, is printed on each coupon. Since food stamps have more liberal 
eligibility criteria than cash welfare and probably less of a stigma, they 
might also be expected to have a significant impact on the working poor. 
In fact, however, when the coupon value of food stamps is added to the cash 
incomes of the working poor, only half a million were lifted above the 
poverty threshold in 1979 and 1980. Food stamps reduced the severe hard 
ship IFI Deficit by $2.2 billion in 1979 and $2.6 billion in 1980. Total 
food stamp benefits to workers were approximated by the reduction in the 
moderate hardship IFI Deficit (assuming that the quarter of a million work 
force participants raised above the moderate hardship level remained only a 
little above it because of the needs-based formula used to determine 
benefit levels). Thus, the total benefits received by the families of 
working poor participants in hardship was on the order of $3.6 to $3.7 
billion in 1980, representing around two-fifths of total food stamp 
benefits. The remainder, presumably, went to dependent families with no 
work force participants.
Table 5.4. REDUCTION IN HARDSHIP RESULTING FROM CASH TRANSFERS AND IN-KIND AID, 1979 AND 1980
IFE
- Reduction in hardship 
resulting from non- 
transfer income
= IFI Net-of-Transfers
- Reduction in hardship 
resulting from cash 
transfers
= IFI
- Reduction in hardship 
resulting from food 
stamps
= IFI Including Food 
Stamps
- Reduction in hardship 
resulting from school 
lunches and housing 
subsidies
3 IFI Including In-Kind 
Aid (other than health 
care)
Severe Hardship Intermediate Hardship Moderate Hardship
Count (OOP) Deficit (1980$M) Count (OOP) Deficit (198P$M) Count (OPP) Deficit (198PSM) 
1979 1980 1979 198P 1979 198P 1979 1980 1979 19801979 198P









































































-281 -319 -601 -721 -280 -254 -1.031 -1,163 -245 -235 -1,516 -1,618




Valuing free school lunches at the cost per meal provided in the 
poverty budget, and housing subsidies by the differential between the 
proportion of cash incomes paid by subsidized and unsubsidized low-income 
residents of rental housing, and adding these values to the combined food 
stamp and cash incomes, reduced the severe hardship IFI Including Food 
Stamps counts by 281,000 in 1979 and 319,000 in 1980. The IFI Deficit was 
reduced by $0.6 billion in 1979, and by $0.7 billion in 1980. The moderate 
hardship IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit was reduced $1.5 billion in 1979 
and $1.6 billion in 1980 by the addition of the estimated value of free 
school lunches and subsidized housing. Assuming that the quarter of a 
million work force participants lifted above moderate hardship standards by 
the receipt of such aid were only marginally above the adequacy levels, the 
total value of school lunches and housing subsidies for working families in 
1980 was on the order of $1.8 billion, or a fourth of the estimated govern 
ment subsidies for school lunches and housing. While it is inappropriate 
to conclude that the remaining three-fourths of benefits went to the non- 
working low-income families, since both the school lunches and the sub 
sidized housing were valued at somewhat less than their cost of provision, 
it is fair to say that the preponderance of such benefits went to families 
whose members were outside the work force.
Families with no earners received the bulk of both cash and in-kind 
aid, and the nonworking poor who received aid were more likely to escape 
poverty as a result:
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Below poverty incomes
without cash transfers 
Below poverty incomes
after cash transfers 
Lifted out of poverty by
cash transfers 
Percent lifted out of
poverty by cash transfers
Below poverty incomes
counting food stamps 
Lifted out of cash poverty
by food stamps 
Percent reduction in poverty
resulting from food stamps 
Lifted out of net-of-transfer
poverty by food stamps and
cash transfers 
Percent reduction in poverty
net-of-transfers resulting
from cash transfers and
food stamps
Below poverty incomes counting 
food stamps, school lunches 
and housing________________
Lifted out of cash poverty by 
food stamps, school lunches 
and housing
Percent reduction in cash 
poverty from in-kind aid
Lifted out of net-of-transfer 
poverty by cash and in- 
kind aid
Percent reduction in poverty 
net-of-transfers from cash 
transfers and in-kind aid
Persons in families 
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Is Work Effort Rewarded?
Most cash transfers and in-kind aid are means-tested, so that benefits 
decline as earnings increase. But if a worker or working family is not 
able to achieve minimal self-sufficiency from earnings, it might be ex 
pected or desirable that those working more and yet falling short would be 
rewarded for their effort. The evidence suggests, however, that in 
dividuals and families whose earnings remain below the poverty level de-
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spite significant participation in the work force are no better protected 
than those with lesser work effort.
In 1980, the full-year work force participants with earnings and other 
nontransfer supplements below the poverty level were less likely to escape 
poverty through transfers than total work force participants (i.e., in 
cluding those participating less than full-year), even though the average 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficits for full-year and total participants were 
very nearly the same, leaving the same margin to be made up by transfers:
Total Full-year 
work force work force
Reduction in IFI Net-of-Transfers resulting
from cash benefits -30.4% -29.9% 
Reduction in IFI Net-of-Transfer resulting
from cash and in-kind aid -37.2 -37.3
Reduction in IFI Net-of-Transfer Deficit
resulting from cash transfers -45.0 -41.3 
Reduction in IFI Net-of-Transfer Deficit
resulting from cash and in-kind aid -55.4 -51.7
Likewise, transfers were more likely to alleviate the poverty of 
voluntary part-time workers than to meet the income shortfalls of full-time 
workers (Table 5.5). Half of the 1979 voluntary part-time workers in 
poverty before receipt of cash transfers had incomes above poverty after 
cash and in-kind aid. In contrast, the Net-of-Transfers IFI for persons 
employed full-time during all weeks in the work force was reduced only a 
third by cash and in-kind transfers. The reductions in the 1979 IFI 
Net-of-Transfers Deficits for full-time and voluntary part-time workers 
were 61 and 45 percent, respectively, reflecting the fact that more of the 
latter probably received benefits in excess of their IFI Net-of-Transfer 
Deficits. Similarly, workers who were unemployed some or all weeks in the 
work force were only slightly less likely to escape net-pf-transfer poverty 
through transfers than those employed all weeks (either part-time or 
full-time); the exit rates were 38 and 42 percent, respectively. The IFI 
Net-of-Transfers Deficit of workers who experienced some joblessness was 
reduced 60 percent, but that of workers employed all weeks in the work 
force was reduced only 55 percent.
Workers who had greater individual earnings, hence smaller HE 
Deficits, were somewhat more likely to escape poverty as a result of cash 
and in-kind transfers than were persons with lesser earnings or greater HE 
Deficits. This was primarily because their average IFI Net-of-Transfer 
Deficits were lower, leaving less ground to be made up by benefits. Even 
so, the differences in protection rates were surprisingly small. Among all 
work force participants with HE Deficits under $1,000 and family incomes 
below the poverty level before transfers, cash and in-kind aid raised 39 
percent above the poverty level. For those with HE Deficits above $1,000, 
cash and in-kind aid raised 34 percent above the the poverty threshold. 
The IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit reductions were very similar, i.e., 60 and 
50 percent, respectively.
Table 5.5. WORK EFFORT AND TRANSFER BENEFIT IMPACTS, 1979
	Percent reduction Percent reduction Percent reduction Percent reduction 
IFI Net-of-Transfers IFI Net-of-Transfers IF! Net-of-Transfers IFI Net-of-Transfers Average IFI 
	as result of as result of cash Deficit as result of Deficit as result of Net-of-Transfers 
	cash transfers and in-kind aid cash transfers cash and in-kind aid Deficit
Total work force 32.5% 40.3% 46.6% 54.8% $2.296
Employed full-time 25.3 33.8 35.8 44.6 2,140
Employed part-time voluntarily 42.5 47.5 54.8 61.3 1,977
Employed part-time involuntarily 31.6 40.8 44.8 58.1 2,423
Intermittently employed 29.9 39.5 45.5 57.4 2,247
Mostly employed 25.9 35.7 39.8 52.5 1,828
Mixed 34.3 44.1 49.1 60.4 2,251
Mostly unemployed 31.3 40.1 48.4 60.2 3,105
Not employed 23.7 32.8 50.4 63.9 3,984
Full-year work force 55.9 40.9 40.9 51.3 2.311
Employed full-time 23.7 33.1 27.7 35.9 2,294
Employed part-time voluntarily 43.8 48.7 50.1 57.1 1,883
Employed part-time involuntarily 29.8 40.2 35.7 49.0 2,312
Intermittently employed 34.5 43.1 45.6 57.5 2,353
Mostly employed 30.9 41.3 38.7 52.6 1,940
Mixed 39.1 46.6 49.6 59.6 2,207
Mostly unemployed 32.8 40.5 47.1 59.3 3,090
Not employed 19.9 24.1 46.6 60.8 4,892
Individual earnings deficit
$0-249 39.0 47.7 54.5 65.1 1,882
250-500 32.9 41.3 51.4 62.9 2,428
500-999 33.0 42.2 48.3 60.1 2,326
1,000-1,499 32.1 40.3 49.6 60.9 2,234
1,500-1,999 29.6 38.9 47.4 59.4 2,082
2,000-2,499 32.8 39.4 43.8 55.6 2,047
2,500-2,999 32.3 37.2 47.9 56.9 2,255
3,000-3,999 23.5 31.5 40.4 50.2 2,449
4,000+ 22.0 27.0 34.6 42.4 3,300
Individual eannn3s
$0-499 26.8 34.5 46.9 56.7 3,308
500-999 31.0 37.9 48.6 58.0 2,535
1,000-1,499 30.9 36.6 45.7 54.0 2,640
1,500-1,999 30.2 39.2 45.1 52.7 2,173
2,000-2,999 37.5 43.3 49.2 58.1 1,831
3,000-3,999 36.0 42.9 44.2 56.2 1,217
4,000-4,999 40.0 48.9 47.5 60.5 1,632
5,000-6,999 35.9 49.5 41.6 58.5 1,585
7,000-8,999 28.5 54.9 40.8 67.2 1,073
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Finally, increased numbers of family work force participants did not 
uniformly increase the probability of escaping net-of-transfer poverty. 
For example, among three-person families with earnings and nontransfer 
incomes below the poverty level, 57 percent of those with no work force 
participants were lifted out of poverty by cash and in-kind transfers, 
compared to only 54 percent of those with three work force participants, 47 
percent of those with two participants and 49 percent of those with one 
participant (Chart 5.8). The IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit averaged only 
$2,115 for three-worker, three-person families, compared to $2,542 for 
those with two workers and $3,334 for those with one worker. In other 
words, there was less of a deficit to make up by transfers when there were 
more earners, yet the chances that transfers would fill the gaps were not 
substantially greater. The IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit of three-person 
families with three in the work force was reduced by only 48 percent, 
compared to 58 percent when there were just two in the work force, and 68 
percent when there was only one participant.
The impacts of cash and in-kind aid varied by the sex and family 
relationship, education, race, occupation and area residence of work force 
participants (Table 5.6):
§ Female family heads were less likely than male family heads to 
exit from poverty as a result of cash transfers alone, but the inclusion of 
in-kind benefits evened the exit rates. Wives and other family members who 
participated in the work force had a relatively greater chance of being 
lifted out of poverty by transfers. Female unrelated individuals were more 
likely to be protected than male unrelated individuals. Overall, female 
workers who were poor before transfers were only slightly more likely than 
males to be lifted out of poverty by benefits.
t Prime age workers who did not achieve minimally adequate income 
from earnings and nontransfer supplements were less likely than younger or 
older workers to escape poverty through transfers and in-kind aid. Out- 
of-school 20- to 24-year-olds often fell through the safety net.
0 Workers with limited education were more likely to be protected 
by transfers; 43 percent of dropouts in the .IFI Net-of-Transfers received 
cash and in-kind aid which raised their families out of poverty. Just 26 
percent of college graduates who were unsuccessful in the labor market were 
lifted out of poverty by transfers.
t Sales, clerical and service workers, as well as operatives, who 
were in poverty before transfers were far more likely than other working 
poor to be cushioned by cash benefits and in-kind aid which lifted them out 
of poverty.
• Blacks in the IFI Net-of-Transfers were less likely than whites 
in similar straits to be lifted out of poverty by the receipt of cash 
assistance, although the chances equalized with the inclusion of in-kind 
aid. The IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit for blacks was reduced more by 
transfers than that of whites. Transfers had a lesser impact on Hispanic 
workers. Although their average IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit was similar to 
that of blacks, they were far less likely to escape poverty and experienced 
a far smaller deficit reduction.
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Chart 5 8 REDUCTION IN PRE-TRANSFER POVERTY AMONG ADULTS AGE 16 AND OVER 
RESULTING FROM CASH TRANSFERS AND IN-KIND AID
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The Unraveling Safety Net
Despite the increasing overlap between welfare and workfare, and the 
absolute growth of transfer payments over the 1970s, the safety net became 
less, rather than more, effective in reducing poverty among the working 
poor. To begin with, the real and relative growth of transfers are fre 
quently exaggerated. Between 1974 and 1979, for instance, transfers 
declined as a share of cash income reported for families and for unrelated 
individuals, while earnings increased: 4/










































In 1974, there were 9.8 million work force participants in families 
with before-transfer incomes below the poverty level, with 6.3 remaining 
million after receipt of cash benefits, a reduction of 35.3 percent. In 
1979, the reduction caused by transfers had dropped to 32.5 percent. In 
1975, the transfer impact was greater than in 1974 because of counter 
cyclical benefits, but in 1980, when the unemployment rate was also high, 
the absolute and percentage reduction in the IFI Net-of-Transfer was 
substantially lower than in 1975:
IFI Net-of-Transfers
IFI


















-35.3% -32.5% -37.1% -30.4%
When transfer impacts are measured in terms of percentage reductions 
in net-of-transfers poverty deficits, the same picture emerges. In 1975, 
for instance, the IFI Deficit was 52.5 percent below the IFI Net-of- 
Transfer Deficit. In 1980, it was only 45.0 percent lower.
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There was evidence of declining rewards for work effort. Compared to 
the 6.7 percentage drop between 1975 and 1980 in the share of the total 
work force Net-of-Transfer IFI lifted out of poverty by cash benefits, 
there was a decline of 9.7 percentage points for full-year participants 
(Table 5.7). Likewise, the effectiveness of the safety net diminished for 
the nonworking poor, but the decline was less than for the working poor. 
For instance, 61.0 percent of all persons age 16 and over in households 
with no work force participants and with below-poverty net-of-transfer 
incomes in 1974 were lifted out of poverty by cash benefits; this compared 
to a 57.2 percent reduction in 1980. But the 3.8 percentage point decline 
in transfer effectiveness for the nonworking poor was far less than the 6.7 
percentage point decline for the working poor:
All individuals age 16 and in households with 
no work force participants






transfers 8,702 9,953 9,036 9,977 
Percentage reduction -61.0% -57.8% -59.5% -57.2%
Neither the changing composition and work experience patterns of the 
work force, nor increased earnings shortfalls, explained the declining 
impacts of the cash transfers. The average IFE Deficit, and the average 
IFI Net-of-Transfer Deficit, both declined in real terms between 1974 and 
1979, as well as between 1975 and 1980; in other words, there was less 
ground to make up by transfers so that the same level of real benefits 
should have lifted more rather than fewer of the working poor out of 
poverty:
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
Average IFE Deficit
(1980 $) $2,742 $2,706 $-36 $2,771 $2,713 $-58
Average IFE Net-of- 
Transfer Deficit 
(1980 $) 2,652 2,606 -46 2,663 2,609 -54
The declining transfer impacts were evident among the long-term un 
employed, the short-term unemployed, those employed part-time whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, as well as among full-time workers who 
experienced no joblessness (Table 5.8). Weighting the 1979 Earnings 
Supplementation Rates-Transfers for each work experience pattern subgroup 
by its 1974 share of the severe hardship IFE for the total work force, and
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Table 5.7. DECLINING EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSFERS IN REDUCING POVERTY AMONG 
WORK FORCE PARTICIPANTS
1979- 1980- 
1974 1979 1974 1975 1980 1975
IFI Net-of-Transfers
Minus IFI * IFI
Total Work Force 54.5% 48. 2% -6.3% 59.0% 43.6% -15.4% 
Full-Year Work Force 55.5 49.2 -6.3 64.1 42.6 -21.5
IFI Net-of-Transfers
Minus IFI i IFI Net-of-
Transfers___________
Total Work Force 35.3 32.5 -2.8 37.1 30.4 -6.7 
Full-Year Work Force 35.7 33.0 -2.7 39.1 29.9 -9.2
IFI Net-of-Transfers
Deficit Minus IFI
Deficit * IFI Deficit
Total Work Force 101.8 87.2 -14.6 110.3 ~81.8 -28.5 
Full-Year Work Force 78.3 69.3 -9.0 99.8 70.3 -29.5
IFI Net-of-Transfers
Deficit Minus IFI
Deficit * IFI Net-of-
Transfers Deficit
Total Work Force 50.4 46.6 -3.8 52.5 45.0 -7.5 
Full-Year Work Force 43.9 40.9 -3.0 49.9 41.3 -8.6
Earnings Supplementation
Rate_____________________
Total Work Force47.1 46.9 -0.2 47.3 44.0 -3.3 
Full-Year Work Force 46.2 45.4 -0.8 48.1 42.0 -6.1
Earnings Supplementation
Rate - Nontransfers___
Total Work Force 18.3 21.3 +3.0 16.2 19.5 +3.3 
Full-Year Work Force 16.4 18.6 +2.2 14.9 17.3 +2.4
Earnings Supplementation
Rate - Transfers_____
Total Work Force 28.8 25.6 -3.2 31.1 24.5 -6.6 
Full-Year Work Force 29.8 26.8 -3.0 33.2 24.7 -8.5
IFE Deficit Minus IFI
Deficit » IFE Deficit
Total Work Force 60.8 59.5 -1.3 61.7 57.4 -4.3 
Full-Year Work Force 54.3 52.6 -1.7 58.1 52.5 -5.6
IFE Deficit Minus IFI
Net-of-Transfers Deficit
* IFE Deficit_______
Total Work Force 21.0 24.2 +3.2 19.5 22.6 +3.1 
Full-Year Work Force 18.6 19.7 +1.1 16.3 19.0 +2.7
IFI Net-of-Transfers
Minus IF! Deficit *
IFE Deficit______
Total Work Force 39.8 35.3 -4.5 42.2 34.8 -7.4 
Full-Year Work Force 35.7 32.9 -2.8 41.8 33.5 -8.3
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Table 5.8. CHANGE IN EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE-TRANSFERS BY WORK 
EXPERIENCE PATTERN, AGE AND SEX/RELATIONSHIP
1980-
1974 1975 1974 1975 1980 1975 
Total work force
Not employed 25.2% 21.0% -4.2% 31.0% 17.0% -14.0% 
Mostly unemployed 29.0 28.4 -0.6 37.6 26.6 -11.0 
Mixed 28.8 29.9 +1.1 39.0 28.1 -0.9 
Mostly employed 25.2 22.0 -3.2 27.7 22.6 -5.1 
Part-time involuntary 26.4 26.5 +0.1 27.6 24.4 -3.2 
Part-time voluntary 34.5 19.3 -5.2 33.8 28.4 -5.4 
Employed full-time 25.1 20.3 -4.8 24.3 19.9 -4.4
Full-year work force
Not employed 30.3 16.7 -13.6 39.8 19.6 -20.2
Mostly unemployed 31.5 29.8 -1.7 39.9 27.4 -2.5
Mixed 31.4 34.4 +3.0 43.9 31.8 -12.1
Mostly employed 28.2 26.7 -1.5 30.5 24.6 -5.9
Part-time involuntary 27.2 27.5 -0.7 26.4 22.6 -3.8
Part-time voluntary 39.0 29.5 -9.5 34.6 28.2 -6.4








Male family heads 27.6 25.3 -2.3 32.6 23.7 -8.9 
Male unrelated
individuals 20.5 14.4 -5.1 23.9 17.1 -6.8 
Other males 36.0 35.0 -1.0 37.1 31.8 -5.3 
Female family heads 24.5 21.5 -3.0 24.6 16.8 -7.8 
Wives 34.2 29.8 -4.4 36.8 30.0 -6.8 
Female unrelated
individuals 26.4 22.4 -4.0 25.7 22.5 -3.5 
































the 1980 rates by each subgroup's 1975 share, suggests that work experience 
pattern changes were a neutral factor:
Actual 1979 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 25.6%
1979 Earnings Supplementation Rates-Transfers for work 
experience groups weighted by their 1974 shares of 
the IFE
Effect of 1974-1979 work experience pattern changes
Actual 1980 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers
1980 Earnings Supplmentation Rates-Transfers for
each work experience pattern group weighted by
1975 share of the IFE 
Increase in Earnings Supplementation Rates-Transfers
associated with 1975-1980 changes in work
experience patterns
Changes in the sex and family relationship composition of the severe 
hardship IFE for the total work force were relatively neutral in their 
potential impacts on transfer effects:
1979 Earnings Supplementation Rates-Transfers for sex/
relationship groups weighted by 1974 share of the IFE 25.9%
Actual 1979 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 25.6
Decline in Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 
associated with 1974-1979 sex/relationship changes 
in composition of IFE -0.3
Actual 1980 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 24.5%
1980 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers for 
sex/relationship groups weighted by 1975 IFE 
share 23.9
Increase in Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 
associated with 1975-1980 changes in sex/relationship 
composition of IFE +0.6
Moreover, the Earning Supplementation Rates-Transfers declined among 
male family heads, female family heads, wives, male unrelated individuals, 
as well as female unrelated individuals.
The only factor which may have contributed to reduced transfer supple 
mentation was the declining share of older workers in the severe hardship 
IFE. However, the impacts could have accounted for only a minor portion of 
the 3.2 percentage point drop in the severe hardship Earnings Supplementa 
tion Rate-Transfers between 1974 and 1979, or the 6.6 percentage point drop 
between 1975 and 1980:
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1979 Earnings Supplementation Rates-Transfers for each 
age group weighted by 1974 IFE share for each age 
group
Actual 1979 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 
Decline in Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 
associated with 1974-1979 age changes
Actual 1980 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers
1980 Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers for 
each age group weighted by 1975 IFE share for 
each age group
Decline in Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers 





By implication, then, the primary cause of declining transfer impacts 
had to be reductions in the availability and level of transfer benefits for 
the working poor. There is direct as well as indirect evidence that this 
was the case. Much of the decline occurred among unemployed workers, and 
there is no doubt that unemployment insurance protections deteriorated. In 
1975, 37.6 percent of persons with at least some unemployment who would 
have been poor in the absence of transfers were lifted out of poverty by 
receipt of cash benefits. In 1980, only 26.5 percent were protected by 
transfers:
Participants employed all weeks 








































Paralleling these trends was a drop in unemployment insurance bene 
ficiaries and benefit levels. Average weekly beneficiaries equalled 43.1 
percent of the average annual unemployment in 1975, but only 38.2 percent 
in 1980. Moreover, the average weekly benefit in 1980 was 8 percent lower 
in real terms than in 1975: 5/
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1980- 




beneficiaries (000) 1,881 2,040 +159 3,371 2,844 -527 
Average annual
unemployed (000) 5,076 5,963 +887 7,830 7,448 -382 
Beneficiaries *
unemployed 37.1% 34.2% -2.9% 43.1% 38.2% -4.9% 
Average weekly
benefit (1980 $) $107 $102 -$5 $108 $99 -$9
There were retrenchments in other transfer programs. Several states 
completely eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed 
Parents, thus, restricting AFDC payments to single parents and usually 
female heads. Yet the proportion of female-headed families receiving 
public assistance also dropped from 32.8 percent in 1974 to 27.1 percent in 
1979. §/ Average real AFDC benefits per recipient declined signifi 
cantly. TJ Because the size of recipient families dropped, real average 
benefits per recipient would have had to increase in order to maintain the 
effectiveness of AFDC in reducing poverty since family income needs rise 
less than proportionately with each additional family member: 8/
1974 1979 1975 1980
AFDC monthly benefit per person
in recipient families (1980 $) $108 $105 $109 $100 
Recipients per family 3.32 2.92 3.20 2.89
The enormous regional disparity in transfer levels and their availa 
bility declined, but this resulted more from diminished transfer protec 
tions in the high benefit areas rather than marked improvements in the low 
benefit areas (Table 5.9). For instance, between 1975 and 1980, the stand 
ard deviation in the proportions of the regional IFI Net-of-Transfers who 
escaped poverty as a result of cash benefits declined from 6.3 percentage 
points to 4.5 percentage points. Yet the poverty reduction impacts of 
transfers declined in all three regions with the lowest poverty reduction 
rates in 1975.
Practical Applications
The most practical and politically sensitive application of labor 
market and poverty statistics is their use in allocating federal funds to 
state and local areas, and in prioritizing the needs of eligible subgroups 
within these areas. As federal grants-in-aid grew rapidly during the
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1970s, and in particular, the federally-funded employment and training 
programs addressed to the problems of the economically disadvantaged, the 
unemployment and poverty rates were adopted as "scientific" and "equitable" 
ways of distributing funds, in contrast to the discretionary approach more 
frequently used in the 1960s. Likewise, state and local planning pro 
cedures were often mandated in federal legislation. The funds allocated to 
states and localities were to be distributed according to the relative 
needs of residents as judged by their comparative unemployment and poverty 
rates. As the outlays for the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
grew, the statistics used in allocation and planning became more important 
issues. In the late 1970s, when CETA outlays were over $10 billion, a 
change in a few tenths of a percentage point in an area's unemployment rate 
might cost it hundreds of thousands of dollars under the CETA allocation 
formulae. Each time CETA was amended there was debate over the relative 
weight to be given to area unemployment and poverty in fund allocation, 
since poor areas were not always those with high unemployment, and since 
allocation formulae based on shares of excess unemployment above a certain 
level distributed resources to different areas than if shares of total 
unemployment were used. Revisions of the estimation procedures for local 
unemployment rates in 1978 led to court challenges about the techniques 
used in deriving state and local estimates.
Allocating Resources According to Hardship Shares
In concept, the hardship measures are preferable to the unemployment 
and poverty rates as a basis for allocating federal employment and training 
resources and other grants-in-aid addressed to labor market-related prob 
lems. The purpose of CETA (and its renamed successor) is "to provide job 
training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, 
unemployed, or underemployed persons . . . ." Yet the unemployment rate 
does not count the underemployed, i.e., low income persons working part- 
time but seeking full-time work and those working full-time but earning 
poverty wages, and includes many--in fact, a large majority—who are not 
from low-income families. On the other hand, only a fourth of all poor 
persons, and two-fifths of those age 15 and over, are in the work force, 
while many individuals marginally above and not counted by the poverty 
level are transfer recipients who might be self-supporting if they received 
training and employment assistance, so that areas with generous transfer 
benefits are penalized in the allocation of federal manpower dollars where 
poverty is the criteria. The hardship measures, particularly the IFE and 
the IFE Deficit, focus on those who are in the work force and unable to 
achieve adequate earnings to support themselves and their families, whether 
the individuals are unemployed or underemployed. In other words, they 
focus on the legislatively-specified universe of need for remedial employ 
ment and training programs.
If hardship measures, rather than unemployment and poverty rates, or 
combinations of the two, were used to allocate funds, there would be some 
substantial changes in the shares provided to different areas:
Nonmetropolitan areas account for a substantially larger share of 
the hardship counts and deficits than of unemployment (Table 5.10). Aver-
Table 5.10. HARDSHIP AND UNEMPLOYMENT SHARES OF METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS AVERAGED FOR 
1974 THROUGH 1980



























































































































































SMSA's with a population of over one million.
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aging the hardship, poverty and unemployment rates over the 1974-1980 
period (in order to average out the year-to-year changes in shares) and 
assuming equal resources to be allocated each year, the allocations to 
nonmetropolitan areas would have been 37 percent higher if IFE shares were 
used in the allocation formulae rather than shares of national average 
annual unemployment (Table 5.11). Because these nonmetropolitan areas 
accounted for a larger share of poverty than of unemployment, they would 
have received only 4 percent more if IFE shares were used in allocation 
rather than poverty shares. Compared to an allocation formula giving 50 
percent weight to the share of average annual unemployment and 50 percent 
weight to the poverty share, an IFE-based allocation would have increased 
nonmetropolitan area resources by 18 percent.
Central cities would have received 6 percent less if allocation were 
according to IFE shares rather than shares of average annual unemployment, 
or 10 percent less relative to a formula giving equal weight to unemploy 
ment and poverty shares. The decrements would have been smaller if IFE 
Deficit shares were utilized for allocation rather than the IFE counts. 
Large central cities (those in metropolitan areas with over 1 million 
population) would have lost more than smaller central cities if the IFE 
share were used.
The suburban areas would have received a fourth less under an IFE- 
based formula compared to an unemployment share formula, and 9 percent less 
compared to a formula weighting unemployment and poverty shares equally. 
If the IFE Deficit shares were used in allocation, the suburbs would have 
received 12 percent less than under the unemployment-poverty formula.
t Over the 1974-1980 period, the West North Central, South 
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central and Mountain states 
averaged a substantially larger share of the IFE than of persons experi 
encing unemployment or of persons unemployed over a third of their weeks in 
the work force (Table 5.12). If IFE shares rather than unemployment shares 
or equally weighted poverty and unemployment shares were used to distribute 
resources, the states in these regions would have received a fourth and a 
tenth more respectively (Table 5.13). In contrast, the New England, Middle 
Atlantic and East North Central states would have received a fifth and an 
eighth less, respectively. Use of the IFI rather than the IFE shares would 
have exacerbated this tendency, since the New England, Middle Atlantic and 
East North Central states had more liberal transfer systems and higher 
Earnings Supplementation Rates so that their combined IFI share (30.6 
percent averaged for the 1974-1980 period) was even lower than their 
combined IFE share (33.7 percent).
t For specific states and localities, alterations in the allocation 
basis can have even more dramatic impacts. To illustrate the feasibility 
of state level estimation, the complete array of hardship measures were 
calculated for Ohio, North Carolina, Georgia, California and New York. The 
impacts of hardship-based allocation varied significantly between these 
states. Ohio's share of national unemployment was much larger than its 
share of the IFE, and its IFI share was even smaller because its Earnings 
Supplementation Rate was far above average (Table 5.14). Ohio's IFI share 
matched its poverty share. In contrast, Georgia's IFE share was much 
larger than its unemployment share, and its IFI share was larger still
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Table 5.11. PERCENT INCREASE OR DECREASE IN ALLOCATION RESULTING FROM USE 
OF HARDSHIP SHARE FOR ALLOCATION RATHER THAN UNEMPLOYMENT OR 
POVERTY SHARE
HARDSHIP SHARE ALLOCATION COMPARED TO 
ANNUAL AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT SHARE ALLOCATION
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HE Deficit IFE Deficit
0 -6% -2% 0 
0 +9+40
-28 -29 -13 -7
+43 +30 +15 +11
-4 -10 -6 -1 
+5 -1 +2 +2
-37 ' -36 -21 -11
-15 -20 -4 -1 
+44 +31 +9 +14 













HARDSHIP SHARE ALLOCATION COMPARED TO 
EQUALLY WEIGHTED POVERTY AND 
ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT SHARE ALLOCATION
HE IFE 
HE Deficit IFE Deficit
-7% -13% -9% -7% 
+14 +24 +18 +14
+25 -26 -10 -3



















Table 5.12. AVERAGE SHARES OF UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND HARDSHIP FOR CENSUS DIVISIONS OVER 1974-1980 
PERIOD



























































































































New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania
East North Central: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North and South Dakota
South Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, flow Mexico, Utah and Wyoming




Table 5.13. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ALLOCATION RESULTING FROM USE OF ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION BASES
USE Of HARDSHIP SIIAKf COMI'AKCU 10 USE OF 
SHARE 01" PH'SONS EXPU'l I Nl INC. UNEMPLOYMENT
USE Of HAKbSHlP SHAKt LOMP/ihLb TO
usr or POVERTY SHARE
USE or HARDSHIP SHARE COMPARED











































































































































































































Table 5.14. STATE SHARES OF UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND HARDSHIP AVERAGED FOR 1974-1980 PERIOD











































































because of its below average Earnings Supplementation Rate. Yet Georgia's 
hardship share was below its poverty share.
Under an IFE-based allocation, North Carolina and Georgia would have 
gained nearly a fifth and a tenth, respectively, compared to a poverty/ 
unemployment allocation formula. California's allocations would have 
changed little while Ohio's would have declined by an eighth and New York's 
by over a fourth (Table 5.15).
Another possible consequence of substituting a hardship-based 
allocation for an unemployment-based allocation is to stabilize funding and 
activity levels. Year-to-year fluctuations in allocations undermine 
operational effectiveness because of the difficulties of phasing programs 
up and down, or trying to plan when likely funding is uncertain. It 
obviously makes a difference whether federal budgeting responds to changes 
in the unemployment rate or in hardship incidence, since the fluctuations 
in hardship are less severe than the fluctuations in unemployment:
Standard deviation in annual 
incidence as percentage 
1974-1980 mean incidence
Unemployment rate 15.8%
Poverty and unemployment rate equally weighted 8.3
Severe hardship HE rate 6.5
Severe hardship IFE rate 5.8
Severe hardship IFI rate 6.8
But the choice of statistics used for allocating whatever funds are 
made available nationally can also affect the stability of funding received 
by states and localities. Although the percentage fluctuations in hardship 
rates are less than the percentage fluctuations in unemployment or combined 
poverty and unemployment rates, hardship shares are only slightly more 
stable than unemployment, or poverty and unemployment, shares. For 
regions, states and areas, the coefficients of variation in HE shares over 
the 1974-1980 period were slightly less than those for poverty or unem 
ployment shares. In most, but not all cases, the IFE shares were more 
stable than unemployment shares, but the combined poverty/unemployment 
allocation shares were frequently more stable (Table 5.16). Since the IFI 
rate is not cyclically sensitive and has experienced differing trends in 
different areas, largely as a result of differentially changing transfer 
policies, the coefficients of variation for the IFI rate were larger than 
those for unemployment and/or poverty.
The resources addressed to the labor market problems of the disad- 
vantaged are subdivided at the national level into categories addressed to 
different segments of the work force, and then are subdivided at the state 
and local levels according to shares of the universe of need. Each year 
the state or local decisionmaking agent must submit a plan detailing the 
composition of the eligible population and must indicate the priorities for 
service based on objective locally established criteria to assure services
Table 5.15. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ALLOCATION RESULTING FROM USE OF ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION BASES
USE OF HARDSHIP SHARE RATHER THAN 
SHARE OF AVERAGE ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT
USE OF HARDSHIP SHARE RATHER 
THAN POVERTY SHARE
USE OF HARDSHIP SHARE RATHER THAN AVERAGE 




























































































































Table 5.16. YEAR-TO-YEAR FLUCTUATIONS IN HARDSHIP, UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY SHARES AS MEASURED BY 
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to those most in need. Yet even though the eligible population includes 
the unemployed and underemployed in low-income families, planning and 
client priorities are usually based on available unemployment and poverty 
data. These data may yield quite different client priorities than the 
hardship data:
• If the severe hardship IFE share for the total work force were 
used to target resources in 1979, males would have received marginally less 
than females, while if unemployment shares were used, they would have 
received slightly more (Chart 5.9). However, male family heads would have 
received substantially more under a hardship-based distribution. Female 
family heads would have gained enormously, since their share of the IFE was 
double their share of the average annual unemployed. The big losers would 
have been wives and other family members:
Average of
Share unemployment 
average annual and 
unemployment poverty share
Males 50.6% 43.5% 47.5% 
Females 49.4 56.5 52.5
Male family heads 18.8 17.7 24.5
Female family heads 6.9 11.9 15.2
Wives 19.7 17.6 14.1
Other family members 40.5 28.7 19.8
Unrelated individuals 14.1 24.2 26.4
• High school dropouts would have received a much larger share of 
resources under an IFE-based distribution than under an unemployment-based 
distribution (Chart 5.10). Students would have received somewhat more 
while high school graduates and persons with some post-secondary education 
would have received much less. The IFE shares among the education sub 
groups very nearly matched the average of the unemployment and adult 
poverty shares:
Share of Average of share
workers who experiencing
experienced unemployment
unemployment and poverty share
Students 10.7% 10.8% 11.9%
High school dropouts 28.8 42.0 39.9
High school graduates
only 38.4 30.7 30.2
Completed some post- 
secondary education 22.9 17.1 18.1
Chart 5.9. SHARES OF HARDSHIP, UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN 1979 BY SEX AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
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Chart 5.10. SHARES OF HARDSHIP, UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IN 1979 BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
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t Minorities would have received about the same share whether 
targeting were based on IFE shares or shares of average annual unemployment 
(Chart 5.11). They would have received less under an IFE-based distribu 
tion than one based on the average of the unemployment and adult poverty 
shares. Minorities would have benefited more if the focus were only on 
full-year work force participants, if targeting were based on hardship 
deficits rather than counts, or if allocation used the IFI rather than the 
IFE share:
Wh i tes Blacks Hispanics
IFE share tshare average 
unemployed
IFE Deficit share * share 
average annual unemployed
IFI share * share 
average annual unemployed














t If hardship were the only consideration in targeting, youth would 
have received substantially less priority, while older workers would have 



















The hardship measures can be used to plan intervention strategies as 
well as client priorities. For instance, the new legislation which re 
places the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act puts greater emphasis 
on state level planning and decisionmaking. The baseline hardship meas 
ures, which have been calculated for five states, suggest that the under 
lying labor market problems and patterns differ significantly from one 
state to another. While disaggregations for each state would be needed to 
make refined judgments, the summary data provide a basis for better 
strategizing employment and training as well as income maintenance strat 
egies at the state level:
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Georgia: With the highest hardship rates among the five sample 
states, and with relatively high average hardship deficits, Georgia would 
have received a large share of any funds distributed by hardship formulae 
(Table 5.17). These severe conditions did not reflect a depressed labor 
market. The percent of the Georgia work force experiencing unemployment in 
1979 was far below the national average and the unemployment incidence in 
the other four states in the sample (although the percent employed part- 
time involuntarily was higher in Georgia). The proportion of the work 
force employed full-year was typical for the nation, so that this was not 
an explanation for the hardship rates. Persons with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings were more likely to have Inadequate Family Earnings, and repre 
sented a larger share of the IFE, than in other states; in other words, 
individual labor market problems were relatively more of a factor in 
explaining family hardship.
The clear culprit, then, was low wages. The I IE and IFE rates among 
workers employed all weeks were 20.7 and 10.8 percent, respectively, or 2.0 
and 1.7 percentage points above the national averages (Table 5.18). 
Persons employed full-time, full-year represented 16.2 percent of the 
severe hardship IFE in Georgia compared to just 10.5 percent of the severe 
hardship IFE for the total work force nationwide, and 12.3, 11.3, 10.1 and 
7.2 percent, respectively, in North Carolina, Ohio, New York and 
California. A ten percent increase in earnings for all Georgia workers 
would have reduced the IFE by 13.7 percent—or a greater amount than 
similar augmentation in other states or nationwide. In contrast Full 
Employment augmentation providing minimum wages for all hours of forced 
idleness had a lesser effect in Georgia than nationwide or in the other 
states in the sample. Finally, the cash and in-kind transfer system in 
Georgia was relatively ineffective in reducing poverty among the working 
poor. Only a fourth of workers in Georgia's IFI Net-of-Transfers were 
raised out of poverty by cash benefits, compared to nearly a third nation 
wide.
To alleviate hardship in Georgia, relatively more emphasis would be 
needed on the underemployed, vis-a-vis the unemployed. Attention might be 
placed on training and upgrading the skills of those already employed, with 
a focus on those forced to work part-time involuntarily. Supplementing 
these labor market strategies, the state might increase the exemptions 
under state income taxes or provide an earned income tax credit of some 
sort so as not to discourage work.
North Carolina: Like Georgia, North Carolina had comparatively high 
hardship rates despite low unemployment. However, there were some quite 
significant contrasts between the two states. The work force participation 
rate was higher in North Carolina, and the number of dependents per worker 
lower, apparently reflecting a greater number of secondary earners. The 
state was below the national average, and ranked lowest in the state 
sample, in the proportion of its work force employed full-time. As a
result, hardship was not as "hard" in North Carolina as elsewhere; the 
state had the lowest average severe hardship deficits in the sample, far 
below those in Georgia. A comparatively small share of its HE and IFE 
were full-year work force participants unemployed over one-third of their 
weeks in the work force, i.e., those likely to have the greatest average 
deficits. They represented only 8.6 percent of the North Carolina severe
Table 5.17. HARDSHIP AND RELATED SUMMARY INDICATORS FOR STATE PLANNING, 1979
NATIONAL AVERAGE GEORGIA NORTH CAROLINA OHIO CALIFORNIA NEW YORK 
Indicator Rank_ Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank
Severe Hardship Rates 
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NATIONAL AVERAGE GEORGIA NORTH CAROLINA OHIO CALIFORNIA NEW YORK 
Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank Indicator Rank
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Rate Persons 16+ ___ 70.1
Person-, Per Work Force
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NATIONAL AVERAGE GEORGIA NORTH CAROLINA OHIO CALIFORNIA NEW YORK
Persons in Families With 
Member in HE Per 
Person in HE_______
Percent HE In IFE
Persons With HE As 
Percent IFE______
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From Cash Transfers 
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1.8 (2) 1 
1.3 (4) 1 
3.2 (5) 3 
9.6 (2) 10













































Table 5.18. VARYING WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERNS AMONG TOTAL WORK FORCE
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hardship HE and 6.2 percent of the IFE for the total work force, compared 
to 11.3 and 10.6 percent nationwide, and 9.2 percent for both in Georgia. 
On the other hand, the unemployed represented 14.9 percent of the North 
Carolina HE and 13.2 percent of its IFE compared to 8.9 percent of both 
the HE and IFE counts in Georgia. I IE and IFE rates for the inter 
mittently unemployed who were jobless less than a third of their weeks in 
the work force were higher in North Carolina than elsewhere.
The safety net in North Carolina was far more effective than in 
Georgia and compared favorably with California and Ohio. Over two-fifths 
of North Carolina's IFI Net-of-Transfers escaped poverty by the receipt of 
cash and in-kind aid, a percentage exceeded only by New York among the 
sample states.
Finally, both intermediate and moderate hardship were relatively more 
prevalent compared to severe hardship. Put another way, there were com 
paratively more persons just above the severe hardship cutoff compared to 
those falling below.
Based on these data, North Carolina should probably put relatively 
more emphasis on helping the less-than-full-year workers, the short-term 
unemployed and those employed part-time involuntarily. The state should 
serve relatively more secondary family earners. It might be politically 
prudent to offer less intensive services to greater numbers in order not to 
lift workers and families from just below severe hardship to a level 
significantly ahead of those just above severe hardship, since there is 
already a concentration just above the severe hardship margin.
Ohio: The severe hardship IFE and IFI rates in 1979 were lower in 
Ohio than in any of the other states in the sample, but the average HE and 
IFE Deficits of those in hardship were quite high. A larger share of the 
persons in Ohio's IFE had Inadequate Individual Earnings than in the other 
states, so that the elimination of individual earnings problems as 
simulated by Adequate Employment and Enhanced Capacity augmentation would 
have substantial impacts in reducing the Ohio IFE and the IFE Deficit— 
greater than in any of the other states.
Moderate and intermediate hardship were also low in Ohio, both rela 
tive to other states and relative to the Ohio severe hardship total. Put 
another way, there were proportionately fewer Ohio work force participants 
just above the severe hardship level who would be affected by measures to 
substantially upgrade those with the most severe labor market problems.
California: A relatively large portion of the California work force 
experiencedunemployment, mostly of a short-term nature. The severe 
hardship HE and IFE incidence rates were extremely low among work force 
participants employed all weeks, so that the unemployed accounted for a 
large share of the IFE and the HE. Many of these individuals in hardship 
participated less than full-year. While the hardship incidence rates were 
extremely low among Calfornia's full-year workers, they were comparatively 
high among less than full-year participants. California was lowest among 
the states in the percentage of the IFE represented by full-time, full-year 
workers, while the full-year participants who were predominantly unemployed 
represented only 9.6 percent of the California IFE, compared to 10.6 per 
cent of the national IFE.
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While the average deficits of persons in the HE and IFE were com 
paratively low, the Earnings Supplementation Rate-Transfers, as well as the 
percentage reduction in the IFI Net-of-Transfers resulting from cash and 
in-kind aid, were only slightly above those in Georgia. California cannot 
be characterized as generous to its working poor.
Based on these data, California should focus relatively more on job 
creation for the short-term unemployed. But the basic problem is one of 
limited work force participation relative to family income needs. The 
percent of the IFE who had Inadequate Individual Earnings was lower in 
California than any other state, and providing all individuals in the 
severe hardship IFE with minimally adequate employment would have reduced 
the IFE by only 30.0 percent compared to the 35.9 percent drop in the IFE 
nationwide with Adequate Employment augmentation. Transfer improvements, 
perhaps rewarding work force attachment, would be necessary to substan 
tially reduce the IFI.
New York: Hardship rates were relatively low in New York, par 
ticularly among full-year workers and those employed full-time all weeks in 
the work force. But New York had a high unemployment level, and a par 
ticularly large share of its unemployed were jobless more than a third of 
their weeks in the work force. The predominantly unemployed accounted for 
8.0 percent of the New York work force compared to 6.4 percent of the 
national work force, and 25.2 percent of New York's severe hardship IFE 
compared to 20.4 percent of the national IFE. The average IFE Deficit was, 
therefore, quite high. Capacity Earnings and Full Employment augmentation, 
i.e., the augmentation strategies focused on unemployment problems, had a 
much more significant relative impact in New York than elsewhere in the 
nation. Despite the high average IFE Deficit, the Earnings Supplementation 
Rate-Transfers was higher in New York than any of the other states.
In order to address these conditions, New York should probably put 
more emphasis on job creation and significant training for the long-term 
unemployed from low-income families. Given the high transfer levels, job 
creation could provide a relatively effective alternative to dependency.
The Practicality of These Applications
In concept, then, the hardship measures, particularly the severe 
hardship IFE and the IFE Deficit, would be ideal as a basis for allocating, 
targeting and strategizing the use of resources addressed to the unemployed 
and underemployed from low-income families. There are, however, some 
practical constraints, and these could become quite formidable when 
combined with the political constraints. Unemployment rates for states and 
labor market areas are derived from the Current Population Survey. There 
is an accepted—if technically questionable—method of adjusting the CPS 
with decennial Census data and annual unemployment insurance and other data 
in order to derive estimates for labor market areas where the CPS sample 
alone is too small to make reliable estimates. Similar adjustment pro 
cedures could be derived to estimate hardship shares for all states and 
labor market areas. However, the unemployment rates would be inherently 
more dependable estimates because they are based on the average of the 
monthly CPS counts rather than a once-a-year survey.
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The poverty rates for states and substate areas are no more dependable 
than the hardship rates, since they are also derived from the March Current 
Population Survey. Like the hardship measures, they understate the 
severity of problems in high-cost areas because there is no adjustment for 
cost variations other than the 15 percent lower poverty levels used for 
rural areas. Yet the inadequacies of the uniform poverty levels were 
already accepted before large amounts of funds were allocated by poverty- 
based formulae. Were a hardship approach to be seriously considered, the 
cost variation issue would be opened up again by areas threatened with a 
reduction in funds. Moreover, an allocation formula which weights both 
poverty and unemployment rates in some sense balances the estimation 
problems, since areas with low costs and high poverty rates probably have 
more disguised unemployment, so that their gains under one measurement 
anomaly are offset by their losses under another.
Both the poverty and hardship measures could be improved by adopting 
an area cost-of-living adjustment as is used in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics lower living standard budget. But what is needed in addition is 
an expansion of the annual survey of work experience and income in order to 
provide more accurate estimates for states and subareas. Until cost 
variations are adopted in poverty and hardship measures, and statistical 
basis for state and local estimates improved, it is almost assured that the 
losers under a hardship allocation scheme would thwart any change, de 
fending the familiar, if flawed, unemployment and poverty allocation 
procedures.
The hardship data could, however, be utilized to determine the 
aggregate annual funding levels. Both the poverty and annual average 
unemployment rates presumably considered in the annual budget process have 
unavoidable lags, so that "old" data must be used in projecting the budget 
level for the coming year. Yet hardship measures tend to fluctuate less 
than unemployment rates, so that this lag is of less consequence. In fact, 
a main advantage of the hardship formulation would be to concentrate 
attention on continuing structural problems. Realistically, it does not 
matter much which conceptual and measurement basis is used, because there 
is little evidence that need levels or changes are the primary determinants 
of congressional budgeting decisions.
The hardship measures would be of more use in prioritizing target 
groups nationally and locally and in determining intervention strategies. 
The 1980 census and the CPS could be combined to achieve estimates and 
disaggregations for states and large substate labor market areas. These 
data could be extremely useful for planning. While need should not be the 
only rationale for prioritizing target groups, the hardship measures are 
more meaningful than either unemployment or poverty to the extent need is 
considered the determining factor in targeting.
In summary, the national hardship data could be useful for national 
budgetary decisions. With refinements, including cost-of-living adjust 
ments, disaggregated data could serve as the basis for allocating funds for 
state and labor market areas, although formidable political obstacles would 
have to be overcome. They would be useful for state and labor market area 
planning. While the CPS data could only be disaggregated adequately for 
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CHAPTER 6. HARDSHIP—A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE
Who Needs New Measures?
A Parable
An ancient parable recounts the story of six blind men of Hindustan 
who come upon an elephant in the road. One grasps a tusk and thinks it a 
spear; the next a knee which he presumes to be a tree; two others touch the 
trunk and tail, which to them feel like a snake and a rope; the fifth 
brushes against the elephant's ear which seems like a fan; while the last 
bumps into the belly and thinks he has hit a wall. Each believes his own 
perception is reality, and they walk on arguing vehemently whether an 
"elephant" is like a spear, a tree, a rope, a snake, a fan or a wall:
These men of Hindustan 
Disputed loud and long, 
Each of his own opinion, 
Exceedingly stiff and strong. 
Though each was partly right, 
And all were in the wrong.
Policymakers, technical experts and laymen who seek to understand and 
improve the structure and operations of the labor market to assure that it 
provides adequately for those willing and able to work are, in many ways, 
like these blind men. Unable to encompass reality, we must grope, using 
statistical measures to determine the size, shape and texture of each ap 
pendage. Depending on what we touch and how we feel, as well as our 
preconceptions and referents, we may reach quite different judgments about 
the nature of the beast.
Most often we encounter the underbelly of the labor market—its in 
ability to provide jobs for all those wanting to work. We focus on the 
unemployment problem and the unemployment measures, reasoning, correctly, 
that a person without work is a person without a paycheck, so that job- 
lessness affects well-being. Where unemployment is concentrated among 
certain groups or areas, and when it rises nationwide, there is no doubt 
that, on average, the jobless, their families and their communities suffer. 
For most of us, this is all we understand about the labor market, and 
perhaps all we need to know.
Others focus on the underpinnings rather than the underbelly, con 
sidering unemployment only a problem when it affects household heads and 
primary breadwinners. An increasing share of the jobless are secondary 
family earners, and their joblessness may have minimal consequences for
252
family well-being. Without the goad of dire necessity, some workers may be 
lacksadaisical in their search for jobs. It might reasonably be argued 
from this perspective that the aggregate unemployment statistics provide a 
very bloated impression of the hardship which prevails among work force 
participants.
Some of us concentrate only on the tail of unemployment which remains 
after transfers and other nonearned income have cushioned its negative 
earnings impacts. In view of the explosive growth of transfers and in-kind 
aid, it is often assumed that the truly needy among the unemployed will be 
protected against the consequences of joblessness. Some would wag the 
elephant by the tail—arguing that unemployment is high because the 
available benefits encourage malingering, and that a reduction in the 
benefits would, in fact, trim the fat from the underbelly.
Those who meet the elephant head-on may perceive it to be a quite 
different animal. Appended to the corpus of measured unemployment are a 
number of individuals who move in and out of the labor force in response to 
their changing employment prospects. Some individuals who are not looking 
for work report that they would take jobs if any were available. Others 
turn their attention to school or housekeeping when jobs are scarce. 
Because they are not actively looking for work, or are presumed unavailable 
because of other activities, they are not counted in the official unem 
ployment statistics even though experience shows that they will work when 
jobs become more available. There are also many workers who want full-time 
employment but can find only part-time jobs. Though less palpable or 
stable than the other parts of the elephant, these appendages are large and 
growing relative to measured unemployment.
Just as the tusk is the elephant's most dangerous feature, it might be 
argued that wages, not unemployment, are the pointed factor in determining 
well-being. If earnings rates are high enough, even long periods of 
joblessness can be weathered. If pay is low, even full-time work will not 
provide an adequate standard of living. The majority of work force par 
ticipants are fully employed whether the job market is good or bad, so that 
their well-being is determined more by wage levels than unemployment 
levels. Low wages are more dangerous still when combined with intermittent 
or involuntary part-time employment, and those who are gored by low earn 
ings are also most likely to be trampled by involuntary idleness.
The trunk of the elephant, used for foraging and feeding, may be its 
most characteristic and certainly its most vital feature. A large elephant 
must have a longer and stronger trunk, and must keep it constantly at work, 
to assure sustenance. Likewise, the adequacy of earnings depends on the 
size and composition of the household which must be supported. The 
adequacy of household earnings depends not only on hourly wage levels, but 
also on the number of earners and their hours of availability. The amount 
of work which is needed depends on whether food is being provided from 
income other than earnings. Those who focus on the trunk of the labor 
market problem have little interest in wage levels or earnings statistics 
alone, but concentrate on the poverty numbers which tell whether family 
units of differing composition are able to earn enough, or adequately 
supplement earnings, in order to maintain well-being.
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Like the blind men in the parable, we are prone to "disputing loud and 
long" that the part of the elephant we touch, measure, or care about, is, 
in truth, its essence. And like those men of Hindustan, each of us is 
partly right. Unemployment does have serious consequences for many of its 
victims. Hardship is prevalent when the unemployment rate is high, and 
hardship rises when joblessness increases. Yet it is also true that many 
of the unemployed suffer little as a result of their idleness because the 
earnings of other family members, or transfer payments and other earnings 
supplements, mitigate the consequences. This is not to deny that many who 
are excluded from the unemployment counts want to be and could be more 
self-sufficient, or that many with jobs are paid so little that they cannot 
afford the barest essentials. Poverty rises when wages do not keep pace 
with inflation, when unemployment increases and when individuals are 
discouraged and leave the labor force, so that the poverty rate reflects 
the severity of labor market problems.
But also like the men of Hindustan, each of us who concentrates on 
only a part of the animal can never grasp its totality. In order to 
determine who suffers seriously as a result of labor market problems, we 
must look at hidden as well as measured unemployment, and earnings as well 
as unemployment. Individual earning levels do not mean much unless con 
sidered in light of breadwinning responsibilities and family status. The 
well-being of workers depends on whether any earnings shortfalls are filled 
by transfers and other supplements. Yet the poverty data do not provide a 
really good picture of the consequences of labor market problems because so 
many of the poor cannot or do not work, while many of those who escape 
poverty through the receipt of transfers and other income would or could be 
more self-sufficient if they were more successful in the labor market.
Just as the blind men might have reasoned together to integrate their 
separate perceptions, it is possible to simultaneously consider all the 
detailed statistics on income levels and sources, wages, poverty, work 
attachment and family status, in order to get a better sense of the di 
mensions, causes and cures for labor market-related hardship. Yet few have 
the patience or capability to piece together these disparate statistics. 
Thus, the hardship measurement system was developed to provide a unifying 
perspective by restructuring the data elements and concepts of existing 
data sets within a framework designed specifically to measure the welfare 
consequences of labor market problems.
All Measures Are Arbitrary
It is not always easy to accept one's limitations. Many of us would 
rather continue groping than admit that our vision is limited and that what 
we perceive is a distortion of reality. It is no surprise, then, that new 
measures requiring new perspectives are rarely greeted with easy ac 
ceptance. The labor force and poverty measures, now entrenched and 
resistant to change, were once as controversial and confusing as the 
hardship notions may seem today. The unemployment rate has become so 
commonplace that we sometimes forget that "unemployment" was neither 
defined, in the current sense, nor reliably measured, until 1940. In fact, 
prevailing economic theory prior to the Great Depression actually denied
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its existence. Workers without jobs were supposed to bid down the wage 
rate until all were employed for less pay, so that any joblessness was 
voluntary, reflecting wage rigidities, or else merely transitory. It took 
the massive dislocations of the 1930s to upset this neoclassicial, full- 
employment equilibrium theory. With at least one of every four labor force 
participants unable to find a job—most of whom were previously stable 
workers—unemployment could not be written off as a temporary aberration or 
the fault of those standing in breadlines.
When President Roosevelt took office to provide a New Deal, the 
pervasiveness of unemployment was undeniable, but the exact dimensions of 
the problem were uncertain. The National Industrial Conference Board 
estimated that 2.9 million persons were unemployed in 1930, while the Works 
Progress Administration studies put the figure at 4.8 million. Estimates 
in 1936 ranged between 5.4 and 8.1 million. This uncertainty reflected the 
lack of agreement about how to define unemployment and the absence of any 
systematic efforts to measure it. Prior to the 1930 census, the only labor 
force data was a decennial count of "gainful workers." Individuals were 
asked what jobs they normally held when they worked. Those looking for 
work but without previous job experience were not counted as gainful 
workers, while those without jobs or forced to accept employment in a 
different line of work were included as gainful workers in their usual 
occupation. The aim was to measure the productive work force rather than 
variations in employment or unemployment, since it was assumed that all 
those seeking jobs would be fully employed in their usual line of work if 
they were flexible in their wage demands. In the Great Depression, 
however, when millions were willing and able to work at almost any wage and 
the most menial jobs, the gainful worker count was of little relevance. 
Necessity proved the mother of statistical invention, and one of the first 
tasks of the Works Progress Administration was a national post-card regis 
tration of the unemployed in 1937 and the initiation of a monthly household 
survey in 1939. Three years later, responsibility for the monthly survey 
was transferred to the Census Bureau, where sophisticated sampling tech 
niques were gradually implemented and improved. In these surveys, persons 
14 years of age and over in the noninstitutional population were classified 
as either "employed," "unemployed," or "not in the labor force." To be 
counted as "employed," the individual had to have worked for pay at least 
one hour during the preceding week, or for 15 hours without pay in a family 
enterprise. Those with jobs but not working because of illness, vacation, 
bad weather, a strike, or a layoff of no more than 30 days, were included 
with the employed, on the assumption that they had some job attachment. 
The unemployed were those not employed, who were willing and able to work, 
and had looked for a job in the last month.
Critics of these labor market definitions charged that they were both 
arbitrary and inaccurate. A major issue was their dependence on the 
household member's subjective assessment of willingness and ability to 
work, and the self-reporting of job search. It was noted that higher 
wages, or reduced income, or increased job availability, might all increase 
the desire to hold a job, consequently affecting reported levels of un 
employment. The subjectivity of the measures was considered especially 
problematic for secondary family earners. To the extent that their incomes 
were not vital for their families' survival, wives and teenagers might 
easily be discouraged by bad times. On the other hand, other family mem-
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bers might seek work if the head lost his or her job. Thus, the size of 
the labor force would change and so would the measured unemployment rate, 
obscuring the distinction between unemployment and nonparticipation.
There were many early critics who charged that the unemployment 
measures understated the degree of involuntary idleness. Workers employed 
part-time but wanting full-time jobs were counted as employed even if they 
worked only one hour. Thus, the worker doing a few odd jobs because of the 
dearth of full-time positions would be included among the employed. It was 
also noted that self-employment might disguise unemployment, as persons 
wanting wage-paying jobs would be absorbed into family enterprises, such as 
farms. The employment measure did not differentiate between adequate and 
substandard employment. Only hours and not types of work were considered; 
only the receipt of wages and not their levels. A worker would be counted 
as employed even if he or she were skilled but working in an unskilled job, 
doing "make-work" or eking out a meager living despite full-time employ 
ment.
There was a running debate about data gathering techniques and the 
purity of monthly surveys. The issue always heated up in bad times. For 
instance, with the sluggish decline in unemployment from its 1958 post-War 
peak, the messenger was blamed for the message. The Joint Economic 
Committee issued analyses of frictional and structural unemployment in 1959 
and 1960, and another on employment concepts in 1961. At the other 
extreme, a Reader's Digest article attacked the data and the statisticians, 
asserting that unemployment figures were more a creation of government 
bureaucrats than a reflection of real economic conditions.
But more was involved than political posturing or technical debate 
over the fine points to divert attention from the stark reality of unem 
ployment. Important changes had occurred in the labor market and new 
theoretical perspectives and public policy issues had emerged over the two 
decades since the labor market statistics had been introduced. The 
question was not only whether labor market statistics provided embarrassing 
proof of the slow recovery, but also whether they were appropriate after 
twenty years of labor market changes.
One major development was the increase in secondary workers. Female 
labor force participation, which jumped dramatically in World War II, con 
tinued upward throughout the 1950s. Though the products of the post-war 
baby bpom had not entered the labor force by I960, structural changes were 
occurring, intensifying the relative unemployment problems of teenagers. 
The average unemployment rate of youths aged 16 to 19 years rose from 2.3 
times the overall rate in 1950 to 2.7 times as high in 1960. In 1954, 
males age 20 years and over accounted for 65 percent of the labor force and 
58 percent of the unemployed. Six years later, the adult male shares had 
dropped to 62 percent and 54 percent, respectively.
Several other structural problems emerged in the late 1950s. There 
was an apparent acceleration of technological change. The impacts were 
concentrated geographically as well as socioeconomically, intensifying 
structural problems in the match-up of labor supply and demand. Depressed 
areas were an increasing concern. Most significantly, the disparity 
between the unemployment rates of whites and blacks increased. In 1948,
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the unemployment rate for nonwhites was 1.7 times that for whites. It rose 
to 2.0 times as high in 1954, and 2.2 times by 1959. The major factor in 
this increase was the exodus of rural and frequently underemployed blacks 
to the cities, where they became more visible as unemployed and where they 
also came into direct and uneven competition with whites for available 
jobs.
It was also becoming apparent by the late 1950s that millions of 
workers, in addition to the blacks and the technologically displaced, were 
unable to earn an adequate livelihood. Poverty was not new, but it re 
mained to be "discovered." As with unemployment three decades earlier, 
there were no agreed definitions of what constituted deprivation and no 
dependable statistics measuring its dimensions, so that many were willing 
to believe that poverty did not exist. It was not until 1964 that Mollie 
Orshansky of the Social Security Administration developed a generally 
accepted poverty index derived by multiplying the costs of a nutritionally 
minimum diet by a factor of three based on crude estimates of the pro 
portion of low income budgets spent for food. These poverty measures were 
adopted as logistical and statistical support for the War on Poverty— 
mapping its strategy, targeting its resources and benchmarking its prog 
ress.
Like the unemployment concepts, these measures generated a good deal 
of controversy. There was much debate over whether the poverty line really 
constituted the margin of deprivation. The War on Poverty's critics noted 
that the U.S. poverty standards exceeded the average living standards in 
most of the world. With the introduction of Medicaid in the mid-1960s, and 
the expansion of housing programs later in the decade, detractors argued 
that many needs were being met by in-kind aid, reducing cash requirements 
so that the poverty counts overstated the dimensions of deprivation. Other 
critics with a more liberal disposition charged that the poverty standards 
had been wrongly defined in absolute rather than relative terms simply to 
demonstrate progress in the War on Poverty as the nation's living standards 
rose over time. Poverty warriors felt that the poverty definition was too 
strict, and that the "near poor" with incomes 125 percent of the poverty 
thresholds should have been included in the universe of need.
The poverty measures were challenged on a range of technical grounds. 
Based on a once-a-year survey no larger than the monthly survey used to 
generate labor force statistics, the poverty numbers were of less relia 
bility than annual average labor force estimates. There was serious under 
reporting of income, particularly nonearned income including cash trans 
fers. The measures did not adjust for regional cost-of-living differences 
other than by lowering the poverty lines a fixed percent for residents of 
rural areas. Poverty standards were adjusted each year by the cost-of- 
living index, but it was debatable whether the CPI reflected the costs of 
the items in a poverty level "market basket."
Over time, however, the labor force and poverty measures gradually 
gained acceptance. Two national commissions were appointed by Presidents 
Kennedy and Carter to assess the challenges to the labor force statistics. 
For the most part, these commissions endorsed both the concepts and the 
data gathering procedures, calling for only minor refinements and increased 
disaggregations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics tried to overcome some of
257
the shortcomings of the poverty measures by developing a lower living 
standard budget based on surveys of consumption patterns of low income 
families and the costs in different areas of the country. While these new 
standards gained some acceptance and application, the poverty measure 
remained the primary indicator of deprivation. In other words, despite the 
arbitrariness of the concepts, despite continuing debate over the under 
lying normative issues, statistical procedures and technical details, the 
poverty and labor force measures have become familiar through usage, 
enshrined in the law, incorporated into countless textbooks, theories and 
models, and packaged for public consumption by the media.
The Resistance to Hardship Measures
Ironically, as the poverty and labor force statistics became accepted 
and enshrined, secular changes in the labor market and in the social 
welfare system were continuing to undermine their effectiveness for one of 
their primary applications—measuring the welfare consequences of labor 
market problems. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the post-war babies and 
their mothers flooded into the labor market, increasing the share of the 
unemployed who were second and third family earners while dramatically 
expanding part-time enployment and reducing poverty by increased family 
work participation. Cash transfers and in-kind aid grew rapidly in the 
1960s and early 1970s, extending the overlap between work and welfare. The 
riots in Watts in 1965, followed by similar disturbances in other cities, 
focused national attention on the structural labor market problems which 
had not been eliminated by a booming economy. The National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders found that "more than 20 percent of the 
rioters in Detroit were unemployed and many who were employed held inter 
mittent, low status, unskilled jobs which they regarded as below their 
education and ability." The Commission concluded that "pervasive unem 
ployment and underemployment are the most persistent and serious grievances 
of minority areas. They are inextricably linked to the problems of civil 
disorders." The War on Poverty also focused attention on those at the end 
of the labor queue who continued to experience difficulties even in a full 
employment economy. The newly introduced poverty data revealed that many 
families remained poor despite quite substantial work effort.
Thus, in 1966, President Johnson directed the Department of Labor to 
develop "subemployment" statistics which would measure not only the availa 
bility of employment, but its adequacy in providing for self-support and 
family maintenance. Subemployment measures for poverty areas were de 
veloped in 1967 and national estimates were presented in the 1968 Manpower 
Report of the President. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 
1973 required the Department of Labor and its Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
calculate and publish measures assessing the adequacy of employment and 
earnings. The 1976 CETA amendments, which established the National 
Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, charged NCEUS with 
developing and refining hardship measures. The 1978 CETA amendments 
repeated the instruction to the Department of Labor to develop and publish 
such measures.
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Despite the increasing need for hardship measures, as well as repeated 
legislative and administrative prodding, we remain today without accepted 
and regularly published statistics measuring the welfare consequences of 
labor market problems. The resistance to hardship measures has been as 
great, or greater, than the earlier resistance to unemployment and poverty 
measures.
Just as the unemployment measures were resisted because they would 
document that millions were involuntarily idle, and the poverty measures 
were resisted because they would document the existence of deprivation in 
our affluent nation, hardship measures are opposed because they will show 
that there are millions of Americans, both employed and unemployed, who are 
failing in or are failed by the labor market despite their significant work 
effort. To actually measure the extent of such problems would shatter the 
ideological detente between conservative pundits who criticize the labor 
force and poverty data for the many ways the numbers overstate problems, 
and the liberal experts who can point to the many ways in which existing 
measures understate the dimensions and degree of suffering. Though the 
ideology of the left and the right coincide on the notion of targeting 
resources to those most in need, the political and practical interests of 
both conservatives and liberals are better served when resources are widely 
dispersed. Thus, it is convenient to accept the unemployment rate as the 
primary measure of labor market problems—since its rise to publicly 
unacceptable levels usually means that mobilization occurs only when the 
middle class is being hurt—and to adopt the poverty measures as a basis 
for transfers, which are focused primarily on the nonworking poor, mainly 
the oldsters, who are a potent political force.
However, the intransigence towards hardship measures resulted more 
from entropy than ideology. The unemployment measures and concepts were 
adopted in a statistical vacuum. In the 1930s there were hundreds—not 
mil lions—of college graduates who had studied the gainful worker concept 
and its underlying neoclassical economic theory. Few of these scholars had 
staked their academic careers on quantitative interpretations of reality. 
There were no computers or econometric models demanding an unvarying 
statistical diet. Reporters did not crowd into the Department of Labor 
each month to get a hot story about the latest body count. By the time the 
poverty measures were introduced, statistics, statistical analyses and 
statistical analysts were already increasing in prominence. Yet income 
data and their applications were still relatively virgin territory. War 
had not yet been declared on deprivation, and billions of dollars did not 
rest on the levels and fluctuations of area poverty and unemployment rates.
Today, any new set of measures faces the resistance of a formidable 
array of vested interests—including the academicians who have developed 
their quantitative models around poverty and unemployment data, the stat 
isticians who have spent their lives refining current measures, the elected 
officials and client groups who stand to lose money if alternative measures 
are used in resource allocation, the press and television commentators who 
can make a story each month from statistical blips in the unemployment 
rate, and the informed public, which has a general notion of what poverty 
and unemployment mean, and has little interest in learning a new statisti 
cal language.
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There are also formidable problems inherent to hardship measurement. 
Complexity is unavoidable since the measures must consider underemployment 
as well as unemployment, both earned and nonearned income, individual 
earnings alone but also in relation to family size and needs, as well as 
both individual and family earnings in light of work force attachment.
As the National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics 
concluded: "It is not realistic to try to incorporate all the dimensions 
into a summary survey statistic such as the unemployment rate and the 
poverty rate. A single indicator cannot give individual attention to the 
components of labor market-related hardship . . ., deal with multiple 
classifications of labor force status during a year, or give separate 
attention to the individual's status or to his or her family's economic 
status."
The hardship measures proposed in this volume, therefore, include 
three primary indicators: one counting the work force participants with 
inadequate individual earnings, another counting those with inadequate 
family earnings, and the third counting participants with inadequate family 
incomes. These counts of persons falling below earnings and income stand 
ards are paralleled by measures of the size of the earnings and income 
shortfalls, yielding an indication of the severity as well as incidence of 
hardship. Because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of achieving 
consensus on standards of earnings and income adequacy, three different 
sets of hardship standards are utilized. Likewise, because of disagreement 
about the duration of work attachment which demonstrates a "real" commit 
ment to work, all the measures are derived for full-year and half-year, as 
well as total, work force participants. Variants of these baseline 
measures are used to address certain "what if" questions which are im 
portant for policy. Detailed disaggregations are derived, paralleling the 
primary disaggregations of poverty, unemployment and work experience data, 
in order to provide more insight into the composition and distribution of 
labor market-related hardship. In other words, there is no one hardship 
measure, but rather a comprehensive, and far from simple, measurement 
system.
This measurement system is composited from the same data and defini 
tional elements utilized in the labor force and poverty statistical 
systems, thus subsuming the problems and controversies of each separate 
system. For instance, the work experience data published each year by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics rely on the ability of the household member 
interviewed in March to accurately reconstruct the weeks of employment and 
unemployment, as well as the usual hours of work, of each family member 
over the preceding calendar year. The income data collected in this same 
survey, which are the basis of the poverty counts, assume that income 
levels and sources are accurately reported. Since there is demonstrable 
underreporting, adjustments must be made which may be accurate in the 
aggregate, but are not as accurate in allocating underreported income types 
to different households in the survey. The hardship data integrate the 
work experience information reported for each family with its income and 
earnings information, so that errors in either or both will be reflected in 
the hardship measures.
However, the complexity of the hardship measurement system, or the 
intractability of the technical issues, can easily be exaggerated. The
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hardship nomenclatures and the corresponding acronyms are unfamiliar and 
perhaps unwieldy, while the disaggregated hardship data are formidable in 
their detail. Yet for someone equally unfamiliar with labor force concepts 
or with income and poverty definitions, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1 
annual reports on work experience and monthly reports on employment and 
earnings, or the Bureau of Census 1 annual reports on income and poverty, 
would be just as challenging in complexity and detail.
Technical adjustments over decades were required to finetune the 
weighting and sampling procedures, undercount adjustments, reliability 
estimates and other statistical aspects of the labor force and poverty 
measures. This work still continues. Similar efforts will be needed over 
many years to assure dependable and accurate hardship statistics. The 
hardship measures proposed in this volume were developed to utilize in 
formation gathered in the March Current Population Survey. But the survey 
instrument is not sacrosanct, nor is the survey approach. A few new 
questions, for instance, might improve the estimates of hours of availa 
bility for work over the year. Current Population Survey procedures were 
developed primarily to generate statistically reliable unemployment and 
employment counts each month. If annual income and earnings adequacy were 
considered of greater importance, it might be possible to expand the sample 
size for the March survey, or to supplement this with an alternative 
sample, perhaps a mail survey instrument accompanying income tax returns.
It is understandable if many of the data gatherers and technical 
experts who developed and refined the current concepts and survey pro 
cedures through years of hard work are less than enthusiastic about 
changes, particularly in a period when budget stringencies are threatening 
the already existing measurement systems and when staff are unavailable to 
handle even the rudimentary procedures required to insure the integrity of 
current data systems, much less to undertake the detailed technical work 
necessary to refine a new measurement system. Yet the obstacles are not 
insurmountable. The hardship measures used in this volume cost only a few 
thousand dollars to tabulate from already-gathered survey data for each 
year. The measures certainly meet the legislative charge to the Department 
of Labor, as well as the recommendation of the National Commission on 
Employment and Unemployment Statistics "that the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
prepare an annual report containing measures of the different types of 
labor market-related economic hardships resulting from low wages, unem 
ployment and insufficient participation in the labor force" with data 
presented "which refer to individuals ... in conjunction with the family 
relationship and the household income status of the individual . . . ." 
Without disputing the need for refinements, the benefits of larger samples, 
or the desirability of more precise survey questions as a basis for hard 
ship estimates, there is no doubt that hardship measurement is technically 
feasible and that the measurement system proposed in this volume is at 
least one reasonable approach.
The real issue is not the feasibility of the hardship measures, but 
whether they are worth the trouble. Social statistics and statistical 
concepts are clearly not immutable, but rather a set of conventions useful 
only to the extent that they describe existing conditions, organize and 
quantify these in light of perceived theory, and generate information 
needed in addressing policy issues. The labor force and poverty measures
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have been accepted because they have served these purposes in the past. 
They still may serve these purposes for those who are knowledgeable enough 
to integrate the detailed and disaggregated labor force and income data in 
light of changing family patterns and labor force participation, and the 
increased overlap of work and welfare. But the hardship measures seek to 
simplify this integration, helping blind men to see the whole of the 
elephant, not just its separate appendages. The true test of the proposed 
measurement system is whether it provides this unifying perspective, in 
creases understanding and improves policy.
A Summary of Findings
If the blind men of Hindustan could see, they would realize that the 
"elephant" is not a spear, a tree, a rope, a snake, a fan or a wall. It is 
a large and lumbering creature, with an uneven footfall and serious con 
sequences for those who cross its path. It can be harnessed or caged, but 
hardly ignored. Analogously, the new measures reveal that labor market- 
related hardship is an immense problem, serious in both good times and bad. 
The consequences of hardship are distributed unevenly, and for those 
affected, the burdens are serious indeed. Hardship cannot be easily 
eliminated. A combination of macroeconomic measures, actions targeted to 
structural labor market problems, and coordinated income transfer policies, 
are necessary to make significant progress. In almost every feature, the 
welfare consequences of labor market problems look different when assessed 
from the hardship perspective rather than from the unemployment and poverty 
perspectives.
The Dimensions and Distribution of Hardship
t The number who suffer severe hardship as a result of labor mar 
ket problems experienced during the year far exceeds average annual unem 
ployment. Wh"jj e man.y of the unemployed are affected little by their weeks 
of idleness, millions of workers who are able to find jobs all weeks they 
are in the work force earn less than what is necessary to support them- 
selves and their families.
Because of low wages and involuntary part-time employment, in addition 
to unemployment, one-fourth of the 117.0 million work force participants in 
1979 had annual earnings below the minimum wage multiplied by their hours 
of availability. This 28.3 million with Inadequate Individual Earnings 
dwarfed the 6.0 million annual unemployed. There were 41.0 million work 
force participants who earned less than 125 percent of the minimum wage for 
their annual hours in the work force, while a staggering 51.0 million 
earned less than 150 percent of the minimum wage equivalent in 1979. To 
put this in perspective, a family of four with the head working full-time, 
full-year, and a secondary worker employed half-time, full-year, would have 
just earned enough to maintain what the Bureau of Labor Statistics defined 
as a lower living standard budget if both received 150 percent of the 
minimum wage or $4.50 per hour in 1979.
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While many of these workers with Inadequate Individual Earnings 
resided in families with other, better paid workers and, therefore, 
reasonably adequate family earnings, half lived in families with total 
earnings below the poverty level. There were another 4.2 million workers 
who earned more than the minimum wage equivalent for their hours in the 
work force, yet lived in families with earnings below the poverty level 
because of limited work force participation or large family size.
Cash transfers and other earnings supplements protected some of these 
low earning individuals and families from hardship. Yet among the 13.3 
million with Inadequate Family Earnings in 1979, 7.1 million had Inadequate 
Family Income, i.e., they remained in poverty after the receipt of cash 
transfers and other earnings supplements. There were 10.5 million work 
force participants in families with incomes less than 125 percent of the 
poverty level, and 14.4 million in families with incomes less than 150 




Numbers Percent of average annual 
(000) work force unemployment
Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE)
Severe Hardship: Earned less than
100 percent of the minimum wage
for nours of availability. 28,269 24.2% 4.7
Intemediate Hardship: Earned less
tnan 125 percent of the minimum
wage for hours of availability. 40,961 35.0 6.9
Moderate Hardship: Earned less
tnar. 150 percent of the minimum
wage for hours of availability. 51,426 44.0 8.6
Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE)
Severe nardship: Work force
participants in families with
ccrbined earnings below the
po.erty level. 13,280 11.4 2.2
Interrediate Hardship: Work
force participants in families
witn ccr.Dined earnings less
than 125 percent of tne poverty
level. 17,190 14.7 2.9
Mocerate Hardship: Work force
participants in families with
combined earnings less than
150 percent of poverty level. 21,553 18.4 3.6
Inadequate Family Income (IFI)
Severe Hardship; Work force
participants in poor families. 7,055 6.0 1.2
Intermediate Hardship: Work
force oarticipants in farm 1ies
witn incomes less than 125
percent of poverty level. 10,524 9.0 1.8
Moderate Hardship: Work force 
particioants in families with 
incomes less than 150 percent 
of poverty level. 14,354 12.3 2.4
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These hardship counts for the total work force included some in 
dividuals with very limited work force attachment. Yet even if concern is 
limited to workers participating 50 weeks or more, the numbers with 
inadequate earnings and incomes are sobering:
Hardship among full-year 
work force participants
Severe Intermediate Moderate 
(OOP) (OOP) (OOP)
Inadequate Individual Earnings 14,248 22,047 29,442
Inadequate Family Earnings 5,675 8,P88 IP,981
Inadequate Family Income 3,098 5,P75 7,383
Many individuals in the severe hardship HE have earnings only a 
few dollars below the minimum wage equivalent, and many families in the se 
vere hardship IFE and IFI have earnings and incomes very close to the pov 
erty level. Yet the aggregate and average deficits of persons in hardship 
are substantial. Unlike the unemployed, the hardship population is concen 
trated at the bottom of the income distribution.
To raise all work force participants up to minimum wage equivalent 
earnings for their hours of availability would have required $52.P billion 
in 1979, which represented 4.P percent of the nation's reported wages and 
salaries. The individual earnings shortfall for all work force partici 
pants in the severe hardship I IE was $1,839. The HE Deficit for full-year 
work force participants was $38.P billion and averaged $2,698.
To raise family earnings to the poverty level for all families with 
work force participants would have required $31.7 billion in 1979, or 
$2,384 for each work force participant in the IFE. To eliminate poverty 
among families with work force participants would have required $12.8 
billion in additional earnings, or $1,818 per work force participant in the 
severe hardship IFI.






HE Deficit $51,998 $87,442 $136,402
IFE Deficit 31,656 48,556 66,668
IFI Deficit 12,825 23,015 37,173
Hardship deficits as percent of 
total wages and salaries
Severe Intermediate Moderate
HE Deficit 4.0% 6.7% 10.5%
IFE Deficit 2.4 3.7 5.3
IFI Deficit 0.9 1.6 2.6
Average hardship deficits
Severe Intermediate Moderate
HE Deficit $1,839 $2,135 $2,652
IFE Deficit 2,384 2,825 3,232
IFI Deficit 1,818 2,187 2,590
There can be no doubt, then, that the hardship measures focus on those 
workers whose employment problems have the most serious consequences:
Percent in Percent in
families with families with
incomes below incomes over
$8.000 $15.000
Total in work force in 1979 11.2% 70.0% 
Persons experiencing
unemployment 23.2 53.0 
Workers with Inadequate Individual
Earnings 29.5 48.6 
Workers with Inadequate Family
Earnings 66.1 8.0 
Workers with Inadequate Family
Incomes 93.8 0.0
• Hardship, like unemployment, is most likely to affect women, 
minorities, younger and older workers, those with limited education, work 
ers in blue collar and service jobs, and residents of nonmetropolitan areas 
and large central cities. As a general rule, the burdens of hardship are 
even more maldistributed than the burdens of unemployment?
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--The incidence of unemployment among females in the work force during 
1979 was 104 percent of the incidence among males. In contrast, the female 
IFI rate was 135 percent that for males, the IFE incidence was 137 percent 
as high, while the HE rate among women was 186 percent of the rate among 
men. Comparing male and female family heads who were the sole breadwinners 
for their households, the unemployment, HE, IFE and IFI rates for women 











































—Black workers were two-thirds more likely than whites to experience 
unemployment during 1979, and half again as likely to have Inadequate 
Individual Earnings. But the IFE rate among blacks was two and a half 
times that among whites, while the IFI rate was nearly three and a half 
times that of whites. Similarly, Hispanic workers were half again as 
likely to experience unemployment, two-thirds more likely to have Inade 































—Workers age 65 and over were twice as likely as those age 25 to 44 
to have Inadequate Individual Earnings during 1979 and 5.4 times as likely 
to have Inadequate Family Earnings, although income transfers equalized IFI 
rates. Teenage workers were three and a half times as likely as prime age 
workers to have Inadequate Individual Earnings. The IFE rate among teen 
agers was three-fifths higher, while their IFI incidence was 28 percent 












































—The chances of experiencing unemployment during 1979 were 2.6 times 
higher among high school dropouts than among college graduates, but the 
HE, IFE and IFI rates for dropouts were, respectively, 3.7, 4.3 and 5.5 




































--Workers employed primarily as operatives, laborers, farm workers and 
service workers were 2.8 times as likely to experience unemployment as 
workers in professional, technical, managerial and administrative jobs, but 


























































--Workers residing in nonmetropolitan areas had the same chance of 
experiencing unemployment as those in metropolitan areas, but they were 
two-fifths more likely to have ladequate Individual Earnings, while their 
IFE and IFI rates were 50 and 46 percent higher, respectively. The unem 
ployment incidence in central cities of SMSA's with over one million 
population was 1.3 times the incidence in surrounding suburbs; the large 










































Unemployment is not always, or even usually, associated with 
hardship. Underemployment—including, low wage full-time or voluntary 
part-time work, as well as involuntary part-time employment--is a more fre 
quent cause of hardship than unemployment. Full-time, full-year employmenT 
is no guarantee of self-sufficiency. And while the individual earning? 
deficits of part-time workers are less than those of full-time workers and 
the unemployed, the earnings shortfalls of part-time workers contribute" 
significantly to family earnings problems.
Almost half of the 18.5 million work force participants who experi 
enced some unemployment during 1979 had annual earnings above the minimum 
wage equivalent for their hours of availability. Less than a fourth 
resided in families with below-poverty earnings. Just one in seven of the 
unemployed resided in a poor family.
While the incidence of hardship was lower among those workers who were 
able to find and keep jobs for all their weeks in the work force, the 
employed with inadequate individual and family earnings and income out 
numbered the unemployed in hardship:
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Severe hardship Severe hardship 
incidence share
HE IFE IFI HE IFE IFI 
Employed all weeks 12.6% 5.8% 3.6% 65.1% 68.3% 62.9%
Employed full-time
all weeks 10.0 4.5 2.7 22.7 22.0 24.8
Employed part-time
voluntarily some
or all weeks 32.6 17.5 6.9 31.1 35.6 22.6
Employed part-time 
involuntarily some 
weeks 44.6 19.8 11.4 11.3 10.7 11.6
Unemployed some weeks 53.5 22.8 14.2 34.9 31.7 37.1
The hardship deficits for participants with different patterns of work 
experience provide a measure of the relative consequences of different 
labor market problems. The average HE Deficit for part-time workers was 
less than that for full-time workers, or for the unemployed, yet the 
part-timers still accounted for 29 percent of the 1979 aggregate HE 
Deficit. The IFE and IFI Deficits are allocated among family work force 
participants in relation to the degree that their individual earnings 
problems contribute to the family earnings or income shortfall. Part-time 
workers accounted for 43 percent of the IFE Deficit and 35 percent of the 
IFI Deficit in 1979. In other words, part-time workers accounted for a 
substantial share of potential earnings for families with inadequate 
earnings and incomes, and their low wages, as well as limited hours of 
availability, were a major cause of hardship:
Average deficit
of subqrouo as 
oercent of average Share of
deficit for all total severe 
in severe hardship hardship deficit
HE IFE IFI HE IFE IFI
Not employed 107% 175% 143% 8% 12% 13%
Intermittently employed 117 97 96 33 24 27
Part-time involuntary 100 105 107 11 11 12
Part-time voluntary 56 91 85 18 32 23
Employed full-time 135 92 102 31 20 25
• Because needs increase with family size, the welfare consequences 
of low earnings are more serious for breadwinners who must support large 
families. Assuring minimally adequate individual earnings for all persons 
in hardship would alleviate, but not eliminate, Inadequate Family Earnings.
Among the 13.3 million total work force participants with below- 
poverty family earnings in 1979, and the 5.7 million in the work force
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full-year, 4.2 million and 1.2 million, respectively, had individual 
earnings above the minimum wage equivalent for their usual hours of availa 
bility. Conversely, among the 28.7 million total work force participants 
in the severe hardship HE, of whom 14.2 million were full-year partici 
pants, only 9.1 and 4.5 million, respectively, were in families with 
below-poverty earnings.
The probabilities that Inadequate Individual Earnings will be as 
sociated with Inadequate Family Earnings, or that family earnings will be 
inadequate despite adequate individual earnings, increase with the number 
of dependents per worker. For instance, the IFE incidence among workers in 
families with two work force participants was as follows:
Severe hardship Severe hardship
IFE incidence IFE incidence
among workers among workers
with Inadequate with adequate
Individual Earnings individual earnings
Two family members 18.9% 1.4% 
Three family members 17.9 1.2 
Four or five family
members 26.7 2.3 
Six or more family
members 46.9 9.3
The likelihood of having Inadequate Family Earnings declines when 
there are more breadwinners with greater labor force attachment. For 





in four or five
member families
Three or more full-year participants in family 1.6% 
Three or more in work force at least one week 3.0
Two full-year participants 5.5 
Two in work force at least one week 8.6
One full-year participant 12.3 
One in work force at least one week 20.5
Eliminating the HE Deficits of all persons with below-poverty family 
earnings would have reduced the 1979 IFE count by only 36 percent, and the 
IFE Deficit by 41 percent. Among full-year work force participants, the 
IFE would have been reduced less than three-fifths by the elimination of
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Inadequate Individual Earnings. Even if all the unemployed and involuntary 
part-time workers in the IFE were provided their usual wage for any hours 
of forced idleness and if everyone's earnings were then increased by 10 
percent, the IFE would have been reduced by only 45 percent and the IFE 
Deficit by 47 percent. Similar augmentation of the earnings of full-year 
workers would have left a third of the full-year IFE with below-poverty 
family earnings.
Income transfers mitigate the welfare consequences of labor 
market problems, but many work force participants and their families, in 
cluding millions with substantial work force attachment, fall through the 
safety net. In-kind aid provides further relief, but adding the estimated 
value of in-kind aid (other than health care) to cash income only modestTy 
reduces the number of work force participants in poverty.
Of the 13.3 million work force participants in families with earnings 
below the poverty level in 1979, 2.8 million were lifted out of poverty by 
nontransfer earnings supplements such as private pensions, alimony, divi 
dends and interest. Cash transfers then raised a third of the remaining 
10.5 million out of poverty. If the value of food stamps were added to the 
cash incomes of recipient families, and this combined amount were compared 
to the poverty level for the family, another 0.5 million workers would have 
been lifted out of poverty. If the value of free school lunches and 
housing subsidies were added to cash income and food stamps, the working 
poor would have been reduced by an additional 0.3 million. In other words, 
the Net-of-Transfers IFI declined by a third as a result of cash transfers 
alone, while cash and in-kind transfers (excluding health care) together 
reduced the number of working poor by almost half. The IFI Net-of- 
Transfers Deficit was reduced $11.2 billion by cash transfers, while the 
cash equivalent of food stamps, school lunches and housing subtracted an 
additional $2.4 billion, representing reductions of 47 and 57 percent 
respectively:
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Transfer impacts on 
the number of the workinq poor
(000)
Work force participants in families 
with below poverty earnings (IFE)
-Lifted out of poverty by 
nontransfer earnings 
supplements
=Work force participants 
who would be poor without 
transfers (IFI Net-of- 
Transfers)
•Lifted out of poverty 
by cash transfers
=Work force participants 
in poverty (IFI)
-Lifted out of poverty by 
addition of value of food 
stamps to cash income
-Lifted out .of poverty by 
addition of value of 
housing subsidies and 
school lunches to cash 
Income and food stamps
=Work force participants 
In poverty counting in- 








Transfer impacts on 
ooverty deficit of the working poor
($000)
Family earnings deficit of work force
participants in families with below
poverty earnings (IFE Deficit) $31,656
-Reduction in family earnings 
deficit resulting from non- 
transfer earnings supplements - 7,650
=Poverty deficit of families 24,006 
with work force participants 
If cash transfers excluded 
(IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit)
-Reduction in poverty deficit 
resulting from cash transfers -H,181
=Poverty deficit of families 12,825 
with work force participants 
(IFI Deficit)
-Reduction in poverty deficit 
if food stamps counted as 
cash income - I,gi6
-Further reduction in poverty 
deficit if value of housing 
subsidies and school lunches 
added to cash income and 
food stamps 530
=Povcrty deficit of families 10,379 
with work force participants 
when in-kind aid value in 
cluded with c<r.h inconip (IFI 
Including In-Kind Aid
Hardship Trends
For the total work force, there was a noticeable decline in HE 
incidence over the 1974-1980 period. The severe hardship IFE rate declined' 
modestly, while the severe hardship IFI rate changed little, actually ris-
ing between 1975 and 1980. The moderate and intermediate hardship HE and 
IFE counts increased relative to the severe hardship totals, while the mod 
erate and intermediate hardship IFI totals declined relative to the severe 
hardship IFI.
Comparisons between the two low unemployment years, 1974 and 1979, and 
the two high unemployment years, 1975 and 1980, are the best indicators of 
multi-year trends. The severe hardship HE rate dropped by 1.6 percentage 
points between 1974 and 1979, and 1.4 percentage points between 1975 and 
1980. In contrast, the intermediate hardship HE rate declined only 0.3 
percentage points over the first period and 0.5 percentage points over the 
second; while the moderate hardship HE declined 0.3 percentage points 
between 1974 and 1979 but rose 0.7 percentage points between 1975 and 1980. 
The number with individual earnings above the severe hardship level but 
below the intermediate hardship level increased from 37 of the severe 
hardship HE in 1974 to 45 percent in 1979, or from 32 to 37 percent 
between 1975 and 1980. This suggests that wage increases, declining un-
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employment or other factors raised some individuals out of severe hardship 
without having the same proportionate impacts on those with less severe, 
but still significant, labor market problems:



















































































The severe hardship IFE rate dropped 0.2 percentage points between 
1974 and 1979, and 0.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980. The 
declines in the intermediate and moderate hardship IFE rates were of 
similar magnitude, so that both the intermediate and moderate hardship IFE 
counts increased in relation to the severe hardship IFE count.
The patterns were reversed in the case of the IFI, where the severe 
hardship rate declined only 0.1 percentage point between 1974 and 1979, 
while rising 0.3 percentage points between 1975 and 1980. In contrast, the 
moderate hardship IFI incidence declined by 0.5 percentage points in the 
first period and 0.3 percentage points in the second, reducing the moderate 
hardship IFI relative to the severe hardship IFI. The relative labor 
market gains of the worst off were thus offset by changes in the relative 
distribution of nonearned income.
t The IFI incidence did not improve between 1974 and 1979, and ac 
tually rose between 1975 and 1980, because of the declining effectiveness 
of the safety net for the working poor. The impact of nontransfer earning? 
supplements increased significantly over the period. Changes in the com^ 
position of the IFE were favorable and the average IFE Deficit declined, 
but the diminished impact of cash transfers more than offset these favor 
able developments. The safety net for the working poor had unraveled prior 
to the massive cutbacks in social programs in the early 1980s.
Nontransfer earnings supplements raised 18.3 percent of the severe 
hardship IFE out of poverty in 1974 but 21.3 percent in 1979. This "Earn 
ings Supplementation Rate-Nontransfers" increased from 16.2 percent in 1975 
to 19.5 percent in 1980. Yet the Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total, 
which considered transfer as well as. nontransfer earnings supplements, 
declined from 47.1 to 46.9 percent in the first period, and from 47.3 to 
44.0 percent in the second. The reason is that cash benefits lifted 35.3 
percent of the Net-of-Transfers IFI out of poverty in 1974, but only 32.5
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percent in 1979, with an even greater drop, from 37.1 to 30.4 percent, 
between 1975 and 1980.
The impacts of cash transfers on the nonworking poor declined as well, 
but the slippage in benefits was greatest for the working poor. For in 
stance, 50.7 percent of all persons in households without any work force 
participant in 1975 were lifted out of poverty by cash benefits compared to 
49.1 percent in 1980. This 1.6 percentage point drop compared to a 6.7 
percentage point drop in the proportion of otherwise poor families with at 
least one work force participant who were lifted out of poverty by trans 
fers.
This drop occurred despite a slight decline in the constant dollar 
average Net-of-Transfer IFI Deficit. It was not explained by changing work 
force composition or work experience patterns. For almost all subgroups in 
the work force, there was a noticeable decline in the Earnings Supple 
mentation Rate-Transfers. As a result of favorable changes in work ex 
perience patterns of persons with Inadequate Family Earnings, the Earnings 
Supplementation Rate-Transfers should have risen 0.3 percentage points 
between 1975 and 1980. Favorable changes in the sex and family relation 
ship composition of the IFE should have increased the transfer impact by 
0.6 percentage points, offsetting the 0.8 percentage point decline which 
might have been expected from the reduced proportion of older workers (who 
more frequently receive transfers).
• Changes in work attachment and experience patterns were relative 
ly neutral, as increased full-year participation reduced hardship probabil 
ities, offsetting the negative effects of increased part-time employment. 
On the other hand, changes in the composition of the total work force wereT 
on balance, quite favorable, contributing to the decline of the severe 
hardship HE and IFE rates.
The proportion of the total work force who were full-year participants 
increased from 70.2 in 1974 to 71.8 percent in 1979, while the proportion 
participating at least half year increased from 83.0 to 84.4 percent. The 
incidence of unemployment dropped by 2.1 percentage points, while among the 
unemployed, the proportion who were jobless- for over one-third of their 
weeks of participation dropped from 41.8 to 40.6 percent. These labor 
market developments reduced hardship probabilities, since the short-term 
work force participants, those experiencing unemployment, and particularly 
those predominantly unemployed, had significantly higher IIE and IFE 
likelihoods.
The percent of the total work force employed voluntarily or involun 
tarily part-time for some or all weeks in the work force and who experi 
enced no weeks of unemployment, increased from 22.5 percent in 1974 to 29.2 
percent in 1979. Since the severe hardship IIE rate among part-time 
workers was three-fourths higher than for the rest of the work force, while 
the IFE rate was three-fifths higher, increased part-time work raised the 
IIE and IFE probabilities for the total work force.
On balance, these changes in work experience patterns and work force 
attachment contributed to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the severe 
hardship IIE rate and a 0.1 percentage point increase in the IFE rate
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between 1974 and 1979 (as judged by weighting the 1979 incidence for each 
work experience/attachment subgroup by its 1974 share, and comparing the 
weighted hardship rates with the actuals for 1979). However, labor market 
changes should have reduced the HE rate by 1.0 percentage points between 
1975 and 1980, and the IFE by 0.6 percentage points, since unemployment was 
lower in the latter year.
The changing composition of the labor force contributed to declining 
hardship incidence:
Teenagers and older workers (45 and above)—those more likely to have 
inadequate individual and family earnings—represented 44.8 percent of the 
1974 work force, but 40.3 percent of the 1979 work force. All else being 
equal, this decline should have reduced the severe hardship HE rate by 0.6 
percentage points and the IFE rate by 0.2 percentage points.
Dropouts declined from 28.7 percent of the work force in 1974 to 20.9 
percent in 1979, while persons who had completed some post-secondary 
education increased from 28.1 to 32.7 percent. Given the lower hardship 
incidence among the better educated, this upgrading of the work force's 
educational attainment should have reduced the severe hardship HE rate by 
2.6 percentage points and the IFE rate by 1.5 percentage points, all else 
being equal.
White collar workers increased from 46.2 to 49.3 percent of the work 
force, while farm and service workers, laborers and operatives—those 
workers most likely to have inadequate individual and family earnings- 
dropped from 39.7 of the work force in 1974 to 36.7 percent in 1979. All 
else being equal, this should have contributed to a 0.9 percentage point 
drop in the severe hardship HE rate and a 0.5 percentage point drop in the 
IFE rate.
The negative impacts of the population shift to those regions where 
severe hardship was more prevalent were offset by the movement to the 
suburbs where hardship was less prevalent. All else being equal, the 
regional shifts would have increased both the severe hardship HE and IFE 
rates by less than 0.1 percentage points while the suburbanization would 
have reduced both by less than 0.1 percentage points.
As a result of substantial changes in family size and composi 
tion, as well as in family work patterns, female family heads and un 
related individuals represented a larger share of the hardship counts and 
deficits in 1980 than in 1974. Conversely, male family heads, wives and 
other family earners constituted a declining share. The favorable effeel? 
of reduced family size and increased participation by second and third fam 
ily earners were offset by the growth of female-headed families and single- 
person families.
Unrelated individuals increased from 11.2 percent of the work force in 
1974 to 14.6 percent in 1979, while workers in larger families with six or 
more members declined from 12.4 to 9.4 percent. The number of earners also 
increased, so that 81.4 percent of the work force participants in multiple- 
member families in 1979 also had other workers in their families, compared 
to 79.2 percent in 1974. Weighting the severe hardship IFE and IFI share
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rates for each family size/number of earners category by its 1974 share 
suggests that these changes subtracted 0.4 percentage points from the IFE 
rate and 0.3 percentage points from the IFI rate.
Male family heads accounted for 39.5 percent of the work force in 1974 
but only 35.9 percent in 1979. Working wives increased only marginally 
from 24.4 to 24.6 percent, while other family members declined from 20.6 to 
19.8 percent of the work force. Female family heads increased from 4.4 to 
5.1 percent. Because the severe hardship IFE and IFI rates tend to be 
lower among male family heads and wives, and unrelated individuals and 
female family heads, the changing sex/family relationship composition of 
the work force contributed 0.3 percentage points to the IFE rate and 0.3 
percentage points to the IFI rate.
The composition of the hardship population changed as a result of 
shifting family patterns. Male family heads accounted for 24.5 percent of 
the 1979 severe hardship IFE, down from 26.9 percent in 1974, while female 
family heads accounted for 15.2 percent, up from a 14.6 percent share of 
the 1974 IFE. Male family heads dropped from 25.9 to 23.2 percent of the 
IFI, mirrored by an increase from 17.2 to 18.9 percent for female family 
heads. Wives and other family members declined from 35.4 percent of the 
IFE and 30.7 percent of the IFI in 1974, to 3'3.9 and 28.1 percent, respec 
tively, in 1979.
Despite a deterioration in the relative unemployment status of 
black workers during the 1974-1980 period, they realized at least modest 
absolute and relative gains as judged from the hardship perspective, al 
though the pace of these gains was far below that of the preceding decade. 
For Blacks, intermediate and moderate hardship improved more than severe 
hardship. Hispanics made substantial absolute and relative progress in es 
caping severe hardship, but the intermediate and moderate hardship gains 
were more limited.
The annual unemployment rate for blacks was 2.1 times that of whites 
in 1974, with a gap of 5.4 percentage points; by 1979, the unemployment 
rate ratio had increased to 2.4 as the gap widened to 7.1 percentage 
points. Nevertheless, the severe hardship I IE rate of blacks declined from 
1.6 to 1.5 times that of whites, while the black/white IFE incidence ratio 
fell from 2.6 to 2.5, and the IFI ratio from 3.6 to 3.5. This relative 
progress was derailed by the 1980 decline, which affected blacks relatively 
more than the 1975 recession, but the 1980 black/white hardship incidence 
ratios still remained below the 1974 levels. The improvements for minori 
ties during the 1974-1980 period were far slower than in the preceding 
decade. According to the hardship measure developed by the National 
Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, the hardship inci 
dence among nonwhites fell from 3.9 times that for whites in 1967 to 3.2 
times as high in 1971, and then improved only marginally to 3.0 times the 
white rate in 1979.
The intermediate and moderate hardship IFE and IFI rates for blacks 
declined relative to the severe hardship IFE and IFI rates. Among white 
work force participants, the exact opposite was true:
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HE IFE IFI 
Whites Blacks Whites Blacks Whites Blacks
Intermediate T Severe
1974 1.38 1.29 1.29 1.26 1.54 1 44
1979 1.46 1.36 1.31 1.24 1.53 1.39
1974-1979 +.08 +.07 +.02 TToT ^ToT
Moderate r Severe
1974 1.75 1.54 1.62 1.50 2.19 1.87 
1979 1.85 1.62 1.66 1.49 2.14 1 77 
1974-1979 +.10 +.08 +.04 ^1)T ^~05~ TlO
Though the ratio of Hispanic to white unemployment remained unchanged, 
the Hispanic severe hardship HE rate declined slightly from 1.32 times the 
white rate in 1974 to 1.28 as high in 1979, while the Hispanic/white IFE 
incidence ratio dropped noticeably from 1.82 to 1.66, and the IFI incidence 
ratio declined from 2.73 to 2.42. Moderate and intermediate hardship 
improved less than severe hardship. For instance, the number of Hispanics 
in the moderate hardship IFE was 1.69 times the number in the severe hard 
ship IFE in 1974 and 1.80 times as high in 1979, an increase of 0.11 
percentage points compared to the 0.04 percentage point increase among 
whites and the 0.01 percentage point decline among blacks. Apparently, the 
severe hardship reductions were achieved by the movement of many Hispanic 
workers and their families to just above the severe hardship levels, rather 
than reflecting across-the-board improvements.
Hardship in Good Times and Bad
t Hardship rises in recessions and declines during periods of eco 
nomic growth. However, the cyclicality of hardship is less extreme than 
the cyclicality of unemployment. Hardship is a continuing structural 
problem which persists even in periods of economic growth and low unemploy 
ment.
Over the 1974-1980 period, there was a significant correlation between 
unemployment and hardship rates:
Correlation between 
Correlation between unemployment incidence
average annual among work force 
unemployment rate participants and 
and severe hardship severe hardship 
incidence incidence
HE incidence .92 .91
IFE incidence .94 .87 
IFE incidence .78 .69
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However, the proportionate fluctuations in hardship were less severe, 
since many of the job losers during recessions were already in hardship, 
and their conditions simply became worse:
1974-1975 1979-1980
Absolute Absolute
increase Percentage increase Percentage
(000) increase (000) increase
Average annual
unemployment 2,754 54 1,485 25 
Persons experiencing
unemployment 2,568 14 2,942 16 
Severe hardship HE 3,589 13 4,478 16 
Severe hardship IFE 1,760 15 1,831 14 
Severe hardship IFI 906 14 1,410 20
The standard deviation of the average annual unemployment rate over 
the 1974-1980 period was 15 percent of the mean; the standard deviation in 
the severe hardship IFE, IFE and IFI rates were 7, 7 and 9 percent of their 
respective means. Simple regression analysis suggests that each 1.00 
percentage point increase in the average annual unemployment rate was 
associated with a 1.25 percentage point increase in the severe hardship HE 
rate, a 0.54 percentage point increase in the IFE rate, and a 0.26 per 
centage point increase in IFI incidence.
Though recessions exacerbate conditions for the victims of struc 
tural employment problems, they also undermine the well-being of the more 
advantaged segments of the labor force who rarely suffer under normal cir 
cumstances. This was particularly true of the 1974-1975 recession. Yet 
the work force was also better protected by income transfers in the 197%^ 
1975 downturn, so that the incidence of Inadequate Family Income among work 
force participants was lower in 1975 than 1980 despite higher unemployment. 
The disadvantaged were affected relatively more by the latter recession and 
suffered more because of reduced protections.
Recessions cause hardship for the more advantaged segments of the work 
force:
-Prime age (25-to-44-year-old) workers accounted for only 29 percent 
of the 1974 severe hardship IFE but 43 percent of the 1974-1975 IFE incre 
ment.
--Male family heads accounted for 27 percent of the 1974 IFE but for 
40 percent of the 1974-1975 IFE increment.
--Work force participants who had completed some post-secondary edu 
cation accounted for }4 percent of the 1974 IFE but 25 percent of the 
recessionary increment.
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--Whites accounted for 76 percent of the IFE but 92 percent of the 
1974-1975 IFE increment.
In the 1979-1980 recession, the more advantaged segments were hurt, 
but to a lesser degree, as suggested by the ratio of each advantaged sub 
group's share of the recession increment in the severe hardship IFE divided 
by its share of the pre-recession IFE:
Male family heads
Work force participants who 
had completed some post- 
secondary education
Whites
















The unemployment rate was a fifth higher in 1975 than in 1980 (8.5 
percent versus 7.1 percent). The severe hardship I IE incidence was 
marginally higher (29.1 percent versus 27.7 percent), as was the IFE rate 
(13.2 percent versus 12.8 percent). Yet despite the relatively worse labor 
market conditions, the IFI rate was lower in 1975 than in 1980 (7.2 percent 
versus 6.9 percent). The reason is clear. Income transfers reduced the 
Net-of-Transfer IFI by 37 percent in the 1975 recession year, compared to 
just 30 percent in 1980, even though the average Net-of-Transfer IFI 
Deficit was, in real terms, lower in 1980 than 1975, leaving less ground to 
be made up by cash benefits.
The most disadvantaged in the work force were the most adversely 
affected by declining transfers. The IFI rate among blacks in 1980 was 1.4 
percentage points above the 1975 level compared to the 0.3 percentage point 
increase in the IFI rate for the total work force. The IFI incidence among 
female family heads rose by 1,1 percentage points, and among high school 
dropouts by 1.7 percentage points.
Some Implications
To significantly alleviate labor market-related hardship will re 
quire a combination of macroeconomic and targeted structural measures, com 
bined with expanded income transfers for the working poor. Full employment 
and increased minimum wages are necessary but far from sufficient, since"
only a portion of the
otherwise in hardship.
benefits of more :
Even if full empl





be achieved by all work force participants with Inadequate Family Earnings, 
earnings supplements would still be needed by millions of work force par-' 
ticipants in order to escape poverty.
Since less than a fourth of the 1979 unemployed were in families with 
inadequate earnings, and only one in seven in poor families, and since just 
a third of workers with Inadequate Individual Earnings were in families 
with below-poverty earnings, reductions in unemployment or increases in the 
minimum wage which would reduce the HE incidence would also affect many 
workers not suffering hardship. Regressions using 1974-1980 annual data 
suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the legislated minimum wage 
(as measured relative to the the real minimum wage averaged for the 1967- 
1980 period) was associated with a 1.9 percentage point reduction in the 
HE, a 0.6 percentage point drop in the IFE and a 0.3 percentage point drop 
in the IFI. Since the ratio of the legislated minimum divided by the 
average real minimum ranged only from 94 percent in 1977 to 102 percent in 
1978, or a swing of 8 percentage points, changes in the minimum were not a 
central factor in hardship trends. A 1 percentage point decline in average 
annual unemployment was associated with a 1.2 percentage point drop in the 
severe hardship HE rate, a 0.5 percentage point drop in the IFE rate, and 
a 0.3 percentage point drop in the IFI rate.
Projecting 1982 hardship levels based on this simple regression model 
for 1974 through 1980, and assuming, most plausibly, that unemployment will 
average 9 percent and inflation will erode only 5 percent from the un 
changing legislated minimum wage, the severe hardship HE rate will be 30.7 
percent, the IFE rate, 14.2 percent, and the IFI rate, 8.0 percent (or even 
higher, as retrenchment in transfer benefits is greater than the 1970s 
downtrend). These projected levels would contrast unfavorably with the 
1979 lows of 24.2, 11.4 and 6.0 percent, respectively. Yet even if un 
employment had miraculously dropped to a 7.0 percent level, and even if 
inflation had declined to a 2.5 percent annual rate, the IFE rate would 
have remained at 13.0 percent, almost the same as in 1975--while the IFI 
rate would have been 7.2 percent, in contrast to 6.9 percent in 1975. In 
other words, large-scale hardship will remain at high levels even if 
economic conditions improve.
If all workers were provided minimally adequate individual earnings, 
hardship would not be eliminated and transfers would still be needed to 
alleviate deprivation among work force participants and their families. 
The severe hardship IFE count would have been reduced by only 36 percent in 
1979, and the IFE Deficit by 41 percent, if the earnings of all persons 
were augmented up to the minimum wage equivalent for all hours of availa 
bility. If every person living in families with below-poverty earnings in 
1979 were provided employment at the usual wage for any hours of forced 
idleness, and their earnings were then increased by 10 percent, 56 percent 
would have remained with Inadequate Family Earnings, and they would have 
needed $22.1 billion in earnings supplements to reach the poverty level. 
Thus, targeted manpower programs providing minimum wage employment or 
marginal earnings improvements would not eliminate the need for income 
transfers.
If the hardship measures were used, rather than unemployment and 
poverty rates, as the basis for allocating and targeting resources in-
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tended for the unemployed and underemployed from low-income families, the 
distribution among geographic areas and population segments would change 
significantly. Nonmetropolitan areas would benefit substantially and so 
would the Southern states. Family heads, both males and females, would re^ 
ceive greater priority. There would be much more emphasis on helping old¥r 
workers and less on youth employment problems. Dropouts would receive far 
more attention.
The nonmetropolitan-area share of the severe hardship IFE, averaged 
for the 1974-1980 period, was nearly two-fifths higher than the nonmetro 
poli tan-area share of average annual unemployment, and a fifth above the 
nonmetropolitan share of poverty and unemployment, each equally weighted. 
If funds were allocated based on IFE shares, the suburban rings of metro 
politan areas would have received a fourth less than if unemployment shares 
were the determining factor, or a tenth less than if equally weighted 
unemployment and poverty shares were used in allocation.
The West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South 
Central, and Mountain states would have received a fourth more under an 
IFE-based allocation than an unemployment-based allocaton, and a tenth more 
than under a poverty and unemployment share basis.
If resources were allocated according to need, and need were based on 
the IFE share rather than unemployment, the following work force groups 
would have been the big winners and losers in 1979:
Winners
Male family heads 
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Adding A Third Leg to Social Statistics
These assorted findings challenge many conventional wisdoms about how 
many and who are suffering as a result of labor market problems. The same 
general conclusions might be reached by careful analysis of the detailed 
and disaggregated labor force and income data, but the hardship measures 
provide a systematic integration which offers new perspectives to the 
public and policymakers who have not been able to piece together the hodge 
podge of existing statistics. Yet the demonstrated utility and sensibility 
of the proposed measures does not assure their acceptance. Those who do 
not like what they see from the hardship perspective may argue that the 
measures distort reality because of the value judgments, assumptions and 
technical problems implicit in the measures. Indeed, it is sobering to 
recognize that so many millions of Americans are unable to support them 
selves and their families even when they are lucky enough to find and hold 
jobs, that there has been little or no progress in alleviating hardship 
over recent years, that the burdens of labor market-related hardship are 
even more maldistributed than the burdens of unemployment, that the greater 
public concern with cyclical rather than structural problems may be mis 
placed, that a rising tide will not lift all boats, and that welfare and 
workfare must continue to overlap if hardship is to be alleviated for those 
failing in or failed by the labor market. It may be equally difficult to 
admit that the unemployment and poverty statistics, which are the foun 
dation of public policy and public understanding, are not effective in 
perhaps their primary application—measuring who and how many suffer as a 
result of labor market problems. It is certainly no easy task to learn an 
entirely new nomenclature, or to adjust and supplement libraries of econo 
metric studies and esoteric analyses which have been based on the assump 
tion that unemployment and poverty rates were good proxies for labor 
market-related hardship. It will also be a formidable challenge to fine- 
tune the hardship measures and to modify the underlying survey instruments 
and approaches in order to improve the accuracy and reliability of hardship 
statistics. Yet if we are seriously committed to understanding and allevi 
ating the welfare consequences of labor market problems, then the unemploy 
ment and poverty statistics must be supplemented by new measures developed 
to integrate earnings, work experience and income data in a systematic way, 
recognizing the complexities of varying family status, labor force attach 
ment and patterns of work experience. Social policies must, then, be 
redirected in light of these new perspectives.
We have spent too many years "disputing loud and long" whether the 
"elephant" is like a spear, a tree, a rope, a snake, a fan, or a wall. 
There is no need to continue groping, conjecturing and disputing. With the 
help of hardship measures, we can see, understand and perhaps better 
harness the beast.

APPENDIX A. HARDSHIP MEASURES—TECHNICAL DETAILS
The hardship measures are calculated from the data gathered in the 
March Current Population Survey covering the earnings, income and work 
experience of individuals over the previous calendar year, as well as their 
labor market, education and family status in the survey week (Table A-l). 
Each of the hardship measures is derived by manipulation of several CPS 
questionnaire responses. The information elements required for the 
calculation of the hardship measures have only been gathered since the 
introduction of a more comprehensive questionnaire in March 1975, so that 
the measures can only be tabulated for the years 1974 forward. A supple 
ment was added to the March 1980 CPS to measure the receipt of in-kind aid. 
The adequacy of family income after "cashing out" in-kind benefits can only 
be estimated for 1979 and 1980.
The complete hardship measures are presented in a 44 row/17 column 
data matrix (Table A-2). In this matrix (which is even more inclusive than 
the streamlined version outlined in Chapter 1), there are 19 "baseline 
measures" (rows 1 through 19). The first seven (rows 1-7) concern the 
adequacy of each individual's employment and earnings over the previous 
year. The adequacy of family earnings are considered in the next six 
measures (rows 8-13). The adequacy of family income is considered by the 
following six measures (rows 14-19). There are twenty-five "interpretative 
measures" (rows 20-44) which vary the baseline measures by augmenting 
earnings, income and employment in different ways or which relate one 
baseline measure to another. Ten of these interpretative measures (rows 
20-29) are designed to focus on the labor force pathologies which cause 
hardship. Eight of the interpretative measures (rows 30-37) focus on the 
interrelationships between hardship and family composition. Seven of the 
interpretative measures (rows 38-44) focus on the impacts of cash and 
in-kind transfers in mitigating hardship.
Each measure is divided into components based on the pattern of work 
force experience of the individuals who are counted by the measure, i.e, 
whether they were employed full-time, part-time, intermittently, or not at 
all, during their period of participation (as indicated in columns 1 
through 12). There is separate categorization of persons not in the work 
force according to their age and armed forces status (columns 13 through 
17).
This matrix of hardship measures is calculated under nine different 
combinations of hardship severity and duration of work force participation: 
(1) using the severe hardship standards and counting all work force par 
ticipants; (2) using severe hardship standards and counting only those 
participants in the work force half year or more; (3) using severe hardship 
standards and counting only full-year work force participants; (4) using 
intermediate hardship standards and including all work force participants;
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trying 10 find a |Ob or on layoff?
Yes ? -j No v (SJtlftoU)
31 How many different weeks was ,j o 
looking for work or on ayoH from a too? r j
a -
3 3
| Was he'ihe I Una lat mull ~Ya ~ rcgry H nttnvd) 
1 in or Disabled and unable to work . i
j T«k ing care of homeor family 1 
Going to Kflool ', ( 
Could not find work { ' 
Retired ) 
Ouing something else 
In Arnwo Forces (S*tp to 46)
33 During I960 in how many weeks did • -j 
; work even for a few houn? r 
• incn.de paid vjcmon and uck leave 
1 aswork
and Ga nUt
34 INTERVIEWER CHECK ITEM ,_„ (Mp ,o X) 
Number of week, ,o,, em 33 o M"51 <****>
| 35 OK) lose any full weeks V es / 
; of work in 1980 because he/the was fS*/p ro 391 
on layoff from a POO or lost a 100? lsto
' 36 You said worked about o ^, 
frnr/y fti iron JJy weeks « 1980. • 
1 How many of the remaining •• ?
weeks wes looking for work 
or on layoff from a job' > ^
• j andu»)l> 
1 No.* fStv <o Ml
weeks wes looking 'or work 
(or on liyofr) all m one stretch? 
Yet - 1 stretch 1 i 
No - 2 stretches O tGoaU) 
No -3+ stretches O 1
(If 0* norm In Hum 33 and 3f. add m 
S3 waeAs. ilap to lum 39 If not. m* 31)
ol the remeewig weeks in 19807
(Rod Hit untt "Yo " rtpiy 6 racenetfj
III or disabled BB 
and uiabk) to work , ™ 
Taking care of 
home or family ?
Going to school C 
In Armed Forces. O 
Retired '^ 
Oomg something else O
(Go to nm 39)
39. For how many employers did work 
in 1980? If more than one at same 
time, only count it as one employer
40 Did look for work biimen (Oka 
Yes J No O ™
41. in the weeks o 0 
the! worked. j ; 
now many hour* ^ ^ 
<M . lOuaMy 3 3
work per week? a,. ^
> t<
Numoer o' ho»-l in itwr- 4 1 s 
1 -34 (SIHP to 44) 
35* IAi* 43)
43 OK) work less than 35 houn for 
at least one week m 1980' 
E«C' joe time o'f with pay because 
o' I- jliajys vacation 4*yi o'f 
or uck ness. 
Yes (Att 44) ._ 
Ni> (S*& ro 461 ™
44 How many weeks , 
did work lets ^ 
than 3S hours in < 
19807 ^ j
45 What was the main reason worked 
less than 35 houn per week? 
Could vry 'md cert time |Ob
Wanted to work cart nme 
or could work only oart lime




48 Whet was... 'slonoMtKib In 19807 f !) O
Same aj item 23 or Armed Form O rJ»*(o«aU J ^
9f 19ffJ Different from a. a. 
item 23 or itam 23 blank.. . O (Satafym U - 
1JA-47E) S ' ̂
47 A. For whom did ww*? » ? V
478 WtetkMolbueaneaioriiicHietnriethW y 
Kit.
47C What klod of work wes...do«o?
470 What were 's matt important ectMttietor duuetf
Ptrvaa.... P O j 
Local Coy'1 ..U O '
48A. How much did. eat 
this employer before < 
durkxj 19807 




I Yej... .. . 1 O M**eaV4j
(Atft lnc.\
n from O O "21 O 0 
MuttaJOi I I I I I
z z z z z
ings from thai 33 333 
•"•"• 1-1- *1- 1- 
35 333 
•a. G G G G G
P ii ass
48C. Does true amount include all tips, bonuses. Buenliiie pay _ 
or eommlesiona may have nrehiwj? Ball 
Yes O No "/ IPnotmlin*^tamaiontto4IA)
49A.DKJ. . earn money from ny other work he^rie did dunng 1980?
Yes , No . (SUpmSOA)
498 How much did Mi 
All other employers? ; Hi
Y-3 1 NO . ! Y
'* 1 '
< 3 .
l/her own business Mrs/her farm 
v expenses? after expenses? 
» No : Yes <~ No v
$ ' i $ I
• > O J " - '.i ' C " o
' : : : i i : . • :
. > -v o - •- c c, <:_, 
Lost money C Lost money
SOA INTERVIEWER CHECK ITEM Longest job (turn 46) A farmer' 
Yes ' -j No •') lit ip n SI A)
SOB Other than the farm income we have already talked about, 
did receive any income from •joculnjral work done for other*, 
recreational tervioss. or government farm programs other than loam)
Yes > (Proof and main No C (At» SI A) 
comtuora to4tAot 498)
51A During 19800(0 receive any unemployment compensation 
from the State or local government?
Yei ; — 7 No (Stiff 10 S2A) •• 
/ (Y_ 
Any Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) ' \
Any Union unemptoyrnent or stnka benefit!? 
1 No '
DUSTRV OCCUPATION
A o 0 o o r* o
BO 1 ! I P 0 
CO Z ? Z Q ^ 
DO 3 3 3 B i> 
EG 1- t- "t- S O 
«0 eaj 555TO 
GO ™ 6 6 G U o 
7 H O ? ? V O
f j o 8 a v»
•5 K j 99 X C 
- L 0 , Y 0
° M 0 M- '•" 2 0
518. How much did. . leuilne
during 19807 0 o a o o
II III
$ a a a <_• c-
"»• "t- t "h + 
53 553 
• G G G G G 
t "2 7 ? ? 
88 338 
99 999
SZA. rxrtra) 1980 del ... racen* any 
Worker^ Comperue Hun peyments 
or other petmeiiu ae a retutt of e 
Ida related Injury or iHnees? 
/£ «*e» auk pay an* ofeaMMy
Yea O -7 No O <S**>
SM. What wea the source of these
State Worker* Comperaenon 
Employer or employer s insurance O 
Own insurance . J 
Other . .. .. .. C
unnpanaauon ^ T 1:7 
did receive <j 3 Z ? ± 
dunng 19807 -33 33?
S 1 "* 
| G G G .> '-
? ? .' 7
• o ; ; r, -
53 Was living m this house 1 veer 
ago that M. on March 1, 1980?
Yes (S»ip No -7 
to Si) /
54 Where did . live on March 1, 1980? 
A Name of State, foreign country, 
U-S. powaeuon. etc. —j
B Name o« county — y
D Did live msioe the limits of 
that city. town, vtltaral. etc.) 
Yes C No O
55 In March 1980. what wes . '• 
mam activity? (FUI oat link)
a On active duty 
in the Armed Forces? O 
b Working at 
siobor txmneas? 1 
c Attending college? 
d. Something ilse? . . }
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Table A-l. (Continued)
COMPLETE LlUt NL'uaCK FOK ALL PERSONS /«» BEFORE BEGINNING QUESTIONS ON EACH PAGE (NAME IS OPTIONAL)
NAME lOpttoml)
LINE NUM8CR C/ram I
56 DURING 1980 010 ANYONE IN THIS HOUSEHOLD RECEIVE 
M>A Any Social Secunty payment] from the U S Government? 
Yes -7 No ; ISHpioSJA)
568 Who received Social Security paymenu either tar them»elve« 
or • combined payments with other firmly memben? Yei
ComelHtSfCiifDreracltfmaa wid» t'Yt>-tit StS
S6C In how many monthi of 1960 #d receive 
Social Security peymena?
O I
O I c. 3
580 Ho« much did receive « Social Security payment*
during I98W * 
fjfptnu tout
Already 
NOTE Social Secunty checks are green-colored check* included
INTENVIEWER CHECK ITEM
Cnildren urxMr 23 present - (Ai» f6F/ 
No children under 23 O'Mem - (Stop to 57)
56F OK> anyone m trui ncueihold receive any upante
Social Secunty payment! which we have not talked about 
for \r* children « ihn houwnold>
Y« No •
(If "Yo," mom ntaaory ihtnga to ifxhjdt r/i/i amount 
! in 56O for otnon rtctivtng)
17 DURING 1980 UIO ANYONE IN THIS HC ..SEHOLD RECEIVE 
I 57A Any SSl payments that a. Supplemental Security Income?
Yn 7 No (Go to nr*l oaf)
( 578 Who received SSl? tAnyor* tttt'l
I ..................................... r
I (CompltH SJCIcn toth ptnaa w,lti ~Yn '«. 57* '
| 57C Hov much did receive m Supplemental Security Income 
dunng I960? llnduOt oolti Ftdtral jnj Stair Ml I
NOTE SSl cnecki from the U S Gov«rnmeni
are pale oaW <n color The color of tu» cOecKt
(Go 10 fTC far ntit ptnon w,i* ~Yn~a< 57* or go to ntil pagi/
333
. + •> 
5 * •
I Annual Tout • Int check « M 25 Medicare Deduction $9/monih
Paoj?
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Baseline Measures -- Individual Earnings Adequacy
1. Work Experience (all persons 16 and over)
2. Inadequate Individual Earnings (subset of work force 
who earned less than minimum wage standard times 
hours of availability for work)
3. HE Incidence (proportion individuals in each work 
force experience category who had Inadequate 
Individual Earnings)
4. I IE Distribution (persons with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings in each work force status category divided 
by total work force with Inadequate Individual Earnings)
5. [IE Total Deficit (minimum wage standard times hours of 
availability minus actual earnings for all persons with 
Inadequate Individual Earnings)
6. HE Average Deficit (total HE Deficit divided by 
number with Inadequate Individual Earnings)
7. IIE Deficit Distribution (share of total deficit for 
individuals in different work force experience category)
Baseline Measures — Family Earnings Adequacy
8. Inadequate Family Earnings (persons In families whose 
total earnings were below family income standard)
9. IFE Incidence (proportion Individuals in each work force 
experience category who were in families with inadequate 
earnings)
10. IFE Distribution (persons in each work force experience 
category who were in families with inadequate earnings 
divided by total with Inadequate Family Earnings)
11. IFE Total Deficit (aggregate of income standards for 
al 1 faml ies with inadequate earnings minus their 
aggregated earnings)
12. IFE Average Deficit (IFE Total Deficit divided by number 
in IFE)
13. IFE Deficit Distribution (share of IFE Total Deficit 
accounted for by family members in different work force 
experience categories)
Baseline Measures -- Family Income Adequacy
14. Inadequate Family Income (persons in families whose 
total income was below family income standard)
15. IFI Incidence (proportion individuals in each work force 
experience category who were in families with inadequate 
income)
16. IFI Distribution (persons in each work force experience 
category who were in families with inadequate income 
divided by total with Inadequate Family Income)
17. IFI Total Deficit (aggregate of income standards for
aTTfanilies with inadequate income minus their aggregated 
earnings)
18. IFI Average Deficit (IFI Total Deficit divided by number 
in IFI)
19. :FI Deficit Distribution (share of IFI Total Deficit 




Interpretative Measures — Labor Force Pathology
20. Full Employment IFE (IFE if every individual were 
employed at minimum wage standard for all hours of 
availability not employed)
21. Full Employment IFE Deficit (IFE Deficit if every 
individual were employed at minimum wage standard 
for all hours of availability not employed)
22. Adequate Employment IFE (IFE if every individual
were employed at least at minimum wage standard for 
all hours of availability)
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit (IFE Deficit if 
every individual were employed at minimum wage 
standard for all hours of availability)
24. Capacity Employment IFE (IFE if every individual
earned as much for hours of availability not worked 
as during each of those worked)
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit (IFE Deficit If each 
individual earned as much for hours of availability 
not worked as during each of those worked)
26. Enhanced Earnings IFE (IFE if each individual's earnings 
were increased by 10 percent)
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit (IFE Deficit if each 
individual's earnings were increased by 10 percent)
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE (IFE if each individual earned 
110 percent of minimum wage standard for all hours 
of availability)
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit (IFE Deficit if each
individual earned 110 percent of minimum wage standard 
for all hours of availability)
Interpretative Measures -- Family Composition
30. Marginally Augmented Full Employment IFE (IFE If
subgroup earnings increased by minimum wage standard 
for each hour of availability not employed)
31. Marginally Augmented Full Employment IFE Deficit 
(IFE Deficit if subgroup earnings increased by 
minimum wage standard for each hour of availability 
not employed)
32. Marginally Augmented Adequate Employment IFE (IFE if 
subgroup earnings increased to at least minimum wage 
standard for all hours of availability)
33. Marginally Augmented Adequate Employment IFE Deficit 
(IFE Deficit if subgroup earnings increased to minimum 
wage standard for all hours of availability)
34. Marginally Augmented Capacity Employment IFE (IFE if 
subgroup earnings were increased so earnings in each 
hour not employed sane as for hours employed)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 
(IFE Deficit if subgroup earnings increased so earnings 
in each hour not employed same as for hours employed)
36. Persons with Inadequate Individual Earnings in Families 
with Inadequate Family Earnings
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate'(proportion persons with 
IFE who were in families with adequate income)
Interpretative Measures -- Transfer Impacts
38. Earnings Supplementation Rate-Nontransfers
(proportion persons with IFE who were in fami1ies 
with adequate incoires net of transfers)
39. IF! Net-of-Transfers (IFI when cash transfers 
subtracted from income)
40. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit (IFI Deficit when cash 
transfers subtracted from income)
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (IFI when value of food 
stamps added to cash income)
42. IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit (IFI Deficit when 
value of food stamps added to casn income)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (IFI when value of food 
stamps, housing subsidies and school lunches added 
to cjsh income)
44. I c l Including In-Kind Aid Deficit (IFI Deficit when 
value of food stanps, housing subsidies and school 
lunches added to cash income)
293
(5) using intermediate hardship standards and counting only those partici 
pants in the work force a half year or more; (6) using intermediate hard 
ship standards and counting full-year work force participants; (7) using 
moderate hardship standards and counting all work force participants; (8) 
using moderate hardship standards and counting only those participants in 
the work force half year or more; and (9) using moderate hardship standards 
and counting just the full-year work force participants. The severe, 
intermediate, and moderate hardship standards for the measures of in 
dividual earnings adequacy are 100, 125, and 150 percent of the average 
real minimum wage for the 1967-1980 period, adjusted each year by the CPI 
less housing costs. The respective standards for the family earnings and 
income measures are 100, 125, and 150 percent of the poverty level for each 
family. Half-year participation is defined as 27 weeks or more and full- 
year participation as 50 weeks or more.
For each of the nine combinations of hardship severity and duration of 
work force participation, the hardship data matrix is calculated for all 
individuals, as well as selected subgroups. The disaggregations, selected 




3. East North Central
4. West North Central
5. South Atlantic
6. East South Central





a. SMSA 1 million or more
(1) Central city
(2) Balance of SMSA
b. SMSA under 1 million
(1) Central city
(2) Balance of SMSA
2. Outside SMSA 
a. Farm
294
State of residence (selected from those with adequate CPS sample 






Family size and earners
1. One person in work force
a. 1 person in family
b. 2 persons in family
c. 3 persons in family
d. 4-5 persons in family
e. 6+ persons in family
2. Two persons in work force
a. 2 persons in family
b. 3 persons in family
c. 4-5 persons in family
d. 6+ persons in family
3. Three or more persons in work force
a. 3 persons in family
b. 4-5 persons in family




3. Hispanic (includes blacks and whites, as well as those 
identified neither as blacks or whites)
Sex of individual and family relationship
1. Male family head
a. Wife in work force
b. Wife not in work force
c. Wife not present
2. Male unrelated individual
3. Female family head
4. Wife






2. 16-19 student as major activity in survey week
3. 20-24 total





1. High school student (primary activity in survey week)
2. Post-secondary student (primary activity in survey week)
3. High school dropout
4. Out-of-school high school graduate with no further education
5. Out-of-school high school graduate with 1-3 years of college
6. Out-of-school high school graduate with 4 or more years of 
	college
Occupation of longest job in last year
1. None reported
2. White collar









Individual earnings deficit (minimum wage or multiple times hours 
































Appendix B provides detailed hardship data for 1979, but only a sub- 
part of the full data matrix available with each disaggregation are pre 
sented. As an example of the comprehensive information which has been 
computed from the March CPS tapes covering 1974 through 1980, the inter 
mediate hardship matrix is presented for female family heads in the work 
force full-year (Table A-3). To illustrate the interpretation of this 
matrix, there were 9,009,000 female family heads in March 1979 (Row 1, 
Column 17) of whom 4,267,000 participated 50 weeks or more in the work 
force (Row 1, Column 1). Among these full-year participants, 649,000 
experienced at least a week of unemployment (Row 1, Column 6 plus Column 
10). Among all female family heads participating full-year, 34.5 percent 
had earnings less than 125 percent of the minimum wage for their hours of 
availability (Row 3, Column 1); of these individuals 37.0 percent were 
employed full-time, full-year (Row 4, Column 2). There were 1,140,000 
female family heads in the work force full-year whose family earnings were 
below 125 percent of the poverty level (Row 8, Column 1) and a total of 
3,771,000 other female family heads in the work force less than full-year 
or not at all who had family earnings less than 125 percent of the poverty 
level (Row 8, Column 13). A total of 3,485,000 female family heads lived 
in near poverty (Row 14, Column 14), although the number would be reduced 
to 3,202,000 if the value of food stamps, school lunches and housing were 
added to cash income (Row 43, Column 17). Among the near poor, 772,000 
were full-year work force participants (Row 14, Column 1). If all full- 
year participants in the work force had their earnings increased to 125 
percent of the minimum wage for all hours of availability, the number of 
female family heads with family earnings less than 125 percent of poverty 
would have dropped from 1,140,000 (Row 8, Column 1) to 618,000 (Row 22, 
Column 1). If the earnings of only female family heads in the work force 
full-year were increased to 125 percent of the minimum wage level for all































































































IFI incUJInj Food Sta-ps
IFI Including Food Stamps
Ceflcit






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hours of availability, the 8,088,000 IFE total for all full-year work force 
participants in 1979 would have been reduced to 7,575,000 (Row 23, Column
1).
There are a number of assumptions which must be made, given limita 
tions in the information available from the March Current Population Survey 
questionnaire, in order to derive the hardship measures for individuals 
with differing work experience patterns. The detailed definitions and 
calculation procedures for each measure in the hardship data matrix are 
contained in Table A-4. Because the concepts behind each measure are 
consistent, but must be derived separately depending on an individual's 
work experience pattern, Table A-4 presents definitions for all measures 
(Rows 1-44) for each separate work experience pattern category. For 
instance, all 44 measures are first defined for persons working full-time 
all weeks in the work force. They are next defined for persons working 
part-time voluntarily some or all weeks in the work force, and so forth for 
the other categories. The hardship counts for the total work force are 
defined as the sum of these separately calculated elements. Column 1, 
Total Work Force, is thus excluded from the definitional table because it 
represents the sum of Columns 2 through 12. Column 2, Employed Part-Time, 
is excluded since this is simply the sum of Columns 4 and 5, Employed 
Part-Tme Voluntarily and Involuntarily. Likewise, Column 10, Not Employed, 
is excluded, since it is the sum of Column 11, Discouraged, and Column 12, 
Unemployed. Columns 7, 8 and 9 are also excluded, since they are sub- 
classifications of, and calculated in the same way as Column 6, Inter 
mittently Employed, simply classifying each individual according to whether 
they were unemployed less than a third of their weeks in the work force 
(Column 7, Mostly Employed), over two-thirds of their weeks in the work 
force (Column 9, Mostly Unemployed) or had intermediate unemployment 
(Column 8, Mixed). Finally Columns 14 through 17 are excluded. Column 14, 
Armed Forces, Column 15, Persons Age 0-15, and Column 16, Persons Age 16 
and Over are subclassifications of Column 13, while Column 17 is the sum of 
Columns 1 and 13. Columns 13 through 17 are only calculated for Rows 1-3, 
8, 9, 14, 15, 39, 41 and 43. It might be noted that when the hardship 
measures are restricted to full-year or to half-year participants, the 
less-than-full-year or less-than-half-year- participants are then added to 
the out-of-the-work-force categories.
A key step in the derivation of these definitions is the calculation 
of an "individual earnings standard" for every work force participant using 
questions about weeks of participation, usual weekly hours, and the number 
of weeks when the individual worked more or worked less than usual hours, 
in order to estimate hours of availability for work during the year and the 
earnings that would have been provided at a minimum wage hourly rate or its 
multiple. The HE compares actual earnings for each work force participant 
to this individual earnings standard. Where actual earnings are below this 
standard, the I IE Deficit is the difference between them. The Adequate 
Employment IFE augments the earnings of each individual in the IFE up to 
the "individual earnings standard" if their earnings are below this level.
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Table A-4. DETAILED DEFINITIONS OF HARDSHIP MEASURES
(2). Erployed Full-Time
1. «ori Force Experience
I. tn.»j«si.4t* Individual Earnings (HE)
3. IIE Incidence
4. II- Distribution
5. tl£ Taul :«f1c1t
6. IIE A.er^e S*fidt
7. HE C«fic1t Distribution
3. '.ni-*m;t Family Earnings (IFE)
9. IFE Inciaence
U\ I.: E OistriDution
II. IFE Toul Deficit
12. IFE A«er*;e Deficit
11. IFE Deficit Distribution
14. :ni4*ja*tt Faaily tncone (IFI)
15. IFI Incidence
Is. I r l Distribution
17. :F1 Total D«fic1t
13. tFI Average Deficit
lj. !F! Deficit Distribution
1(2) • Employed all weeks In labor force with no weeks of lest 
than 35 hours employment
2(2) • 1(2) minus persons with annual earnings above an Individual 
earnings standard equal to product of weeks In labor force times 
minimal hourly Mage or multiple times hours usually worked per week
3(2) • 100 ttoes 2(2) « 1(2) 
4(2) • 100 tines 2(2) « 2(1)
5(2) • SUB of differences between annual earnings of persons In 




100 tines 5(2) * 5(1)
:i. F.ll Eaolo/»*nt IFE Deficit
8(2) - 1(2) minus persons In. fanllles with SUM of annual earnings 
of all menoers above poverty threshold or nultlple
9(2) • 100 times 8(2) » 1(2) 
10(2) • 100 times 8(2) « 8(1)
11(2) • For unrelated Individuals and persons In 8(2) who are sole 
work force participants In families, sun of differences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or multiple. For 
persons in families with two or more adjusted work force participant! 
and wnose coramed IIE Deficit Is equal to or greater than dif 
ference between poverty standard and aggregate family earnings, sun 
of differences between appropriate poverty standard or multiple and 
aggregate fa--vly earnings, times share of combined family IIE 
Deficit accounted for by persons In 8(2). For persons in families 
with two or nore adjusted work force participants and whose family 
[IE Deficit is less than difference between poverty standard and 
d9gregate family earnings, sum of IIE Deficits for family members 
in 8(2) plus these members' share of combined Individual earnings 
standards (or earnings if higher) for family members times the 
difference between the poverty standard or multiple ninus aggregate 
fjmlly earnings, and the combined family IIE Deficit
12(2) • 11(2) . 8(2)
13(2) • 100 times 11(2) « 11(1)
14(2) • 8(2) Blnus persons in families with total Income above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(2) • 100 times 14(2) • 1(2) 
16(2) • 100 times 14(2) « 14(1)
17(2) • For unrelated Individuals and persons In 14(2) who art 
sole work force participants In fanllles, sun of differences 
between fa-ally Income and poverty standard or multiple. For 
persons in fjmlies with two or more persons In adjusted work force 
and whose combined IIE Deficit Is equal to or greater than dif 
ference between poverty standard and fanily Income, sun of dif 
ferences bet.een appropriate poverty standard or multiple and 
aggregate family income, times share of combined family IIE Deficit 
accounted fcr by persons in 14(2). For persons In families with 
two or nore persons In adjusted work force and where combined 
family HE Deficit is less than difference between poverty standard 
and family Income, sum of IIE Deficit for family members In 14(2) 
plus these <r«ob«rs' share of combined Individual earnings standards 
(or earnings if higher) for family members times the difference 
between tne poverty standard or multiple minus family income, and 
the coutlined family IIE Deficit
18(2) • 17(2) « 14(2)
19(2) - 100 tines 17(2) • 17(1)
20(2) • 8(2) »1nus persons In families with augmented earnings of 
all faally mercers in 1(1) plus actual earnings of faally members 
not in 1(1) greater than poverty threshold (augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(2) are same as actual earnings)
21(2) • Calculated similar to 11(2) for persons In 20(2) with sun 
of augmented and actual earnings of family members as specified in 




22. Ad*qu«tt Employment IFE
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit 
Cap4c1(y Employment IFE 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 
Eniunced Earnings IFE 
financed Earnings IFE Deficit 
Enhanced Capacity IFE 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
farqinally Augmented Full 
E=3lo/meni I e c (calculated only 
far sex. fiat I/ relationship and
'torginally Augmented Full 
£jpto/-*n: IFE Deficit (calculated 
en'/ for sex/'aaily relationship 
arc i;e disac,;regattons)
t*rginall/ Aw.yaented Adequate 
L~.:\sj~^m IFE (calculated only 
fcr sii/fistl/ relationsnip and
33. A^jaented Adequate 
E.-:"a/s«nt IF- C«fictt (calculated 
in'/ fo- s«», fawily relationship 
ari a;« disis^re-jationl)
".an'"*'!/ Au^aented Capacity 
Ifplj^nent IFt (calculated only
*jr s«*.'faail/ relationship and 
a;* <:• itinerations)
"irsinall/ A.jnented Capacity 
Er?la.,-eni '.'I Deficit (calculated 
cn;> far se» family relationship
*~J aj« disaj;re<;ations)
'erscns »un Earnings Deficits in 




! r l \«t-of -Transfer*
IFI Vt-of-Trantfers Deficit
I C I Including Food Stamps (calculated
only for 1379 and 1S30)
IF! Including Food Stamp* Deficit 
only for 1979 and I960)
IF! Incl-ding In-Kind Aid (calculated
cn'y far '.479 and 1980)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
^calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
22(2) • Calculated similar to 20(2) with augmented earnings for 
persons in 8(2) equal to Individual earnings standard as specified 
In 2(2) or actual earnings, whichever is larger
23(2) - Calculated slallar to 21(2) with augmented earnings as 
specified in 22(2) through 22(12)
24(2) • Ulculated slallar to 20(2) wtth augnented earnings for 
persons In 8(2) equal to actual earnings
25(2) • Calculated similar to 21(2) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
26(2) • Calculated slallar to 20(2) with augnented earnings for 
persons in 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(2) • Calculated similar to 20(2) with augovnted earnings as 
specified in 26(2)
28(2) • Calculated similar to 20(2) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
29(2) • Calculated similar to 21(2) wtth earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
30(2) • 8(2) minus persons in families with augmented earnings of 
all family nerabers In 1(1} as disaggregated plus actual earnings of 
family members not in 1(1) as disaggregated greater than poverty 
threshold (augmented earnings for disaggregated subgroup oenbers in 
8(2) are same as actual earnings)
31(2) • Calculated similar to 11(2) with sum of augnented and 
actual earnings of family members as specified In 30(2) through 
30(12) instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard 
or multiple
itngs
32(2) • Calculated similar to 30(2) wtth augmented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(1) equal to Individual earn! 
standards as specified in 2(2) through 2(12) or actual earnings, 
whichever are larger
33(2) - Calculated similar to 21(2) wtth augnented earnings as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(2) • Calculated similar to 30(2) wtth augmented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(2) equal to actual earnings, 
and augmented earnings of other disaggregated subgroup members in 
8(1) as specified In 8(3) through 8(12)
35(2) • Calculated similar to 31(2) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(2) • 8(2) minus persons not included In 2(2)
37(2) - [1 - 14(2)/8(2)] times 100 
38(2) • [1 - 39(2)/8(2)] tines 100
39(2) • 8(2) minus persons In families wtth Income excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or multiple
40(2) • Calculated similar to 17(2) except using family Income 
excluding cash transfers
41(2) • 8(2) minus persons in families with cash Income plus value 
of food stamps above poverty standard or multiple
42(2) • Calculated similar to 17(2) except using family cash income 
plus food stamp value
43(2) • 8(2) minus persons in families wtth cash Income plus value 
of food stamps received plus number of family raenbers receiving 
free or reduced price lunches times .044 poverty threshold for 
family, and, if resident of subsidized housing, plus 40 percent of 
cash Income If cash income less than $3000; 25 percent If 13000- 
$6399; 10 percent If J7000-J9999; and S percent If S10.000 or more, 
Is above poverty standard or multiple
44(2) • Calculated similar to 17(2) except using cash and Including 
Income for family as specified in 43(2)
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(4). Employed Part-Time Voluntarily
!. Work Force Experience



















21. Full Employment IFE Deficit
22. Adequate Employment IFE
1(4} • Harked throughout period of labor force participation; son* 
weeks less than 35 hours; main reason was that wanted to work part- 
time, could only work part-time or other
2(4) • 1(4) minus persons earning more than an individual earnings 
standard equal to hours usually worked tines Nlnlaun wage or multi 
ple times weeks In labor force If usual hours less than 35 unless 
weeks worked less than 35 are less than weeks worked it which case 
40 hours are ascribed to the weeks worked more than part-time; if 
usual hours more than 35 but some weeks voluntarily less than 35. 
these weeks are ascribed 20 hours while others are ascribed usual 
hours
3(4) • 100 times 2(4) « 1(4) 
4(4) - 100 times 2(4) * 2(1)
5(4) • Sum of differences between annual earnings of oersons in 
2(4) and Individual earnings standards as specified In 2(4)
6(4) • 5(4) « 2(4)
7(4) • 100 times 5(4) « 5(1)
8{4) • 1(4) minus persons 1n families with sun of annual earnings 
of all members above poverty threshold or multiple
9(4) • 100 times 8(4) « 1(4) 
10(4) • 100 times 8(4) « 8(1)
11(4) • For unrelated individuals and persons 1n 8(4) w^o are sole 
work force participants In families, sun of dlf'erences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or multiple. For 
persons In families with two or more adjusted wort: forte participants 
and whose combined I IE Deficit It equal to or greater tk an dif 
ference between poverty standard and aggregate fanily ea-nHjs. sun 
of differences between appropriate poverty standard or mjlt'cle and 
aggregate family earnings, times share of ccwbiied fanily HE 
Deficit accounted for by persons in 8(4). For persons i- fanlHes 
with two or more adjusted «ork force participants ani w*>;se *8"vly 
HE Deficit Is less than difference between poverty standard »ii 
aggregate family earnings. Sum of HE Deficits for fanily menfcers 
in 8(4) plus these members' share of combined Individual earr.-ngs 
standards (or earnings 1f higher) for fanlly "wrfcers times the 
difference between the poverty standard or multiple minus aggregate 
family earnings, and the combined family HE Deficit
12(4) - 11(4) » 8(4)
13(4) - 100 times 11(4) » 11(1}
14(4) • 8(4) minus persons In families with total Income above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(4) • 100 times 14(4) » 1(4) 
16(4) • 100 times 14(4) . 14(1)
17(4) • For unrelated individuals and persons In 14Ca) who are 
sole work force participants in families, sun of difference* 
between family Incone and poverty standard or multiple. Far 
persons in families with two or more persons 1n adjusted work «orce 
and whose combined HE Deficit is equal to or greater that d'f- 
ference between poverty standard and family income, sir of dif 
ferences between appropriate poverty standard cr- multio'e ani 
aggregate family Income, times share of combined family HE deficit 
accounted for by persons in 14(4). For persons In fanllies with 
two or rore persons in adjusted work forte and where combined 
faaily HE Deficit 1» less than difference between poverty standard 
and family Income, sum of HE Deficit for 'anily nembers 1n 14(a) 
plus these members' share of combined individual earnings standards 
(or earnings if higher) for family members times the di'fereice 
between the poverty standard or multiple minus fanily Income, and 
the combined fanily HE Deficit
18(4) • 17(4) « 14(4)
19(4) • 100 times 17(4) « 17(1)
20(4) • 8(4) minus persons In families with augmented earnings 
of all family members 1n 1(1) plus actual earnings of faitlly 
members not in 1(1) greater than poverty threshold (augmented 
earnings for persons in 8(4) equal actual earnings)
21(4) * Calculated similar to H(4) with sum of augmented and
actual earnings of family members as specified in 20[2] frouah 20(12)
Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or multiple
22(4) • Calculated similar to 20(4) with augmented earnings of all 




23. Adequate Employment Iff. Deficit
24. Capacity Employment IFE
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
26. Enhanced Earnings IFE
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
30. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for lex/family relationship and 
age d(saggregatlons)
31. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregattons)
32. Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
33. Marginally Augmented Adequate
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
34. Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Enploynent IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/faally relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
36. Persons with Earnings Deficits In 
Families with Earnings Deficits
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate
38. Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI Net-of-Transfers
40. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
44. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
23(4) • Calculated similar to 21(4) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 22(2) through 22(13)
24(4) • Calculated similar to 20(4) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(4) same as actual earnings
25(4) - Calculated similar to 21(4) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
26(4) • Calculated sisllar to 20(4) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(4) • Calculated similar to 21(4) with augmented earnings for 
all persons 1n 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
28(4) • Calculated similar to 20(4) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
29(4) • Calculated slnllar to 21(4) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
30(4) • 8(4) minus persons 1n families with augmented eam'njs of 
all family members In 1(1) as disaggregated plus actual earnings of 
family members not in 1(1) as disaggregated greater fun poverty 
threshold (augmented earnings for disaggregated subgroup nenber* In 
8(4) equal actual earnings)
31(4) • Calculated slnllar to 11(4) with sun of augrcnted and actual 
earnings of family members as specified In 30(2) tnrsggh 30(12) 
Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or multiple
32(4) - Calculated similar to 30(4) with augmented earnings of all 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(4) equal to Individual earnings 
standard as specified 1n 2(4)
33(4) - Calculated similar to 31(4) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(4) • Calculated similar to 30(4) with augmented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(4) same as actual earnings
35(4) - Calculated similar to 31(4) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(4) - 8(4) minus persons not Included 1n 2(4)
37(4) • [1 - 14(4)/8(4)] times 100 
38(4) - [1 - 39(4)/8(4)] times. 100
39(4) • 8(4) minus persons In families with Income excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or multiple
40(4) • Calculated similar to 17(4) except using family income 
excluding cash transfers
41(4) - 8(4) minus persons In families with cash Income plus 
value of food stamps above poverty standard or multiple
42(4) - Calculated similar to 17(4) except using family cash 
Income plus food stamp value
43(4) • 8(4) minus persons In families with cash Income supple 
mented as noted 1n 43(2) Is above poverty standard or multiple
44(4) - Calculated similar to 17(4) except using cash and Including 
Income for family as specified 1n 43(2)
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(5). Employed Part-Time InvoluntaH ly
1. Work Force Experience










IFE Average Deficit 
IFE Deficit Distribution 







21. Full Employment IFE Deficit
1(5) > Worked throughout period of labor force participation; some 
or all weeks less than 35 hours; main reason for reduced hours Mas 
that could only find part-tint jobs, slack work or materials 
shortage
2(5) • 1(5) minus persons earning more than an Individual earnings 
standard equal to 40 times minimum wage or multiple tines weeks in 
labor force If usually worked less than 35; although add 40 tines 
weeks Involuntary part-time to usual hours times weeks full-time
3(5) • 100 times 2(5) » 1(5) 
4(5) - 100 times 2(5) « 2(1)
5(5) • Sun of differences between annual earnings of persons 1n 
2(5) and Individual earnings standards as specified 1n 2(5)
6(5) • 5(5) « 2(5)
7(5) • 100 times 5(5) « 5(1)
8(5) • 1(5) minus persons In families with sum of annual earning* 
of all members above poverty threshold or multiple
9(5) - 100 tines 8(5) » 1(5) 
10(5) • 100 times 8(5) • 8(1)
11(5) • For unrelated Individuals and person In 8(5} who are sole 
work force participants in families, sun of differences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or wjltlple. For 
persons <n families with two or more adjusted work force part'c*3*iti 
and whose combined HE Deficit Is eoual to or greater than d'f- 
ference between poverty standard and aggregate fanlly eamlrgs, tj» 
of differences between appropriate poverty standard or nultlple and 
aggregate family earnings, times share of combined family lit 
Deficit accounted for by persons In 8(5). For persons in 'anll'es 
with two or more adjusted work force participants and whose fa.i*ljr 
HE Deficit Is less than difference between poverty standard and 
aggregate family earnings, sun of HE >flc1ts for family ne~sers 
In 8(5) plus these members' share of combined Individual earnings 
standards (or earnings If higher) for fanlly members times the 
difference between the poverty standard or multiple minus aggregate 
family earnings, and the combined family HE Deficit
12(5) - 11(5) , 8(5)
13(5) • 100 times 11(5) » 11(1)
14(5) • 8(5) minus persons 1n families with total Income above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(5) • 100 times 14(5) » 1(5) 
16(5) • 100 times 14(5) « 14(1)
17(5) • For unrelated Individuals and aersons In 14(5) who are 
sole work force participants *n families, sun of differences 
between family Income and poverty standard or multiple. ror 
persons In families with two or more persons In adjusted work farce 
and whose combined HE Deficit Is equal to or greate* thai d'f- 
ference between poverty standard and family Income. Sirs cf d'f- 
ferences between appropriate poverty standard or multiple and 
aggregate family Income, times share of comb-ned family HE Deficit 
accounted for by persons In 14(5). For persons In families »1th 
two or more persons In adjusted work force and where confined 
family HE Deficit 1s less than difference between poverty s:a-iard 
and family Income, sum of HE Oeflcit for fanlly nembers 1n 14,5) 
plus these members' share of combined Individual earnings standards 
(or earnings If higher) for family nenbers times the dlf'erence 
between the poverty standard or multiple minus family incone. and 
the combined family HE Deficit
18(5) • 17(5) « 14(5)
19(5) • 100 times 17(5) • 17(1)
20(5) • 8(5) minus persons (n families with augmented earnings of 
all family menbers <n 1(1) plus actual earnings of family merOers 
not 1n 1(1) greater than poverty threshold (augmented earnings 'or 
persons In 8(5) equal earnings plus minlrwi wage or multiple tines 
40 minus usual hours tines weeks worked less than 35 Involuntarily 
where usual less than 35 or plus minimum wage or multiple times 
usual hours minus 20 times weeks worked less than 35 Involuntarily 
where usual hours more than 35)
21(5) • Calculate^ similar to 11(5) for persons 1n 20(5) with sum 
of augmented and actual earnings of family members as specified fn 




22. Adequate Employment IFE
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
24. Capacity Employment IFE
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
26. Enhanced Earnings IFE
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
30. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregations)
31. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/faaily relationship 
and age dlsaggregations)
32. Marginally Augnented Adequate 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
33. Marginally Augnented Adequate
Enploynent IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregations)
34. Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregations)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/fanlly relationship 
and age dtsaggregatlons)
36. Persons with Earnings Deficits In 
Faallles with Earnings Deficits
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate
38. Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI Net-of-Transfers
40. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1930)
44. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
22(5) • Calculated similar to 20(5) with augmented earnings of all 
family members In 8(5) equal to Individual earnings standard as 
specified 1n 2(5)
23(5) • Calculated similar to 21(5) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 22(2) through 22(12)
24(5) • Calculated similar to 20(5) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(5) 1f usual hours less than 35 and no weeks greater 
than 35, 40 times annual earnings » usual Meekly hours; If usual 
less than 35 and some weeks greater than 35, usual hours times 
annual earnings times weeks worked * [usual hours times weeks part- 
time plus 40 times weeks full-time]; Is usual hours 35 or more. 
usual hours times annual earnings times weeks worked » [40 times 
weeks full-time plus 20 times weeks part-tine]
25(5) • Calculated similar to 21(5) with augmented earnings as 
specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
26(5) * Calculated similar to 20(5) with augnented earnings for all 
persons 1n 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(5) • Calculated similar to 21(5) with augmented earnings for all 
persons In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
28(5) • Calculated similar to 20(5) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
29(5) • Calculated similar to 21(5) wtth earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
30(5) • 8(5) minus persons In families with augmented earnings of 
all family members In 1(1) as disaggregated plus actual earmnjs of 
all family members not 1n 1(1) as disaggregated greater than 3o»erty 
threshold (augmented earnings for disaggregated subgrouo raenbers 1n 
8(5) equal earnings plus minimum wage or multiple times 40 ninus 
usual hours times weeks worked less than 35 where usual less than 
35 or plus minimum wage or multiple times usual hours minus 20 times 
weeks worked less than 35 where usual hours more than 35)
31(5) • Calculated similar to 11(5) with sum of augmented antf actual 
earnings of family members as specified 1n 30(2) through 30(12) 
Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or multiple
32(5) - Calculated similar to 30(5) with augmented earnings of all 
disaggregated subgroup members 1n 8(5) equal to Individual earnings 
standard as specified In 2(5)
33(5) • Calculated similar to 31(5) with augmented earning* as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(5) • Calculated similar to 30(5) with augmented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(5) If usual hours less than 35 
and no weeks greater than 35. 40 times annual earnltgs t usual weekly 
hours; If usual less than 35 and some weeks greater than 35, usual 
hours times annual earnings times weeks worked » [usual hours times 
weeks part-time plus 40 times weeks full-tl-ne]; 1f usual hours 35 
or more, usual hours times annual earnings tines weeks worked t 
[40 times weeks full-time plus 20 tines weeks part-t<me]
35(5) • Calculated similar to 31(5) with augnented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(5) - 8(5) minus persons not Included 1n 2(5)
37(5) - [1 - 14(5)/8(5)J t1«e$ 100 
38(5) • [1 • 39(5)/8(5)] tloei 100
39(5) • 8(5) minus persons In families with Income excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or multiple
40(5) - Calculated similar to 17(5) except using family Income 
excluding cash transfers
41(5) • 8(5) minus persons 1n families with cash Income plus value 
of food stamps above poverty standard or multiple
42(5) - Calculated similar to 17(5) except using family cash Income 
plus food stamp value
43(5) • 8(5) minus persons 1n families with cash Income supplemented 
as noted In 43(2) U above poverty standard or multiple
44(5) • Calculated similar to 17(5) except using cash and Including 




1. Work Force Experience
2. Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE)
3. ME Incidence
4. HE Distribution
5. ME Total Deficit
6. HE Average Deficit
7. ME Deficit Distribution
8. Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE)
9. IFE Incidence
10. IFE Distribution
11. IFE Total Deficit
12. IFE Average Deficit
13. IFE Deficit Distribution
14. Inadequate Fanlly Income (IF!)
15. IFI Incidence
16. IFI Distribution
17. IFI Total Deficit
18. IFI Average Deficit
19. IFI Deficit Distribution
20. Full Employment IFE
1(6) • Experienced weeks of both employment and unemployment while 
in the work force
2(6) • 1(6) minus persons with annual earnings In excess of an 
individual earnings standard equal to the product of weeks in labor 
force times minimum wage or owltlple times usual hours worked. 
except In case where usual hours less than 35 and main reason less 
than 35 was slack work or could only find part-time Job. In which 
case 40 hours substitutes for usual hours, and except where tome 
weeks employment were at less than 35 hours because wanted part- 
time work or could only work part-time while usual hours were above 
35 hours. In which case weeks less than 35 hours are assigned 20 
hours, other weeks evployed are assigned usual hours, and weeks un 
employed are assigned 20 or usual hours In proportion to weeks en- 
ployed part-time voluntarily to weeks employed full-time
3(6) • 100 times 2(6) t 1(6) 
4(6) - 100 times 2(6) * 2(1)
5(6) - Sun of differences between annual earnings of persons In 2(6) 
and Individual earnings standards as specified 1n 2(6)
6(6) • 5(6) » 2(6)
7(6) • 100 times 5(6) t 5(1)
8(6) • 1(6) minus persons In families with sun of annual earnings of 
all members above poverty threshold or Multiple
9(6) - 100 times 8(6) * 2(6) 
10(6) • 100 times 8(6) t 8(1)
11(6) • For unrelated Individuals and persons in 8(6) Mho are sole 
work force participants In families, sun of differences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or multiple, for 
persons in families with two or nore adjusted work force participants 
and whose combined HE Deficit 1s equal to or greater than dif 
ference between poverty standard and aggregate family earnings, sun 
of differences between appropriate poverty standard or multiple and 
aggregate family earnings, tines share of combined family HE 
Deficit accounted for by persons in 8(6) For persons 1n families 
with two or more adjusted work force participants and whose 'arcily 
HE Deficit Is less than difference between poverty stardard and 
aggregate family earnings, sun of HE Deficits for famll/ -nenfrers 
In 8(6) plus these meters' share of combined Individual earr. ngs 
standards (or earnings If higher) for fa-nlly me-sbers tines the 
difference between the poverty standard or multiple minus aggregate 
family earnings, and the combined fanlly HE Deficit
12(6) • 11(6) « 8(6)
13(6) • 100 times 11(6) « 11(1)
14(6) • 8(6) minus persons In families with total incone above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(6) - 100 times 14(6) « 1(6) 
16(6) • 100 times 14(6) » 14(1)
17(6) • For unrelated Individuals and persons In 14(6) who ar« 
sole work force participants in families, sum of differences 
between family Income and poverty standard or Multiple. cor 
persons in families with two or more persons In adjusted wo-k force 
and whose combined HE Deficit Is equal to or greater than ilf- 
ference between poverty standard and family income, sua of dif 
ferences between appropriate poverty standard or nultiale a-d 
aggregate fanlly Income, tines share of combined faaily HE >f1cit 
accounted for by persons In 14(6). For persons in families «1th 
two or more persons in adjusted work force and where carabine;! 
family HE Deficit is less than difference between poverty standard 
and family income, sum of HE Deficit for family members 1n 14(6! 
plus these members' share of combined Individual earnings standards 
(or earnings If higher) for family members tines the difference 
between the poverty standard or multiple alnus fanlly Income, and 
the combined family HE Deficit
18(6) - 17(6) « 14(6)
19(6) - 100 tiroes 17(6) * 17(1)
20(6) • 8(6) minus persons In families with augmented earnings of 
all family members in ijl) plus actual earnings of famly meroers 
not In 1(1) greater than poverty threshold (augnented earnings for 
persons In 8(6) are actual earnings plus weeks unemsloyed ti"*s 
usual hours worked tloes ra1n<muni wage or nultlple e«ceot w*e'e same 
weeks employed part-time Involuntarily in which case earnings a 1 so 
augnented by minimum wage or nultlple tines ao uinus usual hours 
times weeks less than 35 where usual 1s less than 35. or by rc-nlnun 
wage or multiple tines usual hours minus 20 times weeks worked less 
than 35 hours where usual more than 35)
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21. Full Employment IFE Deficit
22. Adequate Employment IFE
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
24. Capacity Employment IFE
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
26. Enhanced Earnings IFE
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
30. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/fanlly relationship and 
agt dtsaggregatlons)
31. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age disaggregatlons)
32. Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
33. Marginally Augmented Adequate
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
34. Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age disaggregatlons)
36. Persons with Earnings Deficits
In Families with Earnings Deficits
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate
38. Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI Net-of-Transfers
40. IFI Net-of-Transfer* Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
44. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
21(6) • Calculated similar to 11(6) for persons In 20(6) with sun 
of augmented and actual earnings of f rally members as saedfled 1n 
20(2) through 20(12) Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty 
standard or multiple
22(6) - Calculated similar to 20(6) with augmented earnings of all 
family members In 8(6) equal to Individual earnings standard as 
specified In 2(6)
23(6) - Calculated similar to 21(6) with augmented earnings as 
specified in 22(2) through 22(12)
24(6) • Calculated similar to 20(6) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(6) equal to weekly earnings for weeks employed tines 
weeks 1n labor force; where some weeks enployed part-time involun 
tarily, equal annual earnings « weeks full-time and 1/2 weeks part- 
time. times weeks in labor force
25(6) • Calculated similar to 21(6) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
26(6) • Calculated similar to 20(6) with augmented earnings for 
persons 1n 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(6) • Calculated similar to 21(6) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
28(6) • Calculated similar to 20(6) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12}
29(6) • Calculated similar to 21(6) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
30(6) • 8(6) minus persons In families with augmented ear-nines of all 
family members 1n 1(1) as disaggregated plus actual earnings of 
family members not In 1(1) as disaggregated greater than cove^ty 
threshold (augmented earnings for disaggregated subgroup menders 1n 
8(6) are actual earnings plus weeks unemployed times usual bows 
worked times minimum wage or multiple except where sane weeks em 
ployed part-time Involuntarily 1n which case earnings also aur-v'ted 
by minimum wage or nultlple times 40 ninus usual hours times weeks 
less than 35 where usual 1s less than 35. or by minimum waae or 
multiple times usual hours minus 20 times weeks worked less than 35 
hours where usual more than 35)
31(6) • Calculated similar to 11(6) with sum of augmented and actual
earnings of family members as specified In 33(2) through 33(12)
Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or
32(6) • Calculated similar to 30(6) with augmented earnings cf all 
disaggregated subgroup members 1n 8(1) equal to Individual earnings 
standards as specified 1n 2(2) through 2(12) or actual earnings. 
whichever are larger
33(6) • Calculated similar to 31(6) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(6) • Calculated similar to 30(6) with augmented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members as specified In 34(2) througi 34(12); 
for subgroup members 1n 8(6), augmented earnings equal to weekly 
earnings for weeks enployed times weeks In labor force. w»>e~e sane 
weeks employed part-time Involuntarily, equal annual earnings » 
weeks full-time and 1/2 weeks part-time tines weeks in labor force
35(6) - Calculated siailar to 31(6) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(6) - 8(6) minus persons not Included 1n 2(6)
37(6) • [1 - 14(6)/8(6)] times 100 
38(6) • [1 - 39(6)/8(6)] times 100
39(6) • 8(6) minus persons In families with Income excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or multiple
40(6) • Calculated similar to 17(6) except using family Income 
excluding cash transfers
41(6) • 8(6) minus persons in families with cash Income plus value 
of food stamps above poverty standard or multiple
42(6) • Calculated similar to 17(6) except using family cash Income 
plus food stamp talue
43(6) • 8(6) minus persons In families with cash Income supplemented 
as noted in 43(2) It above poverty standard or multiple
44(6) • Calculated similar to 17(6) except using cash and Including 























21. Full Employment IFE Deficit
22. Adequate Employment IFE
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
(Hi. Discouraged
1(11) • Old not fork In previous year; main reason could net find 
work; unemployed at least 4 weeks
2(11) • 1(11) minus persons with annual earnings (despite no reported 
work) above Individual earnings standard equal to 2003 hours tines 
nininun wage or multiple
3(11) • 100 times 2(11) » 1(11) 
4(11) • 100 times 2(11) t 2(1)
5(11) • Sun of individual earnings standards of person* in 2(11) 
where Individual earning standards equal 40 tines minimum wage or 
multiple times week of participation
6(11) • 5(11) t 2(11)
7(11) - 100 tines 5(11) . 5(1)
8(11) • 1(11) ninus persons In families with sui of annual earnings 
of all members above poverty threshold or multiple
9(11) • 100 times 8(11) » 1(11) 
10(11) - 100 times 8(11) . 8(1)
11(11) • For unrelated Individuals and persons In 8(11) who are sole 
work force participants in families, sun of differences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or multiple. Fcr 
persons In families with two or more adjusted work force participants 
and whose conblned HE Deficit Is equal to or greater fan d' ffereice 
between appropriate poverty standard or nultiple and aggregate 'a-sily 
earnings, tines share of combined family HE Deficit accounted far 
by persons In 8(11). For persons 1n families vlth two or more adjusted 
work force participants and x'xjse family III Deficit is less than 
difference between poverty standard and aggregate fanily earnings, sum 
of HE Deficits for family me-fcers in 8(11) plus these *e,iibers' share 
of combined Individual earnings standards (or earnings I? higher) for 
family members times the difference between the poverty standard or 
multiple minus aggregate family earnings, and the combined faaily 
HE Deficit
12(11) - 11(11) » 8(11)
13(11) - 100 times 11(11) t 11(1)
14(11) • 8(11) minus persons In families with total income above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(11) • 100 times 14(11) » 1(11) 
16(11) » 100 times 14(11} « 14(1)
17(11) • For unrelated Individuals and persons in 14(11) who are 
sole work force participants In families, sin of differences 
between family Income and poverty standard or muHl9'l e. For 
persons In families with two or nore persons 1n adjusted work force 
and whose contained HE Deficit Is equal to or greater than dif 
ference between poverty standard and 'ailly Incone, MI of dif 
ferences between appropriate poverty stand«-d or rnilt Die and 
aggregate family incone, times share of cammed family HE Deficit 
accounted for by persons 'n 14(11). ror pe^so'S m far-ilies »<th 
two or more persons in adjusted work force snd wt-ere coined 
family HE Deficit Is less than difference between poverty standard 
and family Incoie. sum of HE Oefidt for family nembers 'n J4I11) 
plus these members' share of coratned 'id'vidjal earnings standards 
(or earnings if higher) for fanily members ti^es the difference 
between the poverty standard or multiple minus ftally incone. and 
the combined family HE Deficit
18(11) • 17(11) • 14(11)
19(11) • 100 times 17(11) » 17(1)
20(11) • 8(11) minus persons in families with augnented earnings 
of all family members In 1(1) plus actual earnings of family members 
not In 1(1) greater than poverty threshold 'augmented earnings for 
persons in 8(11) equal raininun wage foes 43 times 50)
21(11) • Calculated similar to 11(11) for persons 1n 20(11) with SUB 
of augmented and actual earnings of family i-erfcers as specified in 
20(2) through 20(12) Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty 
standard or multiple
22(11) • Calculated similar to 20(11) with augmented earnings c' all 
family members In 8(11) equal to Individual earnings standard as 
specified in 2(11)
23(11) • Calculated similar to 21(11) with augmented earnings as 






Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 
Enhanced Earnings IFE 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit 
Enhanced Capacity IFE 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
Marginally Augmented Full 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age disaggregations)
Marginally Augmented Full 
Enployment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age disaggregations)
Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age disaggregatlons)
Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/fantly relationship 
and age disaggregattons)
Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age disaggregations)
Marginally Augnented Capacity 
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age disaggregations)
Persons with Earnings Deficits 
In Families with Earnings Defi cits
Earnings Supplementation Rate
Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI Net-of-Transfers
40. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. (Ft Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
44. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
24(11) • Calculated similar to 20(11) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(11) equal to Individual earnings standard as specified 
In 2(11)
25(11) * Calculated similar to 21(11) with augmented earnings as 
specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
26(11) • Calculated similar to 20(11) with augmented earnings for 
persona In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(11) - Calculated similar to 21(11) with augmented earnings for 
all persons 1n 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
28(11) • Calculated similar to 20(11) with earnings augnented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
29(11) • Calculated similar to 21(11) with earnings augnented to 
110 percent those specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
30(11) • 8(11) minus persons In fanlHes with augmented earnings of 
all family menbers 1n 1(1) as disaggregated plus actual e«mi-s$ of 
family menbers not In 1(1) as disaggregated greater than povt-ty 
threshold (augnented earnings for disaggregated subgroup nenbers in 
8(11) equal minimum wages times 40 times SO)
31(11) • Calculated similar td 11(11) with sun of augnented and actual 
earnings of family members as specified 1n 30(2) through 33(12) 
Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or multiple
32(11) - Calculated slnllar to 30(11) with augnented earnings of 
all disaggregated subgroup menbers 1n 8(11) equal to Individual 
earnings standard as specified in 2(11)
33(11) • Calculated slntlar to 31(11) with aogaented earnings as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(11) • Calculated similar to 30(11) with augnented earnings for 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(11) equal to Individual earnings 
standard as specified 1n 2(11)
35(11) • Calculated similar to 31(11) with augnented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(11) • 8(11) minus persons not Included In 2(11)
37(11) - [1 - 14(11)/8(11}] times 100
38(11) - [1 - 39(!1)/8(11)J times 100
39(11) • 8(11) minus persons 1n families with Incone excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or nwltlole
40(11) • Calculated similar to 17(11) except using fanlly income 
excluding cash transfers
41(11) • 6(11) nlnus persons in fanilles with cash income plus 
value of food stamps above poverty standard or multiple
42(11) • Calculated similar to 17(11) except using fully cash 
Income plus food stamp value
43(11) • 8(11) minus persons in families with cash Incone supplemented 
as noted 1n 43(2) Is above poverty standard or multiple
44(11) • Calculated similar to 17(11) except using cash and Including 
Income for family as specified In 43(2)
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1. Work Force Experience




HE Average Deficit 
HE Deficit Distribution 
















24. Full Employment IFI Deficit
22. Adequate Employment IFE
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
(12). Unemployed
1(12) • Unemployed throughout period of participation, and any weeks 
nonpartldpatton In period due to reasons other than Inability to 
find work or unemployed less thin 4 necks and discouraged throughout 
remainder of period
2(12) • 1(12) nlnus persons wltl) annual earnings above an Individual 
earnings standard equal to weeks In labor force times Minimi** vagc 
or multiple tines 40
3(12) • 100 tines 2(12) » 1(12) 
4(12) • 100 tines 2(12) » 2(1)
5(12) • Sun of Individual earnings standards 1n 2(12) where Individual 
earnings standards equal 40 hours tines Blnlaut wage) or nultlple ti«e* 
weeks of participation
6(12) • 5(12) » 2(12)
7(12) • 100 tines 5(12) » 5(1)
8(12) • 1(12) nlnus persons 1n families with SIM of annual earnings 
of all members above poverty threshold or Multiple
9(12) - 100 tines 8(12) * 1(12) 
10(12) » 100 times 8(12) * 8(1)
11(12) - For unrelated Individuals and persons 1n 8(12) who are sole 
work force participants in families, sum cf differences between 
annual earnings and appropriate poverty standard or nu'tla'i ror 
persons in families with two or more adjusted work force partic'sants 
and whose combined HE Deficit 1s equal to or greater fian diffe-ence 
between appropriate poverty standard or nultlple and aggregate 'anliy 
earnings, times share of conbined faiiily HE Deficit acccu-ted 'o* 
by persons In 8(12). For persons in fanllies with two o* ic^e adjusted 
work force participants and wnose family ME Oe'idt is 'ess t«»an 
difference between poverty standard and acaregate femHy ea^^gs. sum 
of HE Deficits for farUy memhers In 8(12) plus these nw*er»' sha-e 
of combined individual earnings standards (or earnings if K i;*er; for 
family members times the difference between the poverty sta-iard or 
multiple minus aggregate family earnings, and the combined faally 
HE Deficit
12(12) • 11(12) • 8(12)
13(12) - 100 tines 11(12) * 11(1)
14(12) • 8(12) minus persons in families with total Income above 
poverty threshold or multiple
15(12) • 100 times 14(12) » 1(12) 
16(12) - 100 times 14(12) » 14(1)
17(12) • For unrelated Individuals and persons in 14(12) who are 
sole work force participants in fanilles, sun cf di"erences 
between family Income and poverty standard or multiple. For 
persons in families with two or more sersons in adjusted wo-k force 
and whose conbined HE Deficit 1s eaual to or greate* than di'- 
ference between poverty standard and 'anlly Income, sun e f dif 
ferences between appropriate ooverty standard or njltiole and 
aggregate family Income, times share of combined 'aaily HE Deceit 
accounted for by persons In K(12). For sersons in faniHes wth 
two or more persons in adjusted work fcrce and where combined 
family HE Deficit is less than difference between poverty standard 
and family Income, sum of HE Deficit for family me-S>ers 1n 14(12) 
plus these members' share of conbined individual earnings standards 
(or earnings If higher) for family members times the difference 
between the poverty standard or multiple minus family income, and 
the combined family HE Deficit
18(12) • 17(12) » 14(12)
19(12) • 100 tines 17(12) • 17(1)
20(12) - 8(12) minus persons in families with augmented earnings 
of all family members In 1(1) plus actual earnings of faally members 
not In 1(1) greater than poverty threshold (augmented earnings 'or 
persons In 8(12) equal minium wage times *0 frees weeks in labor 
force)
21(12) • Calculated similar to 11(12) for persons In 20(12) wfth sum 
of augmented and actual eaminqs of family members as specified 1n 
20(2) through 20(12) Instead of actual earnings ccooared to poverty 
standard or multiple
22(12) • Calculated similar to 20(12) with augmented earnings of all 
family members in 8(12) equal to Individual earnings standard as 
specified in 2(12)
23(12) • Calculated Similar to 21(12) with audMited earnings as 
specified in 22(2) through 22(12)
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24. Capacity Employment IFE
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
26. Enhanced Earnings IFE
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
30. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sex/fanlly relationship and 
age d(saggreqatlons)
31. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dtsaggregatlons)
32. Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Enploynent IFE (calculated only 
for sex/fanlly relationship and 
age dlsaggregatlons)
33. Marginally Augmented Adequate
Enploynent IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
34. Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Employment jFE (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age disaggregations)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/fanlly relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
36. Persons with Earnings Deficits
In Families with Earnings Deficits
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate
38. Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI Net-of-Transfers
40. (FI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
44. IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
24(12) • Calculated similar to 20(12) with augmented earnings for 
persons In 8(12) equal to Individual earnings standard as specified 
(n 2(12)
25(12) > Calculated similar to 21(12) with augmented earnings as 
specified 1n 24(2) through 24(12)
26(12) • Calculated similar to 20(12) with auonented earnings for 
persons In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
27(12) • Calculated similar to 21(12) with augmented earnings for 
all persons In 8(1) equal to 110 percent of actual earnings
28(12) • Calculated similar to 20(12) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
29(12) • Calculated similar to 21(12) with earnings augmented to 
110 percent those specified In 24(2) through 24(12)
30(12) » 8(12) minus persons In families with augmented earmn;s of 
all family members In 1(1) as disaggregated plus actual earnings of 
family members not 1n l(l) as disaggregated greater fan oove-ty 
threshold (augmented earnings for disaggregated subgrouo nrn&ers in 
8(12) equal minimum wage times 40 times weeks 1n labor force)
31(12) • Calculated similar to 11(12) with sum of augmented and 
actual earnings of family members as specified 1n 30i2) tiroujn. 
30(12) Instead of actual earnings compared to poverty standard or 
multiple
32(12) • Calculated similar to 30(12) with augmented earnings of 
all disaggregated subgroup members In 8(12) equal to Individual 
earnings standard as specified In 2(12)
33(12) • Calculated similar to 31(12) with augmented earnings as 
specified In 32(2) through 32(12)
34(12) • Calculated similar to 30(12) with augmented earnings 'or 
disaggregated subgroup members In 8(12) equal to Individual earnings 
standard as specified In 2(12)
35(12) • Calculated similar to 31(12) with augnented earnings as 
specified In 34(2) through 34(12)
36(12) - 8(12) minus persons not Included 1n 2(12)
37(12) • [1 - 14(12)/8(12)] times 100
38(12) • [1 - 39(12)/8(12)] times 100
39(12) • 8(12) minus persons .In families with Income excluding cash 
transfers above poverty standard or multiple
40(12) • Calculated similar to 17(12) except using family Income 
excluding cash transfers
41(12) • 8(12) minus persons In families with cash Income plus value 
of food starts above poverty standard or multiple
42(12) • Calculated similar to 17(12) except using family cash Inctne 
plus food stamp value
43(12) - 8(12) minus persons In families with cash Income suopleoented 
as noted In 43(2) Is above poverty standard or multiple
44(12) - Calculated similar to 17(12) except using cash and Including 
Income for family as specified in 43(2)
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311
H3l. Total Out of Work Force
1. Work Force Experience
2. Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE)
3. HE Incidence
4. HE Distribution
5. ME Total Deficit
6. HE Average Deficit
7. HE Deficit Distribution
8. Inadequate Family Earnings (IFt)
9. IFE Incidence
10. IFE Distribution
11. IFE Total Deficit
12. IFE Average Deficit
13. IFE Deficit Distribution
14. Inadequate Family Incont (IFI)
15. IFI Incidence
16. IFI Distribution
17. IFI Total Deficit
18. IFI Average Deficit
19. IFI Deficit Distribution
20. Full Employment IFE
21. Full Employment IFE Deficit
22. Adequate Employment IFE
23. Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
24. Capacity Employment IFE
25. Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
26. Enhanced Earnings IFt
27. Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit
28. Enhanced Capacity IFE
29. Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
30. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for lex/family relationship and 
age disaggregatlons)
31. Marginally Augmented Full
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age d(saggreqatlons)
32. Marginally Augmented Adequate 
Employment IFE (calculated only 
for sei/famfly relationship and 
age disaggreqatlons)
33. Marginally Augmented Adequate
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dtsaggregatlons)
1(13) • Total population minus 1(1)
2(13) • 1(13) minus persons In families with no "ember in 2(1)





8(13) • 1(13) minus persons In families with earnings above poverty 
level or multiple
9(13) - 100 times 8(13) » 1(13) 
10(13) • N.A. 
11(13) • N.A. 
12(13) • N.A. 
13(13) - N.A.
14(13) • 1(13) ntnus persons In families with cash incones above 
poverty level or multiple





20(13) • Persons in families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of all family members augmented as specified 
in 20(2) through 20(12), minus 20(1)
21(13) • N.«.
22(13) » Persons In families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of all family members augmented as specified 
1n 22(2) through 22(12). minus 22(1)
23(13) • N.A.
24(13) • Persons in families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of all family members augmented as specified 
In 24(2) through 24(2). minus 24(1)
25(13) - N.A.
26(13) - Persons In families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of all family members augmented at specified 
In 26(2) through 26(12). minus 26(1)
27(13) • N.A.
28(13) • Persons In families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of all family members augmented as specified 
In 28(2) through 28(12). minus 28(1)
29(13) • N.A.
30(13) • Persons 1n families with earning*, below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of subgroup augmented as specified in 30(2} 
through 30(12). minus 30(1)
31(13} • N.A.
32(13) • Persons In families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of subgroup augmented as specified in 32(2) 




34. Marginally Augmented Capacity 
Oploynent Iff. (calculated only 
for sex/family relationship and 
age d<saggregat1ons)
35. Marginally Augmented Capacity
Employment IFE Deficit (calculated 
only for sex/family relationship 
and age dlsaggregatlons)
36. Persons with Earnings Deficits 
In Families with Earnings Deficits
37. Earnings Supplementation Rate
38. Earnings Supplementation ftate- 
Nontransfers
39. IFI N«t-of-Transfers
40. IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
41. IFI Including Food Stamps (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
42. IF! Including Food Stamps Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
43. IFI Including In-Kind Aid (calculated 
only for 1979 and 1980)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid Deficit 
(calculated only for 1979 and 1980)
34(13) • Persons In families with earnings below poverty level or 
multiple after earnings of subgroup augmented is specified 1n 34(2) 





39(13) • Persons 1n families with Incones excluding cash transfers 
below poverty level or Multiple. Minus 39(1)
40(13) • N.A.
41(13) • Persons In families wl^h cash Incomes plas food stamps 
below poverty level or multiple, minus 41(1)
42(13) - N.A.
43(13) • Persons 1n families with cash Incomes and In-kind aid valued 
as specified In 43(2) below poverty level or multiple, minus persons 
In 43(1)
44(13) • N.A.
APPENDIX B. DETAILED HARDSHIP DATA FOR 1979 
(Using 1980 Census Weights)
Table B-l. Hardship by Work Experience Pattern in 1979
Table B-2. Race/Ethnic Origin and Hardship
Table B-3. Sex, Family Relationship and Hardship
Table B-4. Hardship by Family Size and Number of Earners
Table B-5. Hardship and Family Income in 1979
Table B-6. Hardship in 1979 and Age at Interview
Table B-7. Hardship in 1979 by Educational Attainment at Interview
Table B-8. Hardship and Individual Earnings in 1979
Table B-9. Hardship and Individual Earnings Deficit in 1979
Table B-10. Hardship and Occupation of Longest Job in 1979
Table B-ll. Hardship in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas in 1979
Table B-12. Hardship in 1979 Disaggregated by Geographic Region
Table B-13. Hardship in 1979 in a Sample of States
Table B-l. HARDSHIP BY WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN IN 1979




HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IrE (000) 
Enhanced Cap.icity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Kate-Total ($)
Earnings Supplementation Rate- 
Net of Transfers (%)
IFI Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Net of Transfeis Deficit 
($ Mi 11 ions)
IFI Including Fond Stamp-; (000)
IFI Including Food St.imps Deficit 
($ Millions)
IFI IIK hilling In-Kunl Aid (000)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid 




















































































































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit (§)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Siipplrmcnt.it ion Rate-Total ($)
Earnings Siipplrmrnt.it ion Rate-
Net of Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFl Iiu hiding Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IR (minding (n-Kiu.l Aid (000) 
IF( Including In-Kind Aid



















































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced C.ip.icity ItE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in [FE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%)








uding Food Stamps (000) 
tiding Food Stamps Defuit
($ Mi lions
nding In-Kind Aid (000) 





















































































































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFy. Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementalion Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Nrt of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 




















































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earning;, IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity ItE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplcrrifiit.ition Rate-Total (%)
Earningb Supp\ementdtion Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Not of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Tr.msfrrs Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI (nc lulling Food St.imps (000) 
IF[ Including Food SLiinj.s Deficit
($ Million*)
IFI Including (n-Kiii'l Aid (000) 

























































































































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (X)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit" ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplr-nicntat ion Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Not of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI [iicl'idinx In-Kind Aid (000) 



















































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 








































































































































































































HE in IFE (000) 13,470 1,012 455 
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%) 38.8 24.7 23.0 
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of 17.7 9.4 9.9
Transfers (%)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 14,145 919 410 
IFI Net-of-Tr.msh-rs Deficit 37,970 4,287 2,013
($ Millions)
IFI die lulling Komi St.imps (000) 10,189 743 344 
IFI Including Food St.imps Deficit 20,599 2,085 1,009
($ Millions)
IH IIK Imling (n-Kinil Aid (000) 9,909 722 329 




















































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE ̂ Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation R.ile-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
(Fl I (ic I ml i rig Food St.imps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI [minding In-Kind Aid (000) 
IFI Including Jii-K.ii.I Aid


















































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit (§)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit (§ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earning'* Siipp lrinrnL.it ion R.itr-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Net of
Transfers (%)













food Stamps (000) 
Food St.imp'. Deficit 
I 
In-Kind Aid (000)







































































































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Iru lulling Food Si.imps (000) 
IH Including Food Stamps Defnit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 
IFI Iiu hiding In-Kind Aid

































































































































































Table B-2. RACE/ETHNIC ORIGIN AND HARDSHIP
Sfycrr JUM!bhip:_Tola 1 Work Force 




11F. Deficit ($ Million*)
11K Av« r-njr Urf Kit ($)
Ut (000)
I Ft Incidriiie (X)
1>L Illicit ($ Millions)
IKE Average Deficit ($)
1F1 (000)
1KI Incidence (1)
1F1 Deficit ($ Millions)
1FI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment 1FE (000)
Full iuiploymi-nt IKE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (I)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (1)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
1FI Nel-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 















































































































































































































































































































IJF. 1 mi deiii e (I)
UK Deficit ($ Millions)
lit Aveiagr Deficit ($)
ire (ooo)
1FE Incidence (I)
1FL Deficit ($ Millions)
1FE Average Deficit ($)
IKJ (000)
1FI Incidence (1)
1F1 Deficit ($ Millions)
1F1 Average Deficit ($)
Kull Employment IFF. (000) 
Full Employment 1FE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adrcju.it c- r.n>j>luyiut-iit I Ft (000) 
Adequate Employment IrE Deficit
($ Million*)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Fiihjnctd Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Eainingb IrE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (X) 
IF1 Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Ip-Kind Aid (000) 














































































































































































































Table B-3. SEX, FAMILY RELATIONSHIP AND HARDSHIP






Ilk Deficit (J Milllou.)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IKE (000)
1FE locideiice (1)
in. Deficit ($ Million.)
IKE Average Deficit (»)
111 (OOO)
IFI Incidence (1)
IFI Deficit (J Million.)
IM Average Deficit (S)
Full Eo>r lo>mrnt IFE (000)
Full Employment IFC Deficit () Million.)
Art. ijuate Fmploynent IKE (OOO)
(J Million.)
Capacity Eaployaeot IFC Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earning. IFE (000)
Enhanced Earning. IKE Deficit ($ Million.)
(J Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Trail. ter. (1)
IFI Net of Tran.fer. (000)
IFI het-of-Tia.i.ler. Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Sta.p. (000)
IFI Ini lulling Food Stan|» Deficit
() riilllon.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)






























































































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: HALF-YEAR WORK FORCE
Work Force (000)
11L (000)
HE liu d. mr (1)
HE Drf 01 (5 Hill. oil.)
HE Avc age Deficit ($)
I Ft (00 )
IFE loc dence (1)
IFE Drf ell (J Millions)
1FI (000)
1F1 Incidence (I)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
1F1 Avrrage Drficil ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IrE Drficit ($ Millions)
Adr.juate Employmrnt IKE (000)
Adr<jU4le En{>loyu«.at 1H Deficit
($ Millions)
C« acily Employ™ nt IFE (000)
C. acity Eo.ployo.rnl IFE Deficit
$ Millions)
En anced Farmngs IFE (000)
En ..need Earnings HE Deficit ($ Millions)
En ancrd Capacity IFE (000)
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
(J Million!)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (1)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (1)
fFl Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
(J til 11 ions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (OOO)
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
(J Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)
IFI Including lu-Kind Aid Deficit































































































































































































































































































































III 1). licit (5 Million.)
lit Avrragr Deficit ($)
lit (000)
IKE Incidence (1)
IKE Deficit (J Million*)
ni Aveufr Deficit (})
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (X)
IFI Deficit (} Million*)
IFI Average Deficit (J) 
Full F»>j.lu>o.rnl JrE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit (5 Million*)
Adequate rmj.loyo.rnl IKE (000)
Adnjuate FmjiloyiMent IKE Deficit
($ Million*)
Capacity Emj>lo>ment IFE (000)
Capacity Faployurut 1»E Deficit
($ Million*)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000)
Enhanced Earning. IFE Deficit ($ Million*) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
($ Million*)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplemental ion Rale-Total (1)
IFI Nel-of-Trjnsfers Deficit 
(S Hillio *)
IFI Includi g Food Stamps (000)
IFI Includi g Food Stamp. Deficit
($ Millie .)
Ill lucludi g ]u-Kiud Aid (000)
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INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
l,,lk Ti.nr (000)
lit (000)
IIF In. Id. orr (1)
lit Delicti U Million.)
HE Av.i.fcr Deficit (J)
IFE (000)
111 Incidence (1)
1FL Delli It (} Millions)
It! Avri.ge Deficit ($)
Iff (000)
IFI I nc i dime (I)
IFI Deficit (} Million!)
Ul Avrr.gr Drficit ($)
Full Fn>i>lo>p..nt IFE (000)
Full Eaployvenl IFE Drficit (5 Million*)
Ad, qujlr rm,,lo>a,tnt Ut (000)
Adriju.tr F«ployment IFE Deficit
($ Mill, on.)
C.pacity Employment UE (000)
Capacity Eo|>lo)aenl UE Deficit
(5 Million.)
Enhanced Farning. ItE (000)
tnhamrd Earning. IFE Deficit (J Million.)
Enhanced Capacity IKE (000)
Fi.hanred Capacity UT Deficit 
($ Million*)
HE 10 IFE (000)
Earniugt Supplementation Rate-Total (1)
Earning. Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfer* (1)
IFI Net of Transfer* (000)
($ Million.)
IFI Including Food Stamp* (000)
IF] Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
Itl Including In-Kind Aid (000)
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MODERATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Uo.k Forir (UOO)
lie (ouo)
ML In. idn.ie (1)
llr Deficit (5 Million.)
Ill Avrr.gr Drfltit ($)
Irt (UOO)
1FE Incidri.ce (X)
Iff nrflclt ($ Million*)
IFE Avrr.gr Deficit ($)
IH (QUO)
Ifl lucid, nee (1)
IFI Deficit (5 Mill.oni)
IFI Average Drfirit (J)
ull FBMluynent HE (UOO)
ull rmj.lc,)!™,.! lib Orflcit ($ Million.)
dr.jii.tr tmi'lriymrnl HE (000)
.!«jua<r In|iluyarnl llf Deficit
($ Million!)
juacity InuluyiMul IFE (000)
.pacity Eu.ploymrnt IFE Deficit 
(S Million*)
Fubai.ced Earnings IFE (000)
Enhanced Lainiiigs IFE Deficit ($ Milliou*)
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Fate-Total (J)
Earnings Supplemental ion Rate-Net of
Transfer* (1)
IFI Net of Transfer* (000)
IFI Hel-of-Transfer« Deficit
(J Million*)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000)
IFI Including Food Stamp. Deficit
($ rlilUoo.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)




























































































































































































































































































































































Table B-4. HARDSHIP BY FAMILY SIZE AND NUMBER OF EARNERS
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Volk lu.ir (000)
lit. ((100)
tit )..« id,.,,,r (%)
HE Deficit (5 Mill)
lit AVI ,.gr Urllril
1KF (000)
IKF 1 in l drm » (I)
UL Deficit (V n.ll.
HE Averse Deficit
It I (000)




IFI Avriagr Deficit ($)




nl 111 Deficit (J Million.)
o>mrnt JrE (000)
Ad<q.u.lr tmploin.«-nt UT DctvcH.
(5 NilI, UB »)
f.p.cit F^loyo..-.!! 1FE (000) 
C.p.cit Eniiiloxoenl IfE Deficit
($ Mi lion.)
Efihauce FaniK.gt lit (000) 
Enluoce Ejrn.ujji ItT Di/icjt ($ 
Fnh.oce Chanty IVt (000) 
Cnn.ncrd Capacity JIT Deficit
($ Hill too*)
HE in 1FE (000)
Earning. Supplement at ion Rale-Tot*! (t)
Earuiogi Sui>f>leB.rntalion Rate-Net of
Trtosfrr* (X)
IF! Nrt o/ Tr4«sf<>r< (000) 
in Net of Ti<niferi Deficit
(5 Million.)
1FJ Including Food Stampi (000) 
If] Including Food Slaauk Deficit
(5 Bill •on.)
IFI Including la-Kind Aid (000) 






















































































































































































































































































































































































lie lutid. ,,ct (i)
HE Drfn It (5 Mi I Hon.) 
I1C Avrr.(r Dcfi.il ($)
iKt (ooo)
IFF Incidence (1)
1KI Drfirit (J Million.)
IFF. Average Deficit (S)
1F1 (000)
1F1 Incidence (I)
1F1 Deficit ($ Million.)
1FI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Fjoj.loyi.cat ire Di-firit ($ Million.) 
Adequate Employ*, nt ICE (000) 
Adrquatr Fttplo>mrot 1FE Deficit
U "illlon.)
C.p.cily Enploymrot 1FE (000) 
C.pioty EmployuK nt \ft Deficit
($ Hilltoo*)
Enhanced Eaining. Itt (000) 
End-iuccd E»nung« UT Deficit ($ Hillions) 
Enh.nced Capacity 1FE (000) 
Enhanced C.pacity IFE Deficit
($ Million.)




1F1 Net of Transfer. (000) 
1F1 Net of Transfers Deficit
(S Million.) 
IFI Including Food Stamps (000)
U Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 














































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: HALF-YEAR WORK FORCE
Wurk Tuirr (000)
HE (000)
JIL Ini idn.cr (I)
UC Drflill (5 Million.)
JIF. Avn. Kr Deficit ($)
J>£ (000)
IKE Imid.i.re (1)
IfE Deficit (5 Million.)
UE Avujge Deficit (J)
IF! (000)
1F1 1m idrnie (I)
IU Drfitil (5 Million.)
1F1 Average Deficit (5)
Full Employment IrE (000)
lull Fn.ployn.rnt in Deficit (} Million.)
Adr,,u.tr Fapluyaent 1FL (000)
Adequate Employment IU Deficit
(5 rhll.on.)
Capacity Fn.ploym< nt 1KI (000) 
Capacity Employment 1FE Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhanced Earnings IKE (000) 
Enhanced Earning. IFE Deficit (5 Million.) 
Enhanced Capacity IKE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IKE Deficit
($ Million.)
o Rate-Tot.1 (I) 
n Rate-Net of




IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfer. Deficit
(5 Million.)
IFI nc uding Food Stamps (000) 
It I nc udiog Food Stamps Deficit
($ Mi lion.)
IU nc uding In-Kind Aid (000) 
IF] nc udiug lu-Kind Aid






















































































































































































































































































































































































I IE 11., denre (I)
Ilk. Def < II (} Mllll.,,!.)
HE Avr age D. flrit ($)
Jit (00 )
JFE 1m deuce (1)
HE Def ill ($ Million.)
IFF. Avr agr I)i (Utt ($)
in (GOO)
HI Imidime (1)
HI Deficit (} HID Ions)
111 Avrr.gr Deficit (J)
Full Employment HE (000)
Full Employment UE Drficit ($ Million.)
A.tr.|Uitr Fmjiloym nl UE (000)
Adequate Fniployu., nt HE Deficit
($ Hi 11 ion.)
Capacity riuploym.nl HE (000) 
Capacity Employment 1FE Deficit
(S Millions)
Enhanced Faiiungc UE (000) 
Enhamed Faruings UT Deficit (J Hillion.) 
Enhanced Capacity Ht (000) 
Enhanced Capacity 1FE Deficit
{$ Million.)
HE 10 IFE (000)
Earnings Supplrm.ntat ion Rate-Total (I)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfer. (X) 
IFI Net of Transfer* (000) 
IF1 Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 











































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE
V...k },.nr (000)
111 (000)
UK ll.< Irtemr (I)
I1F. Drlull (5 Million.)
lit Av. Kge Defnit ($)
ML (000)
III l,.ciden<r (X)
Hi D. IK It (5 MlllK.n*)
UK Av. ugr Deficit ($)
in (ocx»
IFI Innd.ncr (X)
111 Deficit ($ Million*)
IFI Avnagr Deficit ($)
full Fa,j,lo>»., in IFF (000)
Full Fn.pl oyiwnl ]F> Deficit ($ Million*)
Adfuualr »«.j,loym, ill HE (000)
A.I. uuale F«,|, lo>i»« ul U£ Deficit
($ Million*)
Capacity Foj.l i.) ,i>. nt 1FE (000)
Capacity E»l>lo>»rnt UF Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhanced Eaining* IFE (000)
Enhanced FarU l., k » in Def.t.l (5 Million*)
Enhancrd Capacity Ht Deficit 
(5 Million*)
lit in HE (000)
Earning* Suu|.l. i,,enl at ion lUtt-Total (X)
Transfer* (%)
IFI Nrt of Tranifrrc (000)
($ Million*)
IFI Including Food Stamp* (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamp. Deficit
($ Million*)
UI Including In-Kind Aid (000)


















































































































































































































































































































































































HP i). di u (5 MIDI
lit Avrt.gr Deficit
ItE (000)
IFE Ii.i Idrnce (I)








Full F-n.nIoyB.-nl HI (000) 
lull Lupluyuirii 111 I), (nit ($ Million*) 
Adequate Employment 1KL (000) 
Adequate Employment 1H Deficit
(5 Millions)
Capacity Eoij>loyiu> nt 1FE (000) 
Capacity Employment 1FE Deficit
(J Million*)
Eulianied Eaioings 1FE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFT Deficit (5 Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (OOO) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Drficlt
(J Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Total (1)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (I)
IH Net of Transfers (000) 
1F1 Net of Transfers Deficit
(J Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
1FI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 










































































































































INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Vo/k lour (1)00) 
lit (000) 
HE I,., idrmr (X) 
HE Drfirtt ($ Million.) 
HE Avrra.e DrflcU ({) 
HE (000) 
IFE Incidrnre (t) 
IFE Drflcit (5 Million.) 
UE Avri.gr DrMcit ($) 
IF] (000) 
1>J ji.cidtoce (X) 
1FI Drficit ($ Million*) 
IFI Avrr.gr Deficit ($)
lull rnnloyo.rnt IFE (000) 
lull ,«,. loym.nl 1,1 Deficit ($ Million*) 
AdKjiutr Employmrol IFI (000) 
Adro,uatr FoiployDirnt IFt Drficit 
($ Million*)
Capacity rra|ilo>ut lit 1H (000)
($ Million.)
F.nhantrd F. filing. IFt (OOO) 
tnhanrrd Earning. 1 Ffc Or f i c 1 1 ($ Million*) 
Eiili.nird Cdj.acity IFE (000) 
Enhanced C-inuclly HE Dtficit
(5 Million*)
HE in IFE (000) 
Earnings Sunplruinlat ion Rale-Total (X) 
Earnings Supplement at ion Rate-Net of 
Tfin.fer. (X)
($ Million*)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 
($ Million*)


































































































































































































































































































































































HE In. Id. me (X)
ME Deficit ($ Million*)
11E Aver-ge D< Hcit <$}
HI (000)
m li.cid.-nce (1)
»E Deficit ($ Million*)
UL Average Di-ficlt ($)
1H (000)
1F1 Incidence (X)
1H D. fiiit ($ Millioni)
IF! Average Deficit (J)
Full Fwployixnl 1H (000)
lull Frnjiloyn. nt l>t Dificit (J Million.)
Ai1.-qu.,te luplc.ym. nt Ift (000)
Ad.ijiule Fm|,l,,yn.. nl 1H Deficit
(S Millions)
Capacity Fi»|.lo>». in 1FE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Milliont)
Enhanced Earnings liT (000) 
Enhanced Earning* •!»£ Deficit ($ Millioo*) 
Enhanced C^.acity IKE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity !>*£ Deficit
(5 Million.)
HE in 1FE (OOO)
Earnings Supplcrarniat 100 Rate-Total (I)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Net of
Trail fer. (X)
IF! Ne of Trausfers (000) 
1F1 He of Trauslers Deficit
($ M llloo.)
IFI In ludiag Food Stamps (000) 
1FI lu ludiug Fuod Stanps Deficit
($ H llioui)
IFI In ludtug In-Kind Aid (000) 
Ul In ludiag lu-Kind Aid











































































































































MODERATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
W..<a >uli.r (000)
III (000)
II) In, Id. me (1)
111 I), flrit (} HlllK.ua)
lit Av. i.gr Drficil (})
1>E (000)
HE Iiufd.uce (1)
lit Drficil ($ Million.)
1FE Avrragr Drflrit ($)
in (ooo)
111 1 Bc, drm e (I)
1FI Drfirit (J Million*)
JFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Fn.ploym.nl HE Deficit ($ Million*)
Ad. nujte Employment I IT. Deficit
($ Million.) 
Ca p. city Employment 1ft (000)
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhamed Earnings IFE (000)
Enlianied Eaimngc HE Deficit ($ Million*) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
(S Million.)
HE ID HE (000)
Earntngt Supplementation Katr-Tot*l (J)
Earuings SupplnBintalloo Rate-Net of 
Transfer* (X)
($ Millions)
1FI Including Food Stamp* (000)
IF1 Including Food Stamp* Deficit 
($ Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)


















































































































































































































































































































































































UK I»< i.l. nee (1)














.Full E°>pluyo» nt HE (000) 
lull Employment 1,L Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Fu|>luynenl IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
U H.11100.)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
U Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (X)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Net of
Transfers (X)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 











































































































































Table B-5. HARDSHIP AND FAMILY INCOME IN 1979
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Vu ,k Four (000)
111 (HOO)
lit lnrldrnrr (1)
1IF Drfit»l (J Millions)
Hi Avriagr Deficit (J)
IKE (000)
IrE Incidence (X)
ITt Delicti ($ Million!)
IFE Average Deficit (S)
IF! (000)
)U Incidence (1)
IF) Deficit (J Millions)
1F1 Avrr.gr Deficit (S)
Full Employment IrX (000)
Full Employment 1FE Deficit (J Hillioot)
Adiquite Employment IFE (000)
Adequate £mj> 1 o>in, nt HE Deficit
(5 Millions)
Capacity Employment 1FE (000) 
Capacity Employment HE Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhanced Earning! 1FE (000) 
Enhanced Earning IKE Deficit (J Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
I1E in in. (000)
Earnio s Supplementation Kale-Total (X)
Earnin s Supplementation Rate-Net of
Tian fer* (1) 
1F1 Ne of Transfers (000) 
1H Ne -of-Ttanifers Deficit
($ M ll.ons)
1F1 ID ludiug food Stamps (000) 
1F1 In lulling Food Stamps Deficit
($ M llions)
IF! In ludiug lo-KiDd Aid (000) 


















































































































































































































































































































lit D. lint (i Milliuns)
HE Avrr.gr DC licit (J)
HE (000)
HE li.cldn.ir (I)
1FE Deficit (J Millions)
IFt Avrr.gr Drlicll ($)
111 (OOO)
IFI InrMrncr (I)
IFI Drlicil (5 Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Fjnploymrnt IKE (000)
Full Fn.|,loy»rnt IFE Drficil ($ Millions)
Ad. u.u.le Fa.plo>m. nl 1Kb Deficit
(} Millions)
Capacity Employment 1 Ft (000)
($ Million.)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
(5 Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earning; Supplement al loo Rate-Total (1) 
Earnings Supplrmc nlal 100. Rale-Net of
Transfers (X)
IFI Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Nel-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Slamps Deficit
(S Millions)
















































































































































































































































































































INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
)iip-9 t°_99 $10.000-14^999 {iS.OOO*
hoik |oi,e (000)
ML (000)
111. Ini drntr (1)
ML Drl cit (J Millions)
lit Ayr ..e Drliclt ($)
IKE (000)
1H li,c d<i.ce (t)
UL Drf cit (5 Millions)
HT Av. agi Di fii.it (J)
IFI (OOO)
IFI lniidn.ce (I)
1F1 Deficit (5 Millions)
If] Average Deficit (J)
Full Etuuloyuint IKE (OOO)
Full F»|>loynrnt IKE Deficit ($ Millions)
A<1iu.ij.iie lojiloymenl IFE (000)
Adequsle En|>l oyn.rul HE Deficit
(5 Millions)
Capacity Eaployaieul IFE (000)
Capacity E«.|>lb>mrnt IFE Deficit
(5 Millions)
EiUiaated E«nili>gs IFE (OOO)
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (I)
IFI Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Nel-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000)
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
(5 Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)



































































































































































































































































































Table B-6. HARDSHIP IN 1979 AND AGE AT INTERVIEW




HE Defxcit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)























































































Full Employment IFE (000) 1,357 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 2,839 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 1,207 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit 2,659
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 1,513 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit 3,246
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 1,638 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 3,852 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 1,072 






























































HE in IFE (000) 1,341 
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%) 37.8 
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of 15.4
Transfers (%)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 1,507 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit 3,348
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 983 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit 1,403
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kin.J Aid (000) 938 





























































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (X) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 



















































































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total CX)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 













































































































































































































































Table B-7. HARDSHIP IN 1979 BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AT INTERVIEW




HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
(§ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 























































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 

























































































































































































































HE Deficit ($ Millions)
HE Average Deficit ($)
IFE (000)
IFE Incidence (%)
IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
IFE Average Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Incidence (%)
IFI Deficit ($ Millions)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment IFE (000) 
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000) 
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (%)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (%) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfers Deficit
($ Million:.)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 



















































































































































































































Table B-8. HARDSHIP AND INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS IN 1979
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Vol. Fi.i.r (000)
III (000)
lit In. Kt.iue (X)
lit fUlKll (5 Million.)
ME Avr.gr llrflcU (J)
lit (000)
»E Imidriic* (X)
J»E Deficit ($ Million.)
]»£ Avrr-fct D. flclt (J)
IH (000)
IFI Incldrnce (X)
111 Deficit (S Million.)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Employment 1FE (OOO)
Full Fn.plo>»,. nt UF. Deficit ($ Million.)
Adequate » raj.l nym, nt IKE Deficit
(5 Million*)
Chanty Fiuj.loym.nl 1FT (000)
($ Million*)
Enhanced Faming* IFF (000)
Eiiliamed Earning* IKE Deficit ($ Million*)
Enhanced Capacity 1 FE (000)
(5 Million*)
HE in 1FE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfer* (X)
IFI Net of Transfer* (000)
IFI Net-of-Tran*fer. Deficit
(} Million.)
IFI Including Food Stamp. (000)
IFI Including Food Stamp* Deficit
($ Million*)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)
















































































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE
Vuik Foi.e (000)
111 (000)
HE In. Idruie (1)
lit. llrflcil (5 Million.)
HE Average Deficit (J)
III (000)
in Incidence (1)
l»t Dtfti.it (J fill lion.)
IF! Average Deficit (J)
If! (000)
IF! Incidence (I)
in Deficit ($ Million.)
JFl Avrt.gr Deficit ($)
Full Fjnploymtnt 1FE (000)
Full Fmr.loyu>ent IKE Oiflcit (J Million.)
Adequate Employment 1>E (000)
Adequate Fi»j.l oj,,., ot HE Deficit
(5 Million.)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Enplc^uent HE Deficit
(S Million.)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
EoLanced Earnings 111 Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (OOO) 
Enhanced Cap.nly IKE Deficit
(J M.llion.)
HE in IFE (000)
Transfer. (1)
IF! Net pf Tran.fer. (OOO)
1F1 Hel-of-Transfer. Deficit
($ Million*)
IFI Including Food Stamps (OOO)
IFI Including Food Stamp. Deficit
($ Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)















































































































































































































































































































































INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
U. it Four (000)
in (ooo)
ME In. Id. me (1)
Ml (l.ln it (1 Million.)
Ml Average Drf lilt (})
IrC (000)
IKF Laid, me (I)
HE Deficit (} Million.)
HE Avrregr Drfiril ($)
IFI (000)
IFI Imidence (1)
HI Deficit (5 Million.)
Full Eauloyaenl IFL (OOO)
lull E.j.loysirnl HE Deficit ($ Million.)
Adr <jo.tr Ernploymrnl IKE (000)
A.li-.jixle loi|. loyo.ro t HE Deficit
(5 Million.)
C^j,.< ny Lnnloynrnl HE Deficit 
($ Million.)
Fnhanted Earning. IKE (000)
($ Million.)
ME in 1FE (000)
Eaiuings Supplementation Rale-Net of
Tr.n.fer. (J)
in Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Net-of-Transfer« Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000)
($ Million.)
IFI loiludiujt la-Kiod Aid (000) 











































































































































































































































































































































Table B-9. HARDSHIP AND INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS DEFICITS IN 1979
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
Wi.rk Four (QUO)
lit (000)
III. Ii.rl4ri.cr (t) 
IIP fVfic II (} Million.)
HE Avn.gr Drllrlt (S)
HE (000)
HI li,< i.l. n<r (I)
1H IVf/. 11 (5 Mill loin)
HE Avriagc Deficit (?)
til (UOO)
IF1 IncKhnrc (X)
IH Deficit (J Million*)
IF1 Avrragr Drllrlt ($) 
Full Enrloyarnt JFE (000)
Full FmpluyuH-iil IFF Drficil (J Million.) 
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
($ Million.)
Capacity Employment IFE (000)
Cajucily ru,|,)oyiut nt IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
Euhamed Earning. IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Million.)
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
($ Million.)
HE ID IFE (000) 
Earning. Supplementation Rate-Total (X)
($ Million.)
JF1 Including Food Snap* (000)
1F1 Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Million.)
IF1 Including In-Kind Aid (000) 













































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE
Vott Fi.tir (000)
111 (000)
HE In. id.mr (X)
11E Deficit (5 MIIHoi.a)
III Av. i.»r I), flcll (() 
IFE (000)
in Incidence (1)
HE Deficit ($ Million.)
IFE Avrr.gr Drfl.it (J)
HI (000)
IFI Incidence (J)
IFI Deficit (5 Million.)
IF! Average Deficit ($)
Full Fmployncnt IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Mil HOD.)
Adr<|uate Employment IFE (000)
(} Million.)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Capacity Emnlo>au.nt IFE D.ficit
(} Million.)
Enhanced E.inings IFE (000)
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE io IFE (000)
E.inings Supplemental 100 Rate-Total (1)




IFI Including Food Stamp. (000)
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)













































































































































































































































































































INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
V,,ik lour (000)
lir (ono)
HE !». Idrnte (1)
lit. U. full (} Hilliuus)
HE Avri.gr Deficit ())
111 (000)
lit lncidn.ce (X)
1IT Deficit (J Million.)
HE Avrr.gr Drfirit ($)
111 (000)
111 Inrldrnce (I)
IFI Drficit ($ Millions)
IFI Avrr.gr Drflcit ($)
Full Eaiploynrnl IFE (000)
Full Frnployurol IFI Deficit ($ Million.)
Adi .juale Employment 1 Ft (OOO)
(S Millions)
C.pacity Employment IFE (000)
Capacity Employment IFE Drflcit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Eainiogs IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
(5 Millions)




IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including lu-Kiud Aid (000) 














































































































































































































































































































Table B-10. HARDSHIP AND OCCUPATION OF LONGEST JOB IN 1979
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
W..ik rur.e (000)
lit (000)
ME lurid, m r (I)
lit Deficit ($ Million.)
lir Average Deficit ($)
IKE (000)
1ft JucJd.nre (I)
HE Deficit (5 Million.)
IKE Average Deficit (J)
1F1 (000)
1H 1 nod, me (I)
IF) Deficit {$ Million.)
1F1 Avrr.gr Deficit ($)
Full Employment IKE (000)
Full Employment IKE Deficit ($ Million.)
Adrqu.tr Employment ItE (000)
AuVyu.tr taj}>luym<-nt IKE Drficit
($ Million.)
Capacity Employment 1FE (800) 
Capacity En.nluynirnt IFE Drficit
(S Million.)
Enhanced Earnings IKE (000) 
Enh.ncrd E.ruiog* IFE Drficit ($ MilUon.) 
Enhjncrd Cjj.-oly 1FL (OOO) 
Eiih.orrd Capacity IFL Deficit
(} Million.)
HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Tota.1 (1)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfer* (I)
1F1 Net of Transfers (OOO) 
1FI Net-of-Trinsfers Deficit
(5 Million.)
IF1 Including Food Si*opi (000) 
1F1 Including Food Stamp. Deficit
(5 Millions)
111 Including In-Kind Aid (000) 
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HE D-llilt (S Millluni)
HE Avrra (e Drli.lt (J)
11L (000)
J»E IiHidcuce (t)
IFE Deficit (5 Millions)
IFE Average Deficit (t)
1H (OCX))
IF] Incidence (%)
III Deficit ($ Millions)
IFl Aversge Deficit (J)
Full Employment IFE (000)
Full employment IFE Deficit (J Millions)
Adequate Employment UE (000)
Adequate Employment IKE Deficit
(5 Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000)
Capacity Employment 1H Deficit
(J Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000)
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions)
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
HE IB IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Net of
Transfers (1) 
IFI Net of Transfers (000)
IFI Nel-of-Transfers Deficit
(S Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000)
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000)

























































































































































































































































































































































































Table B-ll. HARDSHIP IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS IN 1979
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
v..it >..i.. (iioo)
lit (GOO)
lit I.,. 1.1. me (X)
11L Drfll it (J Mi 11 11,1.1)
IIP Avri.gi Di full (J)
in (000)
HL Incidence (1)
in Drlicit (J Million.)
DC Aveiagr Deficit {})
Ul (000)
IFI Iniidrnce (1)
IFI Deficit ($ Million.)
IFI Average Deficit (J)
Full Employment IFI (000) 
Full Fiuploymtnt 1>E Deficit ($ Million.)
Adequate Employment UE (000)
AJiijiule Fo.pJo>iueul IFt Deficit 
(5 Million.)
Capacity Em|'Ioyniii.t 1»£ (000) 
Capacity Fraploy.nent IFI Deficit 
(J Million.)
Enhanced Earning. IFZ (000) 
Enh.nced Earning. IFF Deficit ($ Million.) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000)
(J Million.)
HE 10 IFE (000) 
Earning. Supplementation Rate-Total (%) 
Eaiiungt Su|.ul,u,intation Rate-Net of 
Tran.fer. (I)
IFI Ket-of-Tunifer* Deficit 
(5 Million.)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Sl.apt Deficit 
($ Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 























































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE
V,,ik >one (000)
Hi (000)
HE lu. id. •.. t (t)
Itr D. lint (J M. 11 lor,.) 
1IF Avenge Deficit (J)
1>£ (000)
IFE Inr denre (J)
1FE Drf cit (5 Million.)
IFE Ave age Deficit (J)
IFI (OOO)
1FI Inc t, ncr (1)
IH Del ell (5 Million.)
IFI Avr age Dcfiot ($)
Full Euj.lo>ucal IFE (000)
Full Employment IFE Deficit ($ Million*)
Adequate Enploynent IKE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
Capacity Employment IFE (000)
Capacity Employment IFE Deficit
($ Million*)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earning* IFE Deficit ($ Million*)
Enhanced C.p.city IFE (000)
(J Million*)
ME in IFE (000)
Earning* Supplementation Rale-Total (%)
Earning* Supplementation Rate-Net of 
Trao.fer. (1)
IFI Net of Traoifer* (000)
IFI Net-of-Transfer* Deficit 
(5 Million.)
IFI Including Food St.oip. (000)
IFI Including Food Stamp. Deficit 
($ Million*)
IFI Including lu-Kind Aid (000)






















































































































































































































































































































INTERMEDIATE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
VIoiV r»nr (000)
Hi. (000)
I IE lnrid.-M«e (I)
HE Drlicit (S Million.)
HE Avenge Deficit ($)
IFI (000)
in Incidence (1)
IKE Deficit ($ Million.)
IFE Average Deficit (t)
1H (000)
HI li.cid.-iue (1)
IFI Deficit (S Million.)
1H Avrl.gr Deficit (})
Full Employment 1JE (OOO)
Full Fuployaeol IFE Drficit ($ Million*)
Art«.o,uatr rmj.loyn.fut 1H (000)
Adcu,u«te Employment IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
Cajiant Employment 1FE (000) 
Capacit Employment IFE Deficit
(5 Hi lion*)
Enhance E.roiogt IFE (000) 
Enhance Earning. IFE Drficit ($ Million.) 
Eoh.ace Capacity IFC (000) 
Enhance C.p.city IFE Deficit
(5 Million.)
HE 10 IFE (OOO)
E.roingc Supplementation Rate-Total (
Earning. Supplementation Rale-Net at
Transfer. (I) 
IFI Net of Transfer. (000) 
IFI Net-of-Transfer. Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamp. Deficit
(5 Million*)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (OOO) 




















































































































































































































































































































Table B-12. HARDSHIP IN 1979 DISAGGREGATED BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
SEVERE HARDSHIP: TOTAL WORK FORCE
W..ik For<r (000)
lit (000)
ll» 1m id. in r (I)
IIL UrfiiH (> Million.)
lit. Av.r.gr l)< licit (J)
IIE (000)
IFF It.rtd.ficr (I)
1>T Drfiril (5 Million*)
IIL Avrr.gr Drfirlt ($)
IF1 (000)
1F1 Incid.iue (J)
1F1 Deficit ($ Millions)
IH Average Deficit ($)
full Ei»ployo,mt IKE (000)
full E*ploy»eat 1FE Drlicit (} Million*)
Artrqu.tr Finpluynirnt IKL (000)
Adriju.tr EjijiloyuM.nl 1FE Deficit
(S Million.)
Capacity Lmployim m 1FE (000) 
Capacity Fvployurnl 1FE Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhaorrd F.rnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earning. IFE Deficit ($ Million.) 
FiJianrrd Capai ity IKE (OOO) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ H.I lion.)
HE 10 IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rale-Total (
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Met of
Transfers (X)








uding Food Stamps (000)
lion*) 
uding In-Kind Aid (OOO) 















































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: HALF-YEAR WORK FORCE
V'.ik four (CIUO)
lit. 000)
lit 1,1 Id. ni r (X)
III. rfj.il (J Million.)
lit vf/.gr Deficit (S)
ire ooo)
))L iirldrine (1)
1»E Deficit (5 MllHon*)
1>E Avn.gc Deficit ($)
IF! (000)
IF! Incidence (X)
JF1 Deficit ($ Million.)
1F1 Average Deficit ($)
Full Fmployau-nl IFE (000)
full Luployurnl 1FE Deficit ($ Million.) 
Ad<-o,u<le Fnployarnt HE (000) 
Adequate Eayluyneai 1F£ Deficit
(S Million.)
Capacity Ei»ployn< ut 1FZ (000) 
Capacity EvployBcat IF£ Deficit
($ H.llion.)
Enhanied Earning. JFE (000) 
Enhanced Earning. JfE Deficit (J Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (OOO) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
t«tioo fete-Total (X) 
tation Rate-Net of




Ifl Met of Transfer* (000) 
JF1 Nel-of-Tran»fer« Deficit
($ Million.)
IFI Including Food Sl<mpa (000) 
Ifl Including Food Stamp. Deficit
($ Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 


























































































































































































































































































































SEVERE HARDSHIP: FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE
Vi.i* }ui.r (000)
HE (DUO)
HE Incident e (X)
HE Deficit ($ Million*)
HE Average Deficit (J)
Ire, (000)
HE Incidence (f)
HC Deficit ($ Million*)
HE Aveiage Deficit (J)
HI ((XX))
HI Incidence («
IFI Deficit (} Million*)
IFI Average Deficit ($)
Full Fmployment IFE (000)
full Ea.ploya.ent in Deficit (J Million*)
Adequate Employment IFE (000)
Adequate Employment IFE Deficit
(J Millions)
Cap city Employment IFE (000)
Cap city Employment IFE Deficit
( Millions)
Enl. need Earning* IFE (000)
EiUi uied Earning* IFE Deficit ($ Mi 11 loos)
Eitb need Capacity IFE (000)
Enh need Capacity IFE Deficit





































































































































































































































HE in IFE (000)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Total (
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfer. (X) 
1FI Net of Transfer* (000) 
111 Net-of-Trancfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Slanpi (000) 
1FI Including Food Stamp* Deficit
($ Millions)
IF! Including In-PCiud Aid (000) 



















































































Table B-13. HARDSHIP IN 1979 IN A SAMPLE OF STATES






















































































Full Euploy»eul lit (000) 1,020 
Full Fn.yloy.unt IFt DeMut (J M.lllon.) 2.143 
Adequate En|>loyp.rut lit (000) 910 
AJ«-i|u.le Eo^loyaeut 1>E Deficit 1.924
($ Million.)
C«|»city Enployaeot 1FE (000) 1,098 
Cjp«city Enployrncnt IFl Deficit 2.450
(5 MillioD.)
Enhanced Earninc » IFE (OOO) 1,201 
Enhanced Earning. IFE Deficit ($ Million.) 2,777 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (OOO) goo 













































ME io IFE (000)
Earning* Supplementation Rate-Total (1)
Earning* Supplementation Rate-Met of
Trautler. (X)
IFl Net of Transfers (UOO) 







at Food Stamps (000) 
ng Food Staaps Deficit 
ns)
ding lu-Xiud Aid (000),






















































HE In. i drill r (I)
11E Urfl.ll ($ Ml))!
1IF Av. l.gr Drflrit
II £ (000)
IFE Jncidcoic (X)
IFE Deficit ($ Hilli
HE Avriagr D< flrit
1FI (000)
1FI Jncidrnce (1)






Full Employment IFE (000)
Full Fn,|.loy«enl IFE Deficit (J Million.)
AdnjuaVe fmploymrnl. I FT (OOO)
Adequate Employment IKt Deficit
($ Million.)
Capacity FraiOnyment IFt (OOO) 
Capacity Enpluynent ItX Deficit
($ Million.)
Enhanced Earning. ItT (000) 
Enhanced Earning. IFE Deficit (J Millioo*) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
($ Million.)
HE in IFE (000) 
Earnings Supplt mentation Rate-Total (X)
Transfer. (1)








jding Food Stamps (000)
Jding Food Stamp. Deficit
lion.)




















































































































































































































































































































































b.,r> For.e (UOO) 
HE (UOO) 
lit Iiuin.ure (X) 















Full F.o,ploy«ent IFE (000)
Full Eui.loy.Knt IKE Deficit ($ MUlion.)
Adiijuatc Employment IFI (000)
Adequate Employntul HE Deficit
($ Millions)
Capacity Employment IFE (000) 
Oi.jcity tuuloyurut IFE Deficit
($ Millions)
Enhanced Earnings IFE (000) 
Enhanced Earnings IFE Deficit ($ Millions) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE (000) 
Enhanced Capacity IFE Deficit
(5 Millions)
HE ID IFE (000)
Earnings Supplement at ion Rale-Total (X)
Earnings Supplementation Rate-Net of
Transfers (X)
IFI Net of Transfers (000) 
If I Net of Transfers Deficit
($ Millions)
IFI Including Food Stamps (000) 
IFI Including Food Stamps Deficit
($ Million.)
IFI Including In-Kind Aid (000) 
















































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C. SUMMARY HARDSHIP DATA FOR 1974 THROUGH 1980
Table C-l. Summary Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for Total, 
Half-Year and Full-Year Work Force Under Severe, Inter 
mediate and Moderate Hardship Standards
Table C-2. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total and Full-Year Work Force, Disaggregated by Work Ex 
perience Pattern
Table C-3. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Sex and Family Relation 
ship
Table C-4. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Family Size and Number of 
Earners
Table C-5. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Educational Attainment
Table C-6. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Age
Table C-7. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Race/Ethnic Origin
Table C-8. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Geographic Region
Table C-9. Summary Severe Hardship Measures, 1974 Through 1980, for 
Total Work Force, Disaggregated by Area of Residence
Table C-10. Severe Hardship Inadequate Family Earnings and Related 
Deficits After Augmentation of Subgroup Earnings, 1974 
Through 1980.
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Table C-l. SUMMARY HARDSHIP MEASURES 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL, HALF-YEAR 
AND FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE UNDER SEVERE, INTERMEDIATE AND MODERATE 
HARDSHIP STANDARDS



























































































































































































































































































































Total 34,029 46,093 47,467 49,284 46,631 50,830 51,998 70 668
Half-Year 30,085 41,402 42,319 43,924 41,379 45,404 46,403 63*835
Pull-Year 24,901 35,189 35,473 36,710 34,071 37,621 38,446 53^973
Intermediate Hardship
Total 55,725 73,466 76,082 79,818 77,995 85,417 87,442 115 773
Half-Year 49,603 66,408 68,291 71,661 69,758 76,897 78,659 105*350
Full-Year 40,813 56,274 57,051 59,683 57,226 63,610 65,053 89^036
Moderate Hardship
Total 85,243 109,140 113,944 120,201 120,847 133,218 136,402 175 988
Half-Year 76,543 99,338 103,076 108,802 109,073 120,996 123,804 161*321
Full-Year 63,106 84,315 86,339 90,755 89,845 100,509 102,809 136*884





















































































IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT 
Severe Hardship
Total 1,272 1,519 1,588 1,625 1,627 1,843 1,839 2,157
Half-Year 1,686 1,966 2,073 2,110 2,123 2,410 2,404 2,746
Full-Year 1,900 2,176 2,314 2,339 2,386 2,704 2,698 3,012
Intermediate Hardship
Total 1,524 1,834 1,905 1,969 1,955 2,138 2,135 2,584
Half-Year 1,954 2,295 2,405 2,476 2,472 2,695 2,691 3,181
Full-Year 2,160 2,507 2,643 2,723 2,722 2,954 2,951 3,431
Moderate Hardship
Total 1,856 2,242 2,300 2,417 2,396 2,655 2,652 3,146
Half-Year 2,304 2,735 2,816 2,955 2,924 3,249 3,247 3,748
Full-Year 2,494 2,938 3,026 3,195 3,142 3,493 3,492 3,962
IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT 
{1980 $) 
Severe Hardship
Total 2,126 2,326 2,299 2,210 2,055 2,092 2,087 2,157
Half-Year 2,817 3,010 3,002 2,870 2,681 2,735 2,729 2,746
Full-Year 3,175 3,331 3,351 3,181 3,014 3,069 3,062 3,012
Intermediate Hardship
Total 2,547 2,808 2,758 2,678 2,469 2,426 2,423 2,584
Half-Year 3,265 3,514 3,482 3,367 3,122 3,059 3,054 3,181
Full-Ypar 3,609 3,838 3,827 3,703 3,438 3,353 3,349 3,431
Moderate Hardship
Total 3,101 3,433 3,330 3,287 3,026 3,013 3,010 3,146
HnlC-Year 3,850 4,187 4,078 4,019 3,693 3,688 3,685 3,748
Full-Year 4,167 4,498 4,382 4,345 3,968 3,965 3,963 3,962
Table C-l. ^Continued)
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IIE DEFICIT AS PERCENT 
TOTAL WAGES AND SALARIES
Severe Hardship
•total 4.3 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.1 4.0
Half-Year 3.8 4.9 4.6 4.4 3.6 3.6
Full-Year 3.1 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.0 3.0
Intermediate Hardship
•total 7.1 8.8 8.3 7.9 6.8 6.7
Half-Year 6-3 8.0 7.5 7.1 6.1 6.0
Full-Year 5.2 6.7 6.2 5.9 5.0 5.0
Moderate Hardship
•total 10.9 13.1 12.5 12.0 10.5 10.4
Half-Year 9-5 11.9 11.3 10.8 9.5 9.4










































































































Total 11.6 13.2 12.5 12.3 11.6 11.3
Half-Year 8.4 10.1 9.5 9.1 8.4 8.1
Full-Year 7.1 8.9 8.2 7.9 6.9 6.7
Intermediate Hardship
Total 14.9 16.8 16.1 15.7 14.9 14.6
Half-Year 11.5 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.5 11.2
Full-Year 10.0 12.1 11.3 10.8 9.6 9.6
Moderate Hardship
Total 18.5 20.9 20.1 19.5 18.5 18.3
Half-Year 15.0 17.6 16.8 15.9 14.9 14.8





















Total 19,700 24,925 25,455 26,902 27,770 30,801 31,656 41,000
Half-Year 11,591 16,060 15,978 16,184 16,121 17,491 17,891 25,749
Full-Year 8,468 12,491 12,203 12,254 11,486 13,038 13,306 19,981
Tntermediate Hardship
Total 30,111 37,853 38,667 40,853 42,430 47,223 48,556 62,416
Half-Year 19,167 25,967 25,938 26,406 26,763 29,338 30,053 42,049
Full-Year 14,263 20,465 20,060 20,272 19,422 22,171 22,665 33,027
Moderate Hardship
Tot/il 43,128 53,980 55,248 58,255 60,709 67,737 69,668 89,142
Ilalf-Y.jr 29,224 38,953 39,115 39,897 40,823 45,058 46,195 63,474
Full-Y'vir 22,209 31,179 30,749 31,104 30,258 34,642 35,456 50,616
Table C-l. (Continued)
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IFE DgTXHT (1980 S) 
Severe Hardship
Total 32,919 38,160 36,858 36,586 35,073 34,959 35,929
Half-Year 19,369 24,588 23,136 22,010 20,361 19,852 20,306
Pun-Year 14,150 19,124 17,669 16,666 14,507 14,798 15,102
Intermediate Hardship
Total 50,315 57,953 55,990 55,559 53,589 53,598 55,111
Half-Year 32,028 39,755 37,558 35,912 33,802 33,299 34,652
Pull-Year 23,833 31,332 29,046 27,569 24,530 25,164 25,725
Moderate Hardship
Total 72,067 86,643 80,000 79,227 76,675 76,881 79,073
Half-Year 48,833 59,637 56,639 54,260 51,559 51,141 52,431































































































IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $) 
Severe Hardship
Total 2,742 2,771 2,750 2,712 2,694 2,707 2,706 2,713
Half-Year 2,682 2,767 2,708 2,630 2,560 2,539 2,533 2,638
Pull-Year 2,742 2,846 2,824 2,715 2,636 2,668 2,662 2,751
Intermediate Hardship
Total 3,262 3,308 3,244 3,219 3,211 3,210 3,210 3,207
Half-Year 3,227 3,345 3,241 3,170 3,117 3,074 3,066 3,158
Full-Year 3,290 3,425 3,369 3,265 3,193 3,190 3,180 3,252
Moderate Hardship
Total 3,766 3,782 3,710 3,707 3,572 3,671 3,668 3,675
Half-Year 3,793 3,860 3,757 3,710 3,660 3,573 3,567 3,658
Pull-Year 3,873 3,952 3,899 3,834 3,735 3,673 3,665 3,763
IFE; DEFICIT AS PERCENT 







































































Total 6,346 7,252 7,033 6,998 7,012 6,853 7,055 8,465
Half-year 3,790 4,576 4,443 4,305 4,198 4,172 4,278 5,504
PUll-Year 2,776 3,485 3,313 3,233 3,009 3,026 3,098 4,213
Intermediate Hardship
Total 9,558 10,756 10,395 10,532 10,253 10,214 10,524 12,273
Half-Year 6,046 7,172 6,873 6,879 6,585 6,624 6,804 8,369
Full-Year 4,520 5,570 5,147 5,254 4,785 4,947 5,075 6,480
Moderate Hardship
Ttotal 13,219 14,955 14,587 14,500 14,022 13,934 14,354 16,706
Half-Year 8,829 10,476 10,093 9,891 9,441 9,512 9,776 11,910
Full-Year 6,687 8,284 7,698 7,601 6,987 7,193 7,383 9,367
IFI INCIDENCE
Severe Hardship
Total 6.1 6.9 6-6 6 - 4 6 - 2 6.0 6.0 7.2
HaLf-Year 4.4 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.3 5.4
Full-Year 3.8 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.8
Intermediate Hardship
•total 9.2 10.3 9.7 9.6 9.1 8.9 9.0 10.4
Half-Year 7.0 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.0 6.8 6.9 8.3
Full-Year 6.2 7.3 6.7 6.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.4
Moderate Hardship
Total 12.8 14.3 13.6 13.2 12.5 12.2 12.3 14.1
Haif-Yr;ar 10.3 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.0 9.8 9.9 11.8














IFI DEFICIT (1980 ?) 
Severe Hardship
Total 12,889 14,603 13,862 14,085 13,927 14,186 14,556 17,452
Half-Year 8 ' 4 10 10,103 9,328 9,207 8,610 8,961 9,153 11,778
Full-Year 6« 462 8 - 012 7 ' 347 7 ' 219 6 ' 396 7 ' 025 7 ' 160 9 - 499
Intermediate Hardship
-total 23,429 26,511 25,224 25,453 25,127 25,409 26,122 30,812
Half-Year 16,102 19,176 17,870 17,490 16,655 17,055 17,469 21,965
Full-Year 12,497 15,359 14,181 13,846 12,530 13,405 13,708 17,796
Moderate Hardship
-rvj^i 38,339 43,378 41,346 41,484 40,643 40,996 42,192 49,244
Half-Year 27,653 32,736 30,619 29,894 28,528 29,007 29,767 36,752






















































































































































































































































IFI DEFICTr AS PERCENT 












































































FUU, EMPMYMEOT IFE 
Severe Hardship
Total 9,034 9,399 9,246 9,598
Half-Year 4,942 5,407 5,233 5,315
Full-Year 3,378 3,824 3,597 3,715
Intennediate Hardship
Total 11,471 11,823 11,778 12,097
Half-Year 6,878 7,342 7,239 7,223
Full-Year 4,847 5,424 5,197 5,199
Moderate Hardship
Total 14,115 15,571 14,527 14,797
Hall-Year 8,998 9,666 9,495 9,392







































FULL EMPLOYMENT IFB 
AS PEROyr IFE
Severe Hardship
•total 75.2 68.3 69.0 71.1 74.4 75.9 75.9 69.9
Half-Year 68.4 60.8 61.2 63.5 67.3 67.8 67.8 63.0
Full-Year 65.4 56.9 57.5 60.5 63.9 64.6 64.6 59.7
Intermediate Hardship
Total 74.4 67.5 68.2 79.1 72.9 74.8 74.5 68.8
Half-Year 69.3 61.8 62.4 63.8 67.2 68.7 68.7 87.6
Full-Year 66.9 59.3 60.3 61.6 65.0 66.7 66.7 61.9
Moderate Hardship
Total 73.8 66.7 67.4 69.2 71.1 72.8 72.7 68.5
Half-Year 69.9 62.6 63.0 64.2 66.9 68.0 68.0 64.9
Full-Year 69.2 60.6 62.1 63.2 65.5 66.6 66.6 64.0
ADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT IFE 
Severe Hardship
Total 7,349 7,872 7,781 7,899 8,082 8,252 8,513 8,742
Half-Year 3,389 3,923 3,814 3,721 3,828 3,844 3,959 4,369
Full-Year 2,079 2,555 2,371 2,303 2,238 2,346 2,408 2,817
Intermediate Hardship
Total 8,673 9,205 9,218 9,297 9,536 9,693 10,006 10,347
Half-Year 4,432 4,952 4,869 4,736 4,878 4,961 5,110 5,620
Full-Year 2,817 3,371 3,174 3,047 3,025 3,154 3,235 3,845
Moderate Hardship
Total 9,924 10,413 10,479 10,514 10,697 10,925 11,275 11,552
Half-Year 5,410 5,951 5,836 5,673 5,781 5,902 6,079 6,600
Full-Year 3,636 4,212 3,999 3,815 3,726 3,915 4,018 4,703
ADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT IFE 
AS PEBCO/r IFE
Severe Hardship
Total 61.2 57.2 58.1 58.5 62.1 63.9 64.1 57.9
Half-Year 46.9 44.1 44.6 44.5 48.1 49.2 49.4 44.8
Full-Year 40.3 38.0 37.9 37.5 40.7 42.3 42.4 38.8
Intermediate Hardship
Total 56.2 52.6 53.4 53.9 57.1 58.1 58.2 53.2
Half-Year 44.7 41.7 42.0 41.8 45.0 45.8 45.9 42.2
Full-Year 38.9 36.8 36.8 36.1 39.4 40.0 40.0 37.9
Moderate Hardship
Total 51.9 47.7 48.6 49.2 51.6 52.2 52.3 47.6
Half-Year 42.0 38.5 38.7 38.8 41.0 41.2 41.4 38.0
Full-Year 37.9 34.9 35.0 34.6 36.4 36.6 36.6 35.0
CAPACITY EMPDOYMP/T IFE 
Severe Hardship
Total 9,864 10,549 10,384 10,796 10,740 10,796 11,093 11,658
Half-Year 5,482 6,198 6,069 6,198 6,133 6,051 6,193 6,905
Full-Year 3,826 4,424 4,268 4,381 4,106 4,190 4,278 4,928
Intermediate Hardship
Total 12,923 13,624 13,665 14,032 13,923 14,207 14,610 15,489
Half-Year 7,882 8,667 8,599 8,738 8,607 8,803 9,022 10,009
Full-Year 5,635 6,430 6,227 6,323 5,953 6,259 6,397 7,478
Moderate Hardship
Total 16,213 17,191 17,397 17,643 17,446 17,971 18,480 19,825
Half-Year 10,514 11,571 11,654 11,544 11,488 11,930 12,232 13,650
Pull-Year 7,780 8,822 8,693 8,559 8.2RO 8,809 9,014 10,447
Table C-l. (Continued)
377
CAPACITY EMPIOYMENT IFE 
AS PERCENT IFE
Severe Hardship
Total 82.1 76.6 77.5 80.0 82.5 83.6
Half-Year 75.9 69.7 71.0 74.1 77.1 77.3
Full-Year 74.1 65.8 68.2 71.3 74.6 75.5
Intermediate Hardship
Total 83.8 77.8 79.2 81.3 83.4 85.1
Half-Year 79.4 72.9 74.2 77.1 79.4 81.3
Full-Year 77.8 70.3 72.2 74.9 77.5 79.4
Moderate Hardship
Total 84.7 78.7 80.7 82.6 84.2 85.8
Half-Year 81.7 74.9 77.3 78.9 81.6 83.4








































































































ENHANCED EARNINGS IFE 
AS PERCENT IFE
Severe Hardship
Total 90.8 90.3 90.7 89.3 89.9 90.4
Half-Year 88.2 88.1 88.6 86-4 87.2 87.4
Full-Year 87.2 87.3 87.9 86.1 86.1 87.0
Intermediate Hardship
Total 90.0 90.0 90.6 89.5 89.5 89.8
Half-Year 87.4 88.3 88.8 87.3 87.0 87.5
Full-Year 86.5 87.8 88.5 86.7 86.0 86.8
Moderate Hardship
Total 89.1 88.5 89.4 89.0 89.2 88.5
Half-Year 87.2 86.5 87.6 87.0 87.1 86.2



















ENHANCED CAPACITY IFE 
Severe Hardship
Total 6,468 6,839 6,802 6,895 7,028 7,157
Half-Year 2,754 3,188 3,090 2,970 3,027 3,030
Full-Year 1,670 2,029 1,886 1,834 1,719 1,836
Intermediate Hardship
Total 7,545 8,039 7,957 8,010 8,185 8,354
Half-Year 3,540 4,062 3,926 3,755 3,fl34 3,931
Full-Year 2,246 2,720 2,547 2,420 2,324 2,482
Moderate Hardship
Total 8,467 8,945 8,930 8,991 9,165 9,308
Half-Year 4,287 4,774 4,682 4,533 4,624 4.6R6





























































IN IFE BUT NOT IIE












































































































































































































































































RATE - TOTAL 
Severe Hardship
•total 47.1 47.3 47.5 48.1 46.1 46.9 46.9 44.0Half-Year 47.5 48.5 48.0 48.5 47.2 46.6 46.6 43.6Full-Year 46.2 48.1 47.1 47.3 45.3 45.4 45.4 42.0
Intermediate Hardship
Total 38.0 38.6 39.8 39.0 38.6 38.8 38.8 36.9Half-Year 39.1 39.7 40.7 39.3 39.3 38.9 38.9 37 1Full-Year 37.6 39.1 40.3 37.8 37.7 37.3 37.2 36.2
Moderate Hardship
Total 30.9 31.6 32.3 32.2 32.4 33.5 33.4 31 1Half-Year 31.4 32.2 33.0 32.4 33.0 33.5 33.5 31.4Full-Year 30.2 31.4 32.6 31.1 31.7 32.8 32.8 30.4
EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION 
RATE - TRANSFERS 
Severe Hardship
Total 28.8 31.1 30.0 29.9 26.1 25.7 25.6 24 5Half-Year 29.4 32.3 31.8 30.3 27.2 26.2 26.1 24 4Full-Year 29.8 33.2 31.6 30.5 27.1 26.9 26.8 24.7
Intermediate Hardship
Total 23.5 25.0 25.5 23.3 22.5 21.2 21.1 20 7Half-Year 24.9 26.2 27.0 23.7 23.4 21.7 21.6 21 IFull-Year 24.6 26.4 27.2 23.4 23.2 21.8 21.5 21.7
Moderate Hardship
Total 18.5 20.4 20.6 19.0 18.7 18.0 17.9 17 4Half-Year 19.2 21.1 21.8 19.2 19.6 18.1 18.0 17 0Full-Year 18.6 21.1 22.2 18.8 19.1 18.2 18.1 18.0
380
Table C-2. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL AND 
FULL-YEAR WORK FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN
WORK FORCE
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IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $) 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































WORK EXPERIENCE PATTERN 1974 1975 
Total
Not Ettployed 45.6 47.4
Discouraged 54.1 52.3
Unenployed 40.1 42.6
Intermittently Bnployed 18.8 21.7
Mostly Unenployed 44.1 42.5
Mixed 25.4 28.2
Mostly Employed 12.6 13.2
Part-Time Biployed 20.5 20.2
Involuntary 22.3 20.0
Voluntary 20.1 20.2











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT 

































































































































































































IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IFI DEFICIT (1980 $)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PERCENT IIE IN IFE














































































































































































































































EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE-TOTAL 












































































































































































































EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE - TRANSFERS









































































































































































































Table C-3. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL WORK 
FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY SEX AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
WORK FORCE
Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 












































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 













































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 












































































































Wife In Work Force











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 












































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 













































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 











































































































Male Family Head 8,214
Wife In Work Force 4,885
Wife Not In Work Force 2,979
Wife Not Present 351
Male Unrelated Individual 2,320
Other Male 6,239
Total Male 16,773
Female Family Head 1,931
Wife 9,522

























































































1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979R 1980
HE DHFICTT (1980 $)
Male Family lk.-ad 
Wjfo In Work Force 












Wife In Work Force












Wife In Work Force










IIE AVERAGE DnFICIT (1980 S)
Male Family lload
Wife In Work Force












Wife In Work Force

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Male Family Head 7.9 9.6
Wife In Work Force 4.7 6.0
Wife Not In Work Force 12.1 14.5
Wife Not Present 12.8 13.0
Male Unrelated Individual 21.2 22.2
Other Male 11.7 13.3
Total Male 10.1 11.7
Female Family Head 38.7 37.7
Wife 6.9 8.1
Female Unrelated Individual 26.9 30.0
Other Female 11.9 13.3









































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 












































































































Wife In Work Poroe










































































































IFE DEFICIT (1980 $_)
Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroa 













































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 










































































































IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Foroe 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 













































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 











































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Wbrk Force 












































































































Wife In Work Force 







































































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 













































































































Male Family Head 
Wife In Work Force 












Wife In Work Force 










































































































































































































IPI AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980$)
Male Family Head
Wife in Fork Force 












































































































Wife In Work Force 




























































































































































EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE 
TOTAL
Hale Family Head
Wife In Work Force 










































































































EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE 
~~TRANSFERS
Male Family Head
Wife In Work Force 











































































































Table C-4. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL WORK 
FORCE DISAGGREGATED BY FAMILY SIZE AND NUMBER OF EARNERS
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979R 1980
MDBK FORCE
One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
TVo In Family 
three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TWO Family Members in Work Foroa 
Tvo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More Family
SHARE WORK FORCE
One Family Morber In Work Foroa 
One In Family 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Fanuly
TVo Fanuly Members In Work Foroa 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
OHEMPL3YED
One Family Mentoer In Work Foroa 
One In Fanuly 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TVo Fanuly Members in Work Force 
TVo In Family 
Three In Fanuly 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More in Family
UNEHPLOVMEOT RATE
One Family Mgrber In Work Force 
One In Family 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Fanuly
TVo Family Mentiers In Work Force 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Fanuly 
Six Or More In Fanuly
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Fanuly 
Four Or Flvn In Family 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
PREEOMPOWTLY UNEMPLOYED
One Family Member In **>rk Foroe 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Foroa 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or Mores In Work Foroa 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


















































































































































































































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Mcjrbers In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 




























































































































One Family Matter In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TWo Family Members in Work Force 
Two In Family 
three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More in Family
IIE INCIDENCE
One Family Member In Work Florae 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TVo Family Members In Work Force 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
SHARE IIE
One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TVo Family Members in Mark Force 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More in Family
IIE EEFICTT
One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TWo Family Members In Work-Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Forca 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIE DEFICIT (1980 $)
One Family Member In Work Foroe 
One m Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Vtork Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
SHARfi JIB Utl'ICIT




Four Or Five In Family
Six Or More In Family
TVo Fandly Members In Vtork Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Fandly 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Vtork Foroe 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


















































































































































































































































One Family Matter In Vtork Force 1,473 1,746 1,810 1,808 1,805 2,077 2,069 2,417
One In Family 1.486 1,811 1,827 1,789 1,797 2,084 2,076 2,471
Two In Family 1,424 1,667 1,785 1,800 1,799 2,011 2,019 2,298
Three In Family 1/402 1,629 1,771 1,879 1,858 2,096 2,072 2,289
Four Or Five In Family 1,573 1,728 1,789 1,842 1,763 2,135 2,110 2,595
Six Or More In Family L"9 I'*"- I'*88 i' 784 l ' 930 2 ' 233 2 ' 2 18 2,326
TVO Family Members in Vtork Force I' 288 1,539 1,641 1,667 1,684 1,879 1,878 2,202
Tto to Family I' 487 1 ' 702 1 ' 830 l ' 927 1 ' 919 2 ' 084 2 ' 085 2 ' 4H
Three In Family i' 282 i' 504 1 ' 617 l ' 547 1 ' 689 1 ' 804 i' 805 2 '°94
Four Or Five In Family I'l47 1' 43<> 1,504 1,512 1,476 1,765 1,755 2,092
Six Or More In Family LOSS 1,413 1,449 1,555 1,521 1,723 1,745 2,112
Three Or More In Vtork Force 1,111 1» 334 1,370 1,448 1,422 1,627 1,623 1,899
Threeln Family 1,302 1,556 1,582 1,746 1,681 1,762 1,762 2,083
Four Or Five In Family 1,057 1,317 1,351 1,340 1,375 1,565 1,564 1,819
Six Or More In Family 1,095 1,251 1,301 1,456 1,355 1,651 1,638 1,927
IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
One Family Mentor In Vtork Force 2,461 2,673 2,621 2,460 2,280 2,357 2,348 2,417
One In Family 2,483 2,773 2,645 2,433 2,270 2,365 2,356 2,471
Two In Fandly 2,380 2,552 2,585 2,448 2,272 2,685 2,292 2,298
Three In Family 2,343 2,494 2,564 2,555 2,347 2,379 2,352 2,289
Four Or Five In Family 2,628 2,646 2,590 2,505 2,227 2,423 2,395 2,595
Six Or More In Family 2,722 2,895 2,879 2,426 2,438 2,534 2,517 2,326
Two Family Mentors In Vtork Foroe 2,152 2,356 2,376 2,267 2,127 2,133 2,132 2,202
Two In Family 2,485 2,606 2,650 2,621 2,424 2,365 2,366 2,411
Three In Family 2,142 2,303 2,341 2,104 2,133 2,048 2,049 2,094
Four Or Five In Family 1,917 2,189 2,178 2,056 1,864 2,003 1,985 2,092
Six Or More In Family 1,813 2,163 2,098 2,115 1,921 1,955 1,981 2,112
Three Or More In Vtork Force 1,856 2,042 1,984 1,969 1,796 1,847 1,842 1,899
Three In F.imily 2,176 2,382 2,291 2,374 2,131 2,000 2,000 2,083
Four Or Five In Family 1,766 2,016 1,956 1,822 1,717 1,776 1,775 1,819




One Famly Mejrber In Wbrk Force 
One in Family 
TVio In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Matters in Work Force 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Tvro In Family 
three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Foroe 
TV> In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Wbrk Forors 
Thrpe In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































One Family Mejrber In Wbrk Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Menfcera in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Wbrk Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
IFE
One Family Member In Wbrk Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Fcmuly
Two Family Mcanbera In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 



















































































































































































































































IFE DEFICIT (1980 $)
One Family Msnfaer In Vtork Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Matters in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
IFE DEFICIT SHARE
One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TVo Family Members In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five in Fcimily 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Foroa 
Throe In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
IFE AVERftGE DEFICIT
One Family Maifcer In Vtork Force 
One in Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TVO Family tenters in Work Force 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Family


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One Family Matter In Work FOroe 
Cne In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Menfcers in Work Force 
Tvo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































One Family Metrber In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWO In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Fnmily 

























































































































One Family Marber In Work Fbroa 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Matters in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
IFI DEFICIT
One Family Meirber In Work Force 
One In Family 
TVo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Merfcera In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five in Family 



















































































































































































































































m DEFICIT (1980 $)
One Family Marber In Wbrk Force 
One In Family 
TWO In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TWo Family Members in Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Foroa 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TJI DEFICIT SHARE
One Family Menter In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


















































































































































































































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
TWo Family Members in Work Force 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 

























































































































TJI AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
TWo In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Foroa 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 




























































































































One Family Meatier In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
1)1X66 In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members in Nbrk Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































One Family Member In Work Force 48.3 48.3
One In Family 40.0 39.5
Two In Family 70.6 70.3
Three In Family 51.6 51.7
Four Or Five In Family 32.3 37.7
Six Or More In Family 21.4 25.4
Two Family Morbers In Work Force 46.5 48.7
Two In Family 64.2 61.9
Three In Family 54.4 57.3
Four Or Five In Family 40.0 42.7
Six Or More In Family 26.5 33.5
Throe Or More In Work Force 42.6 39.1
Throe In F.imily 74.0 56.0
Four Or Five In Family 48.3 43.8





























































































One Family Member In Work Force 
One In Family 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Two Family Members In Work Force 
Two In Family 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 
Six Or More In Family
Three Or More In Work Force 
Three In Family 
Four Or Five In Family 


























































































































Table C-5 SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL WORK 
FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979R 1980
TOTAL WORK POKE
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1*3 Years 
Oollege Graduate
SHARE TOTAL WORK FORCE
High School Student 
Post-Seoondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Seoondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
UNEMPLOYED
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































































































































High School Student 
Post-Seoondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
SHARE UNEMPLOYED
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
PREDOMINANTLY UNEMPLOYED
High School Student 
Post-Seoondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 





















































































































































High School Student 15.9 18.3 18.9 17.4 13.8 13.0 13.2 17.6
Post-Secondary Student 8.6 13.3 11.3 10.0 8.2 7.6 7.6 10.2
High School Dropout 10.2 14.6 13.1 11.9 10.6 10.2 10.3 13.9
High School Graduate Only 6.8 10.1 8.8 7.8 6.6 6.0 6.1 8.7
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 5.2 7.5 7.3 5.4 4.7 4.0 4.1 5.6
College Graduate 3.0 4.3 4.8 3.9 2.7 2.3 2.5 3.2
SHARE PREPCMPttOTLY UNEMPLOYED
High School Student 10-5 7.9 9.3 9.8 8.6 8.8 8.9 8.3
Post-Secondary Student 4.9 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6
High School Dropout 35.8 34.6 32.9 33.0 33.4 33.7 33.7 32.0
High School Graduate Only 33.9 36.0 34.2 35.3 36.4 36.2 36.2 38.6
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 9.2 10.0 11.0 9.6 10.7 10.0 10.1 10.2
College Graduate 5.7 6.2 7.7 7.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.3
IIE
High School Student 3,521 3,592 3,717 3,774 3,328 '3,236 3,325 3,634
Post-Secondary Student 1»842 2,217 2,113 2,067 1,829 1,938 1,984 2,321
High School Dropout 9,269 10,011 9,508 9,424 8,840 8,324 8,537 9,368
High School Graduate Only 8,471 9,914 9,712 10,203 9,711 9,328 9,543 11,785
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 2,301 2,884 3,038 3,024 3,097 2,937 3,021 3,503
College Graduate 1»351 1,726 1,805 1,833 1,855 1,813 1,858 2,135
HE INCIDENCE
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IIE DISTRIBUTION
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IIE DEFICIT
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 




















































































































































HE DEFICIT (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
HE DEFICIT DISTRIBUTION
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 


















































































































































IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFE
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFE INCIDENCE
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 









































































































































High School Student 
Post-Seoondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Seoondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFE DEFICIT
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFE DEFICIT (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































































































































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years
ffE AVERflGE DEFICIT
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 





















































































































































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFI DEFICrr (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFI DEFICTT DISTRIBtfl'ION
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 





















































































































































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IFI AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 
Post-Secondary 1-3 Years 
College Graduate
IIE IN IFE
High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 











































































































































































































High School Student 
Post-Secondary Student 
High School Dropout 
High School Graduate Only 



















































Table C-6. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL 
WORK FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY AQE






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C-7. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL 
WORK FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY RACE/ETHNIC ORIGIN




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C-8. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL WORK 





EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CEt/TRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATT/wriC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 
MOUNTAIN 
PACIFIC






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
VEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAOT SOUTH CENTRAL 






























































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 





























































































































































































































IIE DEFICIT (1980 $}
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
VEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLAOTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 



























































































































































































































IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLAOTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLAOTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 
































































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
VEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
NEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 
WEST SOOTH CENTRAL 
MOUNTAIN 
PACIFIC
IFE DEFICIT (1980 $)
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 
WEST SOOTH CENTRAL 
MOUNTAIN 
PACIFIC
IFE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 
MOUNTAIN 
PACIFIC
IFI DEFICIT (1980 $)
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOOTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOOTH CENTRAL 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
VEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 
VEST SOUTH CENTRAL 
MOUNTAIN 
PACIFIC
IF! AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
NEW ENGLAND 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC 
EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
VEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 






EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 































































































































































































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 















































































EAST NORTH CENTRAL 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 
SOUTH ATLANTIC 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 












































































Table C-9. SUMMARY SEVERE HARDSHIP MEASURES, 1974 THROUGH 1980, FOR TOTAL WORK 
FORCE, DISAGGREGATED BY AREA OF RESIDENCE
MDRK FORCE 
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL Cm 
BALANCE






































































SMSA I MILLION > 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALMCE






































































SMSA I MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CTTY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA I MILLION f 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE








































































































































INSIDE SMSA 7.6 10.6 9.8 8.4 7.0 6.3 6.3 3 5
SMSA 1 MILLION * 7.9 10.7 9.8 8.5 7.0 6.3 64 83
CENTRAL CITY 9.7 12.9 11.8 10.7 9.2 8.4 85 107
BALANCE 6.7 9.4 8.7 7.3 5.6 5.2 S.*2 7*0
SMSA LESS THAN 1 MILLION 7.2 10.4 9.7 8.3 7.0 6.2 6.2 8~7
CENTRAL CITY 7.8 11.3 10.4 9.3 7.4 7.1 7.1 9*7
BALANCE 6.6 9.6 9.2 7.5 6.6 5.3 5.4 7*8
OUTSIDE SMSA 7.3 10.2 9.1 8.1 6.8 6.5 6.6 9.*3
SHARE OF PREDOMINANTLY 
UNEMPLOYED
INSIDE SMSA 
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CTTY
BALANCE






SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CTTY 
BALANCE





SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































































































































































































































HE DEFICIT (1980 $)
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION 4- 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL Cm 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE




































































IIE AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 $)
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION * 
CENTRAL CTTY 
BALANCE








































































SMSA 1 MILLION +
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION +
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE




































































IFE DEFICIT (1980 $)
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE




































































IFE AVEPACZ DEFICIT (1980 $?
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE







































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CXTf 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION +
CENTRAL COT
BALANCE 




































































IFI DEFICIT (1980 $)
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL Cm 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE








































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL cm
BALANCE




































































IFI AVERAGE DEFICIT (1980 S)
INSIDE SMSA 
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CTTY
BALANCE 






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE






































































SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE


































































EARNINGS SUPPLEMENTATION RATE -
INSIDE SMSA
SMSA 1 MILLION + 
CENTRAL CITY 
BALANCE


































































Table C-10. SEVERE HARDSHIP INADEQUATE FAMILY EARNINGS AND RELATED DEFICITS 
AFTER AUGMENTATION OF SUBGROUP EARNINGS, 1974 THROUGH 1980






























































































































































































































PERCEOT EDUCTION IN IFE WITH 














PEHCkHT REDUCTION TO IFE DEFICIT 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MARGINALLY AUOCTTZ. CAP/CITY 
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WITH CAPACITY EMPLOYMENT V PGINAL
AUGMENTATION
16-19
20-24
25-44
45-64
65+
MALE HOUSEHOLDER
MALE UNRELATET INDIVIDUAL
OTHER MALE
FEMALE HOUT .HOLDER
WIVES
FEHALE UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS
OTHER FEMALES
2.
4.
7.
4.
•
5.
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
1.
25
10
39
35
93
67
98
92
51
72
26
36
3.85
5-41
11.61
6.38
.97
10.21
2.74
4.76
4.04
2.79
2.09
1.66
3.24
5.28
11.52
5.67
.82
8.16
3.26
4.51
4.11
2.18
1.88
2.22
2.75
4.47
9.78
5.44
.58
6.24
2.32
3.70
4.12
1.49
1.55
1.85
2.
3.
8.
4.
•
5.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
1.
64
93
97
24
55
02
57
19
23
89
11
84
2.
3.
8.
3.
•
4.
2.
3.
3.
1.
1.
1.
46
52
87
39
57
50
22
00
94
60
34
86
2.42
3.52
9.05
3.31
.61
4.53
2.20
3.04
4.01
1.62
1.36
1.83
2.77
5.90
12.75
4.87
.81
7.13
3.55
4.13
5.39
2.47
2.62
2.10

0-88099-003-1
